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This thesis focuses on the significance and articulation of divinatory practices in 
Cubaa place where a number of different religious traditions (mainly of African 
and European origins) have come to coexist. Reflecting on the particularities of my 
ethnography, I concentrate on three such traditions: Ocha/Ifá, Palo Monte and 
Espiritismo. However, rather than engaging with them as different ‘traditions’ or 
assuming their syncretic character, I attempt to explore the way in which they 
constitute distinct but related perspectives on human destiny or, as my friends and 
informants put it, on people’s ‘path’ (camino)perspectives, that is, which 
continuously constitute and recalibrate each other.  
 Echoing the work of authors such as Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, I try to 
illustrate the nature of these perspectives by bringing to the fore the ways in which 
different divinatory practices instantiate and embody the efficacy or ‘point of view’ 
of different ‘other-than-human’ beingsbe they deities or the dead. Thus, while in 
the case of Ocha/Ifá and its oracles, I concentrate on the relation between ‘humans’ 
and the orichas (deities), my discussion of divinatory practices within Palo Monte 
and Espiritismo places the emphasis on the relation between ‘humans’ and various 
kinds of the dead (muertos). 
 Treating these relations as an exchange of perspectives between ‘humans’ 
and ‘other-than-human’ entities, I argue for the need to focus on ‘ontology’ and the 
indigenous understanding of these entities’ ‘nature’ in order to avoid both 
‘reductionist’ and ‘constructivist’ renderings of divination; in other words, to avoid 
the theoretical limits of ‘syncretic’ or ‘purist’ readings of the (Afro-)Cuban spirit 
world and its efficacy. This emphasis on ‘ontology’ leads me to construe divination 
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The square is now entirely covered with cards and with stories. My story is also contained in it, 
though I can no longer say which it is, since their simultaneous interweaving has been so close. In 
fact, the task of deciphering the stories one by one has made me neglect until now the most salient 
peculiarity of our way of narrating, which is that each story runs into another story, and as one guest is 
advancing his strip, another, from the other end, advances in the opposite direction, because the stories 
told from left to right or from bottom to top can also be read from right to left or from top to bottom, 
and vice versa, bearing in mind that the same cards, presented in a different order, often change their 
meaning, and the same tarot is used at the same time by narrators who set forth from the four cardinal 








Reflecting back on my academic ‘career’, such as it is, there seem to have been 
apparently frequent changes in my interests and pursuits. I started with an 
undergraduate degree in Sociology at the University of Crete, Greece, which 
culminated in a thesis examining the notion of ‘ideology’ in the work of Karl Marx, 
and especially his book The German Ideology. At the same time, in the last two years 
of my degree, I was initiated into Social Anthropology, taking courses offered by 
anthropologists in the department, such as an introduction to social anthropology, 
ritual and religion, and two courses which required conducting small fieldwork 
projects; one on the night-bars of inner city Athens, which were frequented mainly 
by African immigrants, and another on the social uses of pavements in Koulouri, the 
capital town of the island of Salamina, Greece. My next step was a Masters degree in 
Social Anthropology at Edinburgh University, with a thesis written on ‘urban 
anthropology’. Taking a year off to contemplate my future plans and reflecting on 
my interest in the comparative study of ritual and religion (I had undertaken a further 
course in this at Edinburgh), I realised that this was where my interest lay. It was 
then that I decided to pursue my Ph.D. 
I was particularly interested in religious phenomena that was not totally 
influenced by the so-called ‘big’ monotheistic religions, but had a more ‘local’ and 
‘exotic’ flavour. My gaze towards Cuba was somewhat slowly and arbitrarily 
directed. Language was an important factor as I was already fluent in Spanish, but, 
retrospectively at least, there seem to have been a number of threads that wove my 
academic path together: Marx, ‘African culture’ (however general and ambiguous 
this may now sound), urban settings, and, finally, ritual and religion, they all seem to 
have met, in what became the field of my research for about 14 months, between 
2006 and 2007, when I set out to acquire first-hand experience of Afro-Cuban 
religious and oracular traditions in Havana, Cuba. 
 I commence this thesis by providing a broad socio-historical context of 
Cuba, the Afro-Cuban religious traditions and the research conducted on them from 
past to present. I, then, mention some points of reference that have inspired me and 
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conclude by giving a very broad outline of the whole thesis and its enquiries. The 
rest of the chapters continue to weave together some of the threads that have been 












‘Me and you are complete strangers...’ 
Not many weeks have passed since myself and my partner, Angela, arrived in 
Havana with the plan to stay for at least a year and, as far as I am concerned, conduct 
fieldwork on the Afro-Cuban religious traditions, with a specific focus on their 
divinatory and oracular dimensions. We have already relatively settled in by finding 
a flat to rent, acquiring a general sense of the city and establishing some initial 
formal (those institutions that would host us and thus make possible our long stay in 
Cuba) and informal contacts. After a prolonged and extremely hot and humid early 
October afternoon, we decided to take a stroll in our neighbourhood in Vedado, a 
former well-off residential area just off the centre of Havana that stretches along its 
north-western coastal line. We were accompanied by a Mexican woman who was 
studying medicine in Cuba and lived in a rented apartment owned by our landlady’s 
daughter and her husband. Showing us around Vedado’s wide streets, full of tropical 
vegetation, beautiful, although rundown, colonial-style buildings and many small 
parks, we stopped to have a rest at a big square, where a bronze, life-size statue of 
John Lennon had been placed, in a sitting position, on one of the benches. I observed 
that John Lennon was missing an almost signature object, his thin, round, metallic 
glasses. Our Mexican friend informed us that his glasses used to adorn his face but, 
as people would repeatedly steal them, a person was appointed to keep them, and 
whenever a tourist wished to take a photo, only then would they be temporarily 
placed on the musician’s still face. John Lennon’s rather post-modern monument was 
the outcome of a relatively recent re-evaluation of Western popular culture, which 
was subsequently deemed not necessarily a vehicle of ‘Yankee’ (meaning, 
imperialist and capitalist) ideals. It was then, our Mexican friend commented, that the 
leading member of the Beatles was offered a seat on one of Cuba’s socialist benches. 
As we were just about to make our way back to our flat, and in the same 
square where John Lennon, with his vision impaired was sitting, our paths crossed 
with a middle-aged man whose lazy pace came to a halt in front of us. He looked 
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directly at our friend and in a very gentle but also self-assured manner said to her: 
‘Me and you are complete strangers; please excuse my intrusiveness, but I have to 
tell you that you suffer from a gynaecological problem in your ovaries, which might 
create future complications in your attempts to get pregnant.’ Taking a tiny sealed 
bag out of his pocket he added: ‘Keep this always with you except when you are 
menstruating. This is important to remember, don’t ever have contact with it during 
the days when you have your period. If you do as I say, it will help you with your 
problem.’ The three of us were stunned into silence. Our friend, after overcoming her 
surprise, in tears, thanked the man and, each of us continued on our way. She 
admitted to us that she did indeed have gynaecological problems that the man had 
alluded to; she put the small gift into her pocket. Three years have passed, and all of 
us have long since left Cuba. We recently learned from our Mexican friend that she 
had finally managed to get pregnant with twins but, unfortunately, she had had a 
miscarriage. 
This brief incident is quite illustrative of a general tendency among many 
Cubans I met, of, what I call, ‘oracular propensity’. Messages of a significant and 
pertinent content are occasionally exchanged, often among strangers, and either in 
extremely spontaneous ways and instancesas the one above, or in dreams, or in 
more private occasionsor in more organized ways, often being part of a complex 
ritual and cosmological nature. Even public figures do not escape this general 
‘propensity’, especially since at the beginning of the Revolution, the would-be 
comandante en jefe, Fidel Castro, who was captured by the Batista regime in 1953, 
proclaimed in a seemingly divinatory fashion that ‘history [would] absolve [him]’ 
(Castro Ruz 1997). The present thesis is meant to provisionally isolate, within this 
general propensity, those instances in which significant messages are passed on 
among people, but are said to be ultimately stemming from, what is generally 
depicted as, ‘the beyond’ (el mas allá) and more specifically from a variety of 
‘spiritual entities’. For the latter, following Hallowell (1960), I adopt the term ‘other-
than-human persons’ or entities, although their alterity from humans does not place 
them in an absolute plane of transcendence or unbridgeable distance. On the 
contrary, and as divination seems to suggest, these entities constantly make their 
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appearance in many peoples’ lives, informing and transforming them. At the same 
time, the entities’ messages also give information about themselves.   
 To a large extent, this thesis is dealing with providing indigenous definitions 
of these entities, suspending as much as possible an intuitive urge, from the academic 
point of view, to quickly proceed into a kind of interpretation that would render the 
entities more intelligible in those all-familiar terms that the social sciences, and those 
involved in them, have become all too familiar with (such as social structure or 
function, for example). Very often this kind of familiarization tends to reduce them 
into a kind of ‘symbolic’, ‘representational’ and ‘constructivist’ materialization of an 
ultimately, and again from the academic point of view, purely human and social 
nature.  
My effort is to provide a theoretical engagement with such phenomena that 
takes seriously peoples’ claims of the truth of them, not in order to argue that they 
are true, but in order to produce a narrative that does not presuppose that they are 
not; a narrative that speaks through their truth (see Henare et.al. 2007). Indigenous 
definitions of what exists (and what does not) are, therefore, ‘ontological’ in nature, 
and by providing an anthropological narrative that takes them as seriously as 
possible, this in its turn, is also ontological. This is why the theoretical intentions and 
conclusions of the anthropologist may be so tightly linked to the ethnography 
presented to him or her: ‘their’ ontology is, or can be, ‘our’ methodology. 
 I have been present in many a discussion where the term ‘ontology’ (often 
linked to ‘cosmology’) has been invoked, causing what I can only describe as an 
allergic reaction to it. Among others, the term is meant to depict an intellectual 
construction and classification of ‘things’ (a la Durkheim and Mauss; see Durkheim 
and Mauss 1969)  that are consequently enacted, that is, a system of beliefs that 
produces certain, and because of the former, limited actions. Congruent with this 
may be the understanding that if different ontologies exist then humanity is radically 
divided along the terms of them. In other words, many critical reactions towards the 
term argue that it comes to denote an absolute differentiation among peoples in a 
much more radical, yet similar, sense than the word ‘culture’ would do. But, as 
Holbraad has warned us, ‘ontology’ is not (or should not be) another word for 
‘culture’ (2008b); alluding to the ‘relativistic’ understandings of it I just mentioned.  
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 I believe that the word ontology is not necessarily to be identified with the 
above negative reactions towards it. When my friend Celia, for instance, told me that 
‘her’ spirits of the dead accompany her and reveal things she could not have known 
otherwise (see chapter 3), she was not depicting a radically different world from 
mine, in which I did not perceive the presence of such spirits; our difference was not 
predicated on a general view and perception of the world, but on the fact that she 
perceived a world, the same world I did, but she shared this world with the spirits of 
the dead, whilst I did not (consciously at least). This is what made the difference; a 
significant one, but not an absolute and total one.  
Most, if not all, of the accounts on Afro-Cuban religiosity (see below), tend 
to approach it in terms of explicitly distinct ‘traditions’. There is hardly any unified 
interpretation of them, and ethnographcally researchers whilst acknowledging the 
phenomenon have failed to account for, in any satisfactory way, the fact that many 
people in Cuba engage with more than on of these traditions. This leads them to 
either implicitly or explicitly understand the relations between them in ‘syncretic’ 
terms, that is, as a sign of ‘inauthenticity’ or ‘contamination’: ‘[T]he infiltration of a 
supposedly ‘pure’ tradition by symbols and meanings seen as belonging to other, 
incompatible traditions’ (Stewart and Shaw 1994:1). My focus on ‘other-than-
human’ entities, indigenous understandings and perceptions of them and their 
perspectives seeks to bypass the limitations of the search for ‘pure’ origins and the 
emphasis on ‘syncretic’ blendings in order to illuminate the efficacy of these entities 
and the character of the traditions that embrace them.  
Seeking to explore the context that these entities offer and their perspectives 
both of themselves and of humans, I focus on the instances in which the former 
communicate with the latter; that is, instances of divination. I employ the words 
‘divination’ (adivinación), ‘oracles’ (oraculos), ‘the beyond’ (el mas allá), and even 
‘ritual’ (ritual), ‘religion’ (religión) and ‘religiosity’ (religiosidad) not so much as 
analytical tools that will extensively be constructed and deconstructed or in the 
pursuit of an adequate definition of them, as is often the case.1 Rather, I employ them 
because Cubans do and as the familiarity between the English and the Spanish for 
these terms is so obvious, I believe that we do not get lost in translation, at least not 
                                                 
1 For relevant discussions, see Asad 1993; Bell 1992; Durkheim 2008; Eliade 1987; Evans-Pritchard 
1970; Geertz 1973; Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994; Lambek 2002; Marx 1982; Pals 1996; Smith 1991.  
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so much if we are using these as a starting point and common ground of 
understanding. 
To be ‘religious’ (religioso) does not automatically signify embracing beliefs 
and practices of a specific tradition; due to its colonial past (see below), Cuba is a 
place where various religious traditions coexist and not in isolation but often in vivid 
interrelation. The most prominent ones are Christianity (mainly Catholicism, but also 
Protestantism, which has seen a recent increase; see Ramírez Calzadilla 2006:60-65), 
‘Spiritism’ (Espiritismo) and those of ‘African origin’, the most diffused being 
Ocha/Ifá or else Santería (of Yoruba origin) and Palo Monte (of Congo-Bantu 
origin). When an individual claims to be ‘religious’ this might signify either one of 
all these or a combination, often quite idiosyncratic, of more than one. In the vast 
majority of the existent bibliography, when the syncretic character of Afro-Cuban 
religious traditions is mentioned, it is most often taken to refer to their (especially 
Santería) coexistence and interrelations with Catholicism.2 
An extensive account based on rich ethnographic description and analysis of 
the relationship between Catholicism and Afro-Cuban religious traditions is still to 
be written, leaving the term syncretism itself unexplored and therefore highly 
problematic in this context. Maybe this stems partially from the ethnographic fact 
that nowadays people who actively engage with both do not seem, in the ritual 
context at least, to blend them so much but, nevertheless, accept their distinct 
‘truths’. In any case, this thesis is not dealing with this phenomenon, but explores the 
specificities and interrelations of extremely diffused and popular traditions other than 
Christianity; these are Ocha/Ifá, Palo Monte and Espiritismo. Nevertheless, and as I 
said before, I also move beyond readings of these traditions that solidify them into 
rigid and dogmatic cosmological ‘wholes’, by focusing on describing what other-
than-human entities appear and how they are invoked through them during 
divination.  By turning the former into the background of description and analysis, 
and by bringing to the fore the ethnographic experiences of contact with these 
entities through divination, I also hope to account for the progressive dissemination 
of these traditions outside their initial sources (‘African’ for Ocha/Ifá or Palo Monte 
                                                 
2 Even the very term Santería denotes its Spanish-Catholic influence, coming from the word 




and ‘European’ for Espiritismo), and present a more encompassing (Afro-)Cuban 
cosmos, without reducing them to race, social and economical status or individual 
political inclinations.  
The situation I was met with in Cuba strongly suggested that, although certain 
correlations with the above factors existed and still might persist, these were not as 
prominent and obvious as they were in Cuba’s pre-revolutionary past. My friends 
and informants could be of any ‘colour’, and ranged in economic status from those in 
extreme poverty to those with relative affluence (although never excessive). In any 
case, due to the Revolution’s attempts to smoothen, if not overcome, radical class, 
social and race divisions, as well as the economic crisis of the 1990s, following the 
fall of the Soviet bloc, that has deeply affected almost the whole of the population, 
the above issues prove to be so complex that they would require a different kind of 
thesis altogether, one in which Afro-Cuban religiosity would have to come a poor 
second, if it managed to be present at all.  
Although reliable statistical figures are lacking, there is a general and 
diffused consensus, both among academics (see, for example, Espirito Santo 
2009a:30-40; Holbraad 2004; Ramírez Calzadilla 2006) and in ‘everyday’ talk, that 
religiosity, and especially Afro-Cuban religiosity, has been on the increase in the last 
few decades, and even more so since the 1990s. Many link this to the economic crisis 
itself but also to the fact that religious expression is treated much more positively by 
the regime (see below), implying that the ‘religious boom’ (Ramírez Calzadilla 
2006:13-28) of the 1990s was at least predicated on the fact that there was much 
more ‘religious’ freedom. Again, the complexity of these issues cannot lead to hasty 
assumptions-cum-conclusions, and although they may be valid sociologically 
speaking, they do not fully describe what my interests in these phenomena are, 
namely, the relations of intimacy instantiated between humans and other-than-
humans; an intimacy which lies at the centre of my understanding and this thesis.  
Appreciating the significance of this intimacy, I had to find my way through 
Havana’s informal networks, in neighbourhoods, through friends and their friends, 
and wait for the famous ethnographic ‘snow-ball effect’ to occur; and it did rather 
easily and quickly! Everybody knew a religioso, either in the family, in the 
neighbourhood, a friend or a colleague at work. The places I was more often led to 
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were private houses. No large and official ceremonies occurred outside them; there 
were no public temples specifically for them. Yet, in their own subtle ways, they 
were everywhere; fruits under a tree, a decapitated chicken floating on the sea-shore, 
a small, wrapped paper-package at a crossroads, a colourful necklace or bracelet on a 
passer-by, they, and many more, were all signs of ‘the Cuba profound’ (la Cuba 
profunda; see James Figarola 2001:184).  
I also came to realize quite quickly that many people were involved in ‘the 
religion’(la religión; referring to all indistinctively) because of, and with a great 
reliance on its capacity to reveal significant viewpoints about their lives that 
remained somewhat hidden, as well as to ‘pragmatically’ engage with their 
aspirations, hopes, desires, fears and obstacles. Rather than just posing deep 
existential questions to reflect upon or creating a universal moral ethos, they were 
very much praised for ‘resolving’ (resolver) as earthly a matter as a headache, a 
problematic love affair or a financial calamity. In all these issues, divination, as the 
means of acquiring information and changing one’s life, was soon presented to me as 
an extremely vital phenomenon, and rich in its complexity. Consequently, and almost 
inevitably, it became my main ethnographic ‘site’, and I concentrated on accounts of 
it and the instances in which it occurred. Rather than picking up a particular tradition, 
I embraced all of them, as many of my friends did, and focused on their divinatory 
dimensions. Each tradition had its own diviners of renown, and more than this, a 
person of renown within each tradition was quintessentially a diviner as well. In 
Ocha/Ifá there were the santeros, the santeras and the babalawos; in Palo Monte the 
paleros and in Espiritismo the espiritistas. Each tradition, in the context of 
divination, was meant to invoke different kinds of entities, such as the orichas in 
Ocha/Ifá, and different kinds of (spirits of) ‘the dead’ (muertos) in Palo Monte and 
Espiritismo. Thus, there seemed to be a broad Afro-Cuban spirit world that people 
were eager to invoke and enter into dialogue with that could not be isolated as 
belonging to only one of these traditions. This thesis is an effort to confront this 
world and to illustrate both its distinctive and encompassing aspects. However, 
before continuing on to mentioning some points of inspiration for this thesis and 
providing an outline of each chapter, I want to place the Afro-Cuban religious 
traditions in a broad socio-historical context, both in terms of the general milieu in 
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which they have evolved and in their treatment by the successive regimes of Cuba, 
and academics.  
Socio-historical context 
By inserting the Afro-Cuban religious traditions into a socio-historical context, one is 
inevitably led to deal with a social group as complex, diverse, transforming, real and 
imagined, as that of the so-called ‘Afro-Cubans’. Approaching them in a 
conventional historical fashion, from past to present, one is also led to commence the 
account from the subsequent to the ‘discovery’ of the Americas (1492) and the 
expansion of the slave trade, which served as the vehicle for the importation of 
thousands of people, especially from the African continent. The degree to which 
practices and worldviews deemed as ‘Afro’ in the New World are indeed ‘African’ 
has constituted a lively debate, both within academic circles, and those groups 
characterized, by insiders or outsiders, as ‘Afro’ (see for example Ayorinde 2004; 
Bascom and Herskovits 1959; Brown 2003a; Palmié 1995a, 2001, 2008; Thompson 
1983). Nevertheless, few would openly and unproblematically argue that phenomena 
such as the Afro-Cuban religious traditions would present themselves as such, or 
even exist, if it were not for the strong African presence in certain parts of the New 
World, such as Cuba, historically ignited by the transatlantic slave trade.  
Even a quick glance at the social history of religious traditions of African 
origin in the New World, would make one aware of the fact that the closer we get to 
the early colonial era (late 15th and 16th century) the more these traditions are linked 
to particular groups characterized along the lines of, first, their ethnicityalthough 
mediated by the biased and confused colonial documentation and the huge diversity 
of African peoplesand, second, their New World social status, that is, their 
position as slaves. With the progressive transformation of these groups, even in the 
colonial and slavery era, into free people, we become witnesses to a much more 
complex phenomenon. On the one hand, the descendants of slaves tended to initially 
occupy the lower classes with slow mobility towards the middle and even, in 
exceptional cases, the upper ones. On the other hand, ‘things Afro’ such as religious 
practices and worldviews started disseminating into (or ‘contaminating’ when 
viewed negatively; see for example Ortiz 2001) a much wider part of the society, 
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embracing, in one way or another, groups that were traditionally linked to the ‘white’ 
population from which initially the ruling classes were mostly composed. They 
themselves also underwent transformations on various sociological and demographic 
levels (see Ayorinde 2004).  
The case of the Afro-Cuban religious traditions is not alien to the above broad 
sketch; yet, each country presents us with its own socio-historical particularities. 
Thus, what I will briefly go through is the development of the Afro-Cuban religions 
along the documented history of Cuba, from the colonial era to the present, as well as 
an equally broad sketch of how they have been approached and treated by successive 
regimes and academics. I will follow a somewhat conventional path of presenting 
Cuba’s history in general, and more specifically through the lenses of the Afro-
Cuban religious traditions. By doing so, I divide Cuba’s historical periods into three 
major ones, the colonial era (1511-1898), the years of Cuba as a republic (or 
‘pseudo-republic’, as the Revolution has liked to call it), followed by Independence 
(1902-1958), and, finally, the Revolution (1959-present). The most systematic 
research on Afro-Cuban religions can be traced to the beginning of the 20th century 
with the advent of Independence, initiated by the prolific work of the most renowned 
Cuban ethnographer, Fernando Ortiz. There was a relative slowing down in the early 
years of the Revolution and a proliferation of published works after the 1990s, both 
by Cubans and foreigners.  
(a) The colonial era (1511-1898) 
From the beginning of the Spanish colonial rule (1511) until the middle of the 18th 
century, Cuba remained somewhat in the background of economic activity in 
comparison to other promising lands of the New World that the Spanish Crown had 
already begun to exploit. It mainly served as a passage that connected these other 
areas with Spain itself (see Ayorinde 2004: 25; Gott 2005:19-20). It was in this early 
colonial period, nevertheless, that a very important institution was born, and which 
would serve in the future as a crucial space where the Afro-Cuban religions would 
take shape, and be partially preserved and transformed, the so-called cabildos 
(literally meaning ‘town councils’; Brown 2003a:35). These were associations which 
were organized along broad ethnic or tribal lines and whose members were free 
slaves or descendants of them (Ayorinde 2004:9-10).  
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What is now referred to as cabildos was an aggregate of official and semi-
official institutions organized along some basic general lines. They were clubs of 
recreation, mutual aid societies, brotherhoods or religious fraternities with certain 
social functions. These societies had already existed on Spanish (and Portuguese) 
soil since the 13th and 14th centuries, mostly known as cofradías (see Brandon 
1993:70; Brown 2003a:34). The cofradías in Spain were often formed in terms of 
professions (something like guilds) and also local identity. What pervaded the 
majority of them was an attachment to Catholicism, often through the veneration of 
specific saints, religious indoctrination, catechism, acts of charity and social 
servicessuch as helping the sick and the poor and conducting funeralsand 
carrying out public ceremonies, processions and religious festivities according to the 
Catholic calendar. The institution of cofradías or cabildos was transposed to the 
Spanish colonies of the New World initially for the ‘white’ settlers. Very soon, 
though, it extended to those who formed the bulk of the slavery-derived labour force, 
especially those who came from various parts of the African continent. This, it has 
been argued, occurred for various reasons; among others, it was a strategic move by 
the Spanish Crown to ‘divide-and-rule’, dividing in such way the slave population in 
order to fritter away any potential coiling of a solid and highly conscious body of  
‘Africans’ and slaves against the colonial rule (see Ayorinde 2004:9-10; Brown 
2003a:34). Also, the cabildos could function as a mild way of evangelizing the 
‘animistic’ Africans and lead to their Catholicization as a way of (ideological) 
integration into the Spanish Crown (Brandon 1993:70)strategy that was initially 
designed for the diverse localities of the Iberian peninsula before and especially after 
the expulsion of the Moors (Ayorinde 2004:11).  
In Cuba, the ‘African’ cabildos that emerged were commonly known as 
cabildos negros, cabildos africanos, or cabildos de nación (for a comprehensive and 
detailed account on them, see Howard 1998). In the beginning, since the 16th century, 
their membership consisted of African born people, who in their majority had already 
obtained their freedom. Often, cabildos raised funds to buy certain people out of 
slavery. In comparison to the Spanish cofradías, the cabildos africanos were less 
institutionalized, more civic than religious (that is, Catholic), although each had a 
specific patron saint and shrine dedicated to it. They tended to function more as clubs 
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and mutual aid societies. Another important characteristic was that they divided the 
African population into ‘nations’ (naciones), these referring to broad agglomerations 
of ethnic or tribal groups which simultaneously preserved and redefined identities 
stemming from Africa. Each cabildo had its own institutionalized hierarchy headed 
by the ‘king’ (rey) or else ‘overseer’ (capataz) or ‘president’ (presidente) and his 
‘queen’ (reina). They served as the ‘ambassadors’ (embajadores) of each cabildo to 
the colonial authorities, especially the police and the church (Brandon 1993:71; 
Brown 2003a:35). 
 Being organized along these generic lines, each cabildo was distinguished by 
different symbols and practices, such as dances, rhythms, drums, songs, language, 
colours, flags, a Catholic patron saint, and in general ‘traditions’ that made each 
‘nation’ stand out (see Brandon 1993:71; Brown 2003a:49). In this process, ‘nations’ 
came to be identified as Lucumí (the then predominant ethnonym for Yoruba), 
Congo, Arará or Carabalí (from the Calabar region; see Brown 2003b), for example. 
Cabildos enjoyed a relative freedom, especially in the enclosed confines of their 
buildings, to express themselves in their own ‘African way’. It is an already 
established and almost certainly valid suggestion, based heavily on accounts of 
foreign travellers and other first-hand witnesses and also documents as well as 
objects collected through the authorities’ interactionsometimes oppressivewith 
the cabildos, that the latter served as incubators of, among others, religious practices 
following certain ‘African’ styles, no matter how transformed and redefined they 
might have been in this totally new (world) social context (see Brown 2003a:25-61). 
It can also be comfortably argued that different nations had distinctive cosmological 
pools to draw from and reconstruct. 
It was in the mid-18th century that Cuba stepped bravely into the fore of 
colonial economic activity and transformed into one of the main sugar producers. 
This consequently led to a bigger need for labour and a dramatic increase of slave 
imports, mainly from Africa (Gott 2005:23-26, 36-38). Two important factors are 
said to have contributed to such a change; first, the ‘Seven Years’ War’ and, second, 
Haiti’s dramatic independence. The ‘Seven Year’s War’ of Spain along with France 
against Britain resulted in the latter occupying Havana for almost a year (1762-
1763). Apart from economic growth and more slaves flowing into the island, this 
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period was also characterized by a more racially divided society, subsequent slave 
revolts (often plotted in the cabildos) and also the first plots against the Spanish 
metropolis for independence (Ayorinde 2004:25-26). Haiti’s independence (1791) 
was gained by the slaves themselves and created the first and last black republic of 
the New World, which left a huge impact, of both awe and fear, on future 
generations, especially across the Caribbean. The most pragmatic and immediate one 
was that it contributed to Cuba’s ascendance as a sugar economy requiring a large 
number of slaves.  
From that period onwards Cuba becomes witness to certain important 
changes, initially as sparks, conflicting tendencies among others and, finally, as 
vehicles of the second large historical period I previously identified. To name but a 
few, we have a more clearly stratified society, broadly divided between two 
extremes, the white population of Spanish descent and the black of an African one, 
occasional slave revolts, and ideas (which often led to plots and attempts) of 
independence. In this climate, the official regime adopted a more repressive attitude 
towards the black population, which often led to a restriction of their cultural and 
religious expressions. The previous and relative free expression of ‘African ways of 
life’ such as religious ceremonies casually conducted in the cabildos and more rarely 
publicly (such as the ‘Day of the Kings’; see Brown 2003a:35-39) were banned after 
certain uprisings took place, such as the ‘Escalera Conspiracy’ in 1844. Haiti’s 
independence had already marked the consciousness of the Cubans, positively, as an 
inspiration and, negatively, as a fear of national independence and slave 
emancipation. At the same time, international pressure, especially from Britain, for 
the abolition of slavery increased. In 1868 the ‘Ten Years’ War’ broke out between 
Cubans supporting independence and the Spanish authorities. It ended in 1878 with 
the ‘Pact of Zanjón’, where slaves were freed in the liberated territories. Another war 
broke out from 1879 to 1880, the so-called ‘Little War’ (Guerra Chiquita). Around 
1886 slavery was almost coming to an end. The ‘Second War of Independence’ 
started in 1895 and ended in 1898 with the taking over of Cuba by the US, which had 
contributed to the war against the Spanish Crown. Formerly, an important 
commercial ally of Cuba, the US now actively interfered in the political and 
economical organization of the island. The annexationist and interventionist appetites 
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of the US, supported by certain circles in Cuba, became evident in the ‘Platt 
Amendment’, signed in 1902 (see Gott 2005:110-112), and the huge investment and 
capitalization of private North American companies in the Cuban sugar industry.  
(b) The (‘pseudo’-) Republic years (1902-1958) 
The year 1902 was marked by the withdrawal of the US from direct rule and the start 
of the first Republic years. Cuba was left to build a ‘modern’ state and a ‘new’ 
nation. During this effort, in no way one-dimensional or of catholic consensus, 
‘Africanity’ in relation to ‘Cuban-ness’ presented the new nation with challenges, as 
integration, being the goal, was often seen to be achievable by assimilating the now 
free African slaves and their descendants into the Cuban society by partially 
eliminating attitudes of them deemed as ‘irrational’, ‘primitive’, ‘backwards’, and 
‘animistic’ (Ayorinde 2004:51). This, however, could not be achieved by outward 
repression and unjustified prohibitions, as now, the Afro-Cubans were citizens in a 
fuller sense and not slaves. It could be achieved, though, by a slow process 
characterized by two persisting features, even in the Revolution years: first, by 
stigmatizing in the official discourse certain attitudes deemed as ‘irrational’ and, 
second, by converting them into folkloric traits doomed to be extinguished gradually 
through the modernization of Cuba. It was in this atmosphere that the first systematic 
approaches to Afro-Cuban religions, which both broke from certain past attitudes and 
continued to perpetuate them came to the fore. 
The early research on Afro-Cuban religions drew its interests and 
conclusions, deeply instilled with assumptions and prejudices, from fields such as 
evolutionary anthropology and criminology. One of the first and sill most prominent 
today is the work of Cuban ethnographer, Fernando Ortiz, who conducted systematic 
research on them. In the beginning, he subscribed to the evolutionary and 
criminological (inspired by Lombroso) trend of the time and ‘considered the 
troubling legacy of slavery and the African presenceseen as a veritable heart of 
darkness with the island’s urban capitalsin relation to the shape and destiny of the 
modern Cuban nation’ (Brown 2003a:3). In a nutshell, Afro-Cuban religions or 
‘witchcraft’ (brujería) were seen as pagan and animistic practices and beliefs, still 
surviving among Africans and their descendants, which on a micro-social level held 
them back to the margins of society and on a macro-social one held Cuba back from 
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its modernizing republican aspirations (see Castellanos 1916; Ortiz 1986, 1987, 
2001; Roche y Monteagudo 1908; Trujillo y Monagas 1882). This kind of academic 
trend was born in a climate quite hostile to Afro-Cubans and their practices, which 
sometimes led to outward repression and prohibition, especially up until the 1920s. It 
was in this period that the old-style cabildos either vanished or had to re-shape 
themselves into more of civic institutions and suppress their more public expressions 
of ‘African-ness’. 
This period opened up a new stage for the Afro-Cuban religions, which, 
having to go underground became much more private, undergoing structural 
transformations. At the same time, the former ‘ethnic’ distinctions started 
transforming into specific reglas (literally meaning ‘rules’), religious traditions 
attached to a broad ethnic denomination and increasingly signifying a distinct ritual 
field in which one could become part of by way of initiation but not necessarily by 
descent (see Brandon 1993:78, 83; Brown 2003a:28, 67-71). This is what has been 
distilled to the present into what is known as Regla Ocha/Ifá (or Santería)  and Regla 
Conga (Palo Monte), where, by way of initiation, one acquires a ‘religious family’ 
(familia religiosa), with its ‘godfather’ (padrino) and ‘godmother’ (madrina)those 
who conduct the initiation‘brothers’ (hermanos)the other people initiated by the 
same ‘godparents’and a complex genealogical tree with its ‘trunks’ (troncos) and 
‘branches’ (ramas), which some can trace back even to the colonial era. Furthermore, 
as the various reglas developed, one can witness a gradual coexistence of multiple 
deities (the orichas in the case of Ocha/Ifá) under the same ‘house-temple’ and 
traced in one individual, whereby he or she undergoes various kinds and degrees of 
initiations that relate him or her to more than one entity. 
Initiation in Ocha/Ifá is normally divided along the axis of ‘receiving’ 
(recibir) and ‘making’ (hacer) ‘powers’ (poderes) or deities (the orichas). While one 
may ‘receive’ a number of orichas that are seen to have a special ‘affinity’ (afinidad) 
with the person and provide him or her with specific ‘protections’ (protecciones), the 
oricha that is ‘made’ is always oneoften called ‘tutelary oricha’ (oricha 
tutelar)and is meant to be related with the person much more intimately and in a 
more encompassing way than the orichas ‘received’. The ‘tutelary oricha’ is said to 
be the ‘father’ or ‘mother’ of the person and he or she its ‘child’. Whether one may 
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be initiated and under whose orichas’ protection is decided by the Ocha/Ifá oracles 
and, in case the latter indicate the need for it, the person, along with consecrated 
objects that are said to be the orichas and which are often the centres of offerings and 
sacrifices, receives oracular ‘signs’ (signos in Spanish, oddu in Yoruba); their 
mythological content is meant to condense the initiate’s relation with the orichas in 
question and the more pertinent aspects of his or her destiny, or else, ‘path’ (camino) 
(for a detailed description of Ocha/Ifá initiation, see Brown 2003a:62-112). 
In the case of Palo Monte a similar phenomenon can be observed, although, 
as other than the orichas entities are involved, the ritual steps of initiation, the 
oracles, and the receiving of consecrated objects and ‘powers’ is different in nature 
and content (see chapter 2; see also Bolívar Aróstegui and González Díaz de Villegas 
1998; Cabrera 1986; James Figarola 2006a, 2006b; Ochoa 2010b). Furthermore, 
initiations in Palo do not involve the acquisition of the ever-important oracular 
‘signs’ that follow the ‘reception’ or ‘making’ of the orichas, but, as I will describe 
in more detail later, ‘things’ and entities of a very specific nature. 
Around this era (middle of 19th century), another religious current started 
gaining increasing popularity, initially among the ‘white’, middle-upper classes, and 
consequently diffusing into the lower ones. Schematically, thus, it followed the 
opposite direction to the Afro-Cuban religions, which commenced with the slaves, 
the lower classes and then diffused to the rest of the Cuban society. This was the 
Spiritist movement, imported from Europe and North America, which in Cuba 
acquired the name of Espiritismo. Espiritismo seems to have filled a relative gap, 
namely, that of the systematic and intense veneration of and communication with the 
spirits of the dead which neither the white, Catholic population was previously 
practicingas it went against many orthodox Christian understandings and 
attitudesnor the African-born and their descendants who, as it has been argued, 
having lost their contact with their homeland, their social structures having been 
obliterated, they had also lost a systematic worship of their ancestors (see Brandon 
1993:85-90). As Espiritismo diffused and spread, mainly in the private domain rather 
than being openly public and institutionalized, it inevitably met with the Afro-Cuban 
religious traditions (see Argüelles Mederos and Hodge Limonta 1991; Brandon 
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1993:85-90, 134-136, 171-180; Espirito Santo 2009a:25-36; Hodge Limonta and 
Rodríguez 1997; Román 2007a:219-22). 
Ritual kinship in Espiritismo is much less structured than in Ocha/Ifá and 
Palo Monte, and this is congruent with the fact that there are no rigid or very formal 
practices of initiation. Thus, people do not acquire ‘godparents’ (padrinos and 
madrinas) in the strict sense of the word but relate to individuals who can sense the 
presence of ‘the dead’ (muertos) and can, thus, identify the identities and biographies 
of the specific muertos who are said to be ‘attached’ (apegados) by way of ‘affinity’ 
to each individual. The identification of the muertos’ presence, character and degree 
of intimacy with the living is much more gradual, ever-transforming and 
idiosyncratic when compared to the entities involved in Ocha/Ifá or Palo and, 
therefore, the relations between those who can sense the muertoscalled mediums or 
espiritistasare also more fluid and varying (in the sense that a particular muerto 
can be seen by a variety of people, at different instances and with different messages 
to convey).     
The advent of the 1920s can be broadly said to have been the critical point 
where Afro-Cuban religions were practiced mainly in houses, which have since then 
become the space of a more atomized kind of veneration and liturgy, which persists 
till the present. These are commonly known as ‘temple-houses’ (casa-templo) and in 
them, as Brown has convincingly argued (2003a:62-112), what we now know as 
Afro-Cuban religions have taken their current shape. After the 1920s, as this can be 
evinced by the Afrocubanismo movement (a folkloric, artistic and literary 
sympatheticeven exoticizing, as were ‘primitivist’ movements found elsewhere in 
Europe and the USinterest towards ‘things Afro’; see, for example, Carpentier 
1933; Chomsky 2003:192-218), research on Afro-Cuban religions also became 
somewhat more sympathetic, taking them more seriously and on their own terms, 
although with many of the old prejudices still persisting. Researchers were now more 
positively inclined to them and this can be witnessed in the radical change of style 
and approach of Ortiz himself, who became more interested in these religions not as 
a pathological phenomenon in need of elimination but as a constitutive element of 
‘Cuban-ness’ and in need of preservation, though in folkloric and aestheticized 
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terms, as a national treasure (see Cabrera 1970, 1972, 1993; Lachatañerè 1992; Ortiz 
1946, 1950, 1959, 1985, 1992, 2002).     
(c) The Revolution years (1959-present) 
In many ways, the Revolution (1959) opened a whole new chapter, not only in the 
history of Cuba in general, but also in the fate of Afro-Cubans and Afro-Cuban 
religions. As the Revolution from a very early stage explicitly promised and moved 
towards a society not based on a rigid class system, it definitively embraced the 
lower classes and went against the deep-seated interests of the ruling ones and the 
old regimes. As for the former, this automatically implied better treatment of the 
Afro-Cubans which would mark the whole revolutionary approach both at home and 
its universal and international aspirations. As Ayorinde says: ‘The liberation of 
oppressed blacks in Cuba was extended to the liberation of the oppressed elsewhere’ 
(2004:93), often in Africa itself, and resulting in Fidel Castro exclaiming in 1975, 
with a definitive hint of anti-Americanism, that Cuba is not a Latin American 
country but a ‘Latin African’ one (Ayorinde 2004:94). Yet, what was before deemed 
as the correct path for Cuba’s modernization project was not only not abandoned by 
the Revolution but even accentuated and considered constitutive of the now 
revolutionary project. In general, and as Ayorinde puts it, ‘[t]he government 
attempted to redirect loyalty from the family, the churches, and Afro-Cuban religions 
to the nation and the party’ (2004:95). By increasingly getting closer ideologically to 
and becoming more dependent economically on the Soviet Union during the 1970s, 
‘theories of scientific atheism gained currency’ (Ayorinde 2004:96). Nevertheless, 
the Cuban government, unlike the Soviets, never outlawed religion but tried to 
restrict it in more indirect ways. The move against religion, unlike the colonial and 
‘pseudo-republican’ era, was not directed towards a particular social group or indeed 
religion, but was total; against religion as a whole. This move against religion and 
even more so against Christian religion, especially Catholicism, which was 
traditionally more institutionalized than the Afro-Cuban ones, was obviously directly 
linked to the ruling classes that the Revolution was meant to displace. 
The increasing attachment of the Cuban Revolution to the Soviet Union led to 
a stricter attitude towards religion which, true to its Marxist-Leninist affiliations, was 
defined as ‘the peoples’ opiate’. The most well-known ‘measure’ against religion of 
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the 1970s and 1980s was the exclusion of people who were religious of any kind of 
faith (be that Christian, Afro-Cuban or anything else) from the ‘Party’ (Partido 
Comunista de Cuba) and its ‘Youth Union’ (Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas). As both 
institutions were the most official stamp of who was to be considered a true 
revolutionary and were strongly linked to most conventional professional 
opportunities; those stigmatized as religious and barred from the above were 
seriously marginalized, even to the point of not being able to find a job or being fully 
granted the promised rights of a citizen of the revolutionary state. As the 
manifestations of Afro-Cuban religions were much more extrovert, so to speak, than 
those of let us say the Christian ones, it was only natural that in such a hostile 
environment their suppression was felt more. Afro-Cuban religiosity involves a 
plethora of objects which serve as a means of manifestation of a multiplicity of 
other-than-human entities, offerings placed in the domestic, urban and physical 
landscape, and ceremonies that often attract large numbers of people and tend to be 
easily seen or heard (as chants, music and dancing are an indispensable part of them). 
Many of these manifestations had to be limited and as a result became more covert.  
Soviet-inspired folkloric research was directed towards Afro-Cuban religions 
as remnants of a past that was set to disappear with the consequent revolutionary 
project of ‘rationalization’ and the education of the masses; keeping the more 
aesthetic parts of them and de-contextualizing them from their more inclusive 
attitude towards various aspects of life or focusing on their more (socio-)historical 
aspects.3 Towards the end of the 1980s the official take on religion began to change 
as indeed the whole revolutionary project underwent a re-evaluation. In the third 
party congress in 1986, it was decided that the Revolution should be more open and 
it was then that it was suggested that religiosity was not an inherent enemy of the 
revolutionary state and, thus, the previous marginalization and exclusion of religious 
individuals was probably too harsh (Ayorinde 2004:104). This led to the 1990s 
where things changed even more dramatically. Cuba had long been heavily 
dependent on the Soviet Union. With its collapse, Cuba entered its ‘special period in 
times of peace’ (periodo especial en tiempos de paz), which, accompanied by stricter 
                                                 
3 For such a phenomenon see, for example, Barnet 1983; Barreal 1966; Díaz Fabelo 1960; Guanche 
Pérez 1983, 1986; Guanche Pérez and León 1979; Guillén 1974; Martínez Furé 1997; Moreno 1988; 
León, 1964, 1984; López Valdés 1985; Sosa 1982, 1984. 
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North American sanctions, brought extreme economic hardships to the country. The 
fourth party congress (1991) was indicative of the serious situation Cuba had entered 
and the bold modifications on various levels that had to take place. This was the time 
when a huge ‘opening up’ (apertura) was deemed necessary and as a consequence 
the dollar was legalized and tourism increased dramatically. This also led to a kind of 
self-reflection on the possibly misguided dependence on the Soviet Union. This 
included views on religion:  
They [the congress] blamed an uncritical acceptance of Marxist models developed in other 
contexts that reflected the scientific atheist thinking of the socialist bloc. Scientific atheism 
(like other models inherited from the Soviets) was denounced as inappropriate for the Cuban 
situation […] The congress also debated whether believers should be allowed to join the 
party (Ayorinde 2004:147). 
Fidel Castro announced that ‘we are a party, not a religion, and at a certain moment 
we converted the party and atheism into a religion’ (Ayorinde 2004:147). Studies on 
Afro-Cuban religions since (at least) the late 1980s indicated a significant increase in 
their members and with the wish to make the Revolution ‘speak’ to more people and 
increase party membership, religions in Cuba were considered with a much more 
open frame of mind. It was in this period that studies on Afro-Cuban religions also 
significantly increased both by Cubans and foreigners, who were now allowed to 
enter and stay in the country much more freely and for longer periods of time. 
Approaches on the Afro-Cuban religions became more diverse and exhibited an 
interest in their current conditions rather than viewing them as relics of the past; 
consequently a generally more processesual approach started permeating them.  
For instance, since the 1970s, the interest by foreign researchers increased, 
not being limited to the more ‘Africanist’ approaches of the past led by Herskovits 
and Bascom (see Bascom 1950, 1980; Bascom and Herskovits 1959; Herskovits 
1937, 1966; see also Bastide 1971, 2007 for the case of Brazil). Unlike them, who, 
although acknowledging the deep transformations of these religions into the New 
World, focused more on the survivals, retentions, and resistance of the Afro-
Americans, the younger generation started putting the emphasis on ‘unique 
syncretisms’ and ‘rapid creolization’ (Brown 2003a:27) that the Afro-Americans 
underwent but, more importantly, consciously and actively led. The trend, now, 
became not origins but dynamic transformation as this was beginning to be 
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envisioned by scholars of the ‘Black Atlantic’ in general (see Gilroy 1993; Mintz 
1974; Mintz and Price 1981, 1992; Price 1983; Thompson 1983). In the case of Afro-
Cuban religions, this might have been assisted by the fact that after the 1970s there 
was an increase in the migration of Cubans (and not only of those linked directly to 
the white upper classes, many of whom fled the country shortly after the ‘Triumph of 
the Revolution’ in 1959), and this led to a widespread ‘exportation’ of Afro-Cuban 
religions, especially in the US and Latin America (such as Mexico, Colombia, Puerto 
Rico and Venezuela), but also in Europe (especially Spain). The advent of the fall of 
the Soviet Union and the ‘special period’ accentuated this flow. Therefore, these 
religions could also be studied outside of Cuba.4  
At the same time, more non-Cuban scholars were drawn to study the Afro-
Cuban religions in Cuba itself, a phenomenon which ran parallel to the so-called 
‘religious boom’ of the 1990s (see Ramírez Calzadilla 2006) that spurred Cuban 
scholars to approach them as a living and vibrant phenomenon, and particularly as 
responding to the social or psychological ‘needs’ of the present, but also a persistent 
interest in origins and how people evoke them through the liturgical collective 
memory.5 Non-Cuban scholars have sought to highlight the dynamic character of 
Afro-Cuban religions from various focal points, such as ethnohistory (see Brown 
2003a, 2003b; Dianteill 2002; Palmié 2001, 2002, 2007; Román 2007a, 2007b), 
politics and national identity (see Ayorinde 2004; Hearn 2008; Miller 2000; Moore 
2004; Routon 2006, 2009; Wirtz 2004, 2007), arts and performance (see Bettelheim 
2001; Garoutte and Wambaugh 2007; Hagedorn 2000, 2001), medical anthropology 
(see Wedel 2004) and a relatively recent turn to an anthropological tackling of the 
cosmological and ontological aspects of them (see Espirito Santo 2009a, 2009b, 
2010; Holbraad 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008c; Ramón Ochoa 2007, 2010a, 2010b). 
If I had to place myself within this spectrum of approaches and interests, I 
would opt for this last ‘recent turn’ just mentioned. This is not because I find the rest 
less rewarding, but because, as I said in the very opening of the introduction, my 
main and initial interest is the indigenous definitions of what exists; especially 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Brandon 1993:104-125; Brown 1993, 2003a:92-97, 157-160; Dianteill 2002; 
Lefever 1996; Murphy 1988; Palmié 1995a, 2001; Romberg 2009; Sandoval 1979. 
5 See, for example, Barnet 2001; Fernández Martínez 2005; Fernández Martínez and Porras Potes 




‘things’, that if only their ‘structural-functional’ aspects are highlighted, they would 
tend to be reduced to ‘definitions’ which remain ‘other’ to the indigenous ones, 
ultimately ammounting to analysis becoming a sort of dialysis. In other words, it 
produces a narrative that is based on the assumption-cum-conclusion that they 
ultimately do not exist. Thus, the (not so) New World becomes an anthropologically 
interesting place exactly because its historical constitution has been moulded by the 
meeting of different ‘cultures’, mainly of European, indigenous (Amerindian) and 
African origin.6 In what follows, I mention two general points of inspiration for this 
thesis to which I return in the final chapters, but with a more specific and explicit 
approach to them.    
‘The Europeans lacked perspectivism’ 
Writer and critic, Tzvetan Todorov, illustrates the conquest of America as the space 
of encounter between ‘Others’, the Europeans and the Indians (1992). Unavoidably, 
he relies heavily on written documents produced by the Spaniards and is, thus, more 
revealing in what the latter thought and perceived of the Indians. For instance, he 
traces the views of certain individuals who played an active role in the ‘discovery’ 
and conquest of the New World, such as Christopher Columbus (the discoverer), 
Hernán Cortés (the conqueror), Montezuma (the conquered), and Bartolomé de Las 
Casas (the missionary); and juxtaposes the two different worldviews (that is, the 
Spanish and the indigenous). Todorov presents interesting differences in the views 
among each group, especially the Spaniards, but also argues for a relative tendency 
of each one to perceive the other in a certain way. Despite the otherwise very 
interesting and important variations, the Spaniards, just as the rest of the European 
colonialists, exhibited an indifference, even hostility, towards acknowledging the 
Indians as full subjects. Because of this, real dialogue with them never existed 
(exemplified in Columbus’ attitude; 1992:3-50), and when some form of it was 
developed, the main purpose was the retrieval of information that would lead the 
colonizers to best exploit the natural and human resources of the New World (further 
exemplified in Cortés’ attitude; 1992:53-123). Todorov argues that the encounter 
                                                 
6 In the case of Cuba the presence of Amerindian indigenous groups is much less obvious due to, 
among others, their relative small numbers, and their vast physical and cultural extinction in the 
colonial era (see Gott 2005:11-23). 
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between Old and New World presents us with ‘the problematics of alterity’ 
(1992:185). 
The documents reveal an internal to the colonialists debate whether the 
Indians were to be treated as equals or not to the Europeans (1992:146-167). Either 
the Indians would be different and inferior to the Spaniards (Columbus and Cortés) 
or they would be identical and equal (Las Casas; 1992:127-182). However, even in 
the latter’s case, the result would be assimilation; the Indians adopting the European 
way of life, and not by choice but imposition, whether violent or not. Both cases 
abide ‘by the principle of identity (rather than by that of difference)’ (1992:153), 
whereby ‘difference is corrupted into inequality, equality into identity’ (1992:146). 
Ultimately, what the Spaniards lacked (as well as the Indians but with radically 
different connotations; 1992:63-97; for a similar approach see Sahlins 1995) was, 
what Todorov calls, ‘perspectivism’ (1992:189, 192, 193, 251). One of the few 
historical figures who got close to it (although not definitively, explicitly and fully 
consciously) was the Dominican bishop of Chiapas, Mexico, Bartolomé de Las Casas 
in the famous controversy at Valladolid, Spain in 1550, arguing against the scholar 
Ginés de Sepúlveda, who would support the thesis that the war against the Indians 
was justifiable due to their inferiority and savagery (1992:151-161). Although Las 
Casas, according to Todorov, seems to direct his arguments towards a Christian view 
of egalitarianism and universalism of which its logical implications are the 
assimilation of the Indians to the European culture, Todorov traces hints of 
‘perspectivism’which embraces egalitarianism without the obliteration of 
differences, at least not by means of impositionin a passage of Las Casas, where 
he comments on the Aztecs’ practices of human sacrifice and cannibalism 
(1992:185-201). Such practices were thought of, as Sepúlveda argued, as prime 
‘proof’ of the Indians’ difference-cum-inferiority and hence justification of war 
(1992:186). Todorov follows the argument of Las Casas in some detail (1992:186-
189), and traces its ‘perspectivist’ qualities.  
Las Casas commences his response by saying that no matter how we view 
human sacrifice or cannibalism in terms of morality (assuring us that he also does not 
agree with them morally), this should not be reason for reacting violently against 
those who practice them. In addition, if theyhuman sacrifice and cannibalismare 
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part of the Indian social norms, individuals could not be condemned for following 
and respecting their own cultural laws. Las Casas proceeds by problematizing the 
condemnation of sacrifice itself. He first argues that Christianity is not foreign to the 
notion of sacrifice, not even of human sacrifice, as God commanded both Abraham 
and Jephtah to sacrifice for ‘Him’ their son and daughter respectively (1992:188). He 
mentions more Christian examples of the sacrifice of human life and argues that even 
Spaniards, in extreme situations, resorted to eating each other. But what makes Las 
Casas an insipient ‘perspectivist’, Todorov tells us, are his arguments which were 
presented as four ‘evidences’ of the humanity of the Indians.  
Firstly, they possess an ‘intuitive knowledge of God’ (1992:188), namely, of 
something absolutely superior than them. Secondly, they worship the divine in their 
own way and as best as possible. Thirdly, and most importantly, the Indians sacrifice 
to the ‘god who is thought to be true’ (1992:189) what they value most, the ultimate 
gift, human life. Thus, and fourthly, ‘sacrifice exists by the force of natural law, and 
its forms will be established by human laws, notably in regard to the nature of the 
object sacrificed’ (1992:189). It is here that Las Casas, in Todorov’s view, is lead to 
‘perspectivism’, initiating it by the claim that the Aztecs’ god is true to them: 
But to acknowledge that their god is true for themis that not to take a first step toward 
another acknowledgement, i.e., that our God is true for usand only for us? What then 
remains common and universal is no longer the God of the Christian religion, to whom all 
should accede, but the very idea of divinity, of what is above us; the religious rather than 
religion [...] it is really surprising to see “perspectivism” introduced into a field that so poorly 
lends itself to it. Religious feeling is not defined by a universal and absolute content but by 
its orientation, and is measured by its intensity (1992:189). 
Las Casas, Todorov argues, shows an affection‘love’for the Indians that leads 
him to take the Indians’ religious ‘feeling’ seriously, something very reminiscent of 
the attitude of Maurice Leenhardt, a Protestant missionary in New Caledonia, 
Melanesia at the turn of 19th century and beginning of the 20th (see Leenhardt 1979). 
Although in a less self-conscious way, Las Casas’ arguments lead him to exhibit: 
[A] new variant of the love for one’s neighbor, for the Othera love that is no longer 
assimilationist but, so to speak, distributive: each has his own values; the comparison can be 
made only among certain relationsof each human being to his godand no longer among 
substances: there are only formal universals [...] There is no longer a true God (ours), but a 
coexistence of possible universes [...] Las Casas surreptitiously abandoned theology and 
practices here a kind of religious anthropology which, in his context, is indeed a reversal, for 
it certainly seems that the man who assumes a discourse on religion takes the first step 
toward the abandonment of religious discourse itself (1992:190).     
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Therein lies Las Casas’ ‘radicalism’, where no ‘middle way’ fits (1992:191). There is 
either a true universal religion or not, and therefore the Indians are not savages or 
aspects of our past, and now evolved, selves. This, for Todorov, bares the very 
crucial implication that assimilationism is renounced and, rather, a ‘neutral path’ is 
chosen, that of the Indians deciding what is best for them (1992:193; see also p. 249). 
Todorov’s interesting reading of the historical documents ends with a warning. In our 
‘modern’ times, he argues, it is easy to see the (‘perspectivist’) point Las Casas was 
surreptitiously making, but with a tendency to transform it into a ‘caricature’: 
“Neutral” love, Las Casas’s “distributive” justice, are parodied and drained of meaning in a 
generalized relativism where anything goes, so long as one chooses the right point of view; 
perspectivism leads to indifference and to the renunciation of all values [...] it is replaced by 
eclecticism and comparatism, by the capacity to love everything a little, of flaccidly 
sympathizing with each option without ever embracing any. Heterology, which makes the 
difference of voices heard, is necessary; polylogy is insipid (1992:251). 
 Todorov’s apt comment speaks to the ‘relativist’ tendencies that could transform 
‘perspectivism’ into something negative or caricature-like, but I do not think that he 
takes ‘relativism’ as an inherent quality of ‘perspectivism’, but as a threat to it. If 
anything, ‘perspectivism’ may work, on the contrary, as a space of preservation for 
distinct perspectives rather than their dissolution into one another, in which the 
passion for difference stands out, even with the peril of over-emphasizing it and 
hence seemingly adopting a conservative attitude. But I do not think that the 
dialogical qualities of this kind of ‘perspectivism’ have anything conservative about 
them, because what they precisely do is to unsettle our own perspectives.    
 Going past ‘syncretism’ 
Another point of inspiration for my thesis is the work of the recently deceased Cuban 
scholar and ethnographer, Joel James Figarola (1942-2006). While the majority of 
his work focuses on Palo Monte and Cuban Vodú as these are practiced in the eastern 
parts of Cuba (see James Figarola 2006a, 2006b; James Figarola et al. 1998), his 
book Sistemas Mágicos-Religiosos Cubanos: principios rectores (2001) is, to my 
knowledge, one of the exceptionally few, if not the only, efforts to compare on an 
equal basis and in depth distinct traditions such as the Regla de Ocha (Santería), the 
Regla Conga (Palo Monte), the Cuban variant of Vodú, and Espiritismo (de cordón), 
by revealing both differences and similarities. If one is privileged enough to be able 
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to read in Spanish (as his publications have not been translated), one can appreciate 
the very distinctive character of Figarola’s writing, especially when compared to 
other Cuban and non-Cuban scholars who deal with Afro-Cuban religious traditions. 
Without wishing to categorize and generalize excessively, my general feeling, after 
having read so many accounts on these traditions, is that they miss an analytical or 
interpretative depth and imagination that would boldly transgress the borders of 
conventional description. Figarola, in this sense, appears to be quite unique and I 
would place him on the other end, even to the extreme of being too ‘philosophical’ 
and with the tendency to make ethnographic description often seem extremely 
confined, obscure, and even somewhat irrelevant. But this is precisely his point, 
namely, that the ‘magico-religious systems’ of Cuba ‘contain tangible philosophical 
formulations, although not theoretically systematized’ (2001:10; my translation).7 A 
valuable and valid point I believe, although his often obscure and highly selective 
use of ethnography make him vulnerable to criticism in the face of questioning 
whether these ‘philosophical formulations’ are indeed a reflection of the systems or 
his own view of them.  
The general approach of Figarola is to pinpoint the underlying similarities, or 
as the subtitle of the book suggests, the ‘governing principles’, beneath the apparent 
differences. In the very introduction of the book, he argues that there has yet not been 
a serious effort to account for ‘the process of mestizaje [(something like) mixing] in 
Cuba’ (2001:7) and informs the reader that the approach to these ‘governing 
principles’ will adopt ‘an ontological perspective’ (2001:8). The first, and most 
important, principle which governs the rest is what he calls ‘the principle of multiple 
representation’ (2001:10-50). He commences his analysis of this principle through a 
Frazerian-like approach by ascribing to it aspects of ‘sympathetic magic’, divided 
into ‘homeopathic magic’ which obeys the ‘law of similarity’ and ‘contagious 
magic’, which in itself obeys the ‘law of contact’ (see Frazer 1993:11-48), or as 
Figarola himself calls them, ‘imitative character’, ‘continuation’ and ‘substitution’ 
(2001:22). He offers some examples of the ‘systems’ under study, whereby deities 
are ‘represented’ in multiple ways (in objects, in elements of nature, in spirit 
possessions, and so on), humans are substituted for objects and vice versa, spirits of 
                                                 
7 Whenever I quote Figarola from now on, translations are mine. 
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the dead are manifested in collective groups of people, as illustrations of what he 
means by ‘multiple representations’. The latter, in Figarola’s hands, are not rigorous 
symbolic classifications but obtain a life of their own, as it were, and ‘add efficacy 
and power’ (2001:25): ‘the representations have the capacity of free movement, to 
increase or decrease and to establish relations with the rest of the exterior world, 
independently from the behaviour of the represented object’ (2001:24).  
Figarola, as far as I understand him, tries to distance himself from a 
constructivist understanding of representation and treats it in a similar way to 
Taussig’s notion of ‘mimesis’, who in turn departs from Frazerand then proceeds 
with Benjamin (see Taussig 1993; for another interesting discussion on 
representation, see Wagner 1978, 1986). He also makes the bold claim that ‘multiple 
representation’ can be evinced within each ‘system’, or tradition, playing a specific 
role and highlighting different aspects of it in each one, but it is also in itself a 
system that permeates and, thus, brings together all of the traditions (2001:47). Each 
tradition, thus, gives priority yet ‘with a non-exclusivist reach’ (2001:48) to specific 
aspects of ‘multiple representation’. For the Regla de Ocha, he proposes, the 
emphasis is put on the ability of the deitiesthe orichasto obtain multiple forms 
the majority of which tend to be anthropomorphic and on the initiates’ ‘assimilation’ 
of the oricha through spirit possession and divination (2001:48-49). For Palo Monte, 
what is distinctive is the ‘inclusive and multifarious character’ and the plurality of 
the properties that each magic force and power possesses with which the initiate is 
inextricably implicated (2001:49). In Vodú, what prevails is the co-presence and 
‘interferences’ of multiple deitiesthe luain a given situation such as a ritual, 
informing and affecting an individual (2001:49). In Espiritismo de cordón, the 
‘governing principle’ is the possibility of many mediums channelling simultaneously 
the communication with a spirit of a dead person.     
One might agree or not with the specific content Figarola ascribes to each 
‘system’ as illustrative of the ‘principle of multiple representation’; I, for example, 
find his propositions underdeveloped and with not as much ‘thick’ ethnographic 
description as I would have wished for. But I still find his attempt an original call for 
dealing with the various traditions, engaging with the fact that many peoples’ lives 
are informed and affected by more than one of them. And whether the words 
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‘principle’ and ‘representation’ may sound dubious for some, it is the ‘multiple’ that 
I believe forms the key point of Figarola’s reading. Furthermore, his attempt has the 
merit of transgressing the most formal limits that can be said to distinguish among 
practices and beliefs recognized to belong in each ‘system’. By arguing that all 
traditions are governed by the same ‘principle of multiple representation’, although 
with a different content (and function), implies that there exists an encompassing 
‘ontological perspective’ that is specific to the Cuban case and not just to each 
tradition (see 2001:184-196). This leaves him with the relative freedom to engage 
with themthe traditionsin innovative ways that could throw new light on their 
interrelations. My thesis is very much akin to this kind of approach. Instead of 
commencing with the assumption that there are clearly delineated boundaries 
between the various traditions, the coexistence of which would view them as 
becoming ‘syncretic’ post facto and in their historical development, I propose a 
slightly different path. I begin with what Figarola does, but not in a very explicit 
way, namely, with what kind of interactions between humans and other-than-human 
entities are instantiated in each case.  
Towards the end of the book (2001:165-183), Figarola proposes a distinction 
within the very broad category of other-than-human entities between deities and the 
dead. Without exploring the issue in depth, he argues that: 
[T]he differentiating specificities of each system of beliefs [...] reside in the relations that are 
being established between the divinities and the dead, in virtue of the specific weight that is 
attributed to them in each case (2001:181).  
It is this statement that I take as one of the core elements of this present thesis and try 
to deal with, both ethnographically and theoretically and with as much depth as 
possible; deities, the dead and, of course, the living humans. A triangle that in every 
step of my fieldwork was more than often implicit, and always present and 
impossible to avoid. Figarola, in this same chapter mentions the importance of 
divination (2001:172-178). He proposes a more rigorous engagement with it, 
lamenting the fact that it is specifically this arena in which the accounts on Afro-
Cuban religious traditions have remained poor on a descriptive and analytical level. 
His brief analysis merely offers us a useful point of departure, yet the fact that he 
mentions divination in his chapter that argues for this (re)conceptualization of the 
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relations between the deities and the dead is, for me, quite telling. It is divination that 
became the main ‘instance’ of my fieldwork, as, through it, the various other-than-
human entities were perceived to ‘speak’. What they said mainly revolved around 
utterances of what their view was on human affairs, most often directed towards 
specific individuals (to whom their messages were concerned), but also messages 
that alluded to their own state of being, their moods and dispositions; their 
perspectives in general. Thus, divination seemed to do two things at least; first, 
provide us with perspectives on the biographies of those humans to whom divination 
was referring and, second, perspectives about the biographies of the entities. 
Furthermore, these two things were inseparably linked. But, divination is not just a 
piece of information upon which to just reflect. The oracular messages were not 
‘floating signifiers’ (a la Levi-Strauss), but stemmed from and led to specific actions 
(see also Holbraad 2008a, 2008c); since they were meant to refer to one’s life-course 
or ‘path’ (camino), and it is this very ‘path’ that was harnessed through them.   
My position as a foreigner and anthropologist was not always met without 
ambiguities. Especially for the former, Cubans, due to the prolonged economic crisis 
and the recent ‘opening’ to foreigners, often relate with them in a quite specific 
context. In general, the most prominent ‘kind’ of foreigners who visit Cuba are 
tourists, namely, people who stay for a relatively short period of time. Foreigners-as-
tourists are a source of invaluable hard currency, not only through state-owned 
companies, such as hotels or medical facilities, but also through a vast network of 
more informal economies, often going beyond the limits of the legally permitted. All 
sorts of ‘services’ can be provided to tourists without the latter directly dealing with 
the state: from accommodation, transport, food and the purchase of distinctively 
Cuban products, such as cigars and rum, to even, and as Cuba is widely known for, 
sex. The latter is an extremely complex phenomenon, worthy of a whole dissertation, 
as it is not confined to the conventional image one might have of it.  
Here we are not just dealing with a limited and professionalized sector of 
society which delivers one kind of servicesexand expects from the ‘client’ an 
immediate and relatively pre-established material return. ‘Sex with a price’ is only a 
part of a much broader phenomenon of the relationships developed between locals 
and foreigners which can accommodate other desires of both sides, the complexity of 
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which distance us from the purposes of this thesis (for an interesting discussion, see 
Palmié 2002:260-289). Broadly speaking, though, there seems to be a tension 
between locals and foreigners which can be perceived by the latteras this was my 
positionas a rather constant state of suspicion, or at least doubt, about the 
intentions of the former. In other words, a foreigner is very likely to experience a 
sense that the locals want something from him or her other than the probably too 
romantic expectations he or she might have of ‘pure’ friendship, love and even sex.  
I had to negotiate these ambiguities constantly, although, as I did stay for a 
rather long period, I believe I managed to go beyond the (stereo)typical ‘foreigner-
as-tourist’yumaposition.8 These ambiguities also affected my fieldwork, 
especially in the beginning, as I attempted to create bonds that were not purely based 
on the transactions that normally characterize the relationships between locals and 
foreigners. Maybe this is one of the reasons why I was not keen on being initiated in 
the Afro-Cuban religions myself as this also creates an environment of transactions, 
often of a very material nature. It also creates strong relations, in many respects an 
obligation, with the ‘ritual family’ that conducted the initiation, which may have the 
possible consequence of being limited from a more open interaction with other ‘ritual 
families’.  
Many foreigners visit Cuba with an explicit interest in Afro-Cuban religions. 
Apart from academics, I have met and heard of numerous cases of foreigners visiting 
the island in order to be part of initiations and consultations. As with any other 
‘service’ or ‘product’ provided, foreigners may pay a very different price from 
locals. The Afro-Cuban religions offer a vast number of rituals, initiations and 
oracles that, in one way or another, promise the solving of a problem, bypassing 
obstacles, fulfilling desires or providing a new perspective on things, which more 
often than not come at a price. From a more personal point of view, as the variety of 
traditions and their rituals refer to an extremely elaborate and individualized 
approach (something which I describe in the whole of this thesis), people who are in 
close contact with them often cannot resist engaging with them through a ritual, 
                                                 
8 In Cuban slang the word yuma can mean, often in a derogatory way, ‘North American’, ‘tourist’ or 
‘foreigner’; it is often used to signify a person who is ignorant of the particularities of Cuban everyday 
life and, instead, has a rather naive and exoticized image of it. 
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initiation and consultation. This may contribute to the ‘dual’ nature of these 
traditions. 
One the one hand, they are extremely open to outsiders, be they locals or 
foreigners, in their most public facets. One does not have to be (considered as) a 
‘believer’ to be part of many ceremonies, which often involve quite an attractive and 
sensational ‘space’ of music, chanting, dancing and oracular pronouncements in the 
midst of even less ‘religious’ activities such as eating, drinking, chatting, joking and, 
even, flirting. On the other hand, this public face becomes much more secluded and 
secret in those instances where a bigger degree of commitment is observed. 
Divination, for instance, has its more private moments of a one-to-one interaction 
between the diviner and the ‘client’. Furthermore, certain parts of initiationsalways 
followed by divinationmay only be witnessed by the neophyte, those who conduct 
them and people who have undergone themselves the same kind of initiation. These 
‘secret’ moments are numerous and to be able to witness them is seen as a privilege. 
Being considered as a privilege after all, the non-initiated, although not absolutely 
excluded and maybe exactly because of this, might sense that they are missing out 
the most essential parts of the ceremonies. This is probably why, and apart from 
more personal reasons, the large majority of researchers, both Cubans and foreigners, 
have undergone a kind of initiation.  
I tried to be as open as possible and as my research questions included the 
role of divination in general I followed a path that was not confined to a specific 
tradition and which sought information from both the diviners and their ‘clients’. I 
progressively established strong bonds with particular individuals and their ‘ritual 
families’, whom I would visit on a regular basis (many of them appear in this thesis). 
Through them I would exchange long discussions on the role of the oracles in 
general and in their own lives, as well as have the chance to witness consultations 
with their ‘clients’. I also talked about divination with a lot of people who were not 
as active as the diviners themselves but they either had a direct experience as 
‘clients’ or more indirectly knew other people who did, or those who had just an 
opinion on la religión. In general, I found access relatively easy and many people 
were eager to assist me. In what follows, I provide a broad outline of the thesis and a 
condensed description of each chapter.      
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Outline of the thesis 
As I said in the beginning, the main ethnographic focus of the thesis is the various 
kinds of ‘other-than-human’ entities that appear in instances of divination. During 
the latter the perspectives of the former are revealed in relation to the ‘humans’ but 
also to themselves. Both ‘humans’ and ‘other-than-humans’ are said to have a ‘path’ 
(camino). Divination brings these ‘paths’ to the fore and shows them, but it also 
instantiates their mutual constitution and tight interrelationstheir ‘crossed’ nature. 
It is here where I will attempt to show the particularities and ontological differences 
of these various kinds of other-than-human entities, and the traditions that invoke 
them, and provide a comparison on an equal basis that shows both their differences 
and their perception as all pertaining to the ‘beyond’.  
Chapter 1 could be seen as a continuation of this Introduction. It makes a 
brief mention of the ethnography, but mainly makes reference to two related broad 
themes that appeared in multiple ways during my fieldwork. These are divination 
itself and notions of destiny. I consequently deal with anthropological accounts on 
divination and how these could throw light on the more obscure and less explored 
notion of destiny. Here, following Victor Turner and Robin Horton, I attempt to paint 
a picture of destiny in its various dimensionsranging from specific and more 
‘embodied’ points of view of it to a more encompassing and ‘disembodied’ 
onewhich is more relevant to the indigenous notion of camino.  
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 tackle the various kinds of other-than-human entities and 
more specifically the channels of communication that are instantiated between them 
and the living through divination through ethnographic description. More 
specifically, chapters 2 and 3, deal with different kinds of spirits of the deadlos 
muertos, while chapter 4 with the deities of the Regla de Ocha/Ifáthe orichas. 
Chapter 2 focuses on a very little explored category of the dead (exactly because, as I 
argue, they seem to not ‘belong’ to any specific tradition), which I call ‘alien’ 
muertos, whose interaction with the living is often puzzling, seen as causing 
confusion or even misfortune. Looking at how people come to perceive them, I try to 
explore their condition as one of lacking the potential to communicate and relate, to 
get ‘attached’ to people in a way that would grant them a more stable kind of 
reciprocity with them. On the contrary, chapter 3 deals with those muertos who do 
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get ‘attached’ to people in a more permanent and reciprocal fashion and become, 
what I call, their ‘affines’ through Espiritismo. Between these two categories of 
muertos, I identify one which exhibits characteristics of both, but also its own sui 
generis ones. These are muertos who are initially drawn from the generic reservoir of 
‘alien’ muertos but the relations instantiated with them also make them some sort of 
‘affines’although not in the conventional ‘spiritist’ sense. These are the nfumbi of 
Palo Monte, which I deal with in the last half of chapter 2.  
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the orichas and their interaction with the living. The 
most common paths of communication with them is not the body and the senses, as 
is the case with the muertos, but mainly through ‘material’ oracles which are 
normally employed in the specific space and time of divination which invokes them 
by the adequately prepared and consecrated individuals, the diviners. Another broad 
distinction is that the orichas’ oracular utterances tend to be less idiosyncratic and 
context specific than those of the muertos, yet, if this can be seen as their limit, it is 
also understood as their ability to reveal a broader image of one’s camino. Thus, 
Chapters 5 and 6 try to account for all these differences and common threads in a 
more theoretical way.  
Chapter 5 is concerned with what can be said to constitute each entity’s 
ontology. Considering that it is in divination that information about and from the 
entities is being revealed, there seems to be an interconnected notion of ‘motion’ (see 
Holbraad 2008c); first, in that of one’s camino and, second, in that of the entities 
themselves in order to participate in divination and, more generally, in peoples’ lives. 
Are there categories that could be useful in understanding both the differences and 
similarities among them? Is there a basic ontological ‘material’ or ‘ingredient’ that 
relates the living, the dead and the deities? Are we dealing with a linear movement 
from immanence to transcendence (and vice versa)? Are immanence and 
transcendence useful analytical concepts, or is something else at play? In order to 
start answering these questions, I engage with accounts on Afro-Cuban religious 
traditions that have provided me with useful ideas. I commence with Palmié, and 
then proceed with Holbraad and Espirito Santo, particularly in their use of the 
categories of ‘immanence and transcendence’ and explore whether they can account 
for the totality of the entities I am dealing with.   
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Chapter 6 proposes to compare divination with ‘perspectivism’ and explore 
their potential congruence or affinity. Although the most general premises of 
perspectivism are mentioned in the Introduction through my engagement with 
Todorov, here I deal with a more specific and anthropologically relevant view on it, 
through Viveiros de Castro. I attempt to detach perspectivism from its Amerindian 
context and explore whether divination in Cuba has any perspectival qualities. Final 
and definite conclusions are not to be expected, as I think that the venture is little 
explored. Thus, as with divination itself, rather than assertions or certainties, this 











After just a few weeks of being in Havana, my landlady willingly offers to introduce 
me to a neighbour of hers that, as she tells me, ‘is involved in the religion [esta 
metido en la religión].’ This quite informal way of obtaining useful contacts for my 
research proved to be one of the most common avenues, and this persisted till the end 
of my fieldwork. The ‘religion’ was not something that could be directly or strictly 
found in public ritual spaces and organized in a rigorous institutional way, but rather 
occurred in houses, out in the street, on the banks of a river or the sea, outside 
churches, in the middle of a forest, or a cemetery. My landlady had previously called 
her neighbour, ‘a well respected individual, who has helped a lot of people’, and had 
told him about me and my interests. As I overhear their telephone conversation, my 
landlady tells him: ‘My tenant is a foreign student who is interested in the religion.’ 
She hangs up and tells me that her neighbour, Fernando, would be glad to ‘talk about 
religion.’ Her constant use of the singular‘the religion’perplexed me on what 
kind of religion we were talking about. My bibliographical research when preparing 
for fieldwork had given me an image of the existence of multiple traditions, so, what 
was it, one of them or all of them? I soon came to realize that it was both.  
Fernando lives on the ground floor of a three-storied block of flats with its 
independent entrance through a small front yard. Upon knocking on the door of his 
apartment, a woman in her early forties, his wife, opens and warmly welcomes me 
in: ‘Fernando is dressing up; he will be here in a minute, have a seat. Do you want 
coffee?’ I reply positively and take a seat on a very uncomfortable armchair in the 
small, box-shaped living-room. On the sofa are seated three young children who 
greet me somewhat indifferently and continue watching the TV. Fernando’s wife, 
Lucia, serves me the typical strong, black and sweet Cuban coffee and sits on a stool. 
Exchanging a few conventional words about my country of origin and my stay in 
Cuba, I soon realize that Lucia is as much absorbed in what is on the TV as her 
36 
 
children. They are watching a video cassette of a movie I recognize, ‘The Others’ 
(directed by Alejandro Amenábar and released in 2001); set in a huge isolated 
mansion and depicting a nightmarish realization of the protagonistsa mother 
(Nicole Kidman) with her two young childrenof being dead, although not aware of 
it and acting as if they were alive until the end of the story. Lucia interrupted the 
silence: ‘This is why we, the living, play such an important part in making the dead 
realize their condition; you cannot imagine how many times I have experienced 
similar situations. If you don’t grant them acknowledgment they wander in despair 
and provoke mischief.’ Her words came out so naturally, with no intention to 
provoke some kind of a deep existential discussion about life and death and not 
explicitly directed to any one of us in the room. They floated in the room as a factual 
and mundane comment would do, not depending on or awaiting any response. 
Nevertheless, one of her children turned to her and asked: ‘Is this why grandma was 
upsetting us so much after her death?’ The child’s tone seemed again to be 
demonstrating that the question was more like an affirmation rather than seeking an 
answer. Lucia laconically replied: ‘Yes’, and kept on watching how ‘The Others’ 
were slowly realizing their ‘otherness’. 
I was extremely intrigued and content to realize that fieldwork had already 
begun even in the mere act of drinking a coffee and watching a movie. I started 
wondering how Cubans like Lucia and her family view movies, especially those that 
Hollywood has produced in the hundreds, if not thousands, on fictive and paranormal 
stories of ghosts, spirits of the dead, extraordinary perceptual powers, and so on. 
What was being watched was clearly a familiar event that could be compared to the 
biographical experiences of this family; of specific spirits of the dead seeking 
‘recognition’; of a grandmother who upset them after her death. The ‘Others’ were 
not a totally foreign cultural construct to be watched in an enchanting fictitiousness, 
but more like a sort of documentary that aroused personal memories, verified present 
experiences and implied future events. Was all this part of la religión as well? 
Fernando, taking him a bit more than ‘a minute’ to dress up, made his appearance in 
the living-room. In a loud and joking manner he said: ‘How many times will you 
watch this movie? Come Anastasio, let’s go inside to my consulting room.’ Fernando 
is around 50 years old and as he introduces himself he quickly makes known that he 
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is a babalawo, a high-priest of the Yoruba-inspired religious tradition of Ifá, 
organized around the worship of the deityorichaof divination, Orula.  
The ‘consulting room’ (cuarto de consulta) which is also the couple’s 
bedroom, consists of a multiplicity of objects that, as I come to know, belong to la 
religión, some of which are indispensable for making Orula ‘come down’ (bajarse) 
and participate in Fernando’s divinations. Among others, there is a round wooden 
tray, carved on its borders, a chain with eight pieces of coconut attached to it, a horn, 
and a small wooden pot. All of these are placed around a straw mat, where Fernando 
sits barefoot; his usual place for consulting the Ifá oracle. After a long conversation 
revolving around my interests and a first introduction to Ifá divination, he asks me if 
I would like to stay and witness a consultation planned to take place shortly. I 
happily accept the invitation. The client is a man in his late thirties who has been 
initiated by Fernando and wishes to explore the possibility of undergoing further 
initiations. In traditions like Ifá there is normally a chain of initiations that 
commence with minor ones which are meant to provide a general guidance and 
protection, culminatingif the oracles advise soto fuller initiations, which confer 
a right of active participation, the use of oracles and initiating others (see Holbraad 
2008c:223-230). Fernando’s ‘godchild’ (ahijado) has come for a simple consultation, 
whereby no definitive oracular advice is given, but instead is regarded as limited in 
reach and only indicative.  
Without providing a detailed account of the consultation here (for one, see 
chapter 4), it focused on the client’s current situation in a variety of aspects. The 
discussion ranged from the mundane and easily recognized to my untrained ears of 
events, such as whether things were ‘walking’ (caminar) smoothly in his personal 
and professional life, to more obscure references to his relations with his past 
initiations, certain orichas and obligations towards them. What Fernando stressed 
more than once was the importance of taking heed of the oracular pronouncements 
uttered in the young man’s previous initiation. All this discussion was ignited by the 
previous consultation of the Ifá oracle, which mainly included preliminary 
invocations to the spirit world, and especially Orula; the use of the divining chain 
(okpele or ekuele), which ‘drew out’ (sacar) the oracular ‘signs’ (signos or oddu), 
and upon which the subsequent conversation heavily relied on. Fernando’s comments 
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introduced me to a word that often made its appearance in the divinatory context, not 
only of consultations per se, but the actions following them as well. This was the 
word ‘path’ (camino). For instance, Fernando advised his ahijado that his camino 
was one of getting initiated in Ocha, and more specifically under the guidance of the 
oricha Obatalá, but not in Ifá. He made it clear that he should strictly stick to this 
advice because, otherwise, he would suffer serious misfortunes. His camino was to 
respect la religión, but not to be immersed in it; in other words, his initiation in Ocha 
did not forsee an active role in the priesthood. Rather, his camino was to become a 
good lawyer and Obatalá, an oricha being partly associated with justice, would come 
to his support if properly taken care of. Full initiation, thus, would ‘open and assure 
the path’ (abrir y asegurar el camino) towards this direction. In this context, 
divination seemed to play a crucial role in revealing peoples’ caminos, opening them 
up and showing them their potentials. Camino was sometimes interchanged by the 
word destino (‘destiny’), and thus implied a strong connection to divination. It is this 
very connection that provided the ethnographic foundation upon which this very 
diverse and often confusing image of Afro-Cuban divinatory experience, perception 
and conception constantly confronted me throughout my fieldwork. 
The notion of camino was presented to me with two broad and mutually 
constitutive dimensions. The first referred to the ‘path’ that each living human-being 
was traversing in his or her life-course. Aspects of one’s camino may remain hidden, 
unexpressed and, even, unfulfilled: these ranged from specific events to more general 
characteristics, dispositions, tendencies, weaknesses and potentials and could be with 
either negative or positive effects. The second referred to the ‘path’ that other-than-
human entities also traversed: spirits of the dead had one; often called camino de 
muerto, and this could range from a ‘material’ (material) to a ‘spiritual’ (espiritual) 
one. Deities like the orichas were also said to have, or to be caminos. In this sense, 
not only could distinctions be made between them, but it also revealed the many 
‘paths’ a single deity could have. To say that these two dimensionsthe human and 
the non-humanare mutually constitutive means that a deviation from or a 
fulfilment of a human camino was dependent on a ‘desire’ (deseo) stemming from 
the non-human dimension. For instance, a spirit of the dead might cause misfortunes 
because it requires ‘acknowledgement’ and the need to be attended to. An oricha 
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might ask for a certain sacrifice in order to be ‘fed’ and in turn to help its human 
‘child’. 
Divination created the ‘space’ par excellence, where the mutual constitution 
of human and other-than-human caminos was brought to the fore. Firstly, it revealed 
whether the issue and the person in question were directly related to ‘the beyond’. 
Secondly, if this was the case, a discernment of ‘the beyond’ was sought, that is, 
identification of the specific other-than-human entities involved and their desires, 
such as offerings or initiations. From the human point of view, divination revealed 
aspects of or the whole of the camino of an individual, as well as, and always in 
relation to aspects of the camino of specific other-than-human entities.  
Broadly speaking, and as I mentioned in the Introduction, and what will be 
explored further in the following chapters, two kinds of other-than-human entities 
emerged; spirits of the deadmuertosand deitiesthe orichas. Each kind of entity 
exhibited certain distinctive characteristics: muertos appeared in the senses, 
surrounding and interacting with one’s body. They also tended to reveal specific 
aspects of one’s camino and not so much the whole span of it. Additionally, muertos’ 
caminos seemed themselves to be a more fluid and potentially transforming state of 
being, always in need of the living to facilitate their motion, along with the formers’ 
support of the latter. The orichas, on the other hand, tended towards a 
communication with the world of the living through ‘objects’often consecrated 
and acquiring the role of oracleswhich revealed a mythical state of affairstheir 
biographiesand, by way of discernment, related it to the individual the divination 
was aimed at. The orichas were praised for being able to reveal more enduring 
aspects of one’s camino and, in the case of major initiations (where the neophyte 
creates a conscious and permanent relation of reciprocity with specific orichas), 
significant aspects of the whole camino. The fluidity of the orichas was not so much 
referring to their ontological statethis being more or less safeguarded in the 
mythological pastbut, to rendering them, through divination, communicable and 
relevant to peoples’ caminos.   
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Divination and Destiny 
The categories this thesis is dealing with have proved to be theoretically slippery and 
quite vague. Divination and destiny have not made it to the anthropological hall of 
fame, although, especially the first, often makes its appearance alongside other very 
much explored categories, such as those of ‘religion’, ‘magic’, ‘ritual’ and 
‘mythology’. Although, initially I considered this gap in anthropological inquiry to 
be potentially promising, in so far as it could possibly make an interesting 
contribution to my thesis, by providing reasoned discussion for building a systematic 
argument for an ‘anthropology of divination and destiny’, I have progressively 
moved away from such an enthusiastic and ambitious endeavour. This is not because 
I believe it to be an impossible task, or of no importance, but because an increasingly 
growing gut feeling makes me suspicious of any kind of an ‘Anthropology of ...’, 
especially in the face of a postmodernist deconstructive approach towards any kind 
of category. Such approaches have been powerful in capturing our historical 
imagination of self-building and understanding and by injecting a critical and self-
reflexive attitude towards our theoretical models and, indeed, categories (for religion, 
see Asad 1993; for ritual, see Bell 1992; Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994). Yet, I also 
believe that they leave us with a sense of void and uncertainty of what to do next. 9 
Would it be too far-fetched or even aggressive to argue that this otherwise 
illuminating genealogical hunt for our ‘Western’ categories has entrapped us into a 
radically introvert and at times narcissist dead-end? (For interesting discussions, see 
Mimica 2010; Spencer 1989) Would I be wrong to wonder whether the appearance 
of even separate chapters in current Ph.D. theses which are dedicated to 
‘methodology’, ‘self-reflexivity’ and ‘ethics’ as an almost unspoken and taken for 
granted rule of thumb is congruent with this aforementioned introversion? Is 
Anthropology merely the ‘bastard child’ of our colonial sins for which we should 
endlessly recycle our confessions to the disembodied ears of a Father God we have 
already killed by turning Him into a metaphor, an illusion (see Freud 1972, 1991) or, 
recently (again!), a delusion (see Dawkins 2007)? 
                                                 
9 I take ‘us’ to refer to at least graduate and post-graduate students of Anthropology who have just 
embarked on their academic journey and, as I have often experienced it, commence with enthusiasm 
which progressively shifts into disenchantment. 
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Returning to this short introduction to divination and destiny, I am willing to 
follow a strategy of dealing with them which minimises their objectification as much 
as possible. Avoiding to ‘name’ the object of study is not necessarily a negative 
attitude; it might offer an openness and more positive theorization, considering the 
taken for granted input of ethnography into the current anthropological discourse. 
Thus, what I mostly avoid is a kind of pre-emptive definition of them. In this chapter 
I will mention, somewhat selectively, certain approaches to and ethnographies of 
divination, position myself towards them, and introduce a broad ethnographic sketch 
of the Afro-Cuban divinatory phenomenon in relation to how this is linked to a 
particular notion of destiny. Divination and oracles have been a recurrent theme of 
ethnographic accounts in sub-Saharan Africa, especially by a number of British 
anthropologists who, as Horton suggests (1962:215), might be grouped under the 
label of the ‘Oxford School’. This body of work unavoidably commences with the 
pioneering research of Evans-Pritchard.    
Evans-Pritchard (1990) describes how the ‘poison oracle’ (benge) is 
employed by the Azandespread among the Republic of Sudan, Zaire and the 
Republic of Central Africain order to reveal cases of ‘witchcraft’ (mangu). He 
distinguishes it from magic in that it is not the outcome of a rite, a spell or a 
manipulation of medicines, but an ‘inherent quality’, a ‘substance in the body’ which 
may also be inherited (Evans-Pritchard 1990:1; see also pp. 176-204). 
Magicdivided between ‘sorcery’ when the ends are anti-social and causes 
misfortunes and ‘good magic’involves techniques which are consciously and 
actively employed in order to reach the desired result; whereas witchcraft, which as 
sorcery creates and explains anti-social behaviour, is a ‘physical act’ (1990:1), stirred 
by the inner, often unconscious, desires of the individual and its possession of the 
concrete substance of witchcraft. Although the Azande make use of a multiplicity of 
oracles, they place the ultimate authority to the verdicts of the ‘poison oracle’ or 
benge (1990:40-44, 120-175). The poison is extracted from a wild forest creeper, but 
it is only after an adequate process of consecration that its natural properties are 
extended to its function as an oracle (1990:146-149). The use of benge is relatively 
simple and yields answers in the affirmative or the negative. The poison is inserted in 
the mouth of fowls and, depending on whether they survive or die, the Azande 
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acquire the answer, involving whether the misfortune in question is a matter of 
witchcraft and, if it is, who the witch might be. 
Evans-Pritchard’s most often cited example is that of the granary, which I 
believe encapsulates his approach on Zande oracular revelation of witchcraft 
(1990:22-23). Every now and then, he says, an old granary might collapse and cause 
injury or death to the person standing underneath. The Azande, as ‘we’ do, know that 
the granary might have been very old or eaten by termites and that this was the 
immediate and ‘natural’ cause of its collapse. Nevertheless, gravity, decay and 
termites do not answer with satisfaction why the granary fell at that particular 
moment on that particular person. In other words, ‘natural’ or empirical causation 
cannot fully and logically account for the ‘coincidence in time and space’: 
We have no explanation of why the two chains of causation intersected at a certain time and 
in a certain place, for there is no interdependence between them. Zande philosophy can 
supply the missing link [...] Witchcraft explains the coincidence [...] Witchcraft explains why 
events are harmful to man and not how they happen. A Zande perceives how they happen just 
as we do [...] witchcraft is the socially relevant cause, since it is the only one which allows 
intervention and determines social behaviour [...] death is not only a natural fact but also a 
social fact’ (1990:23-35).   
Evans-Pritchard’s contribution is mostly ethnographic and one can admire the 
detailed descriptions that stem from his commitment to take the Azande seriously, 
something which at the time of the book’s publication (1937) was not a 
straightforward thing to do. Although he proclaimed that ‘[w]itches, as the Azande 
conceive them, clearly cannot exist’ (1990:18), he resisted the then dominant 
anthropological accounts that commenced and ended with a similar frame of mind 
and reduced their analysis of magico-religious beliefs and practices to sociological 
and psychological categories already at hand. Evans-Pritchard’s analysis did not 
remain immune to them however, as he also took witchcraft and oracles to ultimately 
reflect social (and antisocial) relations and ‘a system of moral values which regulate 
human conduct’ (1990:18); and to be the idiom of ‘antisocial sentiments’ (1990:51). 
Perhaps what made the difference in his work as compared to others is that he 
insisted on a detailed ethnographic description and kept analytical comments to a 
minimum.  
Oracles in Cuba were also very often used to reveal ultimate causes, and 
people commonly consulted them in times of crisis, misfortune and puzzlement in 
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order to identify its origin and determine a subsequent course of action. One big 
ethnographic difference between this and the Azande is that misfortune did not 
necessarily stem from human agency (as in the case of the Azande) whether 
consciously or actively provoked (‘sorcery’, in Evans-Pritchard’s terms) or not 
(‘witchcraft’). The afflicted was faced with a wide range of causes, often stemming 
from his or her relation with ‘the beyond’. Furthermore, ‘the beyond’ also proved 
equally difficult to define and polysemic; in it resided entities such as Yoruba deities, 
Catholic saints, God, ‘dark’ or ‘enlightened’ spirits of the dead, among others. Even 
in the case of ‘witchcraft’ (brujería), where the affliction would ultimately come 
from another living person, the means or origins could also be non-human. With its 
most popular face, witchcraft would involve the manipulation of an other-than-
human entity, most often a particular kind of dead person (see chapter 2), who would 
be ‘sent’ on behalf of the afflicter to the afflicted. The multiplicity of other-than-
human entities went hand in hand with a multiplicity of oracles that granted 
communication with them. Initiations, offerings, sacrifices and more subtle ways of 
participation seemed to be part of this multiplicity of ‘the beyond’, each meant to 
realign the relations to a ‘path’ that was potentially able to embrace each one of 
them. Oracles and divination participated in a very complex process of discernment 
among these various entities and revealed the adequate avenues of relating with 
them. I was thus faced with an overwhelming image of ‘the beyond’.  
Aspects of the Zande ethnography remind me of the Afro-Cuban one, but 
only as fragments of a much more encompassing phenomenon. I am also reminded 
of the Nuer spiritual universe as was also depicted by Evans-Pritchard (1977), where 
the human factor is subordinated to the more ritualized environment of deities and 
spirits (see also Lienhardt 1987). In order to grasp such a multiplicity and 
participation I found it hard to follow a somewhat more conventional path of 
fieldwork that can be evinced in accounts on Afro-Cuban religious traditions, 
namely, of focusing on just one of them. If for many Cubans ‘the beyond’ included 
all these different kinds of entities, why should the organizational structure be what 
has historically been distilled into different traditions? Why, in other words, 
commence with them axiomatically? Instead, could this ‘blending’often termed as 
‘syncretism’ (see Ayorinde 2004:21-24; Bascom and Herskovits 1959; Bastide 
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2007:260-284; Brandon 1993:59-74, 157-185; Menéndez 2002)be most fruitfully 
approached by making the divinatory experience the ‘object’ of study and allowing it 
to meander down many paths in the same way that many Cubans were confronted 
with? I hope this has had its merits and, to a certain extent, contributes to a 
consideration of this thesis as an alternative proposition of ethnographic engagement 
with Afro-Cuban religiosity and divination.  
Some 20 or so years after Evans-Pritchard’s publication on the Zande notions 
of witchcraft, magic and the use of oracles, Victor Turner offered his account on 
Ndembua tribe situated in North-West Zambiadivination (1975; see also Turner 
1961). Without exposing in detail Turner’s ethnography, I shall mention a distinction 
he makes between ‘divination’ and ‘revelation’ that might provide interesting food 
for thought. To begin with, Turner formulates the notion of divination and revelation 
as processes of ‘making visible’kusolola, in the Ndembu idiomthings not 
straightforwardly available, something that most accounts on divination take as an 
indispensable and definitional premise of it.10 But, if both divination and revelation 
‘unmask’, they unmask different things. 
 Turner builds up a dichotomy, based on his earlier work on ‘liminality’ and 
‘communitas’, ‘structure’ and ‘anti-structure’ (see Turner 1995), between two 
aspects of social life. The first is what he calls the ‘unitary flow of experience’ 
(1975:16) where life, both social and natural, is experienced in its unity, without 
distinctions and hierarchical statuses, and with profound ‘universal’ equality and 
homogeneity. He calls it a ‘concrete whole’, where non-dualism prevails. The second 
seems to be stemming from the first and is created by the division of this unitary 
flow into structures, statuses and hierarchies which come to form an ‘abstract system 
[...] set aside from this flow’ (1975:16). This is the social plane of dualism and 
structures which ultimately ‘mask’ the previous homogeneous and egalitarian plane. 
Between the concrete whole and the abstract system there is a tension as the social 
person is divided between its actual structural position, with its particular interests, 
and a less explicit but also deeply ingrained intuitive ‘need’ for equality. The abstract 
system of structures, which are mutually interdependent in order to sustain it, 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Curry 2010; Curry and Voss 2007:viiii; Johnston and Struck 2005; LaGamma 




resemble what Dumont had in mind (1970), but also the fact that it is characterized 
by social divisions, hierarchies, structures and inequalities which are hidden behind 
an apparent whole and unity, we are also reminded of Marx’s notion of ideology here 
(see Marx 1938).  
For Turner, ‘revelation’ momentarily and ritually‘liminally’, borrowing 
from Van Gennep (1960)unmasks the unitary flow, by making it felt in an almost 
Durkheimean sense of ‘collective effervescence’ (Durkheim 2008:154-168, 280-
285). ‘Divination’ unmasks the divisions of the abstract system. Both ‘make visible’: 
Whether as the disclosure of what has previously been concealed (divination), or as the 
manifestation of what resists conceptualization in the linguistic terms available to the 
Ndembu (revelation) [...] Thus divination is a mode of analysis and a taxonomic system, 
while revelation is a prehension of experience taken as a whole [...] Divination proceeds by a 
sequence of binary oppositions, moving stepwise from classes to elements. Revelation, on 
the contrary, begins with authoritative images or root metaphors, manifested as sets of 
connected symbols, and is culturally contrived to give those exposed to it of what Walt 
Whitman might have called “the rondure, the cohesion of all” [...] Divination is the process 
of unmaking the private drives of those who seek personal gain at the expense of corporate 
welfare. Revelation and divination both unmask, but divination unmasks the culturally 
defined sins and vices of those who voluntarily separate themselves from the living flow of 
society, while revelation uncovers that flow itself (1975:15-17). 
After these preliminary comments, Turner presents us with an ethnographic case of 
revelation (1975:37-203) and one of divination (1975:207-338) among the Ndembu. 
The first describes the Chihamba ritual, a ‘cult of affliction’ (37), whereby 
misfortune stems from ancestor spirits and a deity called Kavula. In order to 
overcome the affliction the person undergoes various degrees of initiation to the 
‘cult’ whereby he or she gains a sense of ‘wholeness’ by transcending a series of 
structural contradictions made up in Ndembu society (1975:179-187): 
This series of paradoxical situations is the nearest Ndembu can get to the expression of a total 
act-of-being which transcend both life and death in the material sense [...] The aim appears to 
be, both for poet and for Ndembu ritual man, to break through the habitual patterns formed 
by secular custom, rational thinking, and common sense, to a condition where the pure act-
of-being is directly apprehended [...] It is believed at the therapeutic level at least that the 
candidates have been made whole (1975:183-185). 
The second account is of Ndembu divination, whereby diviners employ an oracle that 
consists of a winnowing basket and certain objects that are tossed into it and given 
oracular configurations which the diviner then interprets in order to detect the 
sources of misfortune. Here the agents of misfortune are not so much spiritual beings 
such as ancestors or deities but humans who have acted out of selfish interest against 
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the moral values of Ndembu society; something which in the idiom of divination and 
Ndembu beliefs, according to Turner, is understood as witchcraft. The diviner 
essentially unmasks these social breaches. In relation to Evans-Pritchard’s work, 
revelation would thus approximate the Nuer spiritual universe while divination the 
Zande witchcraft. Thinking beyond the possible criticisms of attributing divination a 
symbolic and regulatory nature (see Ahern 1982; Jules-Rosette 1978; Myhre 
2006:314-316; Swancutt 2006; Tedlock 2001), I wish to hold onto the distinction 
Turner makes between ‘revelation’ and ‘divination’, and explore whether it can be of 
any relevance to the Cuban context.   
To begin with, I wish to distance myself from the specific content Turner 
ascribes to both terms. Thus, in order to render his views constructive of my own, I 
shall initially and partially submit them to a kind of deconstruction. My first 
deconstructive attempt is of the very terms themselves: Turner seems to be ascribing 
a quite idiosyncratic meaning to them, on top of their more conventional one. Take 
for example their definitions in a dictionary. Revelation is ‘making known something 
that was secret or hidden’, while to reveal is to ‘make something known’. Divination 
is ‘foretelling the future by supernatural means’, while to divine is to ‘sense 
(something) by intuition, to guess or reveal (something hidden, especially the future) 
by magical means’ (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary). Of course, one cannot 
expect anthropologists to literally stick to the meanings offered in a dictionary as it is 
the latter which get enriched or even critically handled by the ethnographer’s touch. 
For instance, exploring the word ‘garden’ among the Trobrianders, Malinowski 
demonstrates its plural significance in its various different contexts: ‘The figment of 
a dictionary is as dangerous theoretically as it is useful practically’ (1935:22), he 
exclaims at some point.  
Turner disregards the dictionary’s definition that divination is mainly a 
foretelling of the future, and in this he finds me in complete agreement. As many 
Cuban diviners stress, oracles reveal ‘past, present and future’ (pasado, presente y 
futuro) or, else, (aspects of) one’s ‘path’ (camino). Turner challenges the dictionary 
in another sense: while revelation is defined as making something known, to divine 
is essentially to reveal something by magical or supernatural means. The distinction 
implies that the former operates by non-supernatural means, or at least, not 
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necessarily by supernatural means, and because of this it is thus presented as an 
umbrella term. Turner’s use, in the context of the Ndembu rituals, takes both to 
participate to the supernatural. This reveals the potential of revelation to make 
something known by supernatural means, but this is not constitutive of its definition; 
what is, is to make something known irrespective of the means. What this seems to 
suggest is that revelation is a more encompassing act than divination. Let us not 
forget, though, that the distinction in these terms is made by Turner and not by the 
Ndembu. The latter, according to him, have just one word, kusolola (1975:15). 
Revelation and divination, hence, present us with two different aspects of something 
that accommodates bothkusolola.  It is this more general approach by Turner that I 
find inspiring, rather than the specific content  of ‘revelation’  as that which makes 
visible the ‘unitary flow of experience’, and of ‘divination’ as those instances and 
individuals that set themselves apart from that flow.  
The contents of both terms seem quite obscure and their universalizing 
aspirations render the Ndembu ethnography a mere illustration of Turner’s 
theoretical models. To me, the claim that there is a unitary flow of life that 
transcends divisions, differences and structures appears quite unconvincing, although 
in some respects as powerful as Durkheim’s ‘collective effervescence’. Turner seems 
to suggest that equality and homogeneity are interchangeable terms and, furthermore, 
that these are the ‘natural’ and ‘universal’ conditions of humanity. On the other hand, 
he equates diversity with structures and oppositions, which are constructed and 
social. Why should equality and identity be constitutive of each other, in the same 
way as alterity and opposition? This remains a very problematic notion which might 
be revealing of Turner’s worldview rather than that of the Ndembu. As the Ndembu 
do, I have chosen to employ one termas indeed the Cubans themselves do, that of 
‘divination’ (adivinación) and explore its various contents without these leading to 
the constitution of different terms. The diversity of the contents could point to the 
fact that there are various kinds of divinations. 
Indeed, in the Cuban context, adivinación, like religión, might be an umbrella 
term when it comes to referring to the communication with ‘the beyond’ in general, 
but one soon realizes that ‘the beyond’ is constituted by not only a plurality of other-
than-human entities, but also of different kinds. The most basic distinction that my 
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thesis deals with is that between spirits of the dead and deities. Lucia’s comments in 
the beginning of the chapter alluded to the former, while Fernando’s brief account to 
the latter. Communication with the deadlos muertosexhibits some vital 
differences from that with deities such as the orichas. This can be demonstrated by 
the ways in which they are communicated with: muertos do so mainly through the 
diviner’s body and senses; the orichas mainly through the diviner’s use of 
consecrated objects. Differences also lie in what each kind tends to ‘say’ through 
divination. As I will show in more detail later, the muertos’ perspectives tend to be 
more idiosyncratic, closely linked to their biographies, and they normally reveal 
information about specific events and aspects of one’s life. The orichas’ 
perspectives, on the other hand, tend to be broader in scope and able to reveal one’s 
life as a whole. The messages of each kind, consequently, speak to a relatively 
different kind of dimension of one’s life, create different kinds of commitments with 
those entities, and might lead to different subsequent actions. Yet, contrary to Turner, 
the distinctions do not necessarily lead to oppositions, neither does encompassment 
and coexistence to the dissolving of such distinctions. What I wish to preserve from 
Turner’s already deconstructed model is the two broad tendencies I just described of 
the oracular instantiation of the dead and deities. The former tend to reveal the ‘flow 
of life’ in its specificity and as particular pointswhat Turner calls 
‘divination’while the latter do so in a more encompassing dimension, even to the 
extent of revealing the whole of itwhat he calls ‘revelation’. This kind of flow does 
not speak to humanity in general, but to the individual’s life-course or ‘path’, and 
this confronts us with an inevitable engagement between divination and destiny. I 
hereby mention Horton’s contribution to such an understanding. 
A much more relevant ethnography to the Cuban context is that of the 
Kalabari as presented by Robin Horton (1962). The Kalabari, he argues, have four 
levels of existence. The first, tomi kiri, is ‘the place of the people’ (Horton 
1962:199), which includes all things tangible and visible to common human 
perception and experience. Then, there are another three levels, teme, so and tamuno, 
which are what Horton sets out to describe in detail. He translates teme as ‘spirit’ 
(1962:199), something that is highly reminiscent of what the Cubans call ‘the 
beyond’. Teme can be divided in three broad categories of (‘free’) spirits which can 
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be perceived only by particular personsthe divinersor by ordinary men through 
their effects. The first category is that of ‘duenthe ancestors’ (1962:200). These are 
people who once lived and died in Kalabari communities and are ‘thought of as 
pursuing desires and values similar to those they pursued in life’ (1962:200). These 
desires are not so much individualistic or idiosyncratic (in fact, Horton portrays an 
image of the Kalabari individual as immersed in the community roles and 
responsibilities) but distil down to the wellbeing of their lineage descendants, as long 
as they are adequately appeased. On the contrary, and this goes for the rest of the 
spirits as well, they bring misfortune.  
The second category is that of ‘am’oruvillage heroes’ (1962:200). The 
heroes too were once living persons and cohabited with the Kalabari in their 
communities. Nevertheless, they are very often depicted as not being related to the 
latter in kinship terms; they came from afar, they brought and established new laws 
and ways of life and ‘[f]inally, instead of dying like the ancestors, the heroes 
disappeared into the sky or into the ground. They were not buried, and they left no 
descendants behind them’ (1962:200). While the ancestors interact with and 
influence the fate of their lineage groups, the heroes do so with the whole village. 
Breaches in the specific customs they introduced would cause misfortune to the 
whole village, while their observance would fortify its welfare.  
The third category is that of ‘owuamaputhe water people’ (1962:201). 
They do not coexist with people but live underwater in their own villages. Although 
their mode of behaviour can be human-like, what is highlighted is their 
‘polymorphism’ (1962:201) in that they may appear to humans as humans, pythons 
or rainbows. Their relative deviation and distance from humanity (both in spatial and 
ontological terms) is, according to Horton, congruent with that of their sociality; the 
water people instantiate aspects of the ‘extra-social’ (1962:202) domain. For 
example, they are identified with the rivers and the sea, the weather conditions and 
the abundance of fishthe Kalabari’s main economic activity is fishingpositive 
and negative human behaviour that goes off the beaten track of social norms (such as 
innovations, possession of extreme wealth and power whether or not ill-acquired, not 
meeting up social roles such as parenthood, madmen, for example). In other words, 
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water people are identified with natural or social forces that escape the immediacy 
and familiarity of the Kalabari normative order.   
It is here that Horton introduces a kind of ethnographic analysis that I find 
extremely useful when it comes to the Cuban spirit-world, which also confronts us 
with a similar multiplicity. All three categories of the Kalabari spirits are depicted as 
different in relation to each other and the living. However, the potential for 
cooperation is evident. Their differences do not lead to an absolute negation of 
relations but, on the contrary, is constitutive of them. It is only because they are 
different that they can relate; and furthermore the differences emerge through their 
very relations. The ancestors provide for the immediate world of the lineages, the 
heroes for the village and the water people for the external, but still surrounding 
world. Horton describes how in myth and in rite the three categories might be related 
(1962:202-204). For instance, heroes and water people might have worked together 
in order to introduce a new custom or institution to the village; ancestors and heroes 
used to live together; ancestors and water people might have also collaborated for 
similar innovations. Furthermore, such relations might be revealed as conflicts as 
well, whereby ancestors, for example, fought against water people and by making 
alliances with certain heroes. In rites as well, festivals might be dedicated to all three 
categories, yet, the offerings and chants are clearly defined and separated for each 
kind of spirits. In this sense, the Cuban ethnography bares striking resemblances. 
Although spirits of the dead and deities might be appeased in the same broad ritual 
context, there is no confusion as to what kind of entity is being contacted and 
honoured. Thus, the three categories of spirits come to form a ‘triangle’ in which ‘the 
relations of each category to its neighbours contain elements of oppositions as well 
as of co-operation’ (1962:203). Horton’s depiction of such relations is both analytical 
and synthetical at the same time.  
He proceeds into describing the two remaining levels of experience 
(1962:204-207): each individual in birth is created by a personal spiritual entity 
called ‘tamuno’, which joins the spirit to his or her body. Before this joining, the 
person’s spirit will spell out to its creator its life-course and this will be inscribed in 
its very constitution. ‘What is thus spoken is known as fiete boye‘speech before 
coming’, or more briefly as so‘destiny’’ (1962:205). The individual’s life is 
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affected and intercepted by the three categories of spirits but so ‘covers the whole 
pattern of this interaction’ (1962:205). So as destiny, thus, does not refer to a 
particular interaction with a particular kind of spirit, or to isolated points of one’s 
life-course but to its totality. A specific misfortune might be the outcome of the 
relation between the person and an ancestor, hero or one of the water people, but 
when the same kind of misfortune repeats itself, it will tend to be attributed to one’s 
so (see also 1962:213-214). In a similar fashion, there is a so of lineages, polo teme 
so‘lineage destiny’ (1962:205)and of the village, ama teme so‘village 
destiny’ (1962:206). The fourth level is called tamuno, conceived as the creator of 
everything that exists in the world. This is distinguished by the personal creator of 
each individual and it is often called opu tamuno‘the Creator God’ (1962:206). 
There are no elaborate myths or rites for this entity and no other kinds of direct 
relations with it: 
Of the two terms, tamuno seems the more appropriate when the original creation of the world 
is mentioned, while so seems more appropriate when the subject is the behaviour of what has 
been created [...] In some contexts, then, Tamuno and so refer to the two great roles of a 
single supreme being; tamuno being concerned with the origin of things and so with their 
destiny (1962:206). 
Considering that tamuno signifies the creator force while so the created outcome, the 
former encompasses the latter when it comes to the wider cosmos and the individual, 
while the opposite occurs for the lineage groups and the village, that is, social 
groupings that are of more immediate importance both to the individual and the 
wider cosmos. In any case, both tamuno and so are ‘principles’ (1962:207) that defy 
direct and immediate action upon them, they are less anthropomorphic, reveal 
patterns (or aspects of them) rather than specific points in one’s life-course and, 
ultimately, cannot be escaped from: 
Such contrasts follow from the place of these higher beings in the total scheme of things. For 
when the human spirit acts upon one of the free spirits in ritual, it is trying to influence a 
being that exists alongside itself and is of the same order. But when the same human spirit 
approaches tamuno or so, it is approaching a being who already determines its fortunesa 
being of whose will its every action is a manifestation (1962:207). 
Horton goes on to compare the Kalabari universe, with all its ordered models of 
existence, to scientific models (1962:207-214). Criticizing Lévy-Bruhl’s distinction 
between primitive, ‘mystical thinking’ and ‘rational thought’, he sets out to argue 
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that both scientific thinking and the Kalabari proceed in a very similar fashion. 
Without being able to go into much detail here, both proceed from the immediate 
observable world of ‘things’ to a successive modelling of them into categories, which 
tend to become more and more abstract. More encompassing levels of reality may 
host the apparent discrepancies of immediate observation not because they can 
explain everything in detail but because they have reduced (rather than superseded) 
them, creating a ‘hierarchy of models’ (1962:211) or ‘structural hybrids’ (1962:212); 
as with the Kalabari universe: 
The scientist’s world, then, has several levels of reality. Each level, moreover, has a set of 
descriptive categories which is particular to itself and inapplicable to other levels [...] As we 
ascend from level to level, fewer and fewer of the categories appropriate to the description of 
observable reality apply; until, as physicists often like to emphasize, their highest-order 
models are not really material at all. This dematerialization of successive levels of reality is a 
consequence of one of the basic functions of explanationthat of unifying apparent diversity 
(1962:211). 
This provides Horton with a mode of analysis that transgresses the Durkheimean 
model of religion and gods as ultimately reflecting society (see Durkheim 2008), 
because it also encompasses the rest of the observable world (what one could call the 
‘natural’ world), social transformation and innovation, anti-social behaviour and, 
even, things eluding immediate observation and conceptualization. Particular 
incidents in the Kalabari experience will be identified with the free spirits, while life 
seen in its totality would require the more abstract models of tamuno and so, creator 
and destiny. This can also account for the Kalabari embracing the Christian God, 
identifying ‘Him’ with their unitary conception of tamuno (1962:214). Since the 
relative isolation of the Kalabari villages and the delta world has been opened up to 
more foreign influences, ‘successive levels of Kalabari reality are committed to 
explaining more and more in terms of less and less’ (1962: 214). 
Many points that Horton makes can be endlessly debated. I do not think, for 
instance, that his distance from Durkheim is as great as stated. He suggests that the 
Kalabari worldview is ‘based on a theoretical model whose prototype are Kalabari 
people’ (1962:212). Thus, science’s prototype is the natural world, whilst the 
Kalabaris’ is their selves and the way they interact with the surrounding 
environment. As with Durkheim then, Horton tends to imply that these models are 
conceptual rather than perceptual (see Durkheim 2008:327-335) and that they are 
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responses to the world rather than of it (see Lambek 2002:8). It would have been 
interesting to acquire an ethnographic image of how the Kalabari through their 
diviners come to perceive all these ‘intangible’ beings. But instead of engaging 
negatively with Horton, let us explore the ways his point of view can be productive. 
Although his comparison between the Kalabari worldview and scientific thinking is 
not considered a very common or attractive avenue of anthropological analysis 
nowadays, I detect something valuable in it. If both depart from observable reality 
and proceed into a construction of models that can accommodate or explain ‘more 
and more in terms of less and less’ (Horton 1962:214), this implies that the two 
apparently different ways of thinking are similar in approach and method. Therefore, 
it could be argued that the two are not distinguished on an epistemological or 
cognitive levelhow reality is understoodbut on something other than that. 
Something similar can be, in admittedly a highly selective manner, extracted from 
Evans-Pritchard’s comments on Zande witchcraft: ‘Witchcraft explains why events 
are harmful to man and not how they happen. A Zande perceives how they happen 
just as we do’ (1990:24).  
Both Horton and Evans-Pritchard provide interesting potential insights into 
how we might go about understanding ‘beliefs’ in spirits, oracles, destiny and magic, 
yet they ultimately opt for a more socio and anthropocentric kind of analysis that 
views such beliefs as both conceptual and symbolic models of representation. The 
hint lies in the fact that if they argue that the Kalabari and the Azande perceive 
reality as ‘we do’, then spirits, oracles and so forth are a different kind of reality that 
is perceived. Thus, the anthropological engagement with them can be directed not 
towards questions of why but of what. The oracular questions and answers of why the 
Azande pose to the oracle, pertain and yield answers to what ‘things’ and 
substances‘witchcraft’may participate in and influence Zande life (and death); 
the oracles being constitutive of them and, thus, allowing us to glimpse at what they 
perceive as real. Equally, if both the Kalabari models and the scientific ones proceed 
in the same way, what is different, are the models themselves. This is what Horton 
argues, if I read him correctly: the differences are not ‘epistemological’ but 
‘ontological’, as Viveiros de Castro would argue (see Viveiros de Castro 1998, 
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2004a; for a further discussion on this, see chapter 6), and, thus, not merely 
conceptual but perceptual (see Merleau-Ponty 2002). 
 In other words, to treat Zande witchcraft as a kind of belief located in the 
mind and shared among the group, pushes the ethnographer, Evans-Pritchard in this 
case, to offer a kind of analysis that takes for granted, and uses as an indispensable 
tool, the assumption that witches and their craft, ‘after all’, do not really exist. 
Therefore, they must mean something else other than what they ‘believe’ them to be 
or do. Evans-Pritchard argues that beliefs in witches, their motivations, means and 
effects represent and regulate antisocial behaviour. Thus, witchcraft becomes a kind 
of techniquean ‘epistemology’ in Viveiros de Castro’s termsthat mistakenly or 
unconsciously refers to correct and tangible thingsantisocial behaviour. More (or 
better, less) than analysis, this leads to dialysis of the Azande themselves, their 
‘beliefs’ and of, what I suspect is missing, a richer ethnographic description on what 
the Azande perceive through the oracles and, ultimately, instances of witchcraft.  
This will be one of the main preoccupations of my thesis, namely, not so 
much why or how Cubans ‘see’ reality through spirits of the dead, deities and oracles, 
but what kind of reality they see. If divination initially appears to be a way to 
perceive reality, maybe it is more fruitful to explore it as the very (instantiation of) 
reality itself. Of course, from the human point of view, divination is a means of 
perceiving ‘the beyond’ and different kinds of other-than-human entities are 
perceived differently, as I will describe in the following chapters. But if divination 
pertains to the very perception of them, epistemology and ontology cannot be strictly 
separated or opposed; they appear to participate in one and the same thing.   
Horton’s contribution is also one of the very few ethnographic accounts I am 
aware of that explicitly links divination with destiny (see also Fortes 1983), although 
unfortunately without offering too much ethnographic detail on divination. Whereas 
the three categories of spirits exist externally to the person, the individual 
‘destiny’sobecomes a force that potentially brings them together. According to 
Horton, the human and the spirit world constitute a ‘first-order explanatory model’ 
(1962:213). Its prototype, as said before, is the Kalabari people, that is, the most 
immediate and observable dimension. Each successive category (ancestors, heroes 
and water people) retains something of the prototype but gradually and 
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simultaneously denounces aspects of it as we ascend the order. Ancestors are ex-kin 
and members of the lineages of the community, heroes are non-kin, strangers who 
became members of the community, and water people are ‘extra-social’ forces that 
partially have human-like characteristics. According to this model, there is a 
structure ranging from immediate observable reality and sociality to extra-social and 
less tangible forces, wherein each category has its own specific characteristics 
contrasted and potentially (but necessarily) opposed to the one below but also, and 
because of that, encompassing it: ‘each level unifies phenomena which appear 
disparate at the level below it’ (1962:213). 
I believe that Horton’s scheme is a step forward in reflecting on the Cuban 
phenomenon of divination and destiny. Although he portrays a quite neat model of 
successive levels and the structuring of which sounds quite outdated, it proves useful 
in transcending the obscurities of Turner’s model. Instead of a tension between the 
unitary flow of life and its division, we now have a more encompassing image of 
contrasts and relations that can be accommodated into a whole. In Cuba, muertos 
influence one’s life and destiny, but they do so without necessarily revealing the 
whole pattern of it. It is only cumulatively and retrospectively that one’s interaction 
with a specific muerto can be perceived as inherent of his or her camino, his or her 
entire biography. The orichas, through the oracles, have the capacity to reveal whole 
patterns of one’s camino, or the most significant aspects of the whole of it. This is 
instantiated in cases of initiation. It is then that a camino or stable aspects of it are 
revealed. The perspectives of muertos and those of the orichas can thus be 
hierarchically modelled but, as with Horton, not because one is inherently valued as 
better or more significant than the other: each is better, as it were, in its own domain, 
in its specialization; and this is their respective limit as well. Muertos are better 
equipped in revealing the specificities of one’s life because they participate in it 
much more intensely and intimately; but this means that they are less equipped to 
reveal the broader picture as a result of this. With the orichas the opposite tendency 
applies. Their strength resides not so much in pinpointing the specificities of 
caminos, but in laying down the camino itself. Indeed, people whose lives are 
informed by muertos and orichas tend to explicitly refer to camino when it comes to 
the latter, and this is congruent with the diviners who employ their oracles, who 
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stress that what is revealed by the orichas is indiscriminately past, present and future. 
This is at least so on a primordial level and does not necessarily reflect the 
specificities of the client’s situation. When muertos are mentioned in daily life, 
camino does not come up so explicitly or automatically. It is only a long-lasting 
relation with them that solidifies and is reflectively incorporated into one’s camino. 
In their everyday manifestation, muertos are limitedin both positive and negative 
termsto reveal the past, present or future.  
A final addition to this quite broad sketch, which is indicative of what is to 
follow is the fact that the notion of destiny or fate (even more so than divination) has 
not fared very well in anthropological discourse. I believe that this is because of two 
recurrent kinds of understandings of it which are diametrically opposed. The first can 
be said to be that fate is something preordained and thus inescapable; what is written 
cannot be re-written. This is reminiscent of the myth of Oedipus.  The myth, in short, 
goes like this: before Oedipus was born, his father Laius, King of Thebes, consulted 
the Delphic Oracle as his wife Iocaste could not conceive. The oracle announced that 
a child would be finally born but he would eventually murder Laius and marry 
Iocaste. Laius, thus, relinquished any efforts and desires for descendants. 
Nevertheless, one night Iocaste got him drunk and lured him into her bed. Nine 
months later she gave birth to Oedipus. Laius, trying to avoid fate, removed the 
newborn by abandoning it into the wilds, probably wishing that nature rather than 
himself would put an end to his life. One version has it that the baby was found by a 
shepherd from Corinth who gave it to Polybus and Periboea, the King and Queen of 
Corinth. They decided to adopt Oedipus as if he were their own child. One day, when 
Oedipus was an adult, he consulted the Delphic Oracle whereby the same prediction 
was uttered, this time referring to Oedipus himself: ‘You will kill your own father 
and marry your own mother.’ Once again, in the effort to avoid fate, Oedipus decides 
never to return to Corinth so as to protect the people who he thought were his 
parents. During his walkabouts, he meets Laiushis real fathergets into a fight 
with him and eventually kills him. He then arrives in Thebes after having solved the 
riddle of Sphinxthe beast with a woman’s head and a lion’s body and 
wingsliberating in that way Thebes from her ills. The citizens of Thebes welcomed 
the stranger who saved them by declaring him their new king and marrying him to 
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the widow Iocastehis real mother. Thus, the twice uttered dramatic prophecy found 
its fulfilment in an equally dramatic way (for a more detailed account of the myth, 
see Graves 2001:343-349). 
The myth of Oedipus may be read as an example of an unavoidable fate that 
has already been determined (often by a superior force). Nevertheless, it could be 
argued that from the human actors’ point of view, the bigger part of the story is an 
effort to avoid fateand hence revealing their assumptions or hopesfirst by the 
actions of Laius and then by those of Oedipus himself, given the fact that the Delphic 
Oracle is consulted twice and reveals destiny (see Curry and Willis 2004:55; 
Herzfeld 1993:242). But it is exactly in and through this effort to avoid his fate that 
the divined fate comes to its tragic fulfilment. As Fortes says, Oedipus, in ‘his 
resolute pursuit of the truth […] is the victim of Destiny. The question of 
responsibility or guilt does not even seem to be relevant. It was an appalling Fate and 
not of his own choosing’ (1983:4; see also pp. 32-37). A look at a dictionary 
corroborates such an image. Destiny is defined as the ‘power believed to control 
events’ or ‘that which happens to somebody/something (thought to be decided 
beforehand by fate)’, while fate as the ‘power believed to control all events in a way 
that cannot be resisted; destiny’ (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary). 
 Within these definitions, one can detect a diametrically opposed 
understanding of destiny as irrevocable and already preordained. In the second 
definition of it the dictionary informs us that it is ‘that which happens to 
somebody/something (thought to be decided beforehand by fate).’ Two 
interconnected things attract my attention in such a statement. The first is that as a 
definitional proposition the editor chooses to enclose its second half into a 
parenthesis, implying that its content is not absolutely necessary for the definition to 
apply. If one were to omit the parenthesis altogether, a definition would be that it 
stands for whatever happens to a subject or entity (be that an individual, a country, a 
concept or an object); a quite vague and idiosyncratic definition admittedly, as the 
‘only’ things not applying to it would be precisely whatever does not happen to it. 
The second thing that draws my attention, and which I believe is an important reason 
why this second half has been bracketed, is the claim that destiny, as ‘that which 
happens to somebody/something’, may be (hence the parenthesis), ‘thought to be 
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decided beforehand by fate’ (my emphasis). This ‘(thought…)’, I contend, divides 
the world into those who ‘think’ or believe that destiny is ‘decided beforehand by 
fate’, the gods, the stars and the planets, for example, and those who believe it is not. 
Yet, my sense is that the latter are not so much depicted as those who ‘think’ so but 
as those who know; singing along with Doris Day in Hitchcock’s ‘The man who 
knew too much’, ‘qué será será, whatever will be will be, the future’s not ours to 
see, qué será será, what will be will be.’ It is the former who ‘think’implicitly in a 
metaphysical, irrational and mistaken awayand this is why they deserve to be put 
in the parenthetical margins. 
I believe that this distinction’s radicalism does not necessarily lie in a 
worldview that perceives a chain of events that are superimposed on a subject 
without its control and agency and another one which claims absolute freedom of 
movement. Although fate, as well as divination, speaks directly to what can be freely 
done and decided and what is superimposed, this is not an inherent and exclusive 
attribute of it.11 This is a much broader issue that has puzzled human intellect and 
experience infinitely, the social sciences merely reflecting such preoccupations, may 
find it impossible to come to a final resolution,. What is more pertinent seems to be 
whether this apparent tension between determinism and self-determination is 
‘thought’ to be related to ‘powers’ that can be divined, that is, entered into a dialogue 
with or not. In other words, and as far as the Cuban divinatory context is concerned, 
the anthropologically interesting issue is, not whether and how destiny can be 
fulfilled or avoided (as we will further see it can also be deviated from and 
realigned), but what and who participates in this dialogue. That humans do so can be 
taken as a fact; however, things start looking a bit more strange, and thus interesting, 
when ‘other-than-humans’ prove to be those with which the dialogue takes place.        
A final comment: entities ‘against’ traditions. 
If the ethnographer were to approach the Afro-Cuban cosmos through a highly 
conscious frame that distinguishes among various self-defined and delineated sets of 
traditions, it would be relatively easy to just focus on one of them as, indeed, people 
                                                 
11 For interesting discussions on fate as something potentially predetermined or not, see Craig 1988; 
Curry 2010; Curry and Voss 2007; Curry and Willis 2004; Fortes 1983; Gerth and Mills 1948:70-74, 
302-322, 358-359; Onians 1973; Turner 1981:3-28, 109-176; Weber 1958. 
59 
 
in Cuba do not have difficulty in pinpointing the existence of a Regla de Ocha/Ifá, 
Palo Monte, Espiritismo, Vodú, and so on. Such a legitimate strategy could be even 
more justified in the process of fieldwork as one will soon realize the complexity of 
each tradition, its relatively long and often obscure history and its internal 
distinctions, which point to the existence of ‘sub-traditions’ within the larger 
agglomerates (see Brown 2003a:1-162; Bolívar Aróstegui and González Díaz de 
Villegas 1998; Espirito Santo 2010; James Figarola et.al. 1998). As I have already 
mentioned, my approach was in this sense different. Trying to put aside my 
acquaintance with these more conventional approaches to Afro-Cuban religious 
traditions that informed my preparation for the field, my entrance to and exit from it 
remained consciously diffused to all of them as one of my persistent ethnographic 
questions was whether there was a more general Afro-Cuban cosmos that 
accommodatedalthough not always axiomatically, comfortably or 
automaticallyall of the traditions. Furthermore why, if this was the case, had this 
not been explored in the conventional ethnographic accounts, even though all of 
them strongly implied this? In other words, why did these accounts not consider the 
multiplicity of a ‘supernatural’ universe, when they all in one way or another 
depicted this within each tradition? 
In trying to be as open as possible, I was led to follow a path that many 
Cubans who were not actively participating in these traditions, by way of acquiring 
the ‘office’ of the priest or diviner, themselves followed, either as simple clients or 
compelled to a more complex and multifarious engagement that often involved 
initiations, but not necessarily led to full-time priesthood. I soon came to realize that 
people, when faced with an issue worthy of oracular investigation, would start 
consulting a very wide range of diviners. I use the word ‘compelled’ in a loose yet 
not insignificant way. Faced with this multiple range of oracular traditions, it is very 
easy to start ‘reading’ the whole Afro-Cuban oracular phenomenon as one permeated 
with a very open and idiosyncratic approach, wherein clients and initiates walk into a 
vast religious shopping centre and just pick up the most convenient or attractive 
product; a ‘spiritual laissez-faire’ (Romberg 2009:2; see also Delgado 2009; 




In stark contrast to the actual supermarkets, shops and malls one might expect 
to find in more affluent countries, Cuba’s seem extremely poorly equipped and 
inconsistent. The Cuban religious ‘market’ on the other hand appears to be full of 
different choices, ‘ready to hand’. Furthermore, it is a ‘market’ that eludes the 
socialist state’s strict control and often appears to be working against the very 
foundations and ideals of socialist means of production, property, labour and prices, 
which are all regulated by the state. This image is very much accentuated if one takes 
into account an increasing number of foreigners who visit Cuba in order to get 
initiated or at least bring their own issues there and who end up, as with any other 
transaction, paying a much higher price than Cubans do. These phenomena are very 
real and ethnographically unavoidable. Yet, I believe, it would be extremely hasty 
and potentially misleading to commence with description and interpretation through 
these admittedly more familiar lenses of a specific mode of production and 
transaction and as such treat spirits, deities, initiations and offerings as mere 
‘products’ of, and for human choice. Although one could reach deep levels of 
‘sociological imagination’ (see Mills 2000) by arguing, for example a la Comaroff 
(1985), that this unique phenomenon of a capitalist-like ‘spiritual’ and ‘material’ free 
market that permeates the Afro-Cuban religious cosmos in the very midst of an 
otherwise socialist mode of regulation and restriction, could potentially be an enclave 
of resistance to almost 50 years of socialist government, one could, on the other 





HUMAN DESIRES AS DIVINATION 





This chapter and the following one attempt to come to terms with the generic 
category of the deadthe muertos. When other-than-human entities are said to 
interfere in the world of the living, a broad distinction that is made is that between 
spirits of the dead and divinities. An individual that has a multiplicity of entities that 
inform and affect his or her life will attribute specific characteristics and aspects of it, 
whether more or less permanent, to specific spirits of the dead. The ones who affect a 
more permanent influence will often come to be seen and described as ‘my dead’ 
(mis muertos). Nevertheless, this possessive pronoun‘my’which, when utilized 
to describe the current totality of the dead who are associated with one’s self, is 
normally followed by the pluralmuertosgets instantly individuated and ‘de-
possessed’ when particular muertos appear and affect someone’s life for a relatively 
short period and often in a negative way. Occasionally, muertos that are not 
perceived to ‘belong’ (pertenecer) to the individual may interfere with it. Those who 
can sense them, the ‘mediums’ (mediums), detect their presence ‘around’ (alrededor) 
or ‘behind’ (detrás) the individual and, provided that they do not ‘belong’ to it, they 
‘send them away’ (echarlos) or ‘remove’ and ‘take them off’ (quitarselos de 
encima). In this case, the individual will hardly refer to them as ‘my dead’ but as a 
muerto of which little is known and its influence has been highly transient, somewhat 
mischievous, upsetting the ‘normal’ course of things. 
Thus, within the generic category of muertos we encounter a broad division 
between an actually rich and complex spectrum of ‘spectres’, depending on the 
degrees of intimacy, from the complete lack of it, to its excessive intensity. As this 
division is based on the premise that there are muertos who ‘belong’ to someone and 
those who do not, the former showing ‘affinity’ (afinidad) and the latter not, I have 
come to call them ‘affine’ and ‘alien’ muertos respectively. This chapter deals with 
those that gravitate towards the one end, that of lack of intimacy; the ‘alien’ muertos, 
who due and true to their ‘alien-ness’which, as I will describe further on, 
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characterizes both their condition and their affects on the living. Furthermore, they 
have not been made the exclusive and predominant ‘object’ of interaction with any 
particular tradition, but are diffused in none and all of them at the same time; often 
treated with indifference or as a threat. This is, I suspect, the reason why their silent 
and elusive presence has rendered them relatively absent from most ethnographic 
accounts on Afro-Cuban ‘metaphysics’, and why I strongly believe that my 
approach, which permeates the whole thesis and places the emphasis on dealing more 
directly with the various kinds of other-than-human entities, rather than traditions 
from the outset, has its merits. 
 ‘Alien’ muertos are not a purely individualistic category, meaning that they 
are not those who do not just belong to a particular living person but might belong to 
somebody else. If this is the case, the muerto is not perceived as ‘alien’ but as an 
‘affine’. ‘Alien’ muertos are those that are perceived as not belonging to anybody, 
and it is this radical absence of relations and lack of ‘affinity’ that mediums often 
describe when they refer to how they experience their peculiar presence.  Muertos in 
general, lacking a physical body, communicate with the living through other peoples’ 
bodies. It is said that each muerto chooses to ‘get attached’ (se apega) to a particular 
living body. One of the main reasons for misfortunes, when seen as stemming from 
the dead, is that of neglect (the same goes for divinities as we shall see in chapter 4). 
The foundations of the connection between the living and the dead are, thus, the 
active effort on the part of the former to ‘grant recognition’ or ‘acknowledge’ (dar 
conocimiento) to the latter, the very initial stage of which is that of their presence and 
identity. Furthermore, the basic material from which this bridge is made, is the living 
human body. 
 For example, Pedro, a young friend of mine was experiencing strong 
migraines which impeded him from concentrating on his studies at the university. 
Seeking advice from specialists or gifted people (who do not only have the ability to 
sense and communicate with their own muertos but also with those of others), he was 
told that the migraines were coming from a muerto who was trying to communicate 
his presence to him. The muerto, a remote ancestor of his who lived and died in the 
colonial era of Cuba, was provoking the migraines not because of his mischievous 
character or just to make him suffer, but as an articulation of his presencesince 
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Pedro did not have the capacity to sense him in any fuller waywhich, was 
something that only the medium could do. Such a muerto belongs to the category of 
the spirits of the dead that I deal with in the following chapter, the ‘affines’. In this 
chapter, I initially deal with those muertos that could be grouped into what I have 
called ‘alien’; and then with those with whom, although a very specific kind of 
relation is being forged through the Afro-Cuban religious tradition of Palo Monte, 
are drawn from this generic reservoir of ‘alien’ muertos and transform into, what the 
Palo Monte idiom refers to as, the nfumbi.  
The distinction between ‘affine’ and ‘alien’ muertos I am proposing here, is 
widely documented ethnographically and is reminiscent of what Bloch and Parry 
call, in their introduction to Death and the Regeneration of Life, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
death (1996:15-18): ‘The “good” regenerative death can only be constructed in 
antithesis to an image of “bad” death, which it therefore implies’ (1996:18). What 
may describe a ‘bad’ death is not necessarily exhausted in the negative effects over 
the living: 
The worst thing about ‘bad deaths’ is that they mar or detract from that possible 
completeness. ‘Missing presumed dead’ obscures the final image; the abruptness of an 
accident distorts it, and so cuts it short in a different way’ (Parkin 1986:8), 
thus,  
[…] evil refers to various ideas of imperfection and excess seen as destructive; but these are 
contestable concepts which, when personified, allow mankind to engage them in dialogue 
and reflect on the boundaries of humanity (Parkin 1986:23). 
It seems to be a widely spread phenomenon that the importance given to what 
happens after death is intimately linked to the kind of life and relations the individual 
had and also, commonly linked to the former, the kind of funeral that was conducted 
by the living. In addition, the kind of death as linked to the kind of person and its 
relations has particular repercussions for the living and their relations to the 
deceased. An anti-social person, a violent or sudden death and an improper funeral 
or, even more so, the absence of it, are all factors that make a negative journey for 
the deceased’s spirit highly possible, something which is also reflected in how it 
relates negatively with the living (for a classic description of such ethnographic 
phenomenon, see Hertz 1960:27-86).  
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‘Alien’ muertos, in Cuba, also seemed to be persons burdened with a ‘bad 
death’, while ‘affines’ were privileged with a ‘good’ one. Indeed, many ‘alien’ 
muertos and, even more so, the nfumbi were often depicted as persons who had led 
an anti-social life or had suffered an untimely or violent death, and this was exactly 
the indigenous reasoning for them being in such sort of ‘alien’ state. For instance, the 
nfumbi of Palo Monte could often be persons who had been assassins or their 
victims, suicides, alcoholics or mad-men, among others. On the contrary, ‘affine’ 
muertos tended to lack this negative and marginal state and, therefore, were 
considered as previouslywhen alivemore socialized and currentlyas 
deadmore socializable entities; as such the relations instantiated with them were 
experienced in more positive terms. Nevertheless, and as Parkin implies above, ‘bad’ 
and ‘good’ deaths cannot be limited to a moral understanding of them, but also, and 
more importantly, better conceived as different facets or directionswith their 
various degrees of completeness and incompletenesslife-courses may adopt in 
contexts where, provocatively put, ‘death is not the end’ or, less so, is the end of 
something and the beginning of something else. 
As this chapter and the next one will try to show ethnographically, confining 
the description and analysis to purely moral terms of (what is perceived as) ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ deaths, would probably miss very important aspects of personhood and the 
boundaries and relations between the living and the dead that appear to be 
instantiated. Rather, a more promising avenue, I suggest, could be to follow the 
various notions of a camino that both the living and the dead are perceived to have 
and at various instances articulate to each other and even exchange. This could 
account for the ethnographic fact that not all ‘alien’ muertos necessarily were 
morally ‘bad’ while in life or had died an untimely death; and by the same token, not 
all ‘affines’ were morally impeccable personalities or had died a peaceful death. It 
neither meant that ‘alien’ muertos’ affects on the living were always deemed as 
negative nor that those of the ‘affines’ as by definition positive. 
Very broadly put, ‘alien’ muertos lack a potentiality to relate to the living 
and, at the same time, cannot fully relate with their condition as dead, meaning that 
they cannot properly relate to their ‘new’, dead and disembodied self. On the other 
hand, ‘affines’ are muertos who have adopted a ‘a path of the dead’ (camino de 
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muerto; a ‘path’ in which the muerto progressively and with the indispensable help 
from its living ‘affine’ starts ‘othering’ itself from its human and embodied 
biography), broadening, in such way, their potentials of relating to the living. 
Nfumbi, as I will show in the second part of this chapter, are a strange and therefore 
interesting case which upsets any rigid, conventional and dualistic understanding of 
muertos between ‘alien’ and ‘affines’, but can also reveal a lot about them as well 
and, in general, aspects of what to be and become a muerto in Cuba involves. 
Broken caminos: the ‘alien’ muertos’ vain effort to relate 
In classic analyses, such as Hertz’s (1960), stemming usually from small-scale, non-
Western societies, there is an abundance of information on the social relations of the 
deceased as well as the mortuary rites that are observed. Furthermore, having to do 
with small-scale societies, both the particular social relations among persons and the 
mortuary rites are highly condensed in space. A funeral, even of a commoner, is an 
event that happens in the knowledge and with the participation of a large part of the 
society under the ethnographer’s scrutiny. The fate of the deceased is equally 
informed by his or her past while in life because there is enough memory retained 
and lots of living witnesses; a fact that transforms the latter into useful ‘informants’ 
for the ethnographer. In my fieldwork experience in Havana, I was met with quite a 
different situation. Although there was surprisingly abundant talk about muertos and 
their influence on the living, there was an equally surprising lack of first-hand 
knowledge of the muertos’ past. The latter would be revealed by the muertos 
themselves in a gradual effort and process of communication with the living. I 
constantly felt that Cuba’s muertos, or at least a large number of them, were striving 
to establish a communication with the living because the latter had forgotten them or 
did not even know anything about them in the first place. It is not surprising then that 
the initial stages of the muertos’ presence were often associated with a kind of 
bewilderment or specific misfortunes, especially in cases where the living were not 
equipped with the ‘gift’ (don) to fully recognize such presence, and needed the 
guidance of those who did have it. 
Yet, there was also a large number of muertos who seemed to cause 
puzzlement or misfortune just for the sake of it, or because of their own state of 
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confusion. The gifted people would come to the service of the afflicted not to 
negotiate and establish a kind of positive relation between the two parts, but in order 
to distance them. They would act in such a way so as to defend the afflicted living 
and attack the afflicting muerto, that is, disassociate and keep them apart. This kind 
of muertos were invariably described as ‘dark’ (oscuros), ‘obsessing’ (obsesores), 
‘attached to matter’ (pegados a la materia), ‘evil’ (malos), ‘backwards’ (atrasados), 
‘of little or no light’ (de poca o ninguna luz) or ‘sent’ (enviados). They were also 
seen as ‘wandering aimlessly in the world’ (van vagando por el mundo). This 
temporary kind of relation between these muertos and the living was usually initiated 
by the former and terminated by the latter. People do not relate with them in a more 
permanent and ontological sense, meaning, they do not include them in their camino. 
As soon as their presence is detected the specialist’s role will be to ‘remove’ (quitar) 
them from their attachment to a particular living body. When I asked specialists what 
happens to these muertos as soon as they are removed, I always received quite 
general and vague answers. Most often, people would tell me that theythe 
muertoswould keep on with their ‘aimless wandering’ and they would 
occasionally get attached to other people, causing once again misfortunes. Answers 
like these, sounding more like hypotheses or suggestions rather than convictions, 
were in contrast to the much higher degree of confidence mediums would exhibit in 
detecting or recounting the identification of the ‘affine’ muertos’ presence and 
attachment to a particular individual. Prompted by such contrast, I sometimes 
enquired whether their general ability to ‘sense’ (sentir) the muertos included those 
spirits who were attached neither temporarily nor permanently to nobody. The 
answers I gathered were most often negative. They were not experiencing, in other 
words, a world crammed with the constant presence of an infinity of ‘aimlessly 
wandering’ muertos, although a mass of anonymous dead could be theoretically, at 
least, envisioned.  
I have only met one person, Raul, who described to me his visceral 
experiences with such a mass of anonymous dead without necessarily signalling out 
particular identities and biographies. He was around 45 years old (although he looked 
much younger); he was slightly physically deformed, unmarried and lived with his 
old and sick mother. He told me that this mass would ‘present itself’ (se me presenta) 
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in dreams, as a very deep and creepy darkness from which a multiplicity of usually 
indiscernible voices could be heard. Sometimes, in the midst of this darkness, he 
would see flashing images of persons unknown to him, usually close-ups of their 
faces, but also of fleeting events that would occur to them, presumably while in life, 
and normally unpleasant in nature. For instance, he once saw a black slave being 
beaten to death by his master. Interestingly, he added that this image was most 
probably the ‘persistent memory’ (la memoria persistente) of the slave who, having 
suffered such an unjust life and death, had been ‘Entrapped in the shadows of this 
world [atrapado en las sombras de este mundo].’ Nevertheless, it could also be the 
memories of the master whose unjustness and cruelty could equally be reasons for 
such an ‘entrapment’. ‘In fact’, he said, ‘It does not matter whose memory exactly it 
was, it could be of both; a memory in any case!’ As he also told me, experiencing the 
anonymous mass of the dead in such a way was extremely uncommon and even in 
the case of images like the above, they were elusive, in the sense that there was little 
possibility of obtaining further information about the particular events or the people 
involved. The reasoning implied in instances such as this was that the events or 
memories were of the dead, who were unrelated in a more ‘permanent’ sense to the 
living; they could not fully attach themselves to a living body through which to 
communicate with. As such, the above image was more a ‘persistent’ and fragmented 
‘memory’ of slavery and its cruel conditions rather than a more fully articulated 
memory in it, where the event and its protagonists could offer a biography; 
something which does occur when muertos relate to the living more dialogically and 
permanently (as is the case with the ‘affines’). 
Another way of experiencing the anonymous mass of muertos by Raul was 
while he was awake, though the experience was even more abstract and elusive. At 
times, when he was not only physically alone, but when he ‘felt really alone’, usually 
sitting at home without moving or doing anything in particular, he would sense his 
‘vision and mind’ (vista y mente) becoming ‘cloudy’ (nublada). There would be an 
instant diminishing of his senses. The space (usually in his apartment, but sometimes 
outside) would become darker (although not as completely as in his dreams) and 
images more hazy; sounds would also decrease, and even become extinguished, as 
well as his touch becoming stiff. In fact, his whole body would become numb and 
68 
 
remain unable to move; his thoughts would vanish, leaving him in a ‘vacant’ (vacio), 
‘with no direction’ (sin dirección) and ‘pointless’ (sin sentido) state: ‘as if I were 
dead’, he concluded. For my friend, this was the effect and affect of the anonymous 
dead on him; temporary and impersonal, still, aimless and dark, among others. 
This account is strongly reminiscent of the one given by Todd Ramón Ochoa 
(2007) in which one of his main ‘informants’, Isidra, a practitioner of the Cuban-
Congo religious tradition of Palo, also gives accounts of her experiences of the 
anonymous mass of the dead, referring to it as a ‘sea’ or, in the Cuban-Congo idiom, 
as Kalunga (Ochoa 2007:481-484, 2010b:31-39). Kalunga is a word which, 
according to Ochoa’s ethnography, depicts the anonymous collectivity of the dead as 
a ‘fluid mass’, ‘[i]mmanent, as in saturating, as in suffusing’, full of ‘shadows and 
flows’, ‘ancient beyond memory’, ‘dense and indistinguishable mass’, ‘indifferent’, 
‘infinite’ and ‘ambient’ (2007:482-483). This experience of Kalunga was felt by 
Isidra through her body ‘from the murk of visceral experience, at times powerfully 
moving, at others fleetingly vague’ (2007:482): 
[T]hese visceral events as did Isidra, as minor actualizations, or versions, of Kalunga [...] as a 
kind of vibration or tonal shifting in the fluid vastness of Kalunga. Thus, Kalunga was 
tangibly learned as radically subjective perceptions at the absolute limits of sentience and 
credibility, felt subjectively yet collectively influential, and, in the case of Palo, recognized 
and taught as significant turns of the dead […] an ephemeral sensation […] felt at the fringes 
of perception: the chills, the vibes (2007:482). 
Thus, Isidra and Raul, in slightly different ways, sense the ‘indifferent’ (un-
differentiated probably is a more adequate term) sea of the dead in a vague yet 
recognizable manner, or as Ochoa calls it, as a ‘sense un-certainty’ (2007:486). But 
in Ochoa’s account and in my fieldwork, sensing uncertain-ly (to paraphrase him) 
undifferentiated muertos was transformed into a much more concrete visceral and 
affective experience when a particular muerto would enter into a relation with a 
particular individual. It is here that my approach differs from Ochoa’s. While he 
highlights the primacy of Kalunga’s oneness, vagueness, infinity and indifferent 
immanence which leads at times to the experience of more tangible, differentiated 
and individuated muertos, who importantly become ‘one’s muertos’, I suspect that 
quite the opposite might be at stake.  
I will explore whether it is the more certain viscerality of differentiated 
muertos that ‘lends’, as it were, to this ‘sense un-certainty’ of the anonymous sea of 
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the dead. To paraphrase Ochoa once again, it might not be that the dead (as an 
individuated plurality) are ‘versions’ or ‘aspects’ (Ochoa 2007) of the dead (as an 
undifferentiated mass of the dead or, as I read Ochoa, ‘death’ in general), but the 
exact reverse. Furthermore, as I hope this and the following chapters will 
demonstrate, ‘death’ in general is not perceived as a movement towards oneness, a 
common fate awaiting every and each one of us, neither as a mere reflection or 
transposition of structural social divisions in and of ‘this world’. Death is neither just 
a collective preoccupation with what happens after life has ended nor how the ‘other 
world’ (el mas allá) might look. All these may exist, but they go hand in hand with 
another ‘need’, namely, the one which we ask ourselves how the other world, the 
world of the dead, views ‘our’ world, the world of the living; what does it see and 
how does it communicate with it? The kinds of death that appear within the Afro-
Cuban cosmos are crucially of muertos who, in one way or another, communicate 
with and relate to the living. In other words, it is the oracular aspects of death (or the 
dead) that are highlighted; death as divination, and in this respect, I agree with 
Ochoa, it is immanence in general that comes to the fore, and as far as the dead are 
concerned, a particular kind of immanence (more on this in chapter 5).  
The dead in general, are experienced or sensed as more of this world than 
divinities are; especially when the ones who belong to the anonymous and aimlessly 
wandering mass become momentarily and fleetingly known through and within the 
body and its senses. Very often they affect an individual in a bodily fashion and it is 
always through the senses that their presence is detected. The responsibility to detect 
and consequently treat them properlydistance themlies with those ‘gifted’ 
people who can sense and communicate with them. These people are ones with an 
initial and almost inherent ‘gift’ to sense muertos in general and who might have 
‘cultivated’ (cultivado) or ‘developed’ (desarollado) it, crucially, by ‘developing’ 
their relations with their own muertos; their ‘affines’. These people are often called 
mediums, muerteros, espiritistas, and less often, brujos (‘witches’ or ‘sorcerers’) or 
paleros. This suggests that people who can sense their own muertos can also sense 
the rest of the muertos and other peoples’ muertos, be they ‘alien’ or ‘affines’. 
Furthermore, any kind of muerto can only be sensed with more precision, of its 
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identity and whether it is ‘alien’ or ‘affine’, when it has been ‘attached’, or is trying 
to do so, to a particular living individual.  
As I said before, ‘alien’ muertos get ‘attached’ to a person temporarily and by 
causing some kind of affliction or misfortune. The nature of these afflictions and the 
way they appear are often described as sudden, coming out of the blue, without any 
hint of expectation or logical explanation, and also without any clear solution to 
them. In my previous example of Raul’s migraines, he decided to take the issue to a 
medium because, as he stressed, he had never experienced them before, he 
considered himself as healthy and the medicine he took, although strong, did not 
soothe his migraines. People in similar situations might thus decide to visit a 
medium, whose first task will be to detect or not the presence of a muerto, and more 
specifically, that muerto which might be associated with the issue in question. 
Mediums then, if they do detect it, will proceed in giving a description of the present 
muerto or, as they say, the ‘frame’ or ‘painting’ (cuadro) of it. In the case of it being 
an ‘alien’ spirit, the description they give is in less detail. The past of such muertos 
as well as their fate are only a matter of concern as long as they indicate a way to 
avoid them and ‘remove’ them. Rituals of removal involve ‘cleansings’ (limpiezas) 
and ‘breakings’ (rompimientos), such as ritual baths and the destruction and disposal 
of things belonging to the individual, often clothes, which are said to attract the 
‘negative energy’ (energia negativa) of these muertos. This suggests that the 
‘attachment’ of these muertos is, like clothes, somewhat superficial and not essential 
to the individual’s being as a whole. Equally, the misfortunes they cause are usually 
not as serious as causing death for example, provided they are detected and dealt 
with relatively soon. They can be minor physical ailments, a state of mental unrest or 
confusion, depression, relatively small accidents or problems in one’s social life. 
They are, as an espiritista once told me, ‘Small obstacles in your path [pequeños 
obstaculos en tu camino]’; and, as ‘small obstacles’ the solutions require small 
efforts. Yet, it is crucial to get to know the origin of them, because if this is the 
presence of a muerto, then only specific steps can ‘remove’ them. 
What is revealed about these muertos is first of all their presence. Often they 
are felt as a negative influence, ‘foreign’ (ajena) to the afflicted person. Biographical 
elements, if at all revealed, are restricted to minor information concerning the 
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reasons why the muerto has been ‘entrapped’ in this world and the place and time it 
became ‘attached’ to the person. Most of the times what is detected, is just their 
presence, which is strongly contrasted to that of muertos who have been ‘attached’ to 
the person with the intention of creating a more lasting relation. This last kind of 
‘attachment’ is often said to stem from ‘affinity’, something I will explore in the 
following chapter. What appear to emerge here are two seemingly contradicting 
characteristics of such muertos: firstly, they belong much more to this world than the 
other, the ‘beyond’. In fact, they do not exactly belong but are ‘entrapped’, alluding 
to the point that once dead, in a Hertzian sense, a person is expected to undergo a 
series of transformations and transitions. But not all! Those ‘entrapped’ find 
themselves in such a condition because they cannot relate intimately with a particular 
living body (here I include the senses and the person as a whole). As soon as they try 
to do so, they get linked to the ‘persisting memories’ that permanently haunt them 
and occasionally are transferred to the living. Thus, what these muertos and their 
memories seem to be are too intense and present. Nevertheless, and we come to the 
second point, intense and present though they may be, they are not in such a way so 
as to be able to fully reveal to the living their identities and biographies in detail. The 
living resist cultivating any kind of profound dialogue; they ‘remove’ them, so that 
the same ‘persisting memory’ remains ultimately unuttered, uncommunicated, 
unexplored, and unredeemed. It does not transform into something else and, 
therefore, cannot be forgotten.   
Getting rid of these muertos and their ‘frozen’ memories is something that 
may provoke a certain amount of distress. Martina is a woman around 50 years old 
and, although she is not actively into la religión she has many friends who are and 
often visits them, as well as rituals, especially the ones which involve contact with 
the spirits of the dead. She tells me: 
When I visited the espiritista [people who are said to be able to communicate with spirits of 
the dead], as soon as I entered her house, she told me that she could feel a negative influence 
around me. She gave me an examining look and told me that she could feel my heavy 
[pesado] pace. ‘You are not well, let’s go’, she told me. We then had a seat at her consulting 
room where she called [llamó] her spirit-protector [espíritu protector]. It told her that indeed 
there was a dark spirit of the dead [muerto oscuro] which, in its vain search for light 
[buscando luz en vano] had become stuck [pegado; the same verb can be translated as 
‘attached’] to me. This spirit was provoking all my recent stumblings [tropiezos] at work and 
my sudden feelings of anxiety. The espiritista told me that we should take it off me 
[quitarmelo de encima].  
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In this account we can see that ‘alien’ muertos are sensed, though not fully and 
immediately. The espiritista feels a ‘negative influence’ surrounding Martina’s body 
and more precisely a ‘heavy’ kind of pace. Considering the fact that the two persons 
know each other, the espiritista immediately senses a difference in Martina’s being 
and, furthermore, a negative one. This compels her to say, ‘You are not well’, 
although without a definite reasoning of why this should be the case. But this 
uncertain conviction, so to speak, leads her to bring the matter to her ‘consulting 
room’ where her spirit-protector is invoked. It is only thenwhen the spirit-
protector, a muerto intimately related to the espiritista, gets involvedthat more 
light is thrown on the situation, as indeed such muertos as espíritus protectores are 
said to have more ‘light’. The suspicions are confirmed. It was indeed an ‘alien’ 
muerto (or, as it was described, oscuro, meaning ‘dark’) whose presence the 
espiritista felt as ‘heavy’ in Martina’s pace and also the reason for her ‘stumblings’ 
at work and her negative feelings. 
If life’s course is a camino, this is made ‘heavy’ and prone to ‘stumblings’ by 
a presencethe muerto oscurowhich has been incidentally attracted to and ‘stuck’ 
on Martina’s body; it had to be ‘taken off’, because it had nothing to do with the 
most essential part of her camino. If however, another kind of muerto or entity were 
to be involved (such as an ‘affine’ muerto), the following actions would most 
probably lead not to a ‘removal’ of it from Martina’s camino but a more active and 
conscious relation with them. In Martina’s case there was little access to, or effort 
made to obtain more detailed information of the muerto’s biography, state of being, 
wishes, and perspective in general. It was a muerto oscuro, looking for light in vain; 
a hopeless effort which would be perpetuated by the fact that probably, once again, it 
would be ‘taken off’, as if it were an old piece of clothing, and remain related to no-
body. This was in stark contrast with the kind of muerto the espiritista ‘called’ in 
order to assist her in sensing this muerto oscuro, but also cementing the state of 
unrelatedness it found itself in. If somebody were to ask her about ‘her’ muerto she 
would be able to give a wealth of information about its identity, biography and 
‘function’, the latter possibly being exemplified by the account of Martina’s case.  
Another point I wish to make and which I will continue to explore in 
subsequent parts, is that these kinds of muertos are seen as too human. Many frame 
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this in terms of the memory linked to a camino which is abruptly interrupted. They 
explain that muertos oscuros were persons who died an untimely, sudden or violent, 
death or that, in general, their ‘mission’ (misión) in life was not ‘fulfilled’ 
(cumplirse). In essence, their lives were not lived, quantitatively, as long as or, 
qualitatively, as it should have been. Broken caminos as such, when death arrives, 
are turned into obstacles for other peoples’ caminos, where the actions taken by the 
living are not to amend them but to avoid or get rid of them. Thus, what makes them 
too human is related to having lived and died unrelated to their true camino or 
without having fulfilled it, and this leads them to ‘live’ a death among humans who 
constantly avoid them and make them, in such a way, reminded of their entrapment 
to this world. This is why they ‘wander aimlessly in this world’. They are part of 
itthey are human in that senseyet, they are at the same time excluded from it; 
they are humans with no ‘living’evolving and transformingdestiny and no one to 
relate to. They have no present or future, they are just past.  
Nevertheless, the cases of ‘alien’ muertos do not get exhausted in those who 
have lived an anti-social life or have died an untimely death. The latter might be an 
exemplary sub-case of the former, but the broad and vague category of ‘alien’ 
muertos embraces a more general aspect and version of death. It was not uncommon, 
for example, to listen to peoples’ accounts on them as a presence of a spirit of a dead 
person who had not come to fully realize that it was dead in the first place. Such 
muertos were perceived as persons who continued to act and think as if they were 
still alive. They would still engage in their former daily habits, frequent and inhabit 
the places they used to, such as their house. This provoked confusion both to 
themselves and the living who happened to come across them, especially those who, 
in one way or another, found themselves in the familiar ‘space’ of the muerto 
ignorant of its condition (for example, by living in the same house the muerto used to 
live and still thought it did). In such cases, ‘alien’ muertos were distanced from their 
familiar environment and the people they affected with the mediation of a medium, 
who would make an effort to ‘let the muerto know’ (dar conocimiento al muerto) 
that it was dead. Yet, ‘affine’ muertos could also undergo, through the living, a 
similar process of realization of their condition as dead. This would normally and 
most explicitly occur in the early stages of ‘developing’ their relation with their 
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living ‘affine’, although, and as I will argue in the following chapter, ‘developing’ 
the ‘affines’ always implies a complex and maybe more subtle process of realization 
of death.  
To know how to act as a ‘proper’ muerto, as ‘affines’ seemed to do, more 
positively at least, is not to be strictly confined to, first, the actual fact of death and, 
second, a purely cognitive kind of knowledge of the fact, although all these are 
mutually implicated. To borrow Sussanne Küchler’s evocative depiction of the 
malanggan funerary figurines in New Ireland, Papua New Guinea, as involved in ‘a 
process of un-stitching of the tightly woven relations of which the deceased person 
was so much a part’ (Küchler 2002:4-5), and as constitutive of the person who 
‘becomes, like an onion, composed of layers [or else, ‘skins’] that are stripped off 
one by one, as each layer is turned into a malanggan-figure, until death’ (2002:50); 
the knowledge of death within my ethnographic context could also be paralleled and 
linked to an onion-like, layered process. Nevertheless, its beginning, and not end, is 
death itself. Schematically put, the first layer is the fact of death and the physical 
demise of the human body. This is something that all muertos share, irrespective of 
their state and condition, be it ‘alien’, ‘affine’, or what have you. A second layer, 
where muertos start to differentiate among them, involves the knowledge of the first, 
that is, the ‘hard fact’ of death. ‘Alien’ muertos are most likely to be completely 
ignorant of it, while ‘affines’, although they may initially be ignorant, their position 
as ‘affines’ grants them the knowledge of it relatively quickly. But most importantly, 
what differentiates ‘alien’ from ‘affine’ muertos is the third layer, which is a much 
more extended process, consisting of many other layers, and constitutive of the 
condition of a‘proper’ muerto. 
As I will try to show in the following chapter, to act as a ‘proper’ muerto 
involves the activation of the flow of its camino, which necessitates an almost 
strategic intensification of its past condition (biography) so as to overcome and 
forget it and, hence, proceed to its present condition (‘necrography’; my term) as 
muerto. The following section deals with a very peculiar kind of muertos, the nfumbi, 
as these ‘come to life’ within the tradition of Palo Monte. Their peculiarity, as I will 
try to show, resides in that a very specific ‘material’ is manipulated in order to 
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instantiate them. This, accordingly, creates the quite specific efficacy and perspective 
of this kind of muertos. 
Brujería: the muertos’ involvement in human desires 
Within or besides the category of ‘alien’ muertos there are some who appear to have 
a slightly different fate and they do get related to certain individuals in a fuller and 
more positive sense than the one described so far. This part of the chapter deals with 
a very particular kind of muertos, the nfumbi, who have a lot in common with the 
‘alien’ muertos. Although it is these ‘alien’ muertos who may most often become 
nfumbi through, as it will be shown, a peculiar kind of manipulation, they also 
exhibit characteristics similar to those of the ‘affines’. Apart from that, they also 
have their very own, sui generis characteristics. Here, there must be made a broad 
distinction between the most ‘private’ aspects of relating to nfumbi and the more 
‘public’ ones. The first have to do with how the nfumbi are directly sensed and thus 
communicated with, manipulated and involved in the ‘works’ (trabajos or labores) 
of those individuals that cultivate an intimate relation with them, the paleros and, by 
extension, their ‘clients’. The second is mostly connected to the instances when the 
nfumbi interact with people who do not have a direct relation with them and, when 
they come across them in their camino, are often perceived of as threat, with 
ambiguous if not negative effects, or else, as is commonly put, a case of ‘witchcraft’ 
(brujería). It is in the most ‘private’ aspects and instances that the nfumbi resemble 
the ‘affine’ muertos, and in the more ‘public’ ones that they resemble the ‘alien’. For 
example, people, in order to distinguish them from the ‘alien’who are seen as 
estranged individuals who by their own chaotic and confused agency get ‘attached’ 
momentarily to the livingsay that the latter are ‘sent’ (enviados) (see James 
Figarola 2006a:116). They are still described as ‘dark’, ‘attached to matter’, and so 
forth, but the fact that they are ‘sent’ denotes that they are sent by somebody and it is 
this somebody that, firstly, is related to the muerto and, secondly, to whom the blame 
is ultimately put. Thus, on a sociological level, these muertos are an essential 
material with which purely human relations and more specifically, as we shall soon 
see, desires are instantiated. This phenomenon has been commonly termed 
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ethnographically as ‘witchcraft’ or ‘sorcery’ (see Evans-Pritchard 1990; Marwick 
1986; Parrinder 1963) and in Cuba is known as brujería. 
In instances of brujería the possibility of some misfortune being extremely 
serious, even life threatening, is much higher. One’s camino could be met with more 
than just ‘obstacles’ that make you ‘stumble’, or get turned upside down. One, as it is 
often said, could be ‘knocked down’ (tumbar).12 It is interesting, I think, that the 
idiom of brujería comes to combine two distinct sources of misfortune, the degree of 
which, when just stemming from either one or the other, is relatively less. One is the 
case of the ‘alien’ muertos we just touched upon; the other is among living humans. 
There is a widespread notion, which usually does not undergo deep elaboration but is 
loosely accepted as such, that the mere ill or positive intentions of one person 
towards another may reach, so to speak, the latter and affect him or her accordingly. 
As with the first source of misfortunes, this one is not very likely thought to be 
extremely powerful. They are misfortunes that do not mark deeply peoples’ lives. 
They are part of the everyday and they are usually lost in oblivion until they make 
once more their appearance. Yet, when these two are combined, the cocktail they 
produce is seen as extremely strong, with potential fatal results. This was the most 
common face of what people meant when they referred to brujería or magia negra 
(‘black magic’): a living person and a dead one working together against somebody 
else.  
This kind of interaction is most commonly concentrated in an already 
relatively established system of beliefs and practices that is known as Palo Monte or 
Regla Conga.13 Palo, as with Espiritismo, puts a great emphasis on the role of the 
dead and their interaction with the living, but with very particular kinds of the dead 
and in a very particular way. Being imbued by a dark aura, Palo and its practitioners 
display a high degree of secrecy, not only creating a clear distinction between 
initiated and non-initiated, but also among the initiated themselves. I frequently 
found during fieldwork that a very many people were not keen to admit that they had 
                                                 
12 In popular Cuban-Spanish, tumbar can metaphorically denote to win over or defeat, often cunningly 
or decisively; to take control of something or somebody, and, especially in cases of brujería, to kill. 
Interestingly, tumba in Spanish means grave. 
13 For extensive accounts on Palo Monte, see Bolívar Aróstegui and González Díaz de Villegas 1998; 
Cabrera 1986, 1993; Fuentes Guerra and Gómez 2004:1-38; Garoutte and Wambaugh 2007:67-83; 
James Figarola 2006a, 2006b; Ochoa 2010b; Palmié 2002:159-200. 
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undergone any kind of Palo initiationespecially initiations that conferred an active 
role. It was only upon developing a closer relationship with them or hearing about it 
through a third party that I would learn of their involvement. Furthermore, those who 
did admit to being involved, would be very cautious of what knowledge they would 
reveal and would stress that they, unlike others, did not conduct ‘black magic’; the 
popular image for Palo and its adepts, the paleros and their all important ritual object 
the nganga. 
Palo, and the ‘works’ its adepts engage with through the ngangas and the 
nfumbi, has a very strong public image, which usually highlights its moral ambiguity, 
even immorality, primitivity, fetishism, ill intentions fulfilled by mystical means, 
introversion and secrecy (see, for example, James Figarola 2006a:103; Ochoa 
2007:477-479, 2010a:389; Ortiz 2001; Palmié 2002:159-200, 2006; Wedel 2004:53-
64). Such a generally negative public image is a really complex phenomenon with 
broad socio-historical origins and implications. To an extent, other traditions, such as 
Ocha/Ifá and even Espiritismo (especially its most popular version; see the following 
chapter), have also been charged with a similar image, yet, Palo seems to have 
become the exemplary negative model of it in public discourse. This is especially 
true when the discourse takes into account the differences among them and does not 
just indiscriminately merge them into an amorphous, unitary whole. The socio-
historical origins and implications of such a discourse have to do, I believe, with 
what is socially constructed as an ‘African’ essence, something which can be evinced 
as pertaining to various aspects of ‘cultural expression’, such as manners of 
speaking, body-language, sexuality, values and morals, and even intelligence and 
rationality. Considering all of this, Palo often becomes the African ‘heart of 
darkness’ (Brown 2003a:3) par excellence on Cuban soil, even for religiosos of other 
traditions, but also of Palo itself. It is not uncommon for a palero to verbalize things 
reminiscent of what ‘outsiders’ might also identify with Palo, such as, ‘Palo is dark’ 
(Palo es oscuro), ‘Palo is evil’ (Palo es malo), ‘Palo is for harming’ (Palo hace 
daño), ‘Palo is very material’ (Palo es muy material), and so on. Paleros will not 
necessarily object to being referred to as brujos (‘sorcerers’) or that their ‘works’ 
mainly involve brujería. At the same time, and this is what paleros unlike the 
‘outsiders’ are keen not only to admit to but may poignantly stress, Palo has a 
78 
 
reputedly incomparable efficacy to ‘work fast’ (trabaja rapido), ‘fuck up your 
enemies’ (chingar tus enemigos) and satisfy the darkest and most secret 
desiresdesires which, as some of the paleros I met claimed, somewhat ironically, 
all humans have but are not ready to openly admit. Thus, as with every ‘heart of 
darkness’, the image for Palo is an openly negative one but also accompanied by a 
latent kind of attraction (see Palmié 2002:37-38, 260-289).  
Engaging with these kinds of discourses can be fascinating and may offer a 
very astute sociological edge. Nevertheless, the path I have chosen to follow is 
different and possibly revealing of aspects which can be suppressed and thus misread 
when the focus becomes the otherwise interesting discourses. In my effort to 
approach the ‘insiders’ point of view’, I find it equally rewarding to engage not only 
with the stereotypes but also with a ‘thicker’ description (Geertz 1973:3-30) of what 
points of views are adopted through Palo, rather than about it. Here I am interested in 
the various ways the nfumbi come to adopt a point of view and interact with the 
living, which is also inseparable from what the living do and see through the nfumbi. 
Put differently, instead of focusing on the perspectives about Palo, the nfumbi and 
those who interact with them, I rather venture for an account on the perspectives that 
are generated from and through them. This, I believe, affords us an engagement, not 
only with Palo representations and discourses, but also with what Palo instantiates, 
suspending, in that way, the academic urge and impatience to ascribe to itPaloa 
symbolic function.  
Almost three months have passed since I arrived in Cuba and I still have not 
been able to see the famous or infamous, for many, nganga. But today my 
ethnographic luck is about to change as I will be meeting an old palero somewhere 
on the outskirts of Havana. The aura of mystery that surrounds Palo, which is full of 
stories of extraordinary events, accusations of brujería, dark spirits, and exhumed 
bodies, make my curiosity and excitement even greater. It takes me almost an hour 
by bus to reach Armando’s neighbourhood, where tropical vegetation coexists 
equally with one or two storied small houses, the majority of which look like a 
home-made pastiche of concrete, metal and wood, with fading colours. I enter the 
front yard of a wooden hut with a tall and slender palm tree in the middle. Two small 
flee-infested dogs announce my arrival as the half-hinged door opens. ‘Welcome to 
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my house’ Armando exclaims, and he lets me in. Despite the fact that I have already 
spent three months in Cuba and visited quite a lot of houses, most of them poorly 
decorated and furnished, Armando’s house is surprisingly poor and simple. The floor 
is of the same earth that existed before the house was built, only now, after so much 
use, far more solid and dark. Some worm-eaten rugs cover parts of the three-in-one 
lounge/living/bed room, poorly furnished with only a couple of old chairs, a table 
and his bed. All over there are piles of things, all of them looking old and dusty: 
books, papers, sticks, toys, cigars, bottles, chains, wooden frames, and photographs. 
At some point, after a long chat Armando tells me: ‘So, would you like to see my 
nganga?’ I anxiously reply, ‘Yes’ and we proceed to the back of the house. Another 
door leads us to the backyard.  
In the backyard there is a small wooden hut with no windows. We enter the 
dark room, the only light from two candles. There are two stools where we sit. As my 
eyes get used to the darkness I can discern a huge metal cauldron in the middle of 
one of the hut’s walls. The image is mysterious and almost scary, as there are a 
variety of objects contained in the cauldron. There seem to me to be quite arbitrary: 
there are ‘sticks’ (palos) coming out of it, feathers, a dead black bird, metallic objects 
and an amorphous mass of other materials which I cannot fathom. ‘This is my 
nganga’, Armando exclaims. The collection of these objects along with the cauldron, 
have a dark colour which enhances the image of one object rather than a multiplicity. 
As I come to know through time, this particular dark colour is the outcome of blood 
sacrifices, herbs and alcoholas offerings to the spirits that reside in the nganga, 
dust, rustiness, dirt and dampness, due to the fact that normally the ngangas are kept 
in secure, dark places, ideally out of the house. Next to the nganga, there is also a 
variety of objects that lie on the floor. Smaller ngangas, which I come to know 
belong to some of Armando’s ahijados (‘godchildren’), a collection of sticks, bottles 
of alcohol mixed with spices and herbs, cigars, and geometrical chalk drawings on 
the floor and the walls. ‘This is my laboratory; this is where all the serious work is 
done’, Armando adds. As it is my first real-life experience of a nganga, I probe 
Armando to explain its role in the Palo practice, and also a bit about his biography 
and that of his nganga. 
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Armando got rayado (initiated by way of incisions on the body) in Palo when 
he was 14 years of age, after suffering an ‘almost deadly health issue.’ He was 
immediately sent to the hospital where the doctors were unable to detect or cure what 
was going on. After a week of extreme pain, vomiting and a ‘state of trance’, 
Armando’s family decided to seek the help of la religión. They sought the help of an 
experienced and well-known palero who was a neighbour of theirs. So as not to raise 
suspicions in the hospital, the bulk of the ceremonies were conducted in the house of 
the palero and the gardens of the hospital. Although things appeared to slightly 
improve, after a couple of days, Armando’s state deteriorated again. The palero 
informed the family that his problem had nothing to do with medicine and the 
doctors, but with brujería. But the brujería was so ‘strong’ (fuerte), presumably the 
work of another palero who had been contracted by an enemy family, that Armando 
would need to leave the hospital immediately and be initiated in Palo himself. They 
had to literally smuggle Armando out of the hospital in the night, with the help of 
some doctors and security guards ‘understanding of these things.’ 
He was hurriedly brought to the palero’s house in an unconscious state. 
Armando remembers fuzzy images and sounds, amidst his trance-like ‘struggle 
between life and death’, being laid on the floor of a dark room, people chanting 
around him, animals screaming and ‘strange smells and tastes’, namely, the ritual 
beverages the initiate is given, including sacrificial blood. After this indefinite, semi-
conscious and nightmarish experience Armando woke up ‘one fine morning’ from 
his lethargy. He was alone in the dark room, with only the light of some candles, 
similar to the room we were now in. He stood up and opened the door. The sunlight 
almost blinded him. He entered the unknown house where he finally saw some 
familiar faces. When his mother saw him, ‘risen from the dead’, she let a cry of terror 
and joy. ‘Welcome back’, his recently made padrino told him.  
After this experience Armando was fully initiated in Palo by being rayado  
for a second time and obtaining his own nganga, alternatively called prenda or 
fundamento.14 For Armando, as for the rest of the paleros, the nganga consists of a 
miniature of the whole universe (see Bolívar Aróstegui and González Díaz de 
                                                 
14 For descriptions in Palo initiation, see Bettelheim 2001:40-43; Bolívar Aróstegui and González 
Díaz de Villegas 1998:41-43; Cabrera 1986:160-170; Fuentes Guerra and Gómez 2004:22-24; James 
Figarola 2006a:71-80, 2006b:217-223, 246-249; Ochoa 2010b:111-128.  
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Villegas 1998:15; Cabrera 1993:132; James Figarola 2006a). Elements of nature, 
such as sticks, dead animals, plants, are all material manifestations of spirits that 
have specific powers which are activated through these elements. For example, the 
‘sticks’ (palos) bring into the nganga the great force that is inherent in the forest, ‘the 
wilderness’ (el monte). The dead animals give the nganga and its owner their 
specific capacities, like seeing from a long distance (birds), or the accentuated 
olfactory ability (dogs), for example. Stones (matarí), as in Ocha/Ifá, are 
manifestations of spirits of nature called mpungos (for a more detailed description of 
a nganga’s contents, see Cabrera 1986:126-127, 1993:119-146; James Figarola 
2006a, 2006b; Ochoa 2010b:140-148). 
But what makes the nganga an even more mysterious, ‘dark’, and extremely 
efficacious object is the muerto that is said to reside in it. Each nganga is meant to 
contain at least one spirit of a dead person. This muerto, unlike other muertos, is not 
related to the nganga and its owner by way of affinity or kinship. It is a contracted 
muerto that resides and ‘labours’ (trabaja) with the palero through a ‘pact’ (pacto) 
and it is very often called nfumbi or nfumbe.15 The ‘material’ (lo material) in Palo is 
most dramatically displayed by this kind of pact, as the muerto is not brought into the 
nganga by just immaterial means or objects that the muerto biographically identifies 
itself with. The muerto is in the nganga in a much more literal sense. There are parts 
of its remains, bones and, sometimes, even its skull in it. The pact is then initiated in 
a place that the majority of the people view as that where the dead acquire peace, 
material detachment and respectful remembrance by the living: the cemetery. The 
muertos that are brought from there to the nganga are nevertheless not so much 
resting in peace. They are spirits of people who have been forgotten by society, 
whilst in life were on the margins of it, and who may have died a violent and sudden 
death. Many of them were criminals or the victims of them, alcoholics, drug-addicts, 
and mad people (see Cabrera 1993:126; James Figarola 2006b:37). These spirits are 
considered to be unable to detach themselves from this world and they make ideal 
candidates for acquiring a more active role in it through the pact with the palero. In 
                                                 
15 For the centrality of the nganga, its muerto and its ‘pact’ with the palero, see Bolívar Aróstegui and 
González Díaz de Villegas 1998:15, 39-45, 61; Cabrera 1986:125, 1993:22, 122-123; Fernández 
Martínez 2005:64; Fuentes Guerra and Gómez 2004:21; Garoutte and Wambaugh 2007:68-69; James 
Figarola 2006b:31-48; Ochoa 2010b:158-165; Palmié 2002:159-200, 2006:862-864; Wedel 2004:54. 
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essence, these spirits are drawn from the ‘aimlessly wandering’ and ‘anonymous sea’ 
(see Ochoa 2007) or mass of the dead previously discussed.  
It is not a straightforward thing to do, obtaining a muerto from the cemetery 
in order to make the ‘labour pact’ and ritually making it a resident of the nganga. To 
begin with, it is an illicit activity to steal human remains. As said before, the ideal 
candidates for nfumbi-ship are bodies of somewhat liminal people. This means that, 
normally, these people do not have any living persons to attend to them in the first 
place. Acquiring the human remains of the nfumbi initiates the ever strong and very 
particular bond the palero will cultivate with his nfumbi. In a way, the liminality of 
the dead is passed on to the living in their very first meeting, since the palero will 
have to acquire him illicitly. Armando, like the rest of the paleros, acquired his 
muerto-nfumbi under the darkness of night. He had previously made arrangements 
with the night guard of the cemetery and had obtained his ‘licence’ to do his job 
without interference. The guard’s role is even more complicated and interesting, as 
he is not only the gatekeeper of very important ritual ‘stuff’ for the paleros, but he is 
usually the one who has some knowledge of the identities of the cemetery’s muertos. 
He is the one who knows which of them do not receive visits from the living, may 
know some information about the dead while in life, and generally, through a long 
interaction with paleros, has a very good idea of possibly eligible nfumbi candidates 
(see also Cabrera 1993:132-133, Ochoa 2010b:161-163).  
As soon as the palero has gained access and some knowledge of particular 
muertos, the next step is to ask the muertos themselves. It is very hard to know 
exactly how this is done, as usually the whole event takes place in the complete 
absence of witnesses. This is not only because the action is an illicit one, but also, 
and most importantly for the paleros, because the nfumbi will come to take a leading 
role in the whole function of the nganga and, therefore, knowledge by others of its 
name and way of acquisition could be potentially used against the palero himself. 
Armando, then, went alone to the cemetery and he was not very keen on revealing 
the exact procedure. What he did tell me was that he first went to a very ‘simple and 
poor’ grave where there was no marble covering it. He started chanting in low voice 
(probably in the ritual language of Palo which is a mixture of Spanish and Bantu 
words) and asked the dead if he was willing to enter the pact. Armando tells me he 
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used an oracle without being specific as to which one. I assume it could be a 
relatively simple one where one obtains ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers. This particular muerto 
was reluctant to enter the pact, so Armando proceeded with his search at the 
‘common grave’ (fosa común). There rest a mass of bodies which are invariably not 
claimed, no living people attend them or simply there is no money to afford an 
individual grave. In this anonymous mass of bodies paleros often find their nfumbi. 
Armando too found his there. Since then, Armando’s nfumbi has resided in his 
nganga, the identity of which, through the passage of time, has unfolded in an 
interaction of ‘jobs’. He tells me: 
He [the nfumbi] is a very powerful muerto. Once you give him the order to act, he is 
unleashed [se suelta] and even I find it difficult to control him and convince him to stay calm 
inside the nganga. That is why I only use him in extremely urgent situations, mainly when 
there is a big combat [guerra] going on [alluding to issues of brujería, usually against other 
paleros and their nfumbis] and why I give him offerings periodically, so that he is kept fed 
and knows who his master is…I often communicate with him so that we both make clear our 
needs to each other. He asks me for things to complement the nganga, so that it always stays 
active and strong [fortalecida]. For example, three days ago, he asked me to go to the forest 
[el monte] and find him a special stick [palo], so that he can work more efficiently […] I 
remember once, when I was personally attacked by another palero, my nfumbi had gone 
mad. Several days had passed and it seemed to me that he had disappeared, then I felt his 
presence and ran off to the nganga. I felt his exhaustion in my body and head; there was 
hardly any energy left in him. I knew he had to be fed immediately. Normally, in such 
situations I sacrifice a four-legged animal, which is the most powerful food [comida] one can 
give. But it was late in the night and there was no way I could find an animal at that time. 
Besides, I couldn’t afford it. I had some small chickens in the backyard, but I knew that for 
my tired and hungry nfumbi their blood would only serve as an appetizer, so what I did was 
to cut open my self and offered him my very own blood. Just a few drops and he was new 
again, ready to fight. Since then, I have never fed him with my blood because as he is a very 
material entity, he can get used to it and even addicted and that would drain me off and make 
him a vampire, crazy and totally uncontrollable, unable to distinguish between me and him, 
this world and the other.  
Trying to move away from the general and often stereotypical image of Palo and 
rather than treating it as a tradition from the outset, I delve into the instances of 
interaction between the nfumbi and the living. As I mentioned before, a broad 
distinction can be made between those who come across a nfumbi temporarily and 
those who relate to it in a more permanent way. As the nfumbi are muertos which are 
very commonly perceived as ‘sent’ (enviados), the above distinction could be framed 
in terms of those who ‘send’ it and those to whom it is ‘sent’. The person who 
‘sends’ a nfumbi is essentially the palero, but it can either be because of his own 
personal reasons and wishes or of those who have come to seek his help. Paleros 
stress that the nfumbi are a very particular kind of muerto by saying, for instance, that 
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they are very ‘material’ and they ‘work (a lot) with the material.’ Nfumbi are muertos 
who initiallybefore becoming onefind themselves in a highly ‘material’ state 
and, consequentlyby becoming onetheir ‘materiality’ is accentuated even more. 
Their initial state is one of a profound lack of relatedness. Nfumbi, unlike ‘affines’, 
do not ‘belong’ to any living person; they are also perceived as ‘aimlessly 
wandering’ spirits, in a state of confusion, characteristics which suggest that they are 
initially (no more different than) ‘alien’ muertos. Armando’s acquisition of his 
nfumbi from the common grave, where an undifferentiated mass of bones lay, is just 
a more ‘material’ dimension of the anonymous sociality ‘alien’ muertos find 
themselves in.  
The ontological affinity between ‘alien’ muertos and nfumbi is highlighted by 
the account of another palero, Yosdado, when he described how he found his own 
nfumbi. Yosdado, as it happens with many paleros, even before his initiation in Palo, 
had an ‘innate’ (inata) ability to sense muertos. Around the period of his initiation in 
Palo, he perceived the presence of a muerto which did not ‘belong’ to him. As he 
described it, the muerto got ‘attached’ to him ‘in despair’ (en desesperación) without 
being able to articulate itself as to what it wanted, or where it was coming from. In 
other words, it could not reveal aspects of its biography, or any significant oracular 
messages. Yosdado normally, in such cases of ‘barren attachments’ (apegos 
estériles), as he interestingly called them, would send the ‘alien’ muerto off, ‘To 
where it came from; to hell [de donde vino; al carajo].’ Nevertheless, as he had 
recently been initiated with his second rayamiento in Palo and had already obtained 
his own nganga, he was looking for a muerto to ‘fully activate it’ (activarla 
completamente) and ‘strengthen it’ (fortalecerla). He, thus, decided not to send the 
muerto ‘to hell’, but to try and lure, convince it to become the ‘dog of the prenda’ 
(perro de prenda; as alternatively nfumbi and nganga may be called respectively). In 
order to do so, Yosdado told me that he started ‘conversing’ (conversar) with the 
muerto. As in the case of Armando, he avoided being explicit about what this 
‘conversation’ involved, and just said that the muerto ‘gave its consent and license 




I never came across a similar account as that of Yosdado, nevertheless, its 
uniqueness exemplifies the initial ‘alien-ness’ of all nfumbi. Normally, the muerto 
does not come to the palero but the palero goes in search of his nfumbi. The search is 
thus most often initiated by the living and in places where ‘alien’ muertos are 
attached to or frequent, such as the cemetery and in particular where their human 
remains are buried. In Yosdado’s case, he was initially found by the muerto, in a way 
that normally ‘alien’ and ‘affines’ behave. Even if this is so, he had to actively make 
an effort to convince and transform it into a nfumbi by ‘conversing’ with it and not 
sending it away. As soon as the ‘pact’ was made, one of the nfumbi’s first significant 
revelations was to lead him to where its remains were. This was also the first 
instance when Yosdado acquired knowledge of some of its biography. On the second 
night after the ‘pact’, Yosdado had a very intense and strange dream. Although the 
following morning he could not remember very clearly what exactly the dream 
‘presented’ (presentó) him with, he woke up with a pressing ‘urge’ (deseo) to visit 
the most western province of Pinar del Rio. The urge was at the same time 
vaguenot knowing exactly why and where in the whole province to goand 
intense, as the (recollection of the) dream itself was. Equally vaguely but intensely, 
he felt that the urge and the dream had to do with his nfumbi or, as he said, that 
theythe urge and dreamwere simultaneously the nfumbi’s. He immediately 
decided to embark on his journey to Pinar del Rio the very same day.  
Unfortunately, due to a lack of space and literary skill, I shall have to skip the 
otherwise fascinating and detailed account of Yosdado’s journey, which as he was 
recounting it, I could not help but feel as if I was immersed in a novel. Surrealistic as 
it may have sounded to me, always with a latent and instinctive suspicion towards 
Yosdado’s faithful account of the ‘actual’ events, for him the excitement and 
enchantment looked far greater than mine, not because he considered the events as 
being mundane and highly predictable, but precisely because they were not and 
therefore were enchant-ing (and not enchant-ed), as they unravelled in his very 
journey.  
To unwillingly and forcibly make a long story short, Yosdado’s journey, full 
of spontaneous and incredible, according to him, incidents, led him to a remote area 
somewhere relatively near the picturesque village of Viñales. The whole journey, not 
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being straightforward in its purpose and destination, was described to me as a series 
of subtly interconnected events, full of ‘signs’ (señales) and unexpected encounters, 
which finally led an exhausted, hungry and filthy, yet unusually alert Yosdado, ‘In 
the middle of some woods far from civilization.’ There, under a tree, and for the first 
time so explicitly, he sensed the presence of his nfumbi, which instructed him to dig 
at a very specific point. He started doing so using his own hands. After an hour or so, 
full of sweat and dirt, he came across what he increasingly suspected what his 
nganga and muerto-as-nfumbi was missing: its human remains. Yosdado put them in 
his backpack and made his way back to Havana. The whole journey lasted five days 
and on the night of the fifth he arrived home and immediately ‘sealed the pact’ (cerré 
el pacto) by inserting the bones and skull into their new ‘skin’, so to speak, the 
nganga. 
Yosdado pointed out that it was after all of the aforementioned events that he 
began to have a more intimate relation with his nfumbi, more importantly an 
increase, both quantitatively and qualitatively, of communication and efficacy. He 
would sense the nfumbi less vaguely and more viscerally and could enter into a more 
intelligible kind of dialogue with it. For instance, biographical information about the 
nfumbi was communicated to him. He learned that the muerto had been a mambí,16 
that he was a young, unmarried man, born in Asturias of Spain, where he had freshly 
arrived from, leaving behind his parents and brothers. Not long after arriving in 
Cuba, he had soon been inspired by the Cuban cause for independence. He died from 
a Spanish bullet during an ambush and his comrades only managed to hurriedly bury 
him seven days after his death. Yosdado added in awe that it was also seven days that 
it took him and the nfumbi to get to the remains and bring them to the 
ngangaconsidering the fact that the dream ‘presented’ itself on the second night of 
the ‘pact’ and the journey lasted five more days.  
Nfumbi seem to be drawn from the generic reservoir of ‘alien’ muertos and, 
whereas the majority of the people actively try to avoid them by sending them off, 
some individuals choose to actively engage with them. In a sense, both kinds of 
muertos seem to be highly affected by human agency, be that an act of 
expiationfor the ‘alien’or appropriationfor the nfumbi. To appropriate what is 
                                                 
16 This is the Cuban word for a rebel fighting for the independence of Cuba against the Spanish Crown 
at the turn of the 19th century. 
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normally expiated also suggests that the kinds of muertos we are dealing with do not 
necessarily have rigid ontological boundaries but are dependent, to an extent, on the 
relations that are cultivated among them and the living. For instance, as we saw in 
Yosdado’s case, an initially ‘alien’ muerto became a nfumbi. Theoretically at least 
and as it was suggested to me by various individuals, ‘alien’ muertos may also 
become ‘affines’, if, or as soon as they find the ‘right’ person to get ‘attached’ to and 
the person grants them ‘acknowledgement’. 
Yet, this is not a one way flow, where the living humans mould the kinds of 
muertos they wish to have. The latter find themselves in a state which can be sensed 
by mediums not as strictly fixed but as indicative of the muertos’ potentials. It is here 
that human agency, in dependence of what kind of ‘materialization’ will be adopted, 
makes use or not of these potentials and therefore plays an important role in giving 
them shape and bringing them into existence by, at the same time, using themthe 
perceived potentialsas ‘maps’ of the possible ‘paths’ that can be taken. What I 
mean by human agency is not to be conflated with just a relatively high degree of 
human freedom to create ‘things’ (be they objects, spirits or both) out of nothing. 
Usually, this kind of understanding tends to view human agency as a property of 
humanity that may oscillate between a positive dimension such as creativity and 
resistance, and a more negative one, such as fetishism or animism (see chapter 6); as 
human fancy. In the background lies what is taken to be ‘human’ and what is not, 
and, by extension, what has agency and what does not. Therefore, in this sense, 
agency may or can be ‘given’ to it. This is ultimately a constructivist model which 
imposes its own definition of what is ‘human’ and what is not and when ‘others’ do 
not perceive the same, then they must be ultimately mistaken no matter how real the 
‘social’ or ‘cultural’ realities produced are (as was the case with Evans-Pritchard).  
Human agency, through the ethnography of ‘alien’ muertos and the nfumbi, is 
not limited to what ‘we’ define as human (a living person) and freedom (to create the 
other-than human). To be too human and too free (as a human) when dead, is posed 
as a limit or obstacle. ‘Alien’ muertos are perceived as persons who do not have 
potentials to relate because the degree of identification with their past embodied 
biographies is too intense. Having lost their human body once and for all, they seem 
to be unaware of it. Thus, they cannot transmit their perspectives to the living, 
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neither of their biography nor of them because they have not ‘othered’ themselves 
enough. ‘Alien’ muertos conflate their ‘necrography’ (present state; my term) with 
their biography (past state) and, thus, cannot communicate and ‘properly’ relate to 
the living, because they themselves act and think as ones. ‘Alien’ muertos are 
perceived as ones who do not have the potential to relate, first, with their new 
condition as dead and, second, to the living, but this does not mean that they cannot 
relate in absolute terms. As with having a potential does not necessarily mean that it 
comes to be realized, not having one does not necessarily mean that, under specific 
conditions, it cannot be realized. This is the case with the nfumbi, as although 
initially being in a state of un-relatedness and are thus ‘alien’, they do enter into a 
kind of relation by becoming the nfumbi of a palero. 
Palero and nfumbi enter into a kind of relation that, in many respects, 
resembles that with the ‘affines’. The palero gets to know biographical aspects of the 
nfumbi while in life, as people do with their ‘affines’, but not in so much depth and 
detail. The majority of the paleros I met tended to place them in a secondary position 
and, when they mentioned them, they mostly revolved around aspects which had to 
do with a chain of events that led the person to become an ‘alien’ muerto. In 
Yosdado’s account, what was highlighted about his nfumbi while in life was, firstly, 
that he suffered an untimely death (as he died young and by a bullet in an ambush) 
and, secondly, that his life, death and burial occurred in a sort of strange and lonely 
environment (he had recently left his family back in Spain, was unmarried, and died 
and got buried hurriedly in the woods, after seven days of decomposition). As we 
shall see, with the ‘affines’ there is a much bigger wealth of knowledge about their 
biographies and people actively pursue them as this is accompanied by an increase in 
the flow of perspectives, not only about the muertos’ past life (biography), but also 
their wishes of the present (‘necrography’) and their viewpoints about the living 
themselves; especially those to whom the muertos get ‘attached’ and who become 
their ‘affines’.  
The nfumbi, in that respect, are more akin to ‘alien’ muertos. Although the 
palero through his nfumbi claims to be able to ‘see’ events and get to know about 
things otherwise unseen and unknowable, they tend to be extremely specific. As long 
as ‘alien’ muertos are perceived as such, the instances of encounters with them and 
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the living are extremely short and limited and, usually, they are characterized by their 
negative and alienating effects. In the broader scheme of things that constitute one’s 
camino in life, these encounters are specific points that do not refer to it as a 
continuous and reciprocal journey, but as a deviation from it, which has to be 
amended and realigned ‘on the spot’. As much as ‘alien’ muertos are perceived as 
persons who seriously deviated from their own camino, both while in life (in their 
biography) and as muertos (in their necrography), their relations to the living 
gravitate towards a similar kind of effect, that is, a kind of deviation concerning the 
living as well. ‘Alien’ muertos do not ‘belong’ to the living and, thus, the encounters 
with them also do not belong to their camino; they are external‘alien’to it, not 
internaland ‘affine’. Nfumbi, when they affect people other than its own palero are 
also commonly done so as ‘alien’ muertos; and their affects are often perceived as 
those of the ‘alien’, although even more so exaggerated. The people to whom the 
nfumbi are ‘sent’ may suffer misfortunes that can potentially be very dangerous and 
harming, broadly referred to as brujería. Unlike ‘alien’ muertos who might get 
‘attached’ to the living almost accidentally because of their confused and chaotic 
state (one that does not let them know if and to whom they belong), the nfumbi do so 
intentionally. Ultimately, the intention is not thought as directly or solely belonging 
to the nfumbi but to the person to whom it belongsthe paleroand it is in this 
sense that in the relations between nfumbi and the living it is human agency that 
prevails. 
This peculiar identification between nfumbi and palero and their consequent 
intense relation can also create a peculiar way with which they can be ‘sensed’ by 
others. For example, Armando tells me that the way he perceives the nfumbi of other 
paleros is that he feels the presence of a muerto oscuro followed by another 
presence, that of ‘a real person’, as he tells me, ‘of somebody with a name and an 
address.’ After further, often oracular, investigations this person is tracedmeaning 
that more details are sought especially as to the context of this person’s ill 
intentionsand it is to him or her that the muerto oscuro is ‘sent back’ (virar). In an 
almost identical fashion, as with aimlessly wandering ‘alien’ muertos, their absence 
of biography is sensed, but to that is added a parallel ‘sense’ of another human 
presence with a biography. The accentuated humanity of the nfumbi, dramatically 
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brought into existence by its own remains, is ‘sensed’ as a double presence, one that 
makes it an ‘alien’ muerto without a biography and another that makes it an ‘alien’ 
muerto related to somebodya nfumbi. This is an example of how a nfumbi might be 
experienced. Other accounts I have collected about ‘sensing’ the nfumbi by 
espiritistas and paleros were similar. For instance, another account described that the 
nfumbi was ‘sensed’ as a muerto oscuro but with an intensified feeling of its 
presence: ‘As if it was a real person. It gave me such a chill that I thought that I 
would literally freeze’, my friend told me. 
What I think is highlighted here is an intensification of humanity that the 
nfumbi posses; their very materiality. Their bones and skulls are materials with which 
these spirits are said to be attached to this world. The act of unearthing them is 
crucial exactly because their very essence as particular kind of spirit resides or is in 
these remains. The muerto is thought to be lured into entering into the contractual 
relation with the palero because the palero explicitly acquires something the muerto 
still identifies itself with. Its remains constitute the stuff with which the muerto 
recognizes itself as ‘human’. 
Moving from those people to whom the nfumbi is ‘sent’ to those who ‘send’ 
it, the nfumbi acquire aspects that resemble those of ‘affine’ muertos. As we have 
seen, biographical aspects, although they may be limited, do come out to light; 
nfumbi can also reveal to the palero concerns of his interest or of his ‘clients’ and 
ahijados. But still these concerns make their appearance more spontaneously and 
they are only envisioned as part of one’s camino in a post facto fashion, as an 
accumulation of events that can be recollected without necessarily revealing a 
broader pattern of a destiny from which one may deviate from or realign to (as we 
shall see in the case of ‘affine’ muertos and especially of deities like the orichas). 
This lack of commitment to a broader scheme of things is what many paleros 
emphasize in their interaction with their nfumbi. This is their commitment: 
committed uncommitment, so to speak. 
As long as the former keep the latter ‘fed’ through offerings and sacrifices 
they have a relative degree of freedom to conduct the ‘works’ they desire. Nfumbi 
reveal to their paleros cases where nfumbi of other paleros have interfered and 
negatively affect them or their clients, that is, cases of brujería contra brujería. Not 
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commiting to a broader scheme of things is not to be seen only in negative terms. 
The nfumbi may be hard to perceive in terms of a general camino, but it is exactly 
because of this and its excessive attachment to the world of the living, that it can 
perceive the details that cannot be seen by a more general perspective. It can also be 
highly indifferent to and, thus free from, a commitment to a destiny, allowing it to be 
more spontaneous in fulfilling the desires of humans. It is in other words liberating as 
well. Brujería, in this sense, is not only a defence system against an attackanother 
brujeríabut also a complex and often experimental manipulation of ‘things’ in 
order to achieve other ends and desires, such as healing, positive results in the 
amorous and sexual life, and professional aspirations, for example. In essence, 
paleros, nfumbi, ngangas and the ‘works’ they all inextricably get involved in, are 
directed towards these desires which spontaneously appear in the everyday, without 
creating long-lasting obligations, commitments and exchanges; and this is 
simultaneously its limitbecause they do not engage with a broader viewpoint of 
one’s caminoas well as its liberating effect; in other words, its very peculiar 
efficacy. As we shall see in the following chapter, ‘affine’ muertos also preserve this 
aspect of spontaneity but they also cultivate a more reciprocal, and broader in 





SENSING THE DEAD 





During the time I spent in Havana, my curiosity was drawn by an unfamiliar to me 
tendency of many people to transmit information that was often deemed as 
impossible to be known by any conventional means. People would be keen to tell 
you aspects of your character that transgressed the expected passage of time in which 
a relative familiarization could have taken place. Even more surprisingly, one can 
receive information, not only about character traits, but also about past, present and 
future events and situations of a more tangible nature. For instance, I was often 
witness or told of cases where somebody was informed by an individualeven by a 
complete strangerof a physical ailment, an imminent accident, particular likes and 
dislikes, relations with other people, even a factual description of spaces and objects 
the person might be intimately and knowingly related to. Such instances, imbued 
with an aura of wondrous revelations and prophecies, especially when they come 
from strangers, become stories worthy of recounting in the everyday lives of 
habaneros (people from Havana), not so much because they are deemed as mundane, 
but exactly because they possess this wondrous and revelatory quality that transforms 
the triviality of the everyday into an indigenous experience and idiom of the ‘exotic’ 
and the ‘alter’. Indeed, more than often, many Cubans, even those actively involved 
in la religión, would remember their initial surprise when they were first met with 
such incidents, especially those that rang the bell of truth according to them. 
Similar phenomena are not completely strange to a Western context. For 
instance, my mother has told me that when she was approximately 15 years old, she 
woke up in the middle of the night with a very intense feeling (probably 
accompanied by a nightmare; she is not sure) that something bad had happened to 
her older brother. She was extremely upset, convinced that this was not just a bad 
dream and with the need to communicate her fear. Her brother was indeed unusually 
late home, a fact which had kept my grandmother awake. Some time later the phone 
rang. My uncle had been involved in a car accident and had been taken to the 
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hospital. Another account, again given by my mother, was about a friend of hers who 
died dramatically, falling down the stairs of her house. At the funeral, her sister said 
that three nights before the accident my mother’s friend dreamt of their deceased 
father appearing with a black horse and telling her that he had come for her and that 
soon they would be together. These ‘strange’ cases although individually might be 
intense, in general they float, so to speak, in the consciousness of many of us, 
without us pursuing the matter more and even almost suppressing them from 
affecting our lives deeply. Yet, in Cuba they are much more present and diffused in 
peoples’ everyday talk and experiences and even, as I think, and as in one way or 
another, the entire thesis touches upon, further cultivated and explored. In addition, 
very often they are combined by (a talk of) experiences with spirits of the dead.  
The previous chapter touched upon what kind of muertos might appear in the 
lives of habaneros, although their presence is fleeting, uncertain, with ambiguous 
affects and effects and a certain amount of unfamiliarity, or even hostility. The 
ethnography presented us with what could be called ‘alien’ muertos and then the 
nfumbi. This chapter deals with those muertos whose presence, on a 
phenomenological level at least, seems less uncertain and more ‘visible’. As these 
muertos are said to get ‘attached’ (se apegan) to the living by way of ‘affinity’ 
(afinidad) and, thus, ‘belong’ (pertenecen) to them: I call them ‘affines’, both them 
and living individuals they get ‘attached’ to. ‘Affine’, as with ‘alien’, is a relational 
term; someone is by definition affine to somebody else. Yet, as the ‘alien-ness’ of the 
previously mentioned muertos is a potential that might be explored and actualized or 
not, affinity is also onea potentialthat has to be ‘acknowledged’ (darle 
conocimiento) and ‘developed’ (desarollarse), or, as alternatively called and 
signifying both, ‘materialized’ (materializarse). 
Celia’s muertos 
Celia is a middle-aged woman I met in the course of my fieldwork, during a Santería 
ritual organized by a common acquaintance. What struck me from the beginning was 
her propensity to talk to people about quite personal matters, even though she did not 
know them. On the day I met her, she started making comments on certain peoples’ 
attitudes, and past events that needed further actions in the future. She focused 
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particularly on one woman who was totally enchanted by Celia’s ability to see 
through her. Celia did not only appear to describe her character in a few minutes as if 
she knew her all her life and as if she was a fully trained and talented psychologist; 
she even described her flat, members of her family and certain aspects of her 
relations with them. The woman nodded in surprise. She also told her that she had a 
close relationship with particular spirits of the dead and started revealing aspects of 
their identity. The other woman was totally shocked by Celia’s revelations and got so 
emotional to the point that she started crying. Celia told her that the people who were 
leading her ‘religious life’ (vida religiosa) were not honest and were doing her more 
harm than good. The woman had surrendered unconditionally to Celia’s powerful 
muertos. In the end they agreed that Celia would pay a visit to her house and conduct 
a series of cleansing ceremonies, as well as advising her on how to better take care of 
her own muertos. After that event, I tried to approach Celia and get to know her 
somewhat better. The bond was immediate, as we both confessed to each other later 
on. We talked for a long time. She was interested in my research but also in my own 
views about la religión. She told me that I was a non-believer, a sceptic, but also that 
deep inside me there was a profound mystical part. Interestingly enough, she told me 
that I was a sceptic exactly because there was a spirit, showing affection in me, of a 
distant relative of mine who had been an intellectual in life and he was also a sceptic 
and did not believe in spirits. Being a sceptic after all, I was not particularly 
impressed by Celia’s initial revelations, but I was definitely attracted to her 
personality and we decided to meet again. After that, I became a frequent visitor of 
Celia and her enormous family, both living and dead, all residing in a big, rundown 
colonial house in Havana.  
Celia has undergone multiple initiations in all of the three traditions under 
discussion. Nevertheless, she mainly identifies herself as a santera, ‘daughter’ of 
Yemayá (an oricha in Santería to which she is initiated), with very powerful muertos, 
which are dealt with through Espiritismo. Although she is well versed with the 
dilogún oracle (see chapter 4), she places a great emphasis in her ability to divine 
through her muertos. Even when she makes use of the dilogún, her muertos are ever 
present and assist her in the interpretation of the oracular signs and complement 
them, so as to get a more exact and context specific image of the situation in 
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question. Normally, Celia has images in front of her, whispers in her ears, and very 
often dreams, which are taken to be her muertos’ messages. These messages, unlike 
the use of oracles such as the dilogún, are not actively invoked by Celia. They come 
to her more unexpectedly, although, in her long established relationship with her 
muertos, she may channel them to a degree. I will now describe a telephone 
conversation I had with Celia so as to give an example of how different the nature of 
the communication with the dead can be when compared to that with divinities. 
In the period the conversation took place my father’s uncle was ill and had 
been taken to the hospital. Celia did not know any details about my family back in 
Greece apart from the fact that I had a loving and loved father and mother. When I 
talked to her that day on the phone I told her about my granduncle’s poor but 
recovering health by just adding that, probably, he was also undergoing a kind of 
depression as his wife had recently died. Celia remained silent for a moment and 
then, bypassing the central subject of the discussion, which was the poor health of 
my granduncle, said with absolute confidence: ‘Your grandaunt died with a very big 
preoccupation deep inside her.’ A bit surprised I asked: ‘What do you mean?’ She 
asked me back: ‘Does your granduncle have two daughters?’ I said: ‘Yes.’ She went 
on without any further questions:  
There was a quite serious conflict between the two daughters, and your grandaunt was deeply 
affected by that. Furthermore, your grandaunt was part of the conflict, as she had to make 
important decisions that had to do with it directly. It was a particular decision she took that 
made the conflict even graver. Your grandaunt was a person with a high sense of justice and 
her decision was for the best of all, but in that decision she had to favour one daughter at the 
expense of the other. In her dying days, the conflict was buried so as not to upset your 
grandaunt but she knew that things were not as they appeared to be. She died with this 
preoccupation in her. You must go to church and have a mass for your grandaunt, light a 
candle, so that she can rest in peace.  
I was deeply impressed, unlike what she had said about me in previous 
conversations, like the one I referred to when we first met, her words were full of 
truths which I interpreted as being so specific that I could not claim that they were 
general and often repeated themes one could by chance get right. Apart from that, 
Celia, at that moment, had almost no information about my family and especially 
about its private internal conflicts. In the absence of finding anything else to say, I 
asked: ‘What makes you say so?’ She replied: ‘My muertos have been with me from 
the beginning of the conversation; they told me.’ 
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Following from the previous chapter, where I initiated a discussion on how 
the dead affect peoples’ lives by looking at a particular kind of muertosthe 
‘alien’I now turn to a much broader category which is taken to participate in one’s 
camino with more lasting effects, almost to the degree, for some, of becoming 
constitutive of it. A very common word that is used to describe this kind of muertos 
and their relation with the living, and which implicitly or explicitly serves to 
distinguish them from the ‘alien’, is that of ‘affinity’ (afinidad) (see also Espirito 
Santo 2009a:94-100). In the Afro-Cuban context, afinidad is not restricted to and 
does not necessarily lead to a pleasant and harmonious camino. Rather than being 
merely an a priori positive emotional state of being and mind which has to be 
subsequently enacted, it is realized but also crucially ‘developed’ (desarollarse) in its 
very enactment, and not necessarily with obvious and immediate positive results. 
Afinidad, thus, points more to a kind of co-presence, sharing and familiaritywhat 
Tsintjilonis calls ‘cenesthesia’ (2007:186)than a reflection and representation of an 
ideal cosmological or emotional order of things. The latter is or can be the end 
product rather than the absolute and essential origin, suggesting that we might as 
well be dealing with an emerging ontology. As I will show, the Cuban muertos are 
entities which are ‘evolving’ and transforming, as well as quite idiosyncratic in their 
character and being. It is for this reason that I intentionally do not commence with a 
pre-existing and established field of knowledge and practice, but, I hope this will 
convincingly, emerge progressively through the unfolding of my ethnography. 
Afinidad could be said to be a sort of quality that binds the living and the 
dead into a relation of ‘belonging’, reciprocity and exchange, making (or 
transforming) them (into) ‘affines’. Such a self-explanatory definition becomes less 
secure if one takes into account that afindidad has first to be detected, 
‘acknowledged’ and further ‘developed’, thus it is not a given that fulfils itself in an 
automatic fashion; it has to be ‘achieved’ (Espirito Santo 2009a:227). Nevertheless, 
this kind of achievement does not construct somethingessentially, the world of the 
muertosout of nothing: ‘[P]eople have spirits, regardless of whether they learn to 
communicate with them or not’ (Espirito Santo 2009a:82). Initially, thus, afinidad 
does come as a given, insofar as muertos with specific identities are sensed to having 
been ‘attached’ to specific individuals and therefore ‘belong’ to them. Usually, the 
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very instance, time, place, and conditions in general of ‘attachment’ do not get to be 
known either in extensive details or for its particular reasoning, unless 
retrospectively revealed by the muerto itself. Most often, especially in the case of 
non-mediums, a muerto is perceived by a medium as having already been ‘attached’ 
to the individual and showing its afinidad. Whether one will ‘acknowledge’ the 
affinity, and to what extent, follows from this more ‘unnegotiable’ and preexisting 
‘fact’ of affinity.  
‘Alien’ muertos also get ‘attached’ to people, but as soon as a relation with 
them is negated, they are sent off to the anonymous mass of the dead. ‘Affine’ 
muertos are thought to belong more permanently to a particular individual. If the 
latter ignores them they will still remain attached (they will not get attached to 
somebody else), although with potentially negative effects for both. Here, I have to 
make clear that I have not been able to gather substantial information as to why and 
how muertos get ‘attached’ to particular individuals. Apart from muertos who belong 
to the family, the specific motivation for ‘affinity’ is not clear. Rather, ‘affinity’ was, 
more than anything else, sensed in its effects and affectsin the very presence of 
these muertosand not so much for its incentives (apart from the common to all 
muertos desire to ‘develop’, ‘evolve’ and ‘de-materialize’; see below). 
But, how and why are muertos divided between ‘alien’ and ‘affines’? The 
beginnings of an answer to this are in looking at how ‘affinity’ is sensed. With the 
‘alien’ muertos, as we have already seen, what is sensed is a presence with, or of, an 
absence, so to speak. What is sensed by mediums is ‘something’ which, although it 
has hints of a human biography it ultimately remains ‘in the dark’, where the ‘alien’ 
muerto is normally said to come from and be sent to. This is a place of radical 
immanencethese muertos are perceived as being too much attached to this world; 
they preserve their humanity and memories of it in excessyet, of radical 
unrelatedness as well. What the mediums sense in ‘alien’ muertos is a lack of 
potential to relate. The ‘alien’ muertos, as any other kind of muertos, are not sensed 
continually and permanently as one body perceives the presence of another. Muertos 
appear in the senses more subtly, temporally, gradually and, importantly, according 
to the ‘affinity’ between the medium and the individual. This last factor suggests that 
the affinity between the living and the dead is related to the one among the living 
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and, as it will be shown, among the dead themselves. Remember that my relation 
with Celia was felt by both of us as one of great affinity. In its course this was 
accompanied by Celia’s muertos taking part in it and, furthermore, relating gradually 
to my own ones. Muertos, in other words, not only relate to people but also relate 
people, therefore, they are relations or constitute them, rather than reflecting or 
symbolizing them. 
If, from the mediums’ point of view, ‘alien’ muertos are the sensorial affect 
of the lack of potential to relate, the ‘affine’ muertos are the exact opposite, that is, 
they are potentials of relations and they are sensed as such. This is what, I think, the 
word ‘affinity’ implies. When mediums claim to perceive the presence of a muerto 
they start depicting a ‘frame’ or ‘painting’ (cuadro) of it. They might begin, for 
instance, by saying: ‘On your side’ or ‘behind you, comes’ or ‘it is presented to me’ 
(a tu lado or detras tuya, viene or se me presenta) such-and-such presence or entity. 
Then the medium will go on by giving a visual description of how the muerto is 
presenting itself. This can be information about physical aspects, such as the colour 
of the skin, other racial characteristics, possible bodily peculiarities, or information 
about objects that are present in the ‘frame’ and can be seen on or around the person 
and used by it, such as clothing, tools, cigars, books, and so on. Usually, the 
descriptions of ‘frames’ that I have witnessed or been told of, involve movement. 
The most basic kind is the one that indicates the ‘affinity’ of the muerto to the 
individual. This is framed as sensing its appearance next to or behind the person, 
following it. This can be even more indicative by the way the muerto might be seen 
to adopt certain facial and bodily expressions towards the person; a general body 
language of affection and protectiveness. It might also adopt expressions that hint to 
its current or a more general state of being, not necessarily directly related to the 
person. A muerto can be seen as happy, serious, sad, or angry. All these images are 
not different from the way the living express themselves, the muertos being after all 
(ex-)humans. Images might also be of events that happened to the muertos and are 
deemed as ones that they themselves let appear and, thus, are significant. For 
example, a medium might see the way the person died or an activity that indicates its 
profession while in life. 
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Apart from the visual effects or affects, the muertos appear by transmitting 
messages in other ways. They can be heard, often in whispers, saying specific things, 
or felt. The medium may feel, for example, the sadness or a physical ailment of the 
muerto in his or her own body. Celia tells me that she ‘has’ an African muerto. He 
used to be a slave in the sugar-cane fields of colonial Cuba, he is barely dressed and 
he is a ‘brute’ (bruto) in his manners. Celia informs me that each of her muertos tend 
to transmit messages of a slightly different nature. For example, her African muerto, 
Tomás, when he descends, he normally talks about peoples’ everyday problems, 
obstacles, enemies and especially issues that involve witchcraft. She tells me that 
Tomás, although uneducated, had a deep knowledge in the use of plants and 
witchcraft; he was a palero, a brujo while in life. It is for this specialized knowledge 
which was occasionally transmitted to Celia that Tomás was praised, whereas other 
muertos of hers had different domains of knowledge, characters and ways of 
manifestation. Broadly speaking, the mediums sense in all these ways the presence of 
muertos as revealing perspectives about their own past, when they were alive, and 
presentoften linked to their past and also about the person they are ‘attached’ to. 
Specialized knowledge by different kinds of muertos is also accompanied by 
experiencing them differently, through mediumship. Celia’s Tomás, when he 
‘descends’ he makes her smoke cigars, something which she herself does not like to 
do in his absence, swear, be quite bossy and very interestingly ‘sweat like a pig.’ 
Celia informs me that normally her sweat does not smell particularly bad. She likes 
to take care of herself and she has baths and uses perfume on a daily basis; but when 
Tomás ‘comes down’ (baja), the smell is awful, as if it was she who had been 
working in the sugar-cane fields. Resting on Celia’s accounts, which are not atypical 
of how mediums experience the presence of their muertos, it is hard to see the 
muertos as a mere representation or mental construction of something; slavery, for 
instance. Mediums do not just think about a past but they think through it and, much 
more, they experience it and bring it forward to the present; the past thinks through 
them as well. Tomás’ sweat, apart from signifying his presence, constitutes an 
essential ingredient of Celia’s experiencing of herself, as this is organically blended 
with Tomás and his perspective. In the case of ordinary peoplethose who are not 
able to directly sense (their) muertosit is through the mediums that they start 
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learning to ‘acknowledge’ the presence of their muertos, although, in relation to the 
mediums, the experiences are much more subtle and indirect, at least initially. 
When a medium communicates with another person it is not always the case 
that he or she will immediately sense the latter’s muertos, at least not in full detail or 
the totality of them. Yet, it is possible that significant information referring to the 
person can be revealed, and that is often said, firstly, to be stemming from the 
medium’s own muertos and, secondly, that this is an initial sign of ‘affinity’ between 
the twomedium and the personand between their respective muertos. Further 
communication in the future might strengthen the bond, open up the ‘affinity’ or 
‘open the path’ (abrir el camino) which will entail the flow of even more information 
both about the individual and his or her muertos and even narrow down ‘affinity’ 
seen as existing and developing between a medium’s particular muerto with a 
particular one of the individual. Thus, ‘affinity’ can be both a general and abstract 
‘feeling’, involving personsdead and aliveand a more specific and, in a way, 
limited ‘sense’ of a bond between particular aspects of these persons. ‘Affinity’ in 
this context is not just a diffused and infinite flow of emotion but it is also 
instantiated by affects and biographical aspects, the last two being intimately related, 
to the extent that one is the other. 
Sweat in Celia’s account, was produced in the presence of Tomás and not just 
sweat; it was a particular, with its own smell, different from Celia’s. As her relation 
with him had already been ‘developed’, Tomás’ sweat, as an affect, was inextricably 
bound to his biography as, among others, a ‘sweating slave’ that persisted as a 
memory and got communicated to Celia. If we were to treat the sweat as ignited by a 
particular emotional state that Celia faced with the socio-historical reality of slavery, 
we would be led to conclude or at least imply that Tomás is nothing but a personified 
construct of Celia’s mind; ultimately her own emotive reaction to slavery. We would 
then have to dig into her unconscious so as to reveal her inner individual world and 
how this reacts to the outside ‘objective’ world of, say, history and politics. We 
would, thus, have constructed a socio-psychological theory of ‘animism’, something 
in which anthropologists since Tylor (see Tylor 1958) and Frazer (see Frazer 1993) 
have not been particularly good at (see chapter 6). Furthermore, in this way, we 
would have performed our disappearing act on Tomás’ existence, partly instantiated 
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through his sweat, as the latter would belong to no one else other than Celia herself. 
Consequently, we would be implying that she was just reacting unconsciously and 
‘animistically’ to the objective reality of slavery with the equally objective 
production of sweat (for a similar psychological approach to the effects of the dead 
see, Krippner 1987, 2008). It is in this sense that I prefer the word ‘affect’, as an 
essential element of the interaction between the living and the muertos, rather than 
‘emotion’ or ‘feeling’, because it puts the anthropologist into a more comfortable 
position to read Celia’s and Tomás’ sweat (and all other affects), not in the familiar 
category of psychological individualism, but through the, initially at least, more 
unfamiliar affect of the Cuban ethnography of muertos. I, thus, subscribe to what 
Richard and Rudnyckyj (2009; see also Armstrong 1971; Hirschkind 2001; Swancutt 
2008; Tsintjilonis 2007) say on ‘affect’: 
The word ‘affect’ captures a way of acting on other actions due to its inherently reflexive 
quality [...] Affect, which can be both a noun and a transitive verb, simultaneously makes 
both its subject and its object [...] Furthermore, as will become clear, we conceive of affect 
not so much as an object circulating among subjects, but rather as a medium in which 
subjects circulate. Particular affects enable certain types of circulation and foreclose others 
(2009:59).   
Before going on into seeing how the relations between the living and the dead are 
cultivated and, thus, become an essential part in one’s camino, I would like to offer a 
sort of recapitulation and some possible suggestions-cum-conclusions of what has 
been already said in this and the previous chapter. If ‘affinity’ is the basic sensorial 
element and not only the idiom with which relations between the living and the dead 
are initiated, and this includes a relatively sufficient degree of ‘sensing’, firstly, the 
biography of the muerto and, secondly, that of the living person to whom the former 
is attached, what seems to be suggested is that this kind of ‘affinity’ is not a strictly 
rigid affect. Exactly because it is an affect or, rather, a bundle of multiple affects, the 
muertos’ presence is not stable. A specific muerto might not be perceived in the same 
way, or at all, by some mediums, whereas it allows itself to appear to others. Being a 
medium and a perceptible muerto is, thus, not a fixed condition. This can be seen in 
the following event where an initial and apparent ‘failure’ of mediumship is 
described, followed by a successful one. 
Carmen, a friend of mine in her early thirties, is not a medium herself, but she 
often visits people who are. Through them, she has gradually come to know ‘her 
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muertos’, their biographies and understand herself through them. For instance, she 
attributes her unstable but pleasant and funny character, her difficulty with 
commitment (for example, professionally or emotionally), her tendency to change 
and move all the time, to a spirit of an Andalusian gypsy woman who is intimately 
attached to her. Once, Carmen, suddenly and for no apparent reason, became 
depressed, resulting in her not wanting to leave her house. She also did not want to 
be in crowded places and, in general, socialize the way she normally did. This almost 
turned into a phobia, according to her. This mood she felt concerned her and so she 
sought the advice of a neighbour of hers who lived nearby, and who had a local 
reputation of communicating with spirits of the dead. 
Normally, she would have gone to the medium with which she had a more 
constant contact, but due to the fact that the latter lived far away from her, her 
‘agoraphobic’ depression initially prevented her from doing so. When she visited her 
neighbour, he told her that there was a muerto oscuro who was causing the 
depression and they would have to conduct a rompimiento, that is, a ritual that would 
‘break’ the afflicting attachment of the muerto to Carmen. This would be achieved 
by ritually disposing of her old possessions, such as damaged and dirty clothes in the 
place where the muerto had come to attach itself, and as a result rendered itself as 
disposable as the clothes. However, after doing this, the situation got even worse. 
Carmen, not only felt more depressed and agoraphobic, but she also started having 
strong nauseas which made her vomit and lose her appetite. It was then that she 
decided to visit her close contact. This was a decisive move, according to Carmen, 
because it was proved that it was not at all a muerto oscuro but a muerto of ‘hers’, 
who must have been recently attached to her or let itself made ‘felt’. The affliction 
was a sign, provoked by the muerto, in order to draw Carmen’s attention to it. It was 
the spirit of her recently deceased grandmother who had chosen Carmen, as she had 
always been her favourite grandchild. Carmen told me that as soon as she was told 
about it she started feeling a bit better. After ‘acknowledging’ her grandmother’s 
presence as one of ‘her’ muertos and taking care of her (by conducting a mass for her 
spirit, and lighting some candles, among other things), not only did her affliction 
gradually disappear, but also she got to know things about her grandmother while in 
life that she did not know. This balanced considerably her unstable character. 
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What she got to know about her grandmother, for example, was that when she 
was younger she had a secret affair with a man from her working environment; 
whom she had fallen in love with, but because she was already married to Carmen’s 
grandfather and had given birth to their first son she decided to end the affair and 
dedicate herself to her family. Carmen, according to her grandmother’s posthumous 
confession through the medium, was the first person to know of this secret and this 
was a relief for her grandmother; she felt less uneasy. It is not easy to put into words 
the complexity of the relations that were brought up in this whole event, therefore, I 
will try to do so by starting with some of Carmen’s final words: 
My grandmother needed to let somebody know of her secret so that she could regain her 
peace of mind. I think that she did and this, as well as the fact that I acknowledged her as my 
muerto, also contributed to my feeling better. Furthermore, my grandmother’s presence 
counter-balances [equilibra] the unstable character of my gypsy, which is still an essential 
part of who I am, and I accept it as such, but through my grandmother I manage or try to 
avoid its negative results. My grandmother is wise and much more decisive than my gypsy. 
The secret she revealed to me showed me two things, apart from the secret itself: my 
grandmother is a bit like me in her amorous life. But she had the decisiveness to sort things 
out, to choose one thing from the other, while me, especially in the past, I would tend to be 
more vacillating. 
It is clear to see from Carmen’s account, how for some people their muertos are 
important in understanding one’s self; giving them a deeper understanding and even 
transforming it; both the self and the understanding of it. She mentions 
characteristics of herself in the idiom of her different muertos which do not only 
complement but can also ‘counter-balance’ each other. When she compares her two 
characteristics she does so by comparing her two muertos and, interestingly, in the 
present tense, how they are rather than how they were. In effect, the two muertos 
relate to each other through Carmen, although not always without conflicts. I have 
heard of mediums’ muertos that do not like each other at all and when the one is 
present the other is not or when they both are, they cause confusion to the medium, 
who in his or her turn tries to reconcile or keep them apart, not always successfully. 
Carmen’s account reveals how muertos not only are but also become important. In 
the beginning, her depression prevents her from going to her friend who is a medium, 
choosing instead somebody at hand, with a reputation, but not very intimately related 
to her. The medium who is her neigbour perceives the presence of a muerto as 
causing her depression but he does not sense its identity or biography. His 
‘diagnosis’ is that it is a muerto oscuro and the ‘prescription’ is a rompimiento. But 
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things get worse, so Carmen finally decides to visit her friend. She also confirms the 
presence of a muerto but, in addition to what Carmen has already been told, she 
perceives it with an identity already known to Carmenher grandmother. It was this 
recent appearance of her grandmother as a muerto of Carmen which caused the 
depression in order to gain her attention. 
Here, relations are being instantiated on three levels which are all intricately 
linked. First, we have relations among the living: Carmen and the two mediums (not 
to mention Carmen’s affliction which prevented her from socializing). Second, we 
are presented with relations among the dead and the living and, third, among the 
dead. Carmen’s first visit was to a superficially known individual. This individual, in 
his turn, perceived a muerto unrelated to Carmen, one without a biography. The 
second visit was to a much more familiar person who was able to perceive the ‘real’ 
identity and biography of the muerto and, thus, relate them appropriately. I think that 
the revelation of her grandmother’s secret is also interesting. Not only because of its 
content but also because it was a secret to begin with. Carmen takes it not only as a 
revelation of her grandmother’s past as a living personher biographybut, 
crucially, as something that in the very act of being revealed to her ‘chosen’ 
grandchild, transforms (by making her ‘feel better’) her course as a spirither 
‘necrograhpy’ as I call itwhich, in its turn, is also seen to transform Carmen’s 
camino as well. 
These kinds of relations also have an important affective element on various 
levels: Carmen’s affliction is the initial one. The sudden apparition of something that 
contradicts her (expectations of) character, linked to her gypsy muerto, suggests that 
it might be a case of muertos. By seeking the help of mediums, the affects involve 
them in relation to the sense they have of muertos. The first medium senses a muerto 
oscuro and conducts the rompimiento. This has its affects on Carmen by intensifying 
her affliction. She then visits the second medium, who also senses the presence of a 
muerto, but in a different way. Information revealed triggers other affects. 
‘Acknowledging’ the right muerto and her buried secrets affect equally the muerto 
and Carmen to whom it is attached and a relation has now been affectively initiated. 
Relating with her grandmother, Carmen ‘discovers’ another potential side of herself 
which she cultivates and differentiates it from, although she still relates it to, the 
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affects of her gypsy muerto. The kind of affinity that is emerging relates all these 
different persons (the two mediums with their respective muertos and Carmen with 
her own ones), instantiated with, and as knowledge and affects which come to the 
surface in varying degrees. 
 Nevertheless, I am not suggesting that there is a linear link between the 
affinity between a medium and the ‘client’ and the capacity to sense muertos. It does 
not mean that the stronger the bond and knowledge between the first two necessarily 
reveals more about and from the muertos. There are numerous cases where a great 
deal is revealed among strangers or unknown aspects among known people. Yet, it 
might be suggested that affinity can be fluid and muertos, exactly because (of the 
way) they are sensed, are just potentials of some sort of relations. Mediumshipas 
the capacity to sense muertosis as well a potential, and it is not equally distributed 
to all persons, neither at all times nor in all situations. According to many mediums, 
everyone is theoretically a medium, that is, they can sense aspects of the presence of 
muertos, although this innate capacity is stronger to some. Intuitions, prophetic 
visions and dreams, fleeting images of dead people are instances of such capacity, 
the degree of which varies among each one. Some have it naturally in abundance; 
others may have to develop it. It is here that all these affective experiences are 
encompassed and more thoroughly explored by the religious tradition that is said to 
be the one par excellence that does so: Espiritismo.  
A mass of and for the dead: the public face of ‘necrographies’ 
On a daily basis, muertos make their appearances in a quite private way. They do so 
in one-to-one consultations, in dreams, in one’s senses (either explicitly or implicitly, 
as we have already seen), or through an ‘accidental’ meeting with a stranger. 
Usually, and when seen in isolation, these daily occurrences offer a somewhat 
fragmented image; firstly, of the dead in question and, secondly, of the totality of the 
muertos that, by way of affinity, are attached to the person. Thus, knowledge of and 
from the muertos in such instances, is also fragmented. This does not mean that is 
seen as less important. On the contrary, it might prove extremely useful; besides, the 
accumulation of these experiences is what usually gives a clearer ‘frame’ of a 
particular muerto and the totality of those who are related to the person. For example, 
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a person might get warned by a muerto against visiting a specific place at a specific 
time because of an imminent accident that will occur to him or her. What course the 
individual will follow, after such information is transmitted, can, thus, be deemed as 
life-changing. Indeed, one of the great advantages the messages by the muertos are 
said to display is that their content can be extremely context specific to particular 
situations, persons, places and times. This, I suspect and as I will further explore in a 
later chapter, has to do with the fact that these messages are transmitted through the 
senses and not necessarily in a very formal or ritualized context. Communication 
with the muertos does take place, though, in a more ritualized and public context. It 
is in such context that the immediate ‘necrographic’ experiences are inserted and, up 
to an extent, encompassed by something that we could loosely call a pre-existing 
tradition or cosmology. Here we enter a ritual field of knowledge and practice that is 
widely known in Cuba as Espiritismo. 
Espiritismo in Cuba traces its origins from a 19th century Euro-American 
context where a relatively coherent system of practices and beliefs emerged, 
especially among the middle and upper classes. This soon came to be known as 
‘Spiritism’, or ‘Spiritualism’ in the Anglo-Saxon world. One of its founders is 
considered to be a French pedagogue called Hippolyte Leon Denizard Rivail, but 
widely known as Allan Kardec (1804-1869). In the mid-19th century, he began 
collecting and publishing the ‘doctrine’ of Spiritism which, according to him, 
stemmed directly from contact with the spirits of the dead through mediums (see 
Kardec 2003, 2006; see also Abend 2004; Espirito Santo 2009a:17-24; Hess 1991:2-
3, 15-19, 59-79; Román 2007a:221-224; Vasconcelos 2007). Spiritism, although 
heavily drawing from a Christian notion of morality, went against many of the 
latter’s doctrinal premises and particularly its clerical authority. Communication with 
the beyond was not seen as being in the sole privileged domain of priests, but was 
and could be established within lay people as well, provided they followed some 
general ‘doctrinal’ rules of thumb. Firstly, the Spiritist person would have to lead a 
moral life, and this was more or less understood to be similar to the Christian ethos. 
However, rather than focusing on morality as a strict state of being, it emphasized its 
processual character, as a state of becoming theoretically achievable by everybody, 
and open to amendment. It is here that Kardec’s professional experience came to be 
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incorporated in the Spiritist worldview, namely, that of ‘development’, 
‘enlightenment’, and ‘education’. 
According to the messages from the spirits of the dead Kardec collected, 
when we are alive we are composed of spirit (our inner essence), matter (the body) 
and the ‘perispirit’ (an aura that links the first two). Our spirit survives our material 
death and goes on a long journey of spiritual evolution, towards a direction of purity 
and enlightenment, whereby we become less dependent on matter. The degree of our 
morality, mostly exemplified in our deeds (charity, for example) is both the sign of, 
and the trigger for our spiritual evolution. To continually become and do ‘good’ is 
the mission of every spirit, although in various degrees, and this continues to be the 
case after our body has perished. As spirits we might continue doing ‘good’ by 
helping the living or we might even incarnate to another body. As both the living and 
the dead are driven by the same moral and spiritual goals, one helps and educates the 
other in order to achieve them. Although living persons might acquire through their 
lives and deeds a high degree of evolution, the highest levels are reached without our 
earthbound bodies, memories and desires. The purest and most enlightened 
spiritssuch as those of saints who are thought to be nearer to God, the absolute and 
purest spirithave managed to move beyond this earthly dependence completely. 
The basic practice of Spiritism has been the contact with the spirits of the dead, so 
that this mutual spiritual development and education might be verbalized, 
communicated and acted upon. Traditionally, the most ‘orthodox’ Spiritist groups 
have made contact with already ‘evolved’ spirits, or at least ones that consciously 
strive and direct themselves towards enlightenment. For lower spirits there was either 
indifference or when they appeared, usually causing affliction, the effort was to make 
them conscious of their death or distance them. Such orthodox adherence to Spiritism 
is not the norm in Cuba. Although basic premises are embraced, such as ‘evolution’, 
the kinds of spirits that appear are much broaderlower in purist Spiritist 
termsand they embrace the wide range and variability of people the Cuban society 
was and is consisted of. Espiritismo’s most public rituals are often called ‘spiritual 
masses’ (misas espirituales) and it is here that muertos are collectively invoked, 
appeased, described, talked and listened to. In continuation I will describe a misa that 
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is quite exemplary of those that take place in Havana, adding explanatory comments 
for the sake of clarification. 
Today I am invited to a misa espiritual that has been organized and headed 
by a santera and espiritista friend of mine, Magalis, a middle-aged woman who has 
initiated, and is the spiritual mentor of a close but dedicated circle of people. Once a 
month, she conducts a misa espiritual dedicated to her own muertos and the ones of 
her ‘godchildren’. Yet, less frequent visitors, such as myself, are most welcome to 
attend. 
As I enter the living-room I immediately notice that it has been particularly 
arranged for the event. The big dining table has been removed from sight and instead 
there is a small square table, called bóveda espiritual, clad in a long white cloth. On 
top there are seven glasses of water. The one in the middle is slightly bigger than the 
rest and in it there is immersed a crucifix. Two lit candles are also placed on the 
table. On the left and right side of the table there are two chairs. My eye catches 
certain objects lying on the floor behind and next to the table and the two chairs. A 
hat made of palm leaves, a blue head scarf, a packet of cigarettes, a couple of cigars, 
a bottle of rum and a book. In front of the table on the floor lies a plastic bucket full 
of water and flower petals. Next to the bucket there is a small bottle of cheap 
perfume. Next to each chair on the left and right side of the table, there is a row of 
chairs facing each other, creating, in that way, a sort of corridor running from the 
table to the other end, where it extends to the sofas and armchairs that the sitting-
room is normally furnished with. The whole room has been made more colourful due 
to the abundant presence of freshly cut flowers. 
As people start to arrive, they slowly take their seats as they please, apart 
from the two chairs next to the table. These are reserved for the two ‘head mediums’ 
(mediums cabeceros) of the ceremony, Magalis and a slightly younger woman, one 
of her oldest ahijadas, whose long experience in Espiritismo has put her next to 
Magalis in leading the ceremony. As soon as everybody has been seated, there is a 
short period of silence, as if each person is momentarily contemplating for 
themselves what is about to take place. Magalis, with her eyes closed, starts chanting 
prayers from the Gospel and gradually the rest follow her. These are sung in Spanish 
and they include several ‘Our Father’ and ‘Hail Marys’. When this preliminary 
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chanting, considered essential to invoke the spirit world, finishes each one of us, 
beginning with the mediums cabeceros, stands in front of the table, bends down and 
takes some water from the bucket and spreads it over our forehead, neck, arms and 
legs. This act is considered to rid us any negative ‘energies’ (energías) or 
‘influences’ (influencias) that the person might have brought ‘from the street’. After 
this self-cleansing, each one of us resumes to our seat and more chanting takes place. 
Then there is a pause and Magalis starts enumerating names of spirits that belong to 
her ‘spiritual cord’ (cordón espiritual) and have made their appearance to her 
through time and provided indispensable help to her and, by extension, to her 
ahijados. 
When somebody refers to his or her cordón espiritual they mean the totality 
of the muertos that are attached in an intimate way to him or her. Cordónes 
espirituales might contain muertos ‘of the family’ (familiares) or previously 
complete strangers. By definition, muertos in one’s cordón are those of whom a 
wealth of biographical information is known, usually, and especially in the case of 
complete strangers, revealed gradually by the muertos themselves. According to the 
spiritist doctrine, the spirits of the dead get attached to a particular individualthat 
is, include themselves in one’s cordón, in the Cuban spiritist idiomso as to acquire 
‘light’ (luz), ‘evolve’ (evolucionar) spiritually in the effort to transcend the 
materiality of this world and become ‘purer’ spirits. This is mainly achieved by 
helping the individual who, in his or her turn, will help the spirits attain their goal. 
Because each spirit finds itself at a particular point in spiritual evolution, the 
individual’s role in the latter is crucial, especially in the case of less evolved spirits. 
 In the Cuban spiritist cosmos, spirits are classified, in relation to the 
individual they are attached to, in ‘spirit guides’ (espíritus guías), ‘protectors’ 
(protectores) and ‘of labour’ (de labor). The first is usually one that has achieved a 
high degree of evolution and familiarization with the person and guides it to 
wellbeing. It is also seen as supervising the rest of the spirits. This bares striking 
resemblances with the way initiation in the Afro-Cuban religious traditions occurs, as 
basically, ‘making’ one entity and ‘receiving’ a number of others (see chapter 4). 
Espíritus protectores are the rest of the spirits, each one with its particular 
biographical baggage and specialized powers and knowledge, protecting the 
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individual. The espíritus de labor are often seen as a sub-category of the previous 
and what makes them such is the fact that normally they are the ones who are 
thought to take care of the most everyday and mundane needs of the person, often 
after being commanded to. These are seen as occupying a lower position in the 
spiritual ladder and being more material. Magalis tells me that they can be compared 
to the nfumbi having less light and being quite material, but, as she stresses, with the 
important difference that the latter remain entrapped in their materiality, standing 
almost no chance of evolving. The former, on the other hand, are in the process, no 
matter how low, of ‘enlightenment’ and ‘spiritual evolution’, something which the 
espiritista should ideally contribute to by not ‘materializing’ them excessively. 
In misas espirituales, like the one I am describing, the main issue at stake is 
to create a collective channel of communication with the spirit world and, more 
specifically, those spirits that are related in one way or another to the people present. 
The articulation of the muertos’ perspectives is considered to be one of the most 
important ways to achieve ‘materialization’. If on an initial level the perspectives 
appear in the senses, in order to further become fuller and meaningful, they have to 
be directed and transmitted to their intended recipients through language. After the 
spirit world has been invoked, the word takes Magalis’ ahijada. Turning to a young 
girl in her twenties, she says:  
With the permission of the table [con el permiso de la mesa], it is presented to me [se me 
presenta] a presence of a mulata, with green eyes and straight hair, very pretty, dressed in 
yellow. I can see her giggling all the time and, at times, she bursts into sudden and loud 
laughs. She moves around you as if dancing. 
The young woman nodded in silence, as if she was waiting to hear for more. A 
middle-aged man kindly interrupts the conversation: 
Con el permiso, I perceive her coming with a yellow head scarf and two huge golden 
earrings. She is from a humble background but she is elegantly dressed and, indeed, she can 
dance with real skill. She says that she likes you a lot and that she is helping you with your 
obstacles in life, especially, your financial problems.  
Another woman seized the opportunity: 
She is asking for sunflowers and honey [as offerings], you know, her saintly current 
[corriente santoral] is Ochún [meaning that the muerto had an affinity with the oricha 
Ochún]. She also wants you to make a doll of her, of how she was in life, so that she 




‘Ay carajo [something like, ‘oh shit’ or ‘goddamn it’]’, a harsh voice interrupted the 
smooth and polite interaction of perspectives. It was Magalis, whose voice had 
turned deeper and rougher, as if it was almost a man’s. Her otherwise mellow and 
soft words had also vanished: 
Can’t you see you innocent and naïve spirits, that the girl is a whore? Can’t you see that she 
sells her young and tender body off to the old and white skin of the yumas [almost 
derogatory term for Americans or tourists]?  
Turning to the young woman:  
You think that money is everything. It may buy you nice clothes, drinks and foreign 
cigarettes but the way you earn it will put you in the hospital or in prison. And what about the 
small creature you are carrying in your belly? Will you feed him from the dirty fucks with 
the old yumas?  
At that point, the woman sitting next to the girl shouted: ‘Luz [light]!’ This is 
normally uttered when a piece of information is deemed particularly powerful in its 
truth and implies a strong agreement. This was the girl’s mother, who added: 
I have repeatedly told her that what she is doing is dangerous, but she doesn’t listen to me, 
she is very stubborn. And now you also tell us that she is pregnant; this we didn’t know. 
Magalis went on: 
She is stubborn as her mulata [referring to the previously described spirit]. You have to give 
light to this spirit; you have to attend your other spirits, the ones with more light. They will 
help you and your mulata develop. Listen to Ta’ Jose, he also lived with the worst and he 
immediately saw through you, as if you were transparent. 
Ta’ Jose is the spirit guide of Magalis, an old black man, as she describes him, who 
lived in extreme poverty but he was very wise, honest, hard-working, and a natural 
medium. Meanwhile, the girl had burst into tears interrupted by sudden bursts of 
laughs (efforts of the mulata to possess her, as Magalis later told me). Her mother 
was trying to scold and console her at the same time. Magalis, then, started chanting 
to the ‘African comission’ (comisión africana). 
Spirits of the dead are grouped into ‘commissions’ according to their ethnic 
or professional background. For example, there is the ‘Indian commission’ (comisión 
india), the ‘Arab’ (arabe), the ‘Gypsy’ (gitana), the ‘medical’ (medica), and so on. 
The chant, as Magalis explained later, was always chanted to ‘give light’ to her 
African (spirit), Ta’ Jose, the Africans of the people present and the Africans 
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worldwide, but also in this particular case for the mulata of the girl. The chant 
diverted from the Catholic feeling and content of the previous prayers. It contained 
creolized words and it talked about everyday events. A man grabbed a wooden box 
and started beating it as if it was percussion. The rhythm got quicker and quicker. All 
of a sudden, I glance at Magalis who, with her eyes closed, starts spinning around her 
shoulders and neck. After some spinning, she stops for a while, with her head 
hanging from her neck, as if staring at the floor but with her eyes still closed. She 
then gives a shiver and produces a strange sound with her vocal cords without 
opening her mouth. She almost kneels on the floor and adopts a posture and starts 
producing sounds that, to me, clearly resemble that of a chicken! She goes on like 
this for a while and then she stands up in the middle, exclaiming: ‘Good evening.’ 
All the people answer back, ‘Good evening’, and some by adding ‘Ta’ Jose.’ 
Magalis’ accent has transformed. It is a creole accent, probably similar to how the 
first Africans who learned Spanish might have sounded. Her manner has also 
transformed similarly to her intervention with the girl but even more accentuated. 
Magalis/Ta’ Jose likes to swear, smoke cigars, and wear his hat made of palm 
leaves, which the other ‘head medium’ hastens to offer her/him. Occasionally, Ta’ 
Jose takes small sips of rum, some of which he abruptly spits instead of drinking. Ta’ 
Jose speaks roughly, often with words that would normally be taken as insults, but he 
is also praised, as I come to realize by the reactions of the rest, for his tendency to 
speak bare truths, directly, often in a scolding but also humorous and affectionate 
manner. He reveals muertos of the others, cases of brujería, mentions mistakes or 
hidden secrets of the people present. After finishing his comments about each one of 
us, which took a bit more than an hour, he says it is time to go. Ta’ Jose in Magalis’ 
body takes a few spins, the other medium cabecero assisting him/her not to fall and 
slapping his/her face softly. Ta’ Jose departs and Magalis is seated exhausted on her 
chair. ‘What happened?’ she asks. The other medium explains briefly while Magalis, 
bathed in sweat, drinks some water and lights a cigarette. ‘Good’ she puffs out, ‘I 
hope you liked it.’ 
The rest of the ceremony interchanges between chants and various people, 
apart from the two leading mediums, offering their mediumistic capacities by 
describing what happens in peoples’ lives and their muertos that let themselves 
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appear. Others pop in and give a complementary image, filling in the ‘frames’ or 
describing muertos unseen by others. After five hours the misa comes, almost 
naturally, to an end; chants are now sung bidding farewell to the spirit world, se van 
los seres, se van (‘off go the entities, off they go’) and the misa concludes. 
The potentials of ‘necrographies’ 
One very peculiar thing that the Cuban ‘necrography’ presents us with is that a large 
part of the interaction between the living and the dead occurs long after and very 
often radically detached from the moment of death. The identities, biographies, 
wishes, worries and perspectives of and from many muertos appear in a context 
relatively independent of the ‘fact’ of death and the formal funeral 
proceedingswhich normally serve as ameliorating ‘the commonly encountered 
discrepancy between the event of physical death and the social recognition of it’ 
(Bloch and Parry 1982:13)that most of the accounts on death have accustomed us 
to.17 In most of these accounts, the ‘discrepancy’ is usually mediated by funerary 
acts, even in the cases when something goes ‘wrong’ and unsettles the ‘normal’ 
expectations towards the dead (see for example du Boulay 1982). Furthermore, and 
probably related, although not necessarily, to the above, most accounts depict 
mortuary rites as a process of ‘finishing (off)’ (Course 2007:79; Tsintjilonis 
2004b:376) the dead by way of ‘forgetting’ (Tsintjilonis 2004b:376) and ‘analysis’ 
(Course 2007:77): 
According to this view, what mortuary practices do is to undo the complex social ties which 
once held the living person together, and to thereby make visible and explicit the part of 
which that person was composed (Course 2007:77). 
The ethnographic answer of both Tsintjilonis and Course to this conventional 
‘necrographic’ current is, in one word, ‘remembering’ and ‘synthesis’, respectively. 
There are stark ethnographic differences between the two; for example, Tsintjilonis 
identifies the ‘remembering’ as ultimately stemming from the dead Toraja 
themselves, importantly through the senses and the body (see also Tsintjilonis 1995, 
1997, 2007), whereas Course describes how the ‘synthesis’ is mainly constituted 
                                                 
17 To mention only but a few and highly selective examples, see Barraud et.al. 1994; Bloch and Parry 
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through the recounting of the deceased’s biography by the living Mapuche. In any 
case, both accounts offer a far more enriching image of what ‘finishing (off)’ the 
dead might involve and not necessarily under the lightalbeit belated and transitory 
in the Hertzian senseof death as ultimately, and universally as Bloch and Parry 
(1996) imply,  the ‘end’. 
The Cuban muertos, from what I evinced during my fieldwork, more than 
often appeared with a relative long ‘distance’ from their physical death and even 
their burial and other post-mortuary attention, which, as I said before, normally 
mediates between physical death and its social recognition. This ‘distance’ is not to 
be understood in just temporal terms, but as a much more complex, multifarious, and 
general tendency. Apart from muertos appearing in peoples’ lives long after their 
time of death, they might also appear far from where their death took place. 
Remember that Yosdado’s eventually-turned-into-nfumbi muerto (see previous 
chapter) appeared almost a century later and, although the death occurred in Pinar del 
Rio, the muerto was wandering in Havanaalthough it led Yosdado back to Pinar 
del Rio. Furthermore, and I think more interestingly, the muertos’ distance is 
premised on what in the case of the ‘affines’ is sought to be established out of its 
initial lack but not absence, that is, ‘affinity’ or else intimacy. This is much more 
evident and obvious with the ‘alien’ muertos which, as we have seen, their very 
constitution as such is the lack of potential for ‘affinity’ and intimacy with the living. 
But with the ‘affines’ as well, although intimacy is a much more definitive potential, 
it very often comes as an un(der)developed one. To put it differently, the Cuban 
muertos, be they ‘alien’ or ‘affines’, have the tendency to be, initially at least, 
‘strangers’. 
The implications are far more complex than a mere ‘metaphysical’ 
phenomenon and preoccupation and could be linked to the particularities of the 
Cuban social history, and more specifically to those of Cuban kinship. In most 
anthropological accounts on death, there is an implicit connection with kinship 
categories, and this is verbalized as the dead being ‘ancestors’. The relations between 
the living and the dead are normally depicted to a certain extent as, firstly, exhibiting 
continuity due to their intimacy and, secondly, as undergoing a transformation that 
mainly involves a waning of such intimacy. The dead, in the majority of the 
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accounts, are familiar to the living, they are often remembered as they were in life, 
and they are attached to the latter by way of kinship. This, I believe, resonates with 
the tendency I mentioned of many approaches on death to encounter it in its relative 
proximity to life, making the funerary rites and what follows from them the 
‘necrographic’ instance par excellence. 
The Cuban ‘necrographic’ instance, under such commonly shed light, seems 
quite displaced, so to speak, even in ‘kinship’ or familiarity terms. Not all ‘affine’ 
muertos are family members nor do all family members become ‘affines’ once dead. 
The fact that family members may become ‘affines’, often seen as a sub-category of 
the latter when they are grouped under the generic term of muertos familiares, points 
exactly to the above. Although muertos familiares may appear to their living 
‘affines’ in somewhat more explicit and familiar ways (often in visions while awake 
or asleep), this does not place them in a radically different position from the rest of 
the ‘affine’ muertos. This is why mediums play such a crucial role in establishing a 
more flowing communication with them. Although mediumship is considered as a 
‘gift’, it is also said to be a potential of everyone and it is only its degree that very 
broadly divides mediums from non-mediums (see Espirito Santo 2009a:77-78, 96-
100).18 
One can become a medium, and yet still the majority are not (or have not 
fully become), and hence the need for those who are (or have become). Thus, from 
the non-medium’s point of view, others-as-mediums are required to fully sense 
‘their’ others-as-muertos, which makes the initial ‘alien-ness’ of muertos even more 
pronounced. Carmen’s case is telling, not only because she contacted her muerto 
familiarher grandmotherthrough an espiritista, but also because unknown and 
unfamiliar aspects of her grandmother’s biography came to light and influenced 
Carmen’s camino. Consequently, even in the case of muertos familiares, what is 
pursued is something novel and not something already and definitively known. With 
the ignition and further increase of such a flow, the muertos are perceived to ‘evolve’ 
or ‘develop’ themselves, and this is inextricably connected to a parallel evolving of 
the relations between the living and the dead, directly, if one is a medium (and then 
                                                 
18 For a similar description of shamanism, see Viveiros de Castro 1992:218-238, 2004a: 468-




mediumship itself is said to ‘evolve’ or ‘develop’) or indirectly, if one is not 
(although ‘developing’ your dead always involves an amount of developing your 
own mediumship as well). 
The notion of ‘evolution’ and ‘development’ implies that the ontological 
status of muertos is not a stable but a fluid condition. Here, in my opinion, arises a 
fundamental difficulty in seeking an ethnographic definition of the Cuban muertos. 
An easy path to get round to it would be to follow strictly and literally the most 
‘doctrinal’ parts of what is taken as Espiritismo and how they might ‘give away’ 
hints of a definition (more on this below). Another easy path would be to argue that 
the muertos’ fluidity is such that they defy definition in the first place and, thus, 
define them negatively as the entities for which any kind of definition is not and 
cannot be made applicable. Both paths, in their frugality, might sound attractive and 
convincing, even more so because they could be demonstrated ethnographically. But, 
they are also simplistic and could, also ethnographically, be challenged. As for the 
second path, for the moment, I would limit myself by responding that, although 
indeed muertos are not overtly visible and tangible entities like, say, humans are, 
they are nevertheless positively perceived as distinct kinds of entities and not of an 
inherently chaotic or anarchic constitution. Furthermore, they are distinguished from 
other ‘invisible’ and ‘intangible’ entities such as deities, as we shall see in the 
following chapter. The first path is more difficult to disentangle, but by doing so in 
the remaining of this chapter, I hope that the specific features and potentials of 
muertos will become more salient. 
One could argue that entities like muertos, be they ‘alien’ or ‘affines’, and 
deities are defined by their relation to humanity and non-humanity. Their present 
status as such is moulded by and, at the same time, differentiated from their previous 
condition. Muertos are ex-humans, while deities are often said to be ex-
muertosthis is encapsulated in the often repeated phrase ikú lobi ocha, which is 
loosely translated as el muerto pare el santo or ‘the dead gives birth to the saint’ (see 
Esprito Santo 2010:68-69; Fernández Martínez 2005:36-39; Fernández Martínez and 
Porras Potts 1998:31-32)or ‘senior dead’ (muertos mayores) and, by implication, 
ex-ex-humans. Leaving the deities aside for the time being, I will comment on the 
humanity of muertos, which as I just said is seen to be potentially ‘evolving’ and 
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‘developing’. In terms of a camino, the living and the dead are both perceived as 
having one, while, as I will try to show later, deities are closer to being conceived as 
being themselves caminos. This may be congruent with the claim that people ‘have’ 
muertos when they are related to them, whether temporarily or more permanently, 
while deities ‘own’ and, thus, ‘have’ people, by being their ‘owners’ or ‘parents’. 
One could almost theologically conclude that deities ‘encompass’ (see Dumont 
1972) both the living and the dead, considering that theythe deities‘own’ the 
living, who in their turn ‘own’ the dead. Let us for now focus on what this 
‘possessive’ relationship between the living and the dead might involve. 
If one were to look for the most ‘doctrinal’ parts of Espiritismo, the two most 
obvious sources would be either to refer to spiritist texts mainly produced outside 
Cubaand dating back to the Euro-American spiritist movement and its 
foundersor, with a more ethnographically attuned mind, to approach a specific 
spiritist movement that in Cuba is known as ‘scientific spiritism’ (espiritismo 
científico). Due to the lack of space and substantial firsthand knowledge of this 
current, I will briefly mention what one is likely to encounter as a basic spiritist 
premise (for a more detailed exposition, see Espirito Santo 2009a:264-297, 2010). 
This is the notion of ‘evolution’ which is seen as a more or less linear and 
hierarchical process of transformation from a ‘material’, ‘low’, ‘dark’ and ‘earthly’ 
condition of being to a more ‘spiritual’, ‘elevated’, ‘of light’ and ‘otherworldly’ one, 
which can be evinced in the broader spiritist spectrum and not just the ‘scientific’ 
stream. What is much more prevalent in the latter is; first, a clearer and stricter 
articulation of such an ‘evolutionist’ scheme; second, a tendency to moralize it 
through a lens that combines ‘Christian’ and ‘scientific’ values‘low’ spirits tend to 
be evil or intellectually backward and ‘high’ spirits, good or intellectually 
progressiveand third, a practical interaction with ‘high’ spirits while a tendency to 
exhibit indifference and even aversion to ‘low’ ones. The interaction with the latter is 
often limited to acts of distancing them, similar to the case of ‘alien’ muertos, but 
with a quite different reasoning. As we have seen, ‘alien’ muertos are perceived as 
such because they are sensed as not belonging to the individual and not because they 
are inherently evil or backward; even if they are normally perceived as causing 
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misfortunes, this is so because they do not have the potential to be related to anyone 
and not the other way round. 
The interaction with the dead, outside the confines of a purist ‘scientific’ 
stream of Espiritismo also takes on board the notion of ‘evolution’ and 
‘development’, but on rather different terms. The fact that spirits of the dead which, 
from the purist point of view, were considered ‘low’, would enter into more 
reciprocal relations with the living and constituted their ‘affines’, tended to relativize 
or even become indifferent to a strictly moralizing attitude towards them. This, in its 
turn, creates a quite different understanding of the notion of ‘evolution’ itself, one 
that undermines considerably, if not being explicitly opposed to, the ‘evolutionist’ 
aspects of its purist version. When discussing these ‘internal’ distinctions of 
Espiritismo with my espiritista friend Magalis, she argued that los científicos were 
much more ‘selective’ (selectivos), ‘exclusivist’ (exclusivistas), and therefore 
‘limited’ (limitados) when it came to which muertos they would interact with. In one 
of her final comments she said:  
Los científicos take Kardec’s books too literally and miss the point. They interact with 
muertos already evolved, while education and evolution is a need [necesidad] much more 
pressing for what they call low spirits, whom they actively choose to exclude from their 
educational project [proyecto educacional; often spiritist sessions and groups are called ‘little 
schools’ (escuelitas)]. It is like when capitalist countries choose to make higher education 
private, which means that only affluent people can go to the university. When education is a 
public and free of charge matter, then the people choose if they want to study and they are 
not chosen [because of their socio-economic status]. When I perceive a muerto belonging to 
one’s cordón espiritual, how can I ignore it and treat it as a stranger [desconocido]? If I did 
so, that would make backward [atrasar] both the muerto and the person, and affect them 
negatively. 
This more ‘popular’ and commonly encountered attitude towards muertos often 
classified as Espiritismo cruzado (‘crossed’ or ‘mixed spiritism’; see Espirito Santo 
2009a, 2010), highlights two crucial and interconnected elements. First, the living do 
not choose ‘their’ muertos but the other way round. Second, muertos are perceived as 
entities which either ‘belong’ or not to a person. Those who do, no matter their initial 
degree of ‘evolution’, should, by definition, be ‘developed’ while those who do not 
should be avoided. Thus, it is not the moral and intellectual constitution of muertos 
that is highlighted but their perceived potential of and for ‘affinity’ and, in the final 




‘Alien’ muertos are ‘low’ spirits not because of their inherent evil or 
intellectually impaired character. They are ‘low’ because they act as if they were still 
alive, they are too much attached to their biography and affective memories of their 
past condition and therefore find it difficult to relate to the living as muertos, that is, 
as ‘other’ kinds of entities; entities that have transcended and ‘othered’ themselves 
sufficiently enough in order to be someone’s muertos. Put differently, ‘alien’ muertos 
cannot adopt a point of view that would perceive their past selves from the outside, 
as an ‘other’ and, therefore, they act and perceive things through their past (self) 
conflating it with the present. This is why, as paradoxical as it may sound, when they 
are sensed, a profound lack of biographical information dominates the mediums’ 
capacity to perceive them, which is followed by a lack of oracular knowledge 
concerning the living person that they have temporarily been ‘attached’ to. 
Conflating their past with their present they can neither adopt a point of view that is 
‘useful’ for the living, a point of view that transcends past, present and future, not 
because it conflates them but because it can have a glance at them simultaneously 
with the livings’ present. In these fleeting instances of contact the danger that lurks 
for both the living and the dead, is that they will keep on perceiving themselves in 
the absence of the other, whereas the opposite could suggest the promising affects 
and effects of relations. When people say that ‘alien’ muertos are excessively 
‘material’, what I think they mean is not exactly the same as the purist and 
evolutionist version of spiritism has it. ‘Matter’ is not so much a measure and 
indicator of morality and intellectual abilities, but a degree of alterity and 
disembodiment from the world of the living from which all muertos have initially 
departed and have now to follow a different path: a camino de muerto. An alterity 
that, as the ‘necrography’ of ‘affine’ muertos is pointing to, requires a precarious and 
not automatic effort to obtain the adequate kind of distance from one’s biography in 
order to remember it, let it be ‘seen’ and ‘see’ it, and consequently relate (it) with the 
living. 
‘Affine’ muertos evolve ontologically so as to cement their identity as 
muertos. In order to do so they adopt an external point of view of their biography, 
they transmit it to the living along with a perspective that concerns the biographies of 
the latter. The tension is not to confuse the two and that is what I believe is suggested 
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by the effort to ‘materialize’ them adequately, so as not to cut the flow of this 
perspectival capacity. Sometimes, ‘affines’, after being developed as such through a 
long interaction with the living, are perceived to disappear or, else, they cease to be 
perceived. That, according to the purist spiritist view, is an indicator that they have 
reached a high level of spiritual evolution and de-materialization. Furthermore, this is 
not so much an abrupt phenomenon, but a slow process wherein the muerto starts 
loosing its distinctive character and affects and adopts a much more generic and 
anonymous presence: 
In this sense, an evolved spirit is knowledgeable in an almost ‘abstract’ way, and indeed, is 
seen to embody a kind of anonymity in which personalistic traits are denied, suggesting that 
ascension involves some kind of ‘merging’ with a ‘oneness’ that obliterates the importance 
of biographical details (Espirito Santo 2009a:108). 
This observation (see also Espirito Santo 2009a:293, 2010:78; Garoutte and 
Wambaugh 2007:162-163) resonates with Kardec’s own declarations that were said 
to derive directly from the messages of the dead: 
It is only when spirits have arrived at a certain degree of purification that they are entirely 
freed from all corporeal influences; and as long as they are not completely dematerialised (to 
employ their own expression), they retain most of the ideas, tendencies, and even the 
hobbies, they had while on earth (Kardec 2006:46). 
I only met one person that described to me the complete disappearance from her 
cordón of a muerto, although spirits which were considered as highly ‘evolved’ 
indeed appeared more subtly. Emilia, an espiritista friend, told me that once she 
‘had’ in her cordón espiritual the spirit of a distant relative of hers. Over the course 
of 20 years she had developed a very intimate relation with it. The last five years of 
their ‘affinity’, Emilia says, her muerto started gradually to become more and more 
‘diffuse’ (difuso) and ‘absent’ (ausente). For instance, it would not present itself in 
misas espirituales by possessing Emilia’s body, but it would appear in more 
intangible ways and would tend to pass on messages that were not of an ‘everyday 
significance’ (importancia cotidiana). In all these years, Emilia had ‘made’ (hacer) 
various ‘materializations’ of her muerto, such as a doll with objects that the muerto 
itself had indicated, which, according to her, would ‘channel’ (canalizar) her 
communication and interaction with it. As the latter started to become more subtle 
and general, she initially also started to ‘use’ (usar) these ‘materializations’ less 
often, up to the point that she ignored them completely and even got rid of them. 
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Emilia stresses that there was no use for them any more, as her muerto ceased to 
recognize itself in them; it was ‘transcending’ (trancendiendo). Now, Emilia says, 
she does not feel its presence at all, at least not in any direct way. Every now and 
then, she feels a light breeze like the one she used to feel in the presence of it, but: 
‘This is what is left of it, nothing else; a breeze blowing from wherever it is now.’ 
Emilia’s account suggests that the camino de muerto, as an evolving 
ontological process, may reach a point that highly resembles the very first steps of its 
‘career’. Indeed, her ‘transcended’ muerto slowly became what one could argue 
muertos initially appear as: ‘strangers’, anonymous and almost ‘absent’. 
Nevertheless, their ‘alien-ness’ does not only refer to the living, as the initial 
‘necrographic’ stage seems more often to do. Muertos, as strangers, are so in relation 
to the living. Whereas muertos as ‘affines’ have managed, with the indispensable 
support of the living, to become strangers to their own past selves, to their biography 
and body and follow their camino de muerto to the unknown; finally estranged from 
every-body, theirs and their ‘affines’. Forgetting their humanity, passes through an 
all important process of remembering, because only by remembering can they 
gradually cease being what they were. As Viveiros de Castro puts it, ‘[i]t is difficult 
to forget the deadsince only the dead forget’ (1992:201). In the following chapter, 
I will deal ethnographically with the other-than-human entities that are recognized as 
deities, and in particular those that are said to belong to a specific Afro-Cuban 
religious tradition, the Regla de Ocha/Ifá or else Santería, the orichas. To cite once 
more Viveiros de Castro as a way of an extremely short yet concise introduction to 





OBJECTS AS ORACLES, ENTITIES AS MYTHS 





In the previous two chapters I explored the somatic and affective nature of oracular 
perspectives, as this is mediated by and experienced through the various degrees and 
kinds of muertos. Such perspectives have the tendency to be idiosyncratic, context 
specific and to reveal information both about their transmittersthe muertosand 
their receiversthe living. These oracular pronouncements tend to become 
intensified in quantity and quality as the muertos’ ontological transformation is put 
into motion; something in which the living play an active role. Whilst their 
perspectives seem to be vague or even absent; when they are perceived to be either 
stagnant and too attracted to this world (‘alien’ muertos) or that they have 
transcended it more definitely (highly evolved muertos); it is in their transition from 
vivos (‘living’) to muertos-as-‘affines’ that this oracular intensity and propensity can 
mostly be evinced. 
 I now wish to move onto another ‘kind’ of oracular perspective that, from at 
least a phenomenological point of view, exhibits great affinities as well as 
differences. This chapter will initiate a comparison by focusing on the latter, while 
the next will open up the dialogue by including the affinities. As I hope I have made 
explicit, the ethnography of the muertos and their perspectives (‘necrography’), 
although clustered around, feeding and being fed by cosmological traditions, such as 
Palo and Espiritismo, cannot be strictly identified with them, in the sense that what is 
emphasized is the very interaction with particular other-than-human entities, rather 
than an a priori and unreflexive commitment to these traditions. As I see it, this is 
because ‘necrographies’ essentially appear in the body and the senses. However, 
oracular perspectives have another important source which places the body and the 
senses in a somewhat secondary position and, instead, emphasizes a more ‘material’ 
and ‘objective’ dimension. Here, objects-as-oracles make their appearance and, more 
interestingly are linked to an initially less idiosyncratic collection of biographies, 
grouped in the form of cosmological myths, the totality of which is meant to be able 
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to embrace and explain ‘everything’. Because of this, the crucial role of objects-as-
oracles is to discern and choose from this cosmological and mythological totality the 
particular ‘stories’ that correspond to the divination at issue. The entities that play the 
leading role belong more securely to the realm of divinities rather than that of 
muertos. Furthermore, these divinities and their perspectives are more securely 
organized around an explicit cosmology, a religious tradition. 
The one that seems to be more prevalent and diffused is that of an allegedly 
Yoruba origin, known as Regla de Ocha/Ifá or Santería. It is to this tradition that the 
aforementioned collection of myths, which are employed in divination are 
unquestionably said to belong to, preserved and constantly (re)interpreted. These 
myths have had such a catalytic effect on the divinatory Afro-Cuban cosmos that 
they have left their permanent mark on it and continue to do so. Indeed, when people 
get to know significant information from the orichasthe deities of Ocha/Ifáand 
act in relation to them, they often make references to mythological events and stories 
that the latter are said to be ‘born’ (nacen) from. Here, oracular pronouncements 
stem from, get materialized and condensed in ‘signs’ (signos in Spanish, oddu in 
Yoruba), and make their appearance as the oracles of Ocha/Ifá are cast by the 
diviners and are seen to throw light on the ‘path’ (camino) of the client. It is with 
these oracles, as is often stressed by initiates, that more permanent aspects of one’s 
camino are revealed as well as one’s ‘past, present and future’ (pasado, presente y 
futuro). In fact, camino and pasado, presente y futuro are interchangeably employed 
to such extent that one is the other. Although in quantitative terms these objects-cum-
oracles can be consulted on a regular and everyday basis, their particular efficacy is 
said to reside in the instances when they are employed in order to discern those 
signos that ‘accompany’ (acompañar) the individual in his or her life as a whole and 
permanently. This contrasts with the situation I was describing in the last two 
chapters, where the emphasis seems to be on a more spontaneous, affective, and not 
necessarily long-lasting ‘revelation’ of perspectives and even relations. This oracular 
‘accompaniment’ occurs in instances of minor or major acts of initiation. Indeed, any 
act deemed as such, always involves divination in which, not only are particular 
deities attached to the person, but also particular signos that contain a wealth of 
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information of what this person is or should be. It is also with these signos that it is 
decided with which deity he or she is related and how. 
Deities, like muertos, also appear and communicate with humans in a somatic 
and affective way. They do so, for instance, by way of spirit possession of the 
initiated but, unlike muertos, this is always accompanied by a trance (see Hagedorn 
2001:75-77, 107-135). They may also appearto both initiated and non-initiatedin 
dreams or while awake, but usually in a more indirect and less obvious way than 
muertos. One ‘senses’ a deity through a vast number of ‘signs’ to which it is 
associated. Each deity has a relatively fixed collection of attributes: these are certain 
character traits, strengths and weaknesses, specialized abilities and knowledge, 
elements of nature, favourite foods, plants and animals, corresponding chants and 
‘stories’ (patakín, in Yoruba), which mention aspects of their biographies, including 
why and how they came to be associated with the above attributes and their relations 
with other orichas (for a broad classification, see Bolívar Aróstegui 2005). Unlike 
muertos, who exhibit a quite idiosyncratic character and biography, which is shared 
with and communicated to particular individuals, the deities’ character and 
biographies are shared with many individuals simultaneously and, therefore, are 
much more collectively known and experienced. A muerto’s history and wishes are 
revealed as long as these come into existence spontaneously or gradually, but 
essentially through the senses. Those of an oricha are already known in a generic 
form through the widely shared and articulated mythology. Thus, what divination 
throws light onto, is which oricha or cluster of them is related to the person. A step 
further is to fathom which particular aspects, often called caminos or ‘tendencies’, of 
this oricha or cluster are more intimately related to him or her. This is not so 
straightforward, as orichas are many ‘things’ at the same time and not all apply to 
the individual with the same intensity. For example, the oricha Eleguá, under the 
guise of different caminosand appearing to ‘speak’ in different oracular 
signsmay be a divinity whose behaviour as a trickster is emphasized, or as one that 
controls the ‘paths’ and the ‘doors’ or in its function as the divine messenger. It can 
also be depicted as either masculine or feminine, young or old (for the different 
caminos of the orichas, see Bolívar Aróstegui 2005). 
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As I mentioned previously, in Ocha/Ifá it could be argued that there are two 
distinct kinds of divination. One refers to the current situation of the ‘client’ and, 
therefore, is of a relatively short reach. Its pronouncements are seen as revealing 
mainly events and features of the immediate pasado, presente y futuro of one’s 
camino; they expire, so to speaksome diviners have told me within as short a 
period as seven daysor they do not provide any conclusive information. The other 
kind of divination, which is always accompanied by a short of initiation, brings forth 
a more permanent relation between the ‘client’ and the oracle’s outcomes: the signos, 
the relevant orichas, who are usually the object of such initiations, and the various 
prescriptions, prohibitions, warnings and advice that follow it. It is this second kind 
of divination that refers to one’s camino, not as a fragment and at no specific point, 
but in its totality. 
An example of a consultation with the Ocha/Ifá oracles 
The following account will be given in order to, first, get an image of what an 
oracular consultation involves in Ocha/Ifá, and, second, to demonstrate what kind of 
relations are instantiated, even if other-than-human entities are not brought into a 
direct relation with the ‘client’ of divination. The ‘client’ in this case is myself and it 
occurred in the last couple of months of my fieldwork. Although I had previously 
witnessed a series of consultations (mainly simple ones but also those which were 
part of propitiatory rituals and initiations), it was only in the latter stages of my 
fieldwork that I decided to consult the oracles on my own behalf, and this was for 
various reasons: one was that witnessing the consultations of others, along with 
talking to diviners, was enough for me to obtain a good idea of how divination 
worked, especially with people who were somehow more ‘naturally’ part of the 
context in which the oracles participate and also create. Another reason, perhaps the 
most prevalent, but also indirectly linked to the previous, was that I felt that a 
relatively large degree of trust should exist between methe ‘client’and the 
diviner. The reason I am giving an account of a consultation that was directed at 
myself, is, firstly, that it was one of the few for which I had a more systematic record 
of, and, secondly, because, although the ritual prescriptions involve an initiation of 
relations with entities and objects, they do not lead to major offerings and initiations. 
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This will contribute to the point I wish to make, namely, that even if the latter do not 
take place, the entities through divination are brought into a kind of relation with the 
‘client’. 
Diviners in Cuba, as it seems to be the case in many other parts of the world, 
are prone to accusations of ‘charlatanism’: ‘All prophets are like Cassandra. They are 
not believed beforehand. They are not recognized afterwards. In advance, the 
prophecies are incomprehensible, afterwards they are trivial’ (Ardener 2007:135). As 
‘clients’ are people who by definition do not posses the ‘faculty’ (facultad) to 
communicate with the ‘beyond’,19 if they wish to do so, they depend on those who 
have it. The tension that always lurks is whether it is the ‘beyond’ that is actually 
speaking or just the persons claim of contacting it. In addition, and as the word 
‘client’ implies, divination does not only involve exchange relations between humans 
and deities, but also among humans. It is very probable that divination not only leads 
to offerings or initiations, but also involves economic transactions, not so much in 
the consultations per se, but in what they might engender. It is not uncommon, in 
peoples’ everyday talk, to cast suspicions or accusations against the diviners as 
‘impostors’ (impostores) or ‘speculators’ (especuladores). Nevertheless, it is not the 
system of divination as a whole that is criticized, but particular individuals and their 
‘fasle’ (falsos) pronouncements, as being juxtaposed to the ‘true’ (verdaderos) ones, 
enhancing in a way the system as a whole (cf. Evans-Pritchard 1990; Holbraad 
2008c:238-241). 
I, for my part, was faced with hesitations of a double nature: firstly, I had not 
personally accepted the divination system as a whole from which, if ‘false’ 
divinations were discarded, I could unconditionally embrace the pronouncements of 
the orichas; in other words, I was not only suspicious of the diviners but of the 
‘beyond’ they were claiming to communicate with. Secondly, I felt that my position 
as a foreigner, which in present-day Cuba is almost unavoidably associated with the 
possession of precious, and in greatly lacking, hard currency, would be a very good 
reason for the oracles’ outcomes to point to further ritual actions that would involve 
large, or at least repetitive, transactions of money. As very few things in Cuba have a 
                                                 
19 At least in the ritualized context of employing the oracles; practice which requires, among others, a 
relatively long experience, technical skill and full initiation under the protection of an oricha and/or 
Ifá, which confers the person the right and the consecrated objects that serve as oracles. 
128 
 
fixed price, especially between what Cubans and foreigners pay, rituals conducted 
for the latter always have a ‘foreigners’ price’, where major initiations might cost 
thousands of dollars. I simply was not prepared, not only financially, but above all 
psychologically to enter into such kinds of commitments. It was only at the end of 
my fieldwork, and after having made friends with some of my informants, who had 
come to see me not as a typical yuma (‘foreigner’) and me to see them not as typical 
yuma-seekers, that I asked for a consultation. 
One of these, was with Angelito, a white santero in his early seventies, who, 
as he told me, had grown up with, and been initiated from a very young age by 
‘Africans’, meaning not only people ‘of colour’ (de color), but ones who consciously 
followed an ‘African’ way of life, through practicing Afro-Cuban religious 
traditions, and especially, in this case, Santería. Having previously arranged for a 
consultation, I had told Angelito that there was not a particular or pressing issue that 
I wished to acquire advice on, but in general whether I had chosen the right ‘path’ as 
far as my studies and fieldwork were concerned. This is initially an important 
‘opening’ of any consultation with the Ocha/Ifá oracles, namely, that the ‘client’ will 
bring to it some kind of issue or problem to be explored. Nevertheless, it is the oracle 
which finally decides whether there is actually an issue or not, and the possible 
actions (not necessarily of a ritual nature) that should be taken in order to deal with 
it. The most common case is that there is a kind of problem, just from the mere fact 
that the ‘client’ is seeking advice from the oracles, and one of the most crucial things 
to fathom out through divination, is whether the issue is related to the deities and, if 
it is, with which particular deities and in what way. 
Angelito, being a santero, employs the dilogún oracle, which consists of a set 
of 16 cowrie shells (caracoles). These shells ‘belong’ to the oricha Eleguá, who acts 
as the generic oricha of divination in Ocha, just as Orula does for Ifá. Angelito 
knows very well which entities are to be invoked in the consultation, but he still has 
to acquire some more specific information about the ‘client’, so that the entities will 
be directed to him. Every person in Ocha/Ifá cosmology is born with a personal 
deity, called Eledá, who is said to reside in his or her ‘head’ (orí). In the orí it is 
thought that the most ‘individual’ essence of the person resides, and in which from 
conception, his or her destino or camino is inscribed. Nevertheless, as soon as the 
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person is born destiny is thought to be forgotten, thus creating the need to be 
reminded of it. This is what divination is supposed to be doing; helping people 
remember their destiny, which is ‘inside’, yet forgotten. Angelito, in his moyubas 
(opening chants) will mention my name so that the entities recognize for whom the 
divination is aimed for. He tells me that my first name is not enough, that we should 
‘particularize’ (particularizar) it a bit more. He asks me the date of my birth. He then 
takes a calendar which details the days dedicated to Catholic saints and names. 
Apparently, my date of birth, fifth of February, corresponds to Agueda (female) and 
Felipe (male). Thus, my name to be invoked becomes Aguedo (making it male, 
although it does not exist as such) Felipe Anastasio, and then, in a slightly confused 
mumble, my surname, Panagiotopoulos. Angelito, begins with the moyubas, which 
are in Yoruba and, therefore, I am unable to grasp them, recognizing only Cuban 
names (deceased ritual ancestors of Angelito), names of orichas and every now and 
then ‘Aguedo Felipe Anastasio’. He then takes the cowrie shells with both his hands 
and holds them touching my forehead and begins invoking my Eledá (he pronounces 
my extended name again). He touches both my hands with the caracoles saying 
ocharéo. I am told to reply adaché (this means something like ‘amen’, Angelito 
explains) and he continues with the moyubas and pronounces my full name again. 
After invoking the relevant entities in the moyubas the dilogún is cast on the 
mat. The procedure basically involves to ‘taking out’ (sacar) the relevant oracular 
‘sign’. In the dilogún, this is achieved by casting the 16 cowrie shells on the mat in 
one throw, with the possibility of each one falling in a concave or ‘mouth-down’ 
(bocabajo) or convex or ‘mouth-up’ (bocarriba) position. There are in total 16 
possible outcomes, which make up the 16 principal signos, and provided that the 
dilogún is cast twice, offering in that way a double signo, it gives a combination of 
256 possible signos; something similar occurs with the Ifá oracle, although the 
objects involved are different (see Holbraad 2008c:233-235). Each signo contains 
verses in Yoruba, proverbs, aphorisms, general messages, advice and warnings, and a 
collection of ‘stories’ (historias in Spanish, patakín in Yoruba), which are all meant 
to describe the signo in its generic form. 
Although the verses in Yoruba are said to be the most important elements of 
each signo and that it is they that ‘give birth’ to the various patakín, it is the latter 
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that provide the events which may apply to the particular divination and are the 
object of the diviners’ ‘interpretation’ (interpretación). This is where the tension 
between diviner and client might arise. Interpretation occurs on many levels and it 
involves a kind of discernment; for example, although all patakín refer to 
mythological events and persons, including the orichas, to apply such myths to the 
‘now’ of the consultation, the diviner must skilfully interpret by way of substitution 
and parallelisms, to whom the mythological characters correspond and what the 
mythological events have to say about the ones occurring to the client. This is 
something that depends a lot on the humans’ efforts to find these correspondences 
without these being definitely verified by the orichas’ immediate responses. The 
orichas’ will and interest to communicate is relatively limited, as they give only 
generic pronouncementsthe myths, the proverbs and the general 
messagesleaving humans to interpret them adequately and with as much context 
specificity as possible. Full verification of the consultation is rarely exhausted in the 
consultation per se and often occurs in the long run and is highly dependant on the 
subsequent actionsritual or notwhich if they lead towards the fulfilment of one’s 
desires and general well-being, they hence ‘prove’ the truth of the oracular 
pronouncements. 
Both the dilogún and the Ifá oracle contain a series of ‘techniques’ which lead 
to a more contextualized moulding of the oracular sign. These always involve 
methods of fathoming out from which ‘tendency’ (tendencia) or ‘path’ (camino) the 
signo ‘comes’ (viene). Signos are classified it two broad categories, the signos 
mayores (‘elder signs’) and menores (‘younger’). The two broad ‘tendencies’ a signo 
might come with, are either iré or osogbo. Iré signifies a positive tendency and 
osogbo a negative one. In order to determine the two possible ‘tendencies’ a signo 
might come with, the use of a set of specific objects, called ibo, is required. The 
client holds in each hand, without the diviner knowing which, one of the ibo. Each is 
previously decided whether it will signify the iré or osogbo ‘tendency’. If the signo 
that comes out falls into the category of the ‘elder’ ones, the left hand of the client is 
chosen by the diviner and the ‘tendency’ is revealed. The right hand is chosen if the 
signo is a ‘younger’ one. After this, the nature or type of either the iré or osogbo is 
further explored. Here, the source that brings the iré or osogbo is decided, namely, 
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what entities participate in and are responsible for it, as well which ones may be of 
help to make it happen in case of iré, or avoid it in case of osogbo.  
The consultation then becomes even more individualized. The procedure is 
identical with that of deciding the initial iré or osogbo ‘tendency’, but now the ibo 
stand for ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers respectively. The questions posed to the oracle which 
receive ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers are of a relatively fixed character, although the human 
factornamely, the diviner’s decision as to what questions to pose, might intervene. 
The diviner should ask the oracle the standard questions that are available; for 
example, if iré ‘comes out’, the diviner starts asking whether it is an iré arikú 
(something like a positive tendency towards death), iré elese ocha (a blessing from 
an oricha), iré elese eggun (a blessing from the dead), iré elese obini (a blessing 
coming from women), and so on, until the diviner, through the ibo, gets a positive 
answer. The same occurs in the case of osogbo. A similar procedure is followed to 
decide ‘how’ the iré might be achieved, quickened or strengthened or the osogbo 
avoided, delayed or smoothened, and whether they can be so to start with. This 
procedure ultimately decides what kind of further actions will have to be taken, 
whether an offering has to take place or not, ranging from minor ones to animal 
sacrifices, and initiations. 
Having finished with the ‘technical’ part of the divination and having noted 
down on paper the principal signo and its tendencias, Angelito proceeds into their 
‘interpretation’. The signo of my consultation came with the affirmative tendencia of 
iré, being granted by the oricha Eleguá:  
I have to tell you that independent of your beliefs, you have done something that has granted 
you the charm [simpatía] of the saints, and you are protected although you did not ask for it 
[…] it is maybe out of spontaneity of the saints, not because you have actively sought them, 
but thanks to God, and mediated by Eleguá […] Eleguá will help you a lot, he will guide you 
and your path, in the course of time and your life. 
Here, I believe, the interesting points made by Angelito are that a person, 
independent of his or her ‘beliefs’ (which can also be understood as the conscious 
degree of commitment to particular practices), may win the ‘charm’ of the deities. 
Additionally, one’s life and its course is depicted as a ‘path’, whereby it is 
accompanied (in a positive way in this case) by a general divine supervision, so to 
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speakAngelito calls it God, but, crucially, as ‘mediated’ by specific deities; Eleguá 
in my case.  
You are an intelligent person with big possibilities of success […] you will have many 
alternatives in your life […] in these moments you might be poor, have little, but you are rich 
and you do not know it […] you have many possibilities to continue forward […] and here 
comes Eleguá to help you and stop you before committing any error and helps you move 
forward successfuly […]  Eleguá’s protection is a key [llave], he is the guide of the paths of 
all humans […] he knows how to close the doors before those bad paths and, on the contrary, 
he will open the doors of triumph. 
Angelito is describing in a more articulate and intelligible way what an iré granted 
by Eleguá implies. As he goes on, this positive affinity of mine with Eleguá is 
beginning to transform into a more intimate relation, which ends with a future 
possibility of becoming even more intimate by way of initiation: 
This, of course, does not vanish any possibility [of something going wrong]…the saint helps, 
but […] I can’t ask you to be intelligent, you are; you are objective and a realist; a materialist 
[materialista], for which Eleguá cannot add much […] talk to him, ask him for things, not 
money nor millions, ask him for protection, health, to guide you in safe paths, without 
dangers […] I can’t tell you that you are negatively enchanted [mal encantado]; you are 
positively enchanted [bien encantado], but in all paths of life, no matter how good they are, 
there are always dangers, there is jealousy which is innate in human nature […] and material 
success, when it is the outcome of hard work and honestly obtained is welcome. When you 
have it in abundance keep it, don’t spend it badly, no matter how much money you have you 
may lose it in a day [...] and don’t become an ‘economical referee’ [arbitro económico] of 
your friends or lovers; always keep something for yourself, in privacy; […] in that way you 
avoid problems. And, as I know that whatever you achieve will not be stolen or illicit, and 
that it will come from your own efforts, take care of it, enjoy one part, but keep another […] 
there are people who are very capable of taking advantage of your good heart, sometimes by 
employing amorous seduction […] you don’t have to be harsh neither in matters of heart nor 
in those of the wallet, one thing is almost parallel to the other […] 
The saints find you charming [simpático], the saints like you [les simpatizas] and you might 
come to like them as well […] I won’t make you do things, or pressure you, because your 
own feet will lead you [tus piés te llevarán], maybe because of your needs  in the course of 
time, but your orí is [destined] to come at the feet of the saints [a los pies de los santos], I 
don’t know how much time will pass but, Eleguá, invisibly, will bring you or lead you…I 
will do [hacer] you a small job [obrita], very simple and not expensive at all, and give you 
some recommendations for your good luck. In important and decisive occasions use it […] I 
will not make you do despojos [ritual cleansings], neither baths with plants, neither ebbo 
[offerings], at least for the moment, your ebbo is called ‘water, soap and white clothes’, 
that’s it. 
Then he became a bit more precise and told me to bathe occasionally with fresh milk 
and then water, to use white clothes and in general look after my appearance, to dress 
adequately for each occasion; to avoid red, and when I wanted to use it always 
combine it with white; never black or dark colours; not to eat red apples without 
peeling them: ‘Respect the colour red [respeta el color rojo]’, not to eat pumpkin, 
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‘respect’ it as well; that in this signo riches are found in (as coming from) the 
pumpkin; avoid red wine, it will make me look ridiculous on an important occasion; 
to take very good care of my teeth and trust the doctors (as it seems I do not); that 
one day I will come closer to the ‘religion’; to be careful not to tell big lies; to try and 
always maintain good relations with my father, that there will be something that will 
come between the two of us and it might create conflicts; to respect him. Also, that if 
when walking I happen to see a shell, peel or husk (all these described as cáscara), to 
take it and throw it in the bin, because on my way back I might forget about it, not 
see it and stumble on it, with the possibility of provoking an accident to my 
extremities. He went on: 
Momentarily you transform into a dustman, because in this sign poverty arrives in such a 
degree that the rich man becomes a dustman; so, being you [the sign?], you are going to do 
this [throw the cáscara away] cleaning [in that way] your own path, so that you never reach 
this point [of becoming a dustman], neither out of anybody’s maliciousness nor out of your 
own head [actions]. 
Here, a very interesting point is made about one’s relation to the signo that ‘comes 
out’ in divination, and by extension, all the relevant events and entities that 
accompany it. Signos are not just prescribing paths of actions, but also potential 
dangers. Those which are contained in a particular signo, point to potentials that are 
somewhat related to the client. This does not mean that they will actually happen; on 
the contrary, having obtained such information through the signo, one is advised to 
actually try and avoid them. It is because these dangers are related to the client that 
he or she should make an effort to not let them be actualized. This reflects the iré and 
osogbo tendencies in a much broader dimension, as it were. Signos are just 
tendencies where both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ events occur. They are potentials in 
relation to the client, and being such, he or she could make them happen or avoid 
them. In relation to that, I also find it very interesting that Angelito advises me to 
‘momentarily become a dustman’, collect the cáscara and bin it, so as not to become 
in a more permanent way a poor man. But this is not the only dimension of becoming 
a dustman. Being seen with a negative value, the dustman also refers to taking 
actions that will prevent me from having a physical accident. This is added to 
poverty by way of complementarity or extension, as a physical accident might 
provoke an inability to work, and therefore a path to poverty. 
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Knowing already that I was involved in a relationship, Angelito asks me if 
my girlfriend has a sister. I reply positively and he tells me to be careful with her. 
That she could be the reason for unpleasant events, such as those affecting negatively 
my relationship with my girlfriend, even to the point of separation; that she could 
provoke them by cunning machinations and lies. He advises me to ask Eleguá for 
protection concerning this matter. He goes on: 
As you are an erudite, and because you are interested in these things [the Afro-Cuban 
religions], as your studies require it, I want to give you some advice, which might not apply 
for the moment, but time passes and although it can’t be very bad, as you are guided by 
Eleguá - I can’t think of terrible things - you have to be careful. Be it your curiosity on one 
side, the affinity [referring to the fact that saints found me ‘charming’] on the other, the 
invisible or unknown powers [los poderes invisibles o desconocidos] might lead you closer to 
the religious environment [ambito religioso], but you have to be a little bit careful, when it 
comes to a possible religious seduction [seducción religiosa] towards Ifá. You must be 
extremely careful with that; because you might turn into a slave of Ifá. Logically, Eleguá will 
try to avoid it, but due to your desire or necessity to come closer to these matters you might 
be seduced, captured, and a slave is always a slave, and you don’t have to be slave to nobody. 
If for some Ifá is marvellous, for you it will be slavery, and this would provoke a total 
deviation [desvio] from your life and from what your guardian angel and God want from 
you; because you came on Earth for other things. I more or less translate the language of the 
saints [yo mas o menos, traduzco el lenguaje de los santos], but there are others that surpass 
me; you have other abilities, don’t let yourself be seduced by it [Ifá]…The saints can help 
you a lot but neither for your career nor out of curiosity; in this religion you must be very 
careful and be very well prepared, because it wraps you like a tamal [te envuelve como un 
tamal, the latter being a Latin American recipe made with ground corn and wrapped up and 
boiled in maize leaves] and makes you see marvels where there are only lies. 
Paths are full stones, and sometimes you stumble upon them; some are saints, and the one 
you stumbled upon is Eleguá. Well, we could talk and philosophize until next month, but I 
have to be precise. 
Here is Angelito’s interpretation of the signo being one that reveals an affinity 
between myself and the ‘saints’ without this leading to an immediate and pressuring 
need to go ‘at the feet of the saints’, that is, to get initiated. He also lets it become 
understood that the particular signo could be interpreted as a need to get initiated in 
Ifá. This is combined with me being of a curious ‘nature’ and the possibility of 
becoming ‘seduced’ by Ifá. Angelito is demonstrating a side of the relations that 
exist within Ocha/Ifá, and especially the tensions between Ocha and Ifá (see Brown 
2003a). The most interesting point, I believe, he makes is that one can be favoured 
by the orichas and exactly because of this there is no need to get initiated. In other 
words, when one’s camino, provided it is not intertwined with priesthood as a 
vocation, is lived as it was predestined in his or her orí, then the orichas are 
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somehow positively related with him or her. In these cases, initiations, at least major 
ones, look like ‘corrections’ of deviated caminos and not as divine predilections of 
an a priori affinity. It is the affinity that is checked through divination and sought 
through initiation and not the motive of the latter. In contrast to big, monotheistic 
religions, such as Christianity and Islam, which require an ‘either/or’ commitment 
with them that is exclusivist (they do not leave room, as dogmas at least, for active 
engagement with other religions), and which are not open to engagement through 
constant oracular verification. In the Afro-Cuban context, it is very often the case 
that initiations occur due to a previous state of discontent from the other-than-human 
entities, which is congruent with the occurrence of some sort of negative effect on 
the person’s life. Initiation is meant to throw light on and try to amend these negative 
effects. 
He then proceeded in the ritual prescriptions that ‘came out’ from the 
consultation, with the use of the ibo. He told me to buy a bunch of green (not ripe) 
bananas that would be placed, firstly, in front of Eleguá (Angelito’s own object-
deity) to ask the deity for protection and then, when the bananas went ripe, at the feet 
of a specific kind of tree (called jagüey). 
Eleguá walks [camina] with everybody, with Yemayá, with Ochún, with Obatalá, with 
everybody. We shall offer him the fruits so that he doesn’t let you lose, so as to protect you 
from the bad predictions that other people might have with this sign, to open the doors of the 
right path. When the fruits are ripe we will take them at the feet of a jagüey. This tree has 
very potent roots; they expand with great power and wrap up everything in their path in order 
to survive.   
Another prescription was to ‘prepare’ (preparar) or ‘make’ (hacer) a ‘necklace’ 
(collar) of Eleguá, which would serve as a ‘ticket’ (resguardo), ‘to seek proximity’ 
(para buscar cercania) as much as possible. The ‘preparation’ signified that from a 
‘mere’ red and blackthe colours identified with Eleguánecklace, it would 
transform into a ‘necklace of Eleguá’ (collar de Eleguá) by way of consecration. 
This would include a procedure of being ‘washed’ (lavado), importantly with 
sacrificial blood: ‘It is a way to have Eleguá near you, a point of reference and 
support with which you could call him and have him closer’, Angelito exclaims. 
What is here illuminated is that objects such as a collar, just as the oracle Angelito is 
employing, make entities such as the orichas become closer to the person. From a 
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relative state of distance orichas, through the consecrated objects, move to a state of 
relative ‘proximity’ (see Holbraad 2007b:217). Angelito goes on:  
You have a path to the saint [tienes camino de santo, meaning that in the future I might get 
initiated], but Eleguá is not in a hurry, neither him nor any other saint, because it is not yet 
the time. But be careful with the seduction of Ifá; because within Ifá you would be a slave, 
and you were not born to be a slave but a king, not in the religion but in a kingdom of yours, 
in your career, in your studies. Now you will head to your land; this sign is very mobile, you 
will be a pyramid, not a precipice, not a ditch [fosa, also meaning ‘grave’]. Obara Meyi [the 
sign of the consultation] is a sign where the pyramids of Egypt were constructed. Maybe one 
day, I will see you in front of the pyramids and you will remember of me. 
I finally ask him what kind of ‘transcendence’ (transcendencia) this consultation has. 
In this context, ‘transcendence’ means how far-reaching the pronouncements were; 
how much did they refer to my life, camino, as a whole and not just the immediate 
span of it. He replies somewhat laconically: 
This is not an itá [a divination that occurs during initiation, where the signos that ‘come out’ 
are considered of great ‘transcendence’, namely, of a more permanent reference to the client], 
how can I explain it, there were not any animal sacrifices […] I think I made a quite ample 
interpretation […] I know that this paper [the notes taken down during the consultation, 
including the signo], if seen by another [diviner] might be interpreted as if you had a path to 
Ifá, but this is not my understanding, I do not agree with that. 
He uses the ibo once more to see if there is anything else left to be done; nothing for 
the moment; ‘case closed, the conversation is complete.’ He makes the concluding 
moyubas and finally remarks: ‘Says Ifá [dice Ifá] that Obara Meyi coming as iré is 
light, the illumination of the saint; the light illuminates your path, so as not to fall 
among the mist, in confusion, the rest is there to see; aché.’ 
Objects and Myths 
If one compares oracular pronouncements stemming from muertos and those from 
orichas it is very possible to observe two broad tendencies. The former tend to be 
somewhat more specific and referring to particular points of one’s camino. This is 
definitely the case with ‘alien’ muertos who appear in one’s life momentarily and 
then disappear. But also with the ‘affines’ there seems to be a potential for a 
heightened degree of intimacy which is actualized by way of an increase in the flow 
of perspectives articulated affectively and somatically. Even when ‘affine’ muertos 
reveal a more general point of view, such as a potential of the individual in, say, a 
professional inclination, this tends to be accompanied by the biographical 
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specificities of the muerto itself which are also revealed and have to do with the same 
inclinations. Such exact information will be a specific characteristic of the living 
‘affine’ linked to its affinity with the muerto, which may be complementaryor 
even conflictingwith other characteristics of the same person and often actualized 
through his or her other ‘affines’. In the previous chapter, Carmen’s outgoing but 
also immature character was linked to ‘her’ gypsy muerto, while a more ‘feet on the 
ground’ potential behaviour was activated and actualized by the spirit of her 
grandmother. Furthermore, the oracular pronouncements of muertos, in their more 
fragmented nature, obtain a broader scope only as a gradual accumulation, in the 
myriads of divinatory experiences, and with an equally gradual process of acquiring 
a fuller ‘frame’ or ‘painting’ of the muerto and, by extension, the totality of them that 
comprise one’s cordón espiritual. The constitution of muertos is perceived and 
instantiated as an ongoing ontological transformation and ‘cosmogonical’ act 
(Espritio Santo 2010:71), as happens with the living and along with them, where 
theirthe muertos’biographies are activated in the form of perspectives in order to 
give way to their camino de muerto, to constitute their ‘necrography’, which can thus 
be related to the biography of their living ‘affines’. 
The perspectives given by the orichas have the tendency to be from the very 
beginning broader in scope and, as many say, more ‘transcendental’ 
(trancendentales). In this sense, the orichas can be said to follow the opposite 
direction from the muertos: their point of departure is the general and whole 
inclusive towards the more particular. Confluent with this is a movement that deities 
and muertos can be evinced to follow, which divination seems to trigger and thus 
ethnographically exemplify. While muertos seem to ‘move’ from this world to ‘the 
beyond’, from embodiment to disembodiment, something that depends on their 
interaction and communication with the living, deities like the orichas seem to 
follow the opposite direction, that is, from ‘the beyond’ to the world of humans, from 
disembodiment to embodiment. For both, divination is the very vehicle of such 
‘motion’ (see Holbraad 2008c). In the remaining of this chapter we will see what this 
involves. 
From a cosmological point of view, the orichas are seen as entities already 
constituted and therefore (more) given. Unlike humans, living or dead, who are said 
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to still ‘walk’ their camino, they have already ‘walked’ it in mythical space and time. 
This does not mean that they have ceased to exist or that they are radically separated 
from the human world. On the contrary, the orichas are said to be everywhere and 
perceive everything. Rather, this encompassing quality of theirs suggests that all that 
happens and exists here and now responds to and, to use the indigenous term, is 
‘born’ (nace) from the orichas’ ‘given’ and already ‘walked’ caminos. To pre-empt 
my conclusions, while the living and the dead have caminos, the orichas are them. 
Indeed, whilst with muertos, the divinatory acts reveal at the same time their 
biographies, which are retained in the muertos’ affective memories but not 
previously communicated to the living, for the orichas, divinatory pronouncements 
do not so much reveal their biography as this is already known and communicated. 
What is revealed is which, of the already known and given divine biographies and 
caminos, corresponds to and participates in the camino of the individual. Seen in this 
light, divination seems to be an act of ‘hierophany [...] reproducing a primordial act, 
of repeating a mythical example’ (Eliade 1974:4). This ‘primordial act’ is what, for 
Eliade, constitutes ‘an original ontology’ (1974:5), an ‘archetype’ (1974:6-11) or 
‘divine model’ (1974:21) that makes man ‘contemporary with the cosmogony and 
with the anthropogony because ritual projects him into the mythical epoch of 
beginning’ (1974:22). Thus, any act of ‘hierophany’ is an act of ‘repetition and 
participation’ (1974:34) by man to what is deemed as really real and sacred, while 
‘[t]he rest of his life is passed in profane time, which is without meaning: in the state 
of “becoming”’ (1974:35). 
In line with Eliade’s propositions, it seems that the orichas’ perspectives are 
most often instantiated in the ‘archetypal’ and ‘exemplary’ form of myths. Indeed, 
the myths include events of creation, the ‘birth’ of the cosmos, of the orichas 
themselves, their lives and relations among them and the cosmos, as well as events of 
other mythological personagesincluding human beings, animals, and objects from 
the organic and inorganic world. These ‘stories’ (patakín) are collected into oracular 
clusters coming to form separate, but ultimately interrelated, domains of 
mythological experience and are graphically distilled in oracular ‘signs’ (the signos 
or oddu). Consecrated objects play the crucial role of bringing into the divining 
surface, usually on the floor on a mat, the corresponding ‘sign’ of the particular 
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divination. It could be argued that myth posits an original and primordial unity and 
oneness of the worldconcentrated in the ‘face’ of the creator god Olofin and its 
whole-inclusive power of aché (see Idowu 1962)that is then dispersed into 
different acts of creation by the dissemination of aché into more concrete and diverse 
forms. Nevertheless, if this primordial ‘monotheistic’ quality is evident, it is also the 
case that creation myths posit the primordial value of multiplicity, as the very act of 
creation is inextricably linked with ‘birth’ acts and differentiation (see Goldman 
2007:105-111). If the orichas are the first mythical ‘product’ of this differentiation, 
the original state of multiplicity is thus also of primordial and mythical importance, 
even more so as far as humans are concerned. Because divination brings forth the 
relations that correspond between humans and deities, it is by its inception an act of 
differentiation and multiplicity. Divination discerns from a cosmo-mythical totality 
of multiple orichas, caminos, oracular signs, stories, and in general every potential 
available to occur, those which refer to the particular situation and person the 
consultation is directed to. What is invoked in Ocha/Ifá divination is not the ‘one’, 
Olofin, but the many, the orichas. In the same vein, people directly relate to the 
orichas and not to Olofin, who is aloof and retired from the creative process. 
It is here that Eliade’s conception of the ‘sacred’ as linked to the ‘exemplary’ 
starts to become quite alien to the Ocha/Ifá cosmology. As my final quotation of his 
calls for a discrimination between the sacred-as-exemplary-being and the profane-as-
the-novel-becoming, in Ocha/Ifá the claim that in the totality of ‘signs’ and myths is 
(‘born’) everything that has existed, exists and will ever exist (pasado, presente y 
futuro), implies that its ‘divine models’ and ‘archetypes’ participate in and include 
everything; nothing is excluded from the ‘sacred’. And if there is an absolute non-
distinction from ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’, there is also non-distinction between being 
and becoming (see Goldman 2007:112-113, 2010). In other words, because these 
‘archetypal’ divine models participate frequently, if not constantly, in peoples’ lives, 
something that divination renders ‘actual’, there is no concept of a unique ‘myth of 
eternal return’ (sensu Eliade), since the ‘reality’ that the myths document and 
instantiate does not return because it has never left in the first place; it is people that 
return not the myths. It is ‘mythopraxis’, in Sahlin’s terms, that I believe is at issue 
here, not in order to prove that myths are truethis is beyond question once 
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divination as a whole is taken in its truth-claiming value and not as something whose 
truth may not hold after all (see Holbraad 2008a)but in order to find the 
correspondences of ‘actual’ life to the mythical reality. 
In an extremely intriguing account, Sahlins (1995), as a response to 
Obeyesekere’s highly critical reaction (1992) to previous publications of his (1982, 
1989, 1991), describes and analyzes the perception and understanding of the 
Hawaiians to the arrival of Captain Cook to the islands in 1778. In brief, Sahlin’s 
historical hypothesis is that the Hawaiians treated Cook as (an incarnation of) their 
god Lono. According to Sahlins, they did so from the very beginning of Cook’s 
advent, as it coincided with the annual Makahiki festival dedicated to the god 
himself. In presenting us with very rich historical evidence and imaginative analysis, 
Sahlins describes how Cook’s ‘apotheosis’ was not only a result from such 
coincidences with the Hawaiian ritual calendar, but a complex interaction of the 
natives with the British. These instantiated significant parts of the Hawaiian myths 
and culminated into what these myths had already described as a confrontation of the 
local king with the god (Cook), the killing of the latter and the ascendance of the 
former into ruleevents which were also re-enacted in the very Makahiki festival. 
Sahlins employs the word ‘mythopraxis’ (1995:93, 175, 250; see also Sahlins 1989) 
in order to describe this complex phenomenon of ‘synthesis of history’ (1995:93) 
with native cosmology, where myths do not merely pre-define reality and its 
perception so that they can be proven true, but reality itself unravels in such ways 
that it is perceived as ‘real’ because of its correspondence to myth. Myth, here, is not 
treated as a literary or sacred text with which reality is measured; myth becomes 
aliveliving and livedit is perceived, rather than just conceived (see also Gow 
2001; Hocart 1952; Leenhardt 1979; Lienhardt 1990; Schrempp 1992; Scott 2007; 
Traube 1986; Valeri 1985). 
Divination and the mythology that it brings to the surface, is not just a verbal 
pronouncement, a piece of information that one is then left free and alone to reflect 
and learn from its trans-specific and universal messages. As Holbraad has 
demonstrated (2008c), divinatory acts are not limited to the actual instances of 
consultation and, thus, cannot be separated from consequent actions that may or 
should be followed after the orichas have ‘spoken’. Divination does not reveal a state 
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of affairs that is superimposed on the individual in an eschatological way; it does not 
reveal a kind of destiny that whatever the case it is ultimately bound to occur. In 
other words, divination does not reveal a rigid piece of information with which 
people are just left to contemplate.  
A central element that was revealed in my consultation with Angelito was 
that my camino had an irépositive‘tendency’. Although it was a simple 
consultation, meaning that the ‘transcendence’ of the signos ‘drawn’ was not 
referring to my camino as a whole, it revealed a certain positive disposition of the 
orichas towards me, at least up to that moment. Although Angelito offered advice 
and warnings that I should be mindful of, there was not any indication of a current 
and impending need to get initiated. Without my conscious knowledge of itand I 
would add, despite my ‘disbelief’ or scepticismthe ‘saints were sympathising with 
me [les simpatizas a los santos]’ and I presumably had kept them satisfied even 
though I had never actively engaged in any kind of direct exchange with them 
through previous consultations, initiations or offerings. In essence, the orichas were 
satisfied with me and I was fulfilling my camino. This means that what I perceived 
until then as an absence of relation with the cosmos of the orichas was in fact a 
completely aligned one to such an extent that no major ritual steps were required. 
On the contrary, initiationswhich are meant to be decided by the oracles 
themselves and not by human choicemost often reveal a certain deviation from 
one’s camino, something that divination, first, reveals as a matter of fact and 
information and, second, compels actions in the form of obligations that are thought 
to realign the person with their ‘true’ camino; that which would make the orichas 
satisfied. As there are various degrees of initiation there are also various degrees of 
deviations. By way of conclusion to this chapter, I will initiate a discussion 
comparing the different kinds of other-than-human entities along the axis of the 
broad distinction between deities and spirits of the dead that I touched upon in 
isolation in the last three chapters and I will now try to bring together in the 
following ones.   
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Ikú lobi ocha: the dead give birth to the deities 
If one were to ask what is the relation between the orichas and muertos, a very 
common answer that one may receive is that indeed there is a sort of connection. The 
fact that both kinds of entities are said to belong to ‘the beyond’ (el mas allá) is 
indicative of this. Even more precisely, one might get to hear an expression that is 
very widely employed: ikú lobi ocha. Translating the Yoruba into Spanish, most 
people would argue that it says ‘death gives birth to Ocha [la muerte pare a la 
Ocha]’, or ‘the dead gives birth to the saint [el muerto pare el santo]’, or in its plural, 
‘the dead give birth to the saints [los muertos paren los santos].’ A looser translation 
which I have also come across, and verges with interpretation, is that ‘nothing exists 
without the dead [sin muerto no hay nada].’ What this expression ultimately means 
is a matter of ‘theological’ debate and it would be anthropologically futile to try and 
discover its ‘true’ meaning. Rather, what is interesting is that the expression is 
evoked as an answer to the question of the relation between muertos and the orichas. 
One ethnographic fact is that as both kinds of entities are said to belong to 
‘the beyond’, they somehow have a privileged point of view over human affairs that 
humans alone are not able to adopt unless they communicate with them. In other 
words, both the orichas and the muertos are involved in divination. A common 
interpretation that might be given to the expression is that the orichas themselves 
were once persons who lived, then died and ultimately became divinities. This might 
become evident in common parlance and in certain myths where some orichas, such 
as Changó and Odudua (see Díaz Fabelo 1960), are depicted as ancient Yoruba 
royalty figures. But then again most of the orichas, although they are attributed royal 
qualities just as their initiates (see Brown 2003a:165-286), they are not treated as 
historical figures in the conventional sense. Very interestingly, some santeros and 
babalawos have told me that there might have existed ‘real’ persons who in their 
lives and deaths acted as exemplary models of the divinities, meaning that their 
caminos were very akin to those of particular orichas. In Eliade’s terms, they were 
human exemplary models of the divine ones, which, during the passage of time, had 
their biographical specificities merged into the encompassing nature of the orichas. 
Famous santeros and babalawos are remembered in Cuba as ‘children’ of specific 
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orichas and with specific oracular ‘signs’ as the very personification of the latter 
(see, for example, Brown 2003a:62-112; Ferrer Castro and Acosta Alegre 2006). 
What I believe is more pertinent is not so much the ‘historicity’ of the orichas 
as ex-humans in the conventional sense, but a common ontological thread of 
personhood that relates the living, the dead and the orichas. And this common thread 
is not weaved in order to just focus on an essential identity among them, but it also 
highlights the differences and, because of them, their potential relations. That ‘the 
dead give birth to the saints’ does not mean that we are dealing with a linear and 
homogeneous trajectory from humanity to divinity, mediated by the ‘liminality’ (see 
Turner 1969, Van Gennep 1960) and ambiguity of the dead. If this was the case we 
could expect a, phenomenological at least, similarity between highly ‘evolved’ 
muertos and the orichas which I was not able to trace, even if instinctively inclined 
to. Even if ikú lobi ocha, even if the orichas are said to be ‘senior dead’ (muertos 
mayores), even if in many Santería rituals the dead should be ‘fed’ by way of 
offerings before the orichas, everything pointed to the suggestion that the dead were 
distinct kind of entities and, thus, to isolate expressions and practices as ethnographic 
evidence of something more general can often be misleading. 
As I mentioned in the last chapter, highly ‘evolved’ muertos exhibit certain 
characteristics which seem to suggest a radical distance from the orichas. In few 
words, highly ‘evolved’ muertos become distant from the world of the living while 
the orichas actively participate in it. The former lose their divinatory and 
perspectival capacities while the latter do not. Highly ‘evolved’ muertos gradually 
lose their biographical specificity and along with that they lose their oracular 
perspective for which ‘affines’ are so much praised. As their biographical memory 
withers away, their messages also become more de-personalized, generic and not so 
much referring to a particular living person; in other words, their ‘affinity’ withers as 
well. This withering signifies or rather suggests to the living that the muerto has 
securely entered its camino de muerto, has realized the ‘fact’ of death and has 
‘transcended’. The muerto has passed through the necessary stage and condition of 
the ‘affine’, which involves an intensification of its biography as a way of 
remembering it and therefore distancing itself from it. ‘Alien’ muertos do not 
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remember their biography but are it, they re-enact it confusingly and are entrapped in 
it. 
When muertos are perceived to have ‘evolved’ to a great extent, they are also 
said to have ‘de-materialized’. Things that previously ‘materialized’ them, such as 
dolls, photographs, offerings, slowly become less personalized and more generic to a 
category of muertos, such as glasses of water, candles and flowers. The orichas on 
the other hand, exhibit an excess of ‘materials’ and ‘materializations’. They are ‘fed’ 
with blood, they ‘speak’ through objects, when they ‘come down’ they possess their 
‘children’, they reside in soup-tureens, in stones and sea-shells. At the same time, 
aspects of their biographies are ‘frozen’ in the form of myths and they, in turn, when 
manipulated through divination are said to explain everything. From the point of 
view of highly ‘evolved’ muertos this would pose an antinomy, making them 
retrocede to the initial steps of their ‘becoming’ muertos. For the orichas it does not, 
because they have ‘othered’ themselves to such a degree that their biographies do not 
put them at risk of confusing their present ontological status as divinities. They have 
distanced themselves enough so that when humans ask for their help and advice they 
offer their biographies unchanged in the form of myths and oracular signs. Residing 
in no particular body, their ‘view from afar’ is encompassing and, thus, in order to 
exchange it with the world of humans, they are able to transfer it to a multiplicity of 
‘things’ and ‘bodies’ that ‘belong’ to them.  As we shall see in the following 
chapters, it is humans who may change their perspectives and their own selves in 
order to ‘interpret’ them; it is not so much that myths illuminate reality but, the other 
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Up to now, I have tried to lay the ground towards a relatively untrodden path of 
ethnographic description of the various and most popular forms of Afro-Cuban 
religiosity; one which does not take for granted either the boundaries that might be 
observed to make them appear as distinct ‘traditions’, nor their reputed inherently 
‘syncretic’ character. With this in mind, I have also tried to resist as much as 
possible, a direct reference to distinct religious traditions from the outset. Although 
each of the last three chapters was concerned with the traditions of Palo Monte, 
Espiritismo and Ocha/Ifá respectively, I ventured to engage my argument and 
description of them as fields of knowledge and practice, which specialize in dealing 
and relating with different kinds of other-than-human entities. I will try to go a step 
further, moving beyond engaging with just the different kinds of entities to exploring 
how we can potentially bring them together in their interrelations. A neat 
classification of the three religious traditions into an organic whole is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, and furthermore I suspect that it might prove theoretically 
perilous to force the ethnography into a clearly structured whole. Yet, and to some 
extent, this is not only unavoidable but, if it provides useful comparative insights, 
also welcome. How, for example, can one account for an often repeated comment 
made by initiates that what we are dealing with as distinct religious traditions are 
essentially and ultimately the same thing, that they can all be grouped and, verbally 
at least, merged under the generic and singular term of la religión (‘the religion’) or 
el mas allá (‘the beyond’), while at the same time be treated as clearly distinct? 
In engaging with this question so far, my strategy has been directed towards 
an effort to come to terms with, mainly ethnographically, what might be, loosely and 
heuristically, called ‘other-than-human entities’although I find the term far from 
adequate, especially in a context where these entities seem to maintain, to various 
degrees and ways, their ‘humanity’. What seems particularly interesting is that other-
than-human entities participate in human affairs in a very intimate manner. This 
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element of participation is very much instantiated in events of divination, where a 
kind of communication between them and humans is achieved and brought into 
existence. Far more than this, divination, and its inherent communicative and 
perspectival features, is an essential part of bringing these entities into existence. In 
other words, forms of divination, in a sense, are the instantiations of entities, just as 
oracleswhether persons or objects, or bothare said to be the entities or, at the 
very least, the means through which they ‘speak’. 
As I mentioned in the Introduction, very few efforts have been made to treat 
the various Afro-Cuban religious traditions comparatively or on an equal basis. 
Perhaps, this has to do with the tendency to treat them as traditions in the first place 
and, secondly, as ones that are inherently ‘syncretic’, that is, open to ‘foreign’ 
influences by way of assimilating them into their general cosmological background. 
‘Syncretism’ in this case is a process, conscious or not, active or passive, of merging 
apparent differences into similarities, obliterating, in that way, the former or making 
the latter appear as epiphenomena of profound differences that have been forced 
historically to coexist. However, as my approach has implied so far, we might as well 
bring to the fore in more detail what these other-than-human entities are and explore 
in more depth their differences and similarities, rather than almost anxiously avoid 
them, mention them axiomatically or take them for granted. This would be, I believe, 
counter-intuitive to the Afro-Cuban ethnography itself, which seems to suggest that 
as long as these other-than-human entities participate actively in the lives of humans, 
they might not be a stable state of being, rigidly secured in the beyond, but a deeply 
transforming and transformative kind of agency, as much in the beyond as in the 
world of the living. 
In the discussion that follows, I engage with several approaches that are 
closer to my own and try to explore their potentials as well as limits so as to start 
bringing to the surface more explicitly the comparisons this thesis has set out to 
make. Commencing with Palmié’s promising venture to compare Palo and Ocha, I 
proceed with Holbraad’s ethnographic conception of ‘immanence and transcendence’ 
and propose its usefulness when it comes to comparing the various kinds of other-
than-human entities, and not just the orichas, with which Holbraad deals. I, thus, 
extend his ‘model’ of immanence and transcendence to entities like the 
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muertossomething that Espirito Santo touches upon when dealing with them 
through Espiritismoand venture to build a more encompassing ‘model’. I do not 
intend to argue that this dissolves the differences among the various kinds of entities 
but, on the contrary, that it is part of creating them. I, thus, venture to follow the 
threads I alluded to in chapter 1, where I mentioned, first, Turner and, then, Horton 
in order to bring forth the notion of ‘path’ (camino), as including specific points in 
one’s life, as well as involving a more general and encompassing direction or 
potential that ‘reveals’ its whole flow. 
As I hope I have managed to demonstrate ethnographically in the previous 
chapters, entities like the muertos tend to participate in and reveal the former 
(specific points of one’s camino), while entities like the orichas, the latter (the whole 
camino). I propose that engaging with the category of ‘immanence and 
transcendence’, they may afford us with a clearer understanding of this phenomenon 
and account for the complex ways the various other-than-human entities interrelate 
and may all participate in and forge one’s camino. The word camino (from the verb 
caminar, meaning ‘walk’), as I will try to show and utilizing Holbraad’s ideas, 
involves a notion of ‘motion’. Divination, by relating humans and these entities, puts 
into motion both sides; thus, immanence and transcendence may be the very 
instantiation of these ‘motions’ as well as the ‘space’ in which the various caminos 
intersect, ‘cross’ each other, and are brought into relation to show how one is 
constitutive of the other. If this is the case, and if divination brings to the surface 
these various kinds of perspectives of humans and non-humans, then it also might be 
useful to explore the possibility of Cuban divination being a particular kind 
‘perspectivism’the subject matter of the sixth and last chapter. 
Wizards and... their discourses 
One of the few attempts to compare different traditions as part of a single 
ethnographic whole has been made by Stephan Palmié, especially in the second 
chapter of his book Wizards and Scientists, titled ‘Genealogies of Morality: the Afro-
Cuban nganga as wage laborer, slave and maroon’ (2002:159-200). Although his 
main ethnographic concern appears to be Palo Monte, and especially its all-important 
ritual object, the nganga with its nfumbi, he also argues that it cannot be treated 
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separately from Ocha and, although extremely briefly mentioned, Espiritismo. To 
begin with, Palmié initiates an interesting discussion which places the emphasis on 
the Afro-Cuban religious traditions as realms of an alternative kind of ‘discourse’ 
(2002:162) or, else, ‘language of practice’ (2002:191), that comments ‘on morality of 
human-divine interaction […] as linked to more generalized images of sociality 
arising out of specific historical experiences’ (2002:162). On the one hand, we are 
presented with Ocha and its deitiesthe orichasand, on the other, with Palo and 
the nganga which essentially contains the spirit of a dead personthe 
nfumbialbeit, in a very ‘material’ way as its human remains are placed in it. Thus, 
and as I have also tried to emphasize, an important distinction exists in the ‘nature’ 
of other-than-human entities pertaining in Ocha and Palo, in the sense that the 
former deals with deities and the latter with the dead. 
This distinction corresponds to the distinctions existing between the two on 
various other levels, such as rituals, initiations and consecrated objects, which, 
according to Palmié, consist of the means or ‘techniques of spatial and temporal 
segregation of matters palo and ocha’ (2002:163). All these diverse ‘techniques’ are 
ultimately linked to this broader distinction between orichas and muertos-as-nfumbi 
which are related, but in a fundamentally incompatible way (2002:163), as it will be 
shortly demonstrated. Herein lie the ‘less clearly articulated but nonetheless powerful 
notions about the moral implications of interacting with them’ (2002:163). 
Consequently, Ocha and Palo and their respective entities are, firstly, historically 
and unavoidably related and, secondly, the relation is oppositional and dichotomous. 
Why, according to Palmié, is this so? 
Muertos in general, from the Ocha point of view, are an ambiguous category 
of entities. Apart from those who are deceased members of the ritual family and who 
are somewhat appeased through chants and offerings, Ocha does not create any 
direct and intimate relations with the dead. Indeed, while there is an overwhelming 
wealth of practices relating to the orichas, through divinations, initiations and 
offerings, Ocha displays a relative poverty, indifference and even, as Palmié argues, 
fear towards the muertos. This is particularly so with those muertos that Palo 
engages with, that is, ‘alien’ muertos, who ‘are regarded, not only as morally 
ambivalent, but as potentially malignant’ (2002:165). In my chapter which deals 
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partially with Palo (chapter 2), I have tried to explain who these ‘alien’ muertos 
might typically be. Their ‘liminal’ biography creates a vulnerable ‘necrography’, so 
to speak, that might lead themor ‘lure’ them, as it is often saidinto the nganga of 
a palero and transform them into nfumbi. To become an nfumbi is seen as a ‘pact’ in 
which the palero’s desires prevail. The relation between the two is, thus, very often 
depicted as one of a kind of domination and, I agree with Palmié, as one in which 
‘human agency is the key’ (2002:167). All these factors contribute to the image of 
Palo as being essentially involved in ‘witchcraft’ (brujería) or magic. On the other 
hand, as I have tried to show too, people relate to the orichas in a much more 
reciprocal way (2002:166), and the image created is one of ‘enduring moral 
relationship[s]’ (2002:166), of a religion ‘proper’. Seen in this way, Ocha and Palo 
are related through a set of oppositions ‘echoing conventional social constructions of 
nature [Palo] and culture [Ocha]’ (2002:164). As Palmié puts it:  
If ocha tends to be represented as imposing a civilizing process on an unruly world whose 
powers are made to enter domestic ritual space (ilé ocha or casa de santo – i.e. house of the 
gods) as divine kings, palo prescribes an obverse directionality. It notionally leads ritual 
actors out of the human oikos and into physically as well as morally unsocialized terrain. 
Manipulating a nganga is, quite literally, an errand into the wilderness (2002:171). 
Initiation in Ocha results in people being ‘born’ as ‘children’ of the orichas, while 
the palero appropriates the muerto, just as a master his slave. Ultimately, according 
to Palmié, this reflects ‘New World histories of violence and dehumanization, 
histories centering around the consumption of commodified human beings by a 
plantation economy based on slavery’ (2002:174). The nfumbi, thus, becomes a sort 
of slave or wage labourer and is part of an (historical) experience where persons 
become objects (slaves or wage labourers) and objects become persons (nganga, 
human remains). If Ocha creates ‘a Maussian image of gift exchange’, for Palo, it is 
best to apply ‘Marxist notions of social relations mediated by the transaction of 
commodities’ (2002:173). Palmié builds up a chain of homologous oppositions along 
the axis of the tense relations between the two traditions: Ocha: Palo :: culture: 
nature :: religion: magic :: reciprocity and morality (Mauss): appropriation and 
objectification (Marx), and within Palo, palero: nfumbi :: master: slave/wage 
labourer. This last one proves to be very dynamic and one of tension, as therein lies a 
‘historically cogent twist’, namely, the ‘possibility of revolt’ (2002:176); the slave-
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nfumbi turning against the master-palero and reversing in a vengeful way the 
relationship:  
If treated improperly, ngangas may be rendered ineffective. But they may also turn against 
their owners, consuming their persons in a phantasmagoric transformation of the Hegelian 
image of the dialectics of dependence between master and slave […] a deadly struggle to 
wrest control over one’s human subjectivity by depriving others of it (2002:176-177). 
All these oppositions, Palmié says, basically, and on the level of ‘a division of cultic 
labor’ (2002:191), tend to work in Ocha’s favour (2002:193). In addition, the 
aforementioned oppositions are not absolute but relative (2002:194), and here Palmié 
inserts in his historical dialectics ‘the catalytic effect of spiritism’ (2002:192): 
Defining a generalized scheme of progressive evolution in the afterlife, Kardecian spiritism 
may have contributed to easing the intellectual integration of heterogeneous conceptions 
about the dead in the two major Afro-Cuban religious traditions. For it offered the concept of 
a moral continuum along which nfumbi, alien muertos, the ancestral and priestly dead of 
regla ocha, and even the oricha themselves became classifiable as specimens of more or less 
obscure or enlightened stages in the ontogeny of numinous entities. For many a practitioner, 
elements of spiritist doctrine nowadays function as a kind of euhemeristic glue that holds his 
or her individual belief system together (2002:192.). 
What Palmié is describing may indeed make sense to those who have been dealing 
with the Afro-Cuban religious traditions or similar ones in the New World, especially 
with a strong ‘African’ presence.20 It is indeed very common to perceive an idea of 
Ocha being treated as a religion proper and as standing in stark contrast to Palo, 
which is often treated as brujería, an image heavily imbued with moral claims, as 
Palmié shows. It is also very common to observe a profound difference between the 
two traditions as far as the entities they are engaging with are concerned. Indeed, and 
as Palmié claims, with the orichas, relations of reciprocity seem to prevail, whereas 
with the nfumbi, ones of appropriation structured around the prevalence of the 
palero’s desires (through ‘coercion’ and ‘commission’, Palmié 2002:199). Yet, as he 
also warns, this has been more than anything a matter of discourses. Just as Palo can 
be seen as a discourse on human objectification and alienation, profoundly marked 
by the historical experience of slavery, Ocha has adopted a vocabulary that both 
reflects and creates its moral ‘dominion’ over Palo, not because it is unfamiliar with 
the ‘dark’ issues of Palo (in fact, as Palmié argues, similar phenomena can be traced 
                                                 
20 See, for example, Bastide 2006; Brown 1986; Brown and Bick 1987; Brown 2001; Claudine and 




within Ocha, such as brujería, or the orichas being vengeful) but Ocha, in the game 
of social control and power, both among the ‘division of cultic labour’ and the priests 
(see also Brown 2003a) and between them and the broader Cuban society through its 
history (see also Ayorinde 2004), has managed to hide and even project them, at least 
on a discursive level, to Palo. 
I will hereby mention those points of Palmié that I find useful for my 
argument and those which I find problematic. I begin with the former. As mentioned 
before, Palmié initiates a dialogue between different Afro-Cuban traditions (Ocha 
and Palo), something which is still at an embryonic stage, at least in terms of one 
that goes beyond purely descriptive and, thus, taken for granted comparisons. 
Summarising briefly, his is a valuable attempt to overcome both ‘purist’ and 
‘syncretistic’ readings of these phenomena. Even more interestingly, in seeking 
relations between putatively distinct religious traditions he is not led to explicitly 
conclude that they are related because they are ultimately the same. On the contrary, 
he argues that their relation is one of ‘crass opposition’ (2002:165). This, I believe, 
affords us with a much richer view of relations in general, one that is not limited to a 
quest for identity but expands towards a quest for alterity as well, the latter, in the 
case of Ocha and Palo, being constitutive of their relation, according to Palmié. 
A second point I find useful is that, in the effort to come to terms with those 
differential relations between the two Afro-Cuban traditions, he places an initial 
emphasis on the kinds of other-than-human entities that each tradition deals with. He, 
thus, identifies a broad distinction that the present thesis also takes seriously, that 
between deitiesthe orichasand muertos and how people relate with each. This 
last point is, as I have been arguing too, a crucial one because it views these 
traditions in less essentialist terms and, rather, puts an emphasis on the interactions 
that are instantiated among humans and other kinds of entities. A third point that I 
agree with is somewhat more ethnographic. This has to do with what Palmié 
identifies as pertaining to the domain of the orichas and to that of the muertos. As far 
as the former are concerned, there seems to be a predominance of reciprocity, one 
which furthermore acknowledges a much larger degree of agency to the deities. As 
for the latter, quite the opposite can be observed, that is, a relation of objectification 
and appropriation (or a contractual one), as Palmié puts it, in which human agency is 
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more prevalent. Nevertheless, such a relation is not fixed but is characterized by 
tension. This is the possibility of revolt of the nfumbi against its master, the palero. I 
will explore these notions further on in this thesis; however, I now turn to what I find 
problematic with Palmié’s take, at least in shedding light on mine. 
To begin with, and as this should be clear by now, my comparative approach 
includes on equal terms, not only Ocha and Palo, but also Espiritismo. Palmié’s very 
brief mention of the latter leads him to hastily, in my opinion, treat it as a mere 
mediator between the oppositions of the other two. What initially could be construed 
as a qualitative difference of a kind is now turned into a difference of degrees. The 
differences between Ocha and Palo, orichas and nfumbi, seen as an opposition, 
acquire a representational, semantic and discursive character. Ultimately, Palmié is 
interested in the ‘representations of the relation’ (2002:162) between Ocha and Palo, 
‘a discourse on morality’ (2002:162), ‘theories about the nature of the relationship 
that humans can establish with different types of nonhuman agents’ and ‘images of 
sociality’ (2002:165). But, what about ‘the nature of the relationship’ itself, rather 
than the ‘theories’ about it? As far as Palmié deals with the relationship between 
Ocha and Palo, he concludes that this is one of opposition, and one that ultimately 
works in Ocha’s favour. It is, thus, an Ocha-centric point of view (cf. Brown 2003a). 
When Espiritismo comes into play, things get relativized because Espiritismo’s 
muertos create ‘a moral continuum’ (2002:192) among the two extremesOcha and 
Paloand work as ‘a kind of euhemeristic glue’ (2002:192) among them. A former 
relation of opposition between two points becomes a continuum by inserting a third 
point. It is interesting that this third point, serving as mediator, is a tradition that, due 
to its Western and Christian affiliations and deviations from them, looks a bit more 
familiar from the more ‘Afro-exotic’ Ocha and Palo. 
Since Palmié is interested in the moral relations built among the three 
traditions, Espiritismo seems to acquire the role of a ‘catalyst’ or mediator between 
two previously opposed sets of practices and beliefs and the discourses generated 
from and about them. Espiritismo seems to offer a particular perspective on ‘the 
beyond’, namely, that disembodied spirits proceed from an attachment to matter to a 
progressive and linear de-materializationsomething that, I argue, a more ‘Afro-
Cuban’ or, even, ‘African’ disposition seems to be unfamiliar with or indifferent 
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tothat culminates with the extremely highly evolved spirits, saints, angels and, 
even, the unattainable status of (the Christian) God. If this premise is transposed 
axiomatically to account for the totality of ‘the beyond’ in the Afro-Cuban cosmos, 
and if indeed it is treated as a premise, then one, as Palmié seems to be arguing, 
would be faced with the task of allocating the different kinds of other-than-human 
entities within this evolutionist moral continuum. Thus, the nfumbi of Palo would 
find themselves at one extreme of excessive materiality, the various muertos in 
between and the orichas, being associated with Catholic saints, towards the other 
end; that of absolute dematerialization. 
Such a linear ‘spiritist’ reading poses more problems than it solves both 
ethnographically and, hence, theoretically. Firstly, it conflates morality with the 
ontological status of each entity. In other words, the more material an other-than-
human entity is, the more ‘immoral’. The case of the orichas may stand as a clear 
ethnographic counter-example that this is not necessarily so. The orichas manifest 
themselves and communicate with humans in a variety of ‘things’ from the organic 
and inorganic world, unlike many highly evolved muertos. Furthermore, their 
behaviour is definitely neither perceived as inherently benevolent nor as uniform and 
stable towards humans and the world in general. Secondly, the ‘spiritist’ reading 
would imply that the orichas are (‘just’) highly evolved muertos, that is, ex-humans 
who dematerialized enough so as to reach the status of divinity. Although some 
orichas are thought of as historical figures, this could by no means exhaust their 
ontological status and biography. What each kind of entity seems to be is equated 
with what each tradition is, and further to this, with the moral dispositions and 
worldviews of the persons who are identified with or produce a discourse about 
them. For all these reasons, I would argue that such a model tends to simplify the 
complex ethnographic reality and thus proves to be an impoverished model. 
Thus, the whole edifice of Palmié although it starts with a promising 
emphasis on dealing with other-than-human entities finally goes past them and falls 
into an already too familiar analysis on religious discourses and politics. It turns a 
potentially ontological argument of relations and differences into an epistemological 
one of degrees, what Viveiros de Castro calls a ‘recent widespread sentiment against 
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difference which sees it as inimical to immanence, as if difference were a stigma of 
transcendence and alterity a harbinger of oppression’: 
All difference is read as opposition and all opposition as the absence of a relation: “to 
oppose” is taken as synonymous with “to exclude” – a strange idea which I can only attribute 
to the guilty supposition that others conceive otherness as we do. Well, they don’t: others are 
“others” precisely because they have other “others”’ (Bird-David 1999:80). 
Taking from Viveiros de Castro, this is probably a widespread but particular 
intellectual approach in which oppositions are initially posited in order to be 
subsequently demolished by showing that ‘actually’ these are only ideals (in the 
mind or in discourse) which ‘in reality’ are mediated by the ‘facts of life’ and 
relativize them; this kind of intellectual approach concludes that differences are 
ultimately of the same kindnature/ontologybut of a different 
degreeculture/epistemology (more on this in the next chapter). On a more 
ethnographic level, this creates quite a lot of obstacles: firstly, the initial and useful 
distinction between deities and muertos remains somewhat shallow. If one were to 
explore their relations, Espiritismo and other-than-nfumbi muertos should be taken 
into account seriously and, up to an extent, on their own terms and not just as playing 
the role of the ‘mediator’. Secondly, my interest is not so much in discourses and 
notions of morality, but more ontological, that is, to explore in more depth what is 
(the indigenous definition of) the nature of these other-than-human entities and their 
relations with humans. This, I believe, could account in a very insightful way for the 
relations among different traditions with their respective entities, which the Afro-
Cuban ethnography strongly suggests is not necessarily one of initial oppositions and 
subsequent mediations. In other words, it does not fully account for the very common 
phenomenon of people seeking help and advice, even to the point of initiation, of 
more than one of these traditions. So, rather than adopting an approach based on 
dialectical oppositions, I propose a more dialogical one (cf. Bakhtin 2008). 
Indeed, even if Palmié does not explicitly argue so, this kind of dialectic 
approach concludes that differences are either resolved by way of domination (Ocha 
over Palo) or by way of mediation and their subsequent dissolution into a continuum 
(through Espiritismo). A dialogical take, on the other hand, is not motivated by 
resolving the differences neither does it conclude by dissolving them. Rather, and as 
Bakhtin (2008; see also Course 2010) argued for the novelty of the novel, it 
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preserves alterity by constructing a ‘system’ that remains openwith its 
‘contradictions’, neither resolved nor dissolvedbecause of its inherent capacity to 
accommodate the multiplicity of voices and languages (‘polyphony’ and 
‘heteroglossia’ respectively, in Bakhtin’s terms) that converse in equally multiple 
and transforming ways. Thus, Ocha/Ifá, Palo and Espiritismo should not be seen as 
‘traditions’ which enter into relations of alliance or conflict but as ‘voices’ or, rather, 
‘chronotopes’ (that is, spatiotemporal planes), to borrow another of Bakhtin’s terms 
(see Bakhtin 2008:84-258), when-and-where-in the ‘polyphonic’ voices and 
perspectives of other-than-human entities are most frequently uttered, listened to and 
talked back to in the divinatory contexts. 
Immanence and Transcendence 
What Palmié initiates ethnographically, Holbraad achieves theoretically. Although 
Holbraad does not explicitly adopt a comparative approach to the various traditions 
and their respective other-than-human entities, the analytical frame he constructs, I 
believe, might prove very useful when dealing with them both ethnographically and 
theoretically. On the one hand, Palmié builds up an ethno-historical common base of 
comparison, linking ‘notions’ of human-divine interaction and ‘discourses’ on 
morality; whereas, Holbraad delves more deeply into the human-divine interactions, 
detached from the otherwise ethnographically relevant discourses on morality and 
notions about such interactions and their socio-historical dimensions and 
implications. His is a more ethnographically dense account on the nature of these 
interactions, a venture on ‘ontology’, rather than more representational takes, as 
Palmié’s attempt seems to be. Therefore, in this chapter I will try to answer Palmié’s 
initial ethnographic questions, which are partly concerned with comparisons, 
utilizing Holbraad’s analytical framework, which, although not explicitly doing so 
himself, he yet potentially suggests. As I said previously, whilst I keep Palmié’s 
comparative intentions, I depart from his approach by bringing Espiritismo’s muertos 
on an equal level with Ocha/Ifá and Palo, and distance myself from notions and 
discourses on morality. I thereby adopt Holbraad’s ‘ontological’ approach by trying 
to extend it to all traditions. 
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 To pre-empt my argument slightly, and, in a few words, the basis of this 
comparison which is explicitly laid out by Holbraad in his contribution to Thinking 
Through Things (2007b), is the category of ‘immanence and transcendence’. Such a 
category might initially seem too broad or vague, making it resistant to 
ethnographically derived definition(s) and apt only for philosophical and theological 
discussions.21 Yet, its broadness, if accompanied with ethnography, might also prove 
analytically useful to my own comparative preoccupations. Hopefully, in turn, the 
ethnographic challenge might prove equally rewarding for any possible re-
conceptualization of immanence and transcendence, as I think it does in Holbraad’s 
venture, even though he is dealing exclusively with the orichas and Ocha/Ifá 
divination. If for him, immanence and transcendence acquire a very specific flavour 
through Ocha/Ifá divination, it might be the case that in seeking a comparative 
approach with the rest of the oracular traditions, other kinds of immanence(s) and 
transcendence(s) emerge, or that the other traditions can also be located within the 
immanence and transcendence axis he describes. 
 The category of immanence and transcendence is a heuristic one, a point of 
departure, which as will be shown, is what might seem as a theoretical lens through 
which the Afro-Cuban ethnography could be examined. More precisely, immanence 
and transcendence will be examined through the notion of camino in its two 
interconnected dimensions: first, the life-course or camino of humans and, second, 
the perspectives of the entities related to it and the simultaneous instantiation of the 
entities’ caminos through divination. Briefly put, muertos are ‘immanent’ and have 
an immanent perspective (that can slowly move towards transcendence in the case of 
the ‘affines’), while deities like the orichas are ‘transcendent’ and have a 
transcendental perspective (which has to be rendered ‘immanent’ up to an extent). In 
other words, for muertos immanence is the point of departure and transcendence the 
point of arrival, while for the orichas the opposite seems to hold. 
Here, I am interested in looking at immanence and transcendence not as two 
diametrically opposed and unbridgeable dimensions, nor as being inherently 
‘paradoxical’ (see below) in their relation. Instead, the ‘paradox’, in the Cuban 
context, arises when indeed they are taken as two opposed points and not as a 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Corten and Doran 2007; Deleuze 2001; Heidegger 2004; Jacyna 1983; Levinas 
2007; Lipner 1978; Kim 1987; but, also see Ikenga-Metuh 1985. 
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‘distance’ which has to be traversed and directed. In order to engage with such an 
understanding, I mention efforts made by anthropologists such as Fenella Cannell, 
Mathew Engelke and Webb Keane who also deal with the ‘paradox’ of 
transcendence, engaging with a kind of ‘Anthropology of Christianity’ as an 
‘impossible religion’, and by ultimately arguing that transcendence itself is 
impossible. My argument following them, wishes to contribute to this proposition 
and possibly go beyond it, as I will try to show that immanence as well is impossible. 
Thus, before presenting Holbraad’s thoughts on immanence and transcendence, I will 
mention how transcendence is seen as a particular ‘problem’ pertaining to 
specifically Christian ‘anxieties’. 
Fenella Cannell, in her introduction to the edited volume The Anthropology of 
Christianity (2007), argues that there has been a relatively small amount of 
anthropological research on Christianity. This shortage is reflective of a tendency to 
treat Christianity as something homogeneous and as linked to another category 
understood homogeneously, that of modernity, especially in the colonial context, 
where both of them have been said to be imposed on local and different cultures 
(Cannell 2007:12). Christianity, treated as a homogeneous thing, is also frequently 
said to be characterized by an all-important premise, that of transcendence (2007:13), 
constructing in that way a ‘paradigm of Christianity as the “impossible religion”’ 
(2007:8); that is, a religion that postulates an absolute distance and separation of 
divinity from humanity that cannot or should not be ‘materially’ mediated. Cannell 
traces back the construction of such a ‘paradigm’. She mentions, for example, Hegel 
and how he made a contrast between classical, Hellenistic and Roman, religion and 
the Judeo-Christian one: 
The many aspects of this contrast turned on the difference between a form of religion in 
which the divine was present in the world [classical religion] and one in which the divine was 
essentially thought of as belonging to a world of transcending, superior to, and radically 
incommensurable with the world of time and space [Judeo-Christian religion] (2007:14). 
Thus, the central focus for thinking about Christianity becomes the separation of the 
divine from the human ‘world of time and space’ which, for Cannell, constitutes the 
transcendental quality of the Christian God. She cites Durkheim from his book The 
Division of Labour in Society as the continuation of Hegel’s line of thought through 
the social sciences 
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[I]t is only with Christianity that God finally goes beyond space; his kingdom is no longer of 
this world. The dissociation of nature and the divine becomes so complete that it even 
degenerates into hostility. As the same time, the nature of divinity becomes more general and 
abstract, for it is formed not from sensation as it was in the beginning, but from ideas 
(Cannell 2007:16). 
An important by-product of the construction of such a transcendental God is the 
question of how this extreme separation can be mediated (2007:15, 18) and, having 
posited transcendence as God’s nature, mediationseen as a counter-point to this 
very transcendence but also sometimes as a ‘necessary evil’creates a series of 
ambiguities and tensions, not only when Christianity is compared to other traditions 
but also within its own ‘borders’ (2007:39-45). These tensions and ambiguities of the 
‘impossible’ are what create an ‘anxious’ kind of transcendence, according to Keane 
in his epilogue to The Anthropology of Christianity. As with modernity, Keane 
argues that Christianity is preoccupied with defining the relation of the subject and 
the object as an opposition (2007:309), which is ultimately an impossibility; 
therefore the ‘anxiety’: 
In this alignment, Christianity and modernity both seek to abstract the subject from its 
material entanglements in the name of freedom and authenticity. It is in this, I think, that we 
can see one suppressed link between modernist rationality and theology (however much the 
explicit claims of the latter have fallen away): the value of freedom and abstraction lies, at 
least in part, in their offer of transcendence. Gifts symbolic of intentions, words true to the 
heart, and, perhaps above all, money are transcendence’s quotidian forms. 
But, at the same time, I have argued that even in its most abstract and transcendent, the 
human subject cannot free itself from objectification. It retains a body, it continues to work 
on, transact, and possess objects. And it cannot even be sincere without the publicly known 
material forms of speech […] As I have argued elsewhere, agents continually constitute 
themselves through semiotic practices that contain an irreducibly material dimension. Which 
also means that they cannot free themselves from the practices by which they are embedded 
in the world of other people. It is this irresolvable tension between abstraction and the 
inescapability of material and social mediations that I call the modern subject’s anxious 
transcendence. And Christianity is an especially rich ethnographic domain for exploring the 
genealogies and futures of this troubled subject (2007:321-322).  
The discussion I am trying to initiate and develop in this chapter in a more explicit 
way than the previous ones, finds also its resonances in this relatively recent effort to 
come anthropologically to terms with the dynamic relation that has been said to exist 
between the kinds and degrees of ‘absence’ and ‘presence’ in religious contexts, 
which are located partly in other-than-human entities. This relation is often depicted 
as one of tension, a problem (see Engelke 2007), especially in contexts where 
Christianity, often along with modernity, comes historicallyalmost always through 
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the colonial encounterto coexist with ‘traditional’, non-Western, religious 
perspectives (see Bille 2010; Cannell 2007; Comaroff 1985; Engelke 2004, 2007; 
Keane 2007; Scott 2007). For instance, Keane, in his book Christian Moderns: 
Freedom and Fetish in the Mission Encounter (2007), gives an account of such an 
encounter between Christiansinitially the Dutch colonizers and consequently the 
local convertson the Indonesian island of Sumba, an ex-Dutch colony, and the 
unconverted ‘ancestral ritualists’. Initially, the encounter is set up as a ‘sharp 
contrast’ (2007:4), namely, between the Dutch Calvinists and the ‘fetishist’ 
Sumbanese, especially given the colonial context. Nevertheless, the picture becomes 
far more complex when one takes into account the internal divisions of Christianity, 
which can be traced even in a pre-colonial context, as well as a much more fluid 
interaction between the two extremes in a postcolonial one, where, according to 
Keane’s account, it has given rise to various kinds of ‘conversions’ and ‘hybrids’. 
This is exactly what he articulates through the specific ethnographic 
Sumbanese context. More precisely, Keane illuminates the diversity within 
Christianity in a loose serial model. A first distinction arises between Catholicism 
and Protestantism, where the first is taken to be, through the lenses of the latter, less 
transcendental and more material. The basic ‘indicators’ of transcendence are taken 
to be words, language in general, and objects: ‘Good Protestants pray with their eyes 
shut. Catholics, by contrast, do so with open eyes. Why? So they can read the words 
of their prayer books instead of speaking from within’ (2007:2). This contrast can be 
witnessed to its extreme by Engelke’s account on the Masowe Apostolics in South 
Africa, described as ‘the Christians who don’t read the Bible’ (2004, 2007), to the 
point of making one of their contemporary prophets exclaim that the pages of the 
Bible could even serve as toilet paper! Both Keane and Engelke come to terms with 
how particular Christian groups articulate a ‘correct’ kind and degree of presence of 
the divine that is ultimately transcendent. This heavily relies on what these groups 
ascribe agency to. The divine can be made present through various ‘things’, such as 
words, texts, bodies, objects, rituals, institutions, architecture, food, and so on. By 
ascribing agency to these ‘things’ people recognize not only a particular agency for 
the divine but also for themselves. A more transcendentalist view of the divine 
dematerializes it by negating the agency of objects, even if, in Engelke’s case, these 
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are intimately and traditionally linked to it, as the Bible is. This process limits the 
agency of the divine to less ‘material’but still materialmanifestations such as 
words and ritual speech in particular, and at the same time attributes more agency to 
humans. 
Keane draws from Latour (1993) and from what the latter calls ‘purification’, 
which although held as an ideal is always bound to actually create new hybrids as 
pure transcendence, dematerialization, and pure interiority cannot be achieved; it has 
to be objectified, shared and performed in one way or another. The divine is, thus, 
transcendental only in reference and when compared to other notions of it. In 
Keane’s account, the Calvinists construct their own God and oppose it to other 
Protestant groups, other Christians, such as the Catholics, and the fetishist ancestral 
ritualists who standnot in absolute but in comparative and discursive termsat the 
other end, as their notion of the divine has granted agency to a plurality of ‘things’. 
The main analytical tool is power relationships and what Keane and Engelke call 
‘semiotic ideology’, a discourse that mainly through language itself creates the 
‘right’ kind of agency and transcendence. Although they take into account 
cosmological and ontological aspects of these groups, I cannot help but see a 
predominance of the ‘divine’ and its tension between transcendence and immanence 
as ultimately a constructivist approach; one that is constructed in an ideological 
struggle that moralizes the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, and uses performative skills so that 
everybody can witness the ‘truth’ that has been previously constructed. Palmié’s 
approach seems to be closer to those mentioned above. In continuation, I present how 
immanence and transcendence acquire quite a different flavour in Afro-Cuban 
divination, commencing with Holbraad’s views on them. 
Immanence and Transcendence of deities: the orichas of Ocha/Ifá 
Holbraad’s main concern in his contribution to Thinking Through Things, is a re-
examination and, ultimately, a re-evaluation of the Polynesian term mana and its 
various ethnographic ‘cousins’ across the world. Without touching upon the first part 
of his paper, where he reviews the various approaches on ‘mana-terms’ and 
consequently delineates his, I will go straight to his ethnographic presentation of 
mana’s ‘Afro-Cuban cousin’ (Holbraad 2007b:201), that of aché. Aché, like mana, is 
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a ‘thing’ that appears to be multiple and excessive, transgressing boundaries that 
could be thought of as rigid. It is, for instance, thought of as a kind of ‘power’ that 
deities, people and objects might have, transfer and receive. It is aché that confers the 
‘faculty’ (facultad) or ‘power’ (poder) to divine, having been previously ‘received’ 
(recibido) by the diviner by way of his initiation and the ‘receiving’ of the necessary 
ritual paraphernalia which have been ‘charged’ (cargados) with aché in their process 
of consecration. It is in the latter that aché acquires its more concrete senses, as it is, 
for example, with the divinatory powderalso called achébabalawos use in order 
to divine. Aché is, thus, ‘power and powder, abstract and concrete, concept and 
thing’ (2007b:204) at the same time, and, more importantly, not standing in 
opposition, but the one ‘internally’ linked to the other, so ‘[n]o powder no power’ 
and ‘no power no powder’ (2007b:204); ‘each is defined in terms of the other’ 
(2007b:205). 
He then goes on to ask ‘[w]hy do Cuban diviners consider these two concepts 
[power and powder] mutually constitutive while we, presumably, not’ (2007b:205). 
Here, he introduces the concept of ‘transference’ and claims that the connection is 
neither just logical or analytical nor just practical, but one that does not oppose the 
two. Aché, under such light, is ‘an indiscrete thing and a concept that literally 
transfers itself’ (2007b:206), and this is instantiated in terms of its efficacy. ‘So what 
makes powder power in Ifá?’ (2007b:207), he goes on to ask. It is here that his 
analysis, through the ethnography of aché, starts baring its efficacy in relation to my 
comparative approach, as he explicitly inserts the category of ‘immanence and 
transcendence’. Orula, the patron deity of Ifá divination, can only ‘speak’ through 
the consecrated objects that make up his oracle. By employing them, Orula ‘speaks’ 
by materially presenting an oddu-configuration or, else, an oracular sign. Thus, from 
a non-conversing state he is rendered conversing, through the mediation of the 
oracle’s power, ritually transferred in the powder: 
Divinatory power, then, most crucially involves the capacity to engender what we might call 
‘ontological leaps’ on the part of the deity, from transcendence to immanence or, more 
simply, from radical absence (the ‘beyond’) to presence (2007b:207). 
This is how orichas and humans enter into relations. Holbraad argues that, both 
ethnographically and theoretically, we are faced with ‘the problem of transcendence’ 
162 
 
(2007b:207). Without the mediating role of the babalawoswho possess just the 
right kind of power (and powder) Orula, and in general the orichas, would ‘remain 
in a state of transcendence, permanently separated from humans in the ‘beyond’’ 
(2007b:207). 
At this point, I would like to contend that this separation between the 
‘beyond’ and humans is not so much referring to a kind of transcendence that 
signifies an absence of relations. A main ontological premise of Ocha/Ifá is that 
every person is born with their camino inscribed in their head. After birth, the person 
tends to forget this kind of primordial inscription of his or her camino. This is why he 
or she might deviate from it. For example, when a friend of mine, Leonardo, 
consulted the Ifá oracle within the context of his mano de Orula initiation, the oracle 
‘said’ that his camino was one strongly linked to the world of arts. His inherent 
artistic abilities had been suppressed by the fact that he was ‘forced’ initially to study 
engineering and subsequently work in various industries. In essence, Leonardo had 
deviated from his camino, the latter not pointing to what one’s life-course actually is 
but what kind of potentials are the most prominent and in alignment to the 
constitution of Leonardo’s person. It is worth noting that these potentials are not only 
referring to positive ones that might be fulfilled or not; they can also be negative 
ones. In Leonardo’s initiation, the oracle also ‘said’ that he had the propensity to 
drink and that there was a danger lurking in him of becoming an alcoholic and 
destroying his life. Leonardo contended, in what seemed to me an ironic tone 
towards the oracle’s pronouncement, that ‘as a good Cuban [como un buen 
Cubano]’, he of course enjoyed a drink every now and then, but that he was not at all 
an excessive drinker. To this, the babalawo replied, in a calm but also assertive way, 
that Leonardo’s drinking propensity was not something that could be judged by his 
actual habits, but that it was a ‘tendency’ (tendencia) of his signo (of the 
consultation), therefore, a potential danger always present and able to be ‘activated’ 
(activado) in the future. The problem, the babalawo went on, was not that Leonardo 
actually drank, but, what for others (who did not have it in their camino) was not a 
threat, for him was a much more probable thing to occur. Leonardo’s signo included 
a mythical event where one of the characters suffered from the destructive results of 
his vices, although not necessarily alcohol. 
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The babalawo illuminated his reference to alcohol by revealing that in that 
particular signo the oricha Changó was involved and, thus, ‘spoke’. This particular 
oricha, in the Cuban context, has acquired the fame of being a womanizer, a dancer 
and a drinker. As drinking is a propensity of many ‘good Cubans’, the babalawo 
almost intuitively specified alcohol as the vice par excellence, yet the fact remained 
that whatever the precise vice, tragedy out of vicehaving been the outcome of the 
mythological eventwas imminent and a definitive tendency of Leonardo’s camino. 
 This also points to the suggestion that peoples’ ‘mimetic’ (cf. Kramer 1993; 
Taussig 1993) obligations towards their signos and effort to ‘live with’ (vivir con) 
them, is not limited to acting them out faithfully, but also, in the case that they 
‘speak’ of negative (mythological) events, to avoid them. Thus, divination brings to 
light, in the form of utterances, those mythological events that are in some way 
related to the person. It generates knowledge of, rather than creating and constructing 
them out of nowhere and nothing, the significant relations of humans. This 
knowledge is in itself significant because in cases of deviation, people can (and 
should) start realigning themselves to their ‘true’ and not necessarily actual camino. 
The move from transcendence to immanence, thus, is best understood, not as a 
creation of relations, but as a transformation of them directed by the chosen camino 
that comes out in divination. 
Returning to Holbraad’s arguments, divination goes hand in handactually it 
instantiatesthe potential that humans and deities have to relate to each other and, 
therefore, makes Ifá and Ocha worship possible. The kind of transcendence Holbraad 
has in mind begins to seriously deviate from a somewhat more conventional one, 
where transcendence denotes a bounded entityresembling the Western category of 
the person as an ‘individual’ who is also materially bounded (c.f. Carrtihers et.al. 
1985; Morris 1991), this may or not relate to other individuals, themselves seen as 
discrete and bounded entities as well (see Holbraad 2007b:207-208). Divination, 
through the powerful powder the diviner has the power to use, is vital in 
transforming the deities’ transcendence into embodied relations. Thus, ‘powder is the 
catalyst of divinatory power, i.e. the capacity to make Orula ‘come out’ and ‘speak’ 
through his oddu’ (2007b:208). And as the babalawo marks with his fingers the oddu 
that has ‘come out’ on the powder of the divining board, ‘[t]he extensive movement 
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of the oddu as it appears on the board, then, presupposes the intensive mobility of 
powder as the medium upon which it is registered’ (2007b:208). As each oddu is 
conceived as a deity on its own or, alternatively, a ‘path’ (camino) of Orula himself, 
the very act of its marking on the powder constitutes it, brings it into existence by 
relating or, else, making it immanent. For Holbraad this has a very important 
implication: ‘that these deities are to be thought of neither as individual entities nor 
as relations, but rather as motions’ (2007b:209). This sheds a totally new light on 
what initially looked like transcendence: 
If the oddu of Orula, as well as the orishas more generally, just are motions (or ‘paths’), then 
the apparent antinomy of giving logical priority to transcendence over relation or vice-versa 
is resolved. In a logical universe where motion is primitive, what looks like transcendence 
becomes distance and what looks like relation becomes proximity. Motions through and 
through, the deities are never divorced from humans, stuck in the ‘beyond’ of transcendence 
– to say so would be to place limits on the logical priority of motion. Conversely, humans’ 
relations with motile deities cannot be taken for granted, as the Melanesianist image would 
have it, for there is no guarantee that the deities’ movement will be elicited in the right 
direction, as it were. The relation, then, is potential, and it is just this potential – the potential 
of directed movement – that aché-powder guarantees, as a solution to the genuine problem of 
the distance deities must traverse in order to be rendered present in divination (2007b:209). 
According to this view, deities and their signsthe odduare ‘potential relations’ 
(2007b:211) which become actualized by divination in which, from transcendent, 
they become immanent. This kind of movement transforms the entities and their 
oddu: 
Oddu do not simply ‘travel’ from the beyond of mythical transcendence to the here of the 
divining board, for their ‘motion’ is not one of a self-identical entity. As we have seen, the 
capacity of oddu to reveal themselves in divination implies a transformation […] oddu can 
relate to ‘others’ just because they can ‘other’ themselves, inasmuch as their ‘motion’ from 
transcendence to immanence is premised on their capacity virtually to ‘self-differentiate’ 
(2007b:211). 
Up to now, Holbraad has reconceptualized the notion of transcendence and 
immanence as best thought of as distance and proximity respectively. Secondly, the 
potentiality that the two might be related renders it possible for them to be seen as 
‘motions’, where divination plays the crucial role, from being potentials to being 
actualized. The kind of immanence and transcendence Holbraad construes becomes 
even more peculiar as he warns us that, although they are best seen as proximity and 
distance, this should not be understood in merely spatial terms, but in ‘ontological’ 
ones (see 2007b:211). Exactly because the deities and their oddu transform 
themselves in their motion from transcendence to immanence, the latter become 
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ontological distance and proximity. As I understand it, this means that the kind of 
transcendence-as-distance we are dealing with, is one that signifies a latent yet 
potential relation, whilst its transformation into immanent-as-proximate signifies, or 
makes it a rather actualized relationand an essential part of its actualization being 
the revelation of it as an oracular pronouncement. And, as he has shown elsewhere 
(see Holbraad 2008c), this kind of pronouncement divination actualizes and 
simultaneously transforms persons, and even the relations among them, 
‘ontologically’. Holbraad concludes that aché, under these considerations, should not 
be conceived ‘as diversified essence but as the premise of diversification itself’ 
(2007b:213) and that Ifá, as well as Ocha, creates a verticalhierarchical 
‘cosmology’ where deities ‘can be characterized by their degree of ‘distance’ from 
the human world’ (2007b:215): 
[T]heir ontic transformations also imply shifts in what one might call ontological status, 
since their multiple becoming is inflected hierarchically as a ‘continuum’ of relatively 
proximate and relatively distant ‘manifestations’ (2007b:216). 
Holbraad’s notion of immanence and transcendence sounds quite unfamiliar with one 
that would tend to homologize and relate the pair with others that, writers such as 
Cannell, Keane and Engelke, have identified. In very broad terms, for the latter, 
transcendence tends to get homologized with spirit or immateriality, abstraction and 
absence, even of human relation. In contrast, immanence gravitates towards the 
opposite, that is, matter, concreteness and presence. When transcendence is intense, 
at least as an ideal, a ‘problem’ arises, in finding ways of relating to it. The solution 
seems to lie in the effort to neutralize the intensity or extremeness of transcendence 
by going against it, as it were. In other words, a highly transcendental god, who is 
normally absent, distant and aloof, finds its way through a path that makes it more 
material and present so that it can be related to and not remain an ‘impossible’ one. 
Thus, the ‘anxiety’, to repeat Keane’s term, revolves around what kind of 
immanence should be achieved so that the general transcendence of the divine does 
not become too threatened or offended. Furthermore, there seems to be a 
constructivist approach when it comes to this sort of ‘anxiety’. To relate, by way of 
achieving immanence as presence and materialization, it seems to also imply an 
effort made and achieved essentially by humans. Whether (a) god’s immanence is 
166 
 
attributed to a specific object, act or utterance, it looks as if it is human agency that 
ultimately transfers or ascribes agency to the otherwise transcendent entity (see, for 
example, Gell 1998); an approach that, I believe, a large part of the academic 
discussion around ‘materiality’ and ‘material culture’ has often adopted (see, for 
example, Miller 1987, 2005). The transcendence of divinity cannot be dealt with as a 
distant or absent state of being that has to be rendered proximate or present in order 
for humans to forge a relation with it. This may lead to the constructivist view that 
divinity only appears from nothing and nowhere and is only made ‘something’ out of 
human desire and, even, fancy (see Latour 2010). 
One thing that entities like the orichas suggest is that (their) transcendence 
does not necessarily signify absence, nor a potentiality to relate to humans as 
Holbraad describes, but of relating in the first place. If divination forms an integral 
part of their ‘motion’ from transcendence to immanence, this is not to be confused 
with a transformation from an absent and non-relational state to a present and 
relational one. Perhaps this is what Leonardo was suggesting when, after the 
aforementioned initiation, he told me that his signo of the mano de Orula divination 
‘spoke’ of a suppressed artistic ability which should be given voice in some form and 
also that, although he was not a heavy drinker, he could end up being one and ruining 
his life. As he understood it, the first aspect of his camino should be actively pursued 
whilst the second avoided. Echoing the babalawo, Leonardo highlighted that both 
tendencies of his signo always existed and will exist through his life; they were 
integral to his very camino. The fact that particular orichas like Changó ‘spoke’ 
through the signo and showed ‘affinity’ to Leonardo was an indication that theythe 
orichaswould take a more active part in fulfilling his camino, by making the first 
tendencyartistic abilityhappen, and ensuring the secondalcoholismbe 
avoided. But this ultimately depended on him, on how he would act from now on, 
not only to try and fulfill his camino on his own, but also in ‘attending to’ 
(atendiendo) his orichas (through offerings). 
Apart from people, like Leonardo, employing their own powers, skills and 
intellect in order to fulfil or avoid the tendencies of their camino, offerings and 
initiations are also meant to contribute towards this direction. In a broad sense, the 
need to get fully initiated – something also indicated by divination – points to the fact 
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that the person in question has quite seriously deviated from his or her camino, 
something that the initiation itself will try to amend. Similarly, it could be argued 
that smaller kinds of initiationoften called ‘protections’are just smaller 
deviations from one’s camino, and perhaps of a lesser degree or less permanent 
nature. On the contrary, in the case that no initiations are required, it is more than 
often perceived, not as a negative thing or an absence of relation with the ‘beyond’, 
but as the proof that one is truly fulfilling his or her camino and keeping the orichas 
satisfied. The mano de Orula initiation in general, which Leonardo underwent, is 
maybe one of the few exceptions as, up to my knowledge, there is no explicit 
necessity of a previous divination to have indicated the need to undergo it. But, I 
think, it being an exception is telling of the very point just made. The mano de Orula 
initiation, apart from being considered as a sort of ‘half’ initiation in Ifáwhereby 
the initiate obtains one ‘hand’ of Orula, whereas in full initiation one obtains the 
other as wellis also, and for many most importantly, the ceremony where one’s 
camino as a whole is first revealed (through a divination called itá), including 
whether one should undergo further initiations in Ocha/Ifá and, if yes, under which 
particular orichas’ guidance and protection. Similar sorts of ceremonies can be 
alternatively conducted, such as the bajada de Orula (the ‘bringing down of Orula’, 
where one does not ‘receive’ the ‘hand’ of Orula but just the itá divination) or by 
consulting the Ocha, rather than the Ifá, oracle, something which is often a matter of 
contestation between Ocha-centric priests and ritual houses and families and Ifá-
centric ones (see Brown 2003a). 
In what follows, I would like to explore and expand on Holbraad’s theoretical 
construction of the motion from transcendence to immanence that is involved in 
Ocha/Ifá divination with further ethnographic description and analysis. I shall 
describe such a notion of ‘motility’ (cf. Holbraad 2008c) by arguing that through it 
there is a process of ‘individuation’ wherein transcendent signos and their 
correspondent orichas that follow and ‘speak’ through them, transform into oracular 
and, thus, relevant and significant perspectives. 
As we have already seen in chapter 4, a typical consultation with the Ocha/Ifá 
oracles involves the manipulation of consecrated objects which from a non-
conversing state transform into a conversing one. In this process, the deities are 
168 
 
invoked to ‘come down’ and are rendered present so as to offer their perspectives. As 
the orichas do not have a definitive and unique bodily form, divination directs them 
to be momentarily embodied in the very oracles. Thus, objects-as-oracles become the 
invoked entities. This is when they are explicitly meant to ‘speak’. By doing so, their 
embodiment is confluent with a parallel process of individuation and discernment. 
Before being ‘brought down’, the orichas reside in a cosmological whole, which is 
encapsulated in the totality of the myths and ‘signs’ that constitute the Ocha/Ifá 
divinatory corpus. The very act of a particular divination, apart from invoking the 
right entities (such as Orula for Ifá, other orichas for Ocha, ritual ancestors of the 
diviner and the client’s orí) also ‘brings down’ one of the totality of the 256 signos or 
oddu. A particular oddu will ‘come out’, and this will correspond to the particular 
situation. Thus, in this instant, the potentiality embedded in transcendence is a 
totality that explains everything which the very act of divination invokes into 
immanence in the sense that it individuates and fragments it; that is, it makes it 
relevant to a specific person and situation. 
Each oddu, in its turn, consists of its own ‘properties’: chants in Yoruba, 
aphorisms and proverbs in Spanish, specific warnings and a collection of myths or 
‘stories’ (patakín). All these are said to describe the oddu in its totality. Here we are 
met with a further phase of individuation, again seen as the direct responsibility of 
the deities’ interference: the fathoming out of iré and osogbo. The process of iré or 
osogbo is also part of the process of individuation as every oddu might come with 
either a positive or a negative ‘tendency’. Broadly put, an oddu coming with an iré, 
positive tendency signifies its gravitation towards a positive outcome of the 
mythological events involved in it, as well as a generally positive disposition of the 
entities related to them towards the client of divination. The opposite occurs for an 
osogbo, negative tendency. Furthermore, and as we have already seen, once the 
‘tendency’ is determined, the oracle is consulted in order to further examine its 
nature. The individuated entities, signos and their tendencies can thus be seen as a 
gradual embodiment of the former, standing in a necessary relation to the ‘needs’ of 
the specific divination. This might be broadly defined as the first phase of divination, 
which is followed by a second, often called ‘interpretation’ (interpretación). The 
diviner must now ‘translate’ the already selected and individuated signos and their 
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myths as much as possible making it relevant and intelligible to the client’s 
perspective.  
As the ‘original’ perspective of the orichas comes in the form of myths, 
which refer to their biographies and not the client’s, the diviner’s crucial and 
mediating role is to transform them into (more akin to the) ‘human’ (condition), but 
without loosing their ‘original’ essence; their efficacy, in other words. Consequently, 
gradual individuation leads to the diviner coming to embody the perspectives of the 
deities. Through this process, more individuation may occur. For example, not all 
proverbs, aphorisms, warnings and advice or patakín will be necessarily equally 
relevant to a particular consultation or client. Some might stand out as more relevant; 
although there is always the potential that the rest may become more relevant in the 
future. In cases of initiation it is more probable that the totality of the oddu’s 
properties will be taken into account on an equal basis and this is congruent with the 
fact that the oddu ‘drawn’ in initiations are meant to follow the client in a much more 
permanent way than those drawn in simple consultations. In the case of the patakín 
or proverbs, unlike the more direct nature of warnings and aphorisms (for example, 
‘don’t talk badly to your elders’), there is an extra interpretative effort by the diviner 
to make them more relevant to the client. Mythological characters find their 
correspondence to the real life situations of the client. Yet, this kind of immanence 
retains something of its transcendental quality. In fact, this is what Ocha/Ifá’s oracles 
are meant to offer in relation to other oracles: more transcendental yet relevant to the 
individual information. They do not offer predictions or revelations in the strict and 
concrete sense of the word. They remain somewhat broad in scope.  
Ultimately, the correct interpretation of the ‘signs’ is not just measured by the 
client on the spotin the oracular instancebut through its transcendental, that is, 
encompassing, reach. Furthermore, the orichas’ perspectives are meant to be 
instantiated through the prescriptions and the actions following, offerings and 
initiations for example, and the degree to which these actions are judged to have 
contributed to the re-alignment of one’s camino, the disappearance of misfortunes or 
their appearance and persistence in the case when oracular pronouncements and 
prescriptions were not followed. In other words, the individuation process that a 
divination might have initiated is fully consummated in all that follows it and, thus, 
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one could argue that the entities and their perspectives ultimately come to be 
embodied, passing through the oracles and the diviner, into the client.  I now turn to 
what kind of immanence and transcendence the muertos can be said to have, or move 
through. 
Immanence and Transcendence of muertos: ‘affines’, ‘alien’ and nfumbi 
Espirito Santo (2009a:224-230) also utilizes Holbraad’s same contribution to 
Thinking Through Things (2007b) in order to compare, and ultimately account for the 
co-existence of the spirits of the dead and deities such as the orichas. She does so by 
comparing aché, a property of the orichas, and fluido, a property of the muertos. 
Thus, she is inevitably led to compare the kind of immanence and transcendence of 
the former and that of the latter. This is why, I think, looking at her conclusions is 
highly pertinent to the general comparisons I am trying to make. 
Spirits of the dead possess fluido, an ‘invisible substance’ (Espirito Santo 
2009a:227), that spirits have, but not in a fixed state, quantity and quality. Like the 
aché of the orichas, it can be blocked, passed over, diminish or increase, and this 
increases and diminishes accordingly the quantity and quality of information, affects 
and effects, such as healing, released by the spirits of the dead and handed over to the 
living. The latter play an important role in the flow of the spirits’ fluido as they help 
release it by ‘developing’ and ‘educating’ the dead through mediumship, offerings, 
‘spiritual masses’, chants, material ‘representations’, things which are commonly 
said to ‘materialize’ the former. Thus, the flow of fluido is inseparable from a 
process of ‘materialization’ and, importantly, the right kind and degree of it; one is 
constitutive of the otherthey are ‘internally’ or ‘ontologically’ linked, as Holbraad 
would have it and as Espirito Santo indeed suggests; there is no (onto)logical priority 
of one over the other. 
Schematically put, when there is a flow of fluido both the muertos and the 
living benefit. There is a flow of perspectives, the dead describe in a fuller ‘picture’ 
their past lives, they let themselves be sensed; they express their wishes; the 
livingprovided they start fulfilling the muertos’ wishes by previously opening their 
senses to their messagesobtain significant information about their own lives, their 
wishes are also expressed and ideally fulfilled. It is important to note that, by 
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obtaining information about what the dead remember of themselves (how they 
looked, what clothes they wore, what colours they liked, for example) the living start 
getting clues about how to ‘materialize’ them. For instance, if a muerto appears in a 
‘spiritual mass’ as a woman dressed in white and holding sunflowers, there is 
immediately an aggregate of ‘things’-cum-clues of what, as a spirit of the dead, it 
remembers or likes (or likes to remember, if you like): being a woman, the colour 
white and the sunflowers. Although these ‘things’ can be treated as ‘materializations’ 
separately (for example, the sunflowers as an offering to the spirit), they can all be 
‘materialized’ as a totality and more ‘literally’, as indeed the muerto appeared, by 
‘preparing’ (preparando) a doll, which, in this case, would be female, dressed in 
white with sunflowers placed on or next to it. Whether this would be the right kind of 
‘materialization’ should ideally be verified or even suggested by the muerto itself 
directlycommunicating it to the living through a mediumor indirectly, by the 
consequent flow of fluido that is released and its various manifestations, such as 
significant information, healing effects, and so on. The opposite occurs to fluido if 
‘materialization’ is not of the right kind or does not even take place. 
Espirito Santo traces the similarities of fluido and muertos with aché and 
orichas. Both are concept and thing at the same time (2009a:227). Both reveal 
‘potential relations’ which must be accomplished, achieved or ‘developed’, in 
spiritist terms, through mobilization (2009a:227). Initially, thus, it seems that 
muertos, just like orichas, from a state of transcendence ‘move’ to a state of 
immanence, from ‘beyondness’ to the world of the living. What this means is that 
transcendence itself is potentially bridgeable; in that it can be transcended, so to 
speak. But if for aché and the orichas, what looks like transcendence is actually 
distance and what looks like immanence is proximity, for fluido and the muertos, 
Espirito Santo warns us, this is not the case: 
While the ‘beyond’ in Ifá might be conceived as a proximity to Olofi, the creator of all 
things, in espiritismo it consists of a spirit’s failure to integrate into a medium’s self-
awareness and behavioural dispositions. In espiritismo, ‘beyondness’ results from the failure 
of socialization, and thus, activation. It is a beyondness that signals absence, rather than 
transcendence, and this points to a critical difference between espiritismo and Ifá 
(2009a:226). 
Espirito Santo is alluding to the gradualor else ‘analogic’, as she calls it, as 
opposed to ‘digital’ (2009a:228)process of achieving the presence of muertos. A 
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muerto hardly appears in full and at once, but rather, through successive 
mediumships, both at different times and by different mediums, one starts getting a 
cumulative ‘frame’ of it, wherein information is constantly added. This is what 
‘development’ and ‘education’ of the dead involves. In my previous, hypothetical but 
very indicative example of the muerto appearing as a woman dressed in white and 
holding sunflowers, let us imagine that the person to whom she is attached  has 
‘prepared’ a doll, with these characteristics of her. This might have happened after 
the muerto herself has, through a medium, requested such a kind of ‘materialization’. 
In any case, many consider the latter as a trigger, a channel or potential for the flow 
of perspectives coming from the muerto; perspectives concerning both the muerto’s 
necro/biography and that of the person she is attached to. As I see it, this kind of 
movement from transcendence to immanence crucially denotes an intensification of 
intimacy (see Tsintjilonis 2004b). 
It is this kind of intimacy and its intensification that might lead the person to 
add more ‘things’ to the doll. For example, the muerto might reveal on another 
occasion that she likes, or liked while in life, to smoke cigars. It is very possible, 
then, that the next time you visit the house of the person, to see a cigar placed on the 
doll’s lap. Furthermore, if the person is a medium and if the muerto tends to 
‘possess’ it (not all muertos do), when it does so, the person prompted by the muerto, 
or being the muerto, who has occupied its body, might ask for a cigar. The first time 
this happens is normally the reason why the cigar was put on the doll’s lap in the first 
place, either because the muerto herself asked for it or because the ‘possessed’ 
medium felt the urge to smoke, which amounts to the same thing, that is, something 
the muerto likes to do. 
Not to gain this kind of intimacy with the muertos is what, for Espirito Santo, 
‘beyondness’ would signify. According to her, for Espiritismo’s muertos what looks 
like transcendence is actually absence and what looks like immanence is presence, 
unlike distance and proximity respectively for the orichas, as Holbraad suggests. 
Espirito Santo, building on this difference, mentions some others that I find 
interesting and very familiar with the ethnography of muertos and deities I presented 
in the previous chapters. 
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The first is that the central point with which the muertos’ peculiar 
immanence-as-presence is achieved and further developed is the medium’s body, 
senses and affects. As Espirito Santo says: 
[I]t is the medium herself, her body-in-the-world, rather than the babalawo’s markings, that 
displaces the ‘ground’ where the ‘powder’ sits, speaking in Holbraad’s terms. She embodies 
this movement; she becomes the spirits whom she is materializing precisely vie her own 
movement (2009a:229). 
As muertos appear in and through the senses, and they do so only because they have 
been attached to one particular individual by way of affinity, perspectives about and 
from themtheir biography and necrographyrevolves, follows and is generated in 
this particular body. The case with the orichas is different: their ‘biographies’ do not 
come to light painstakingly, or as a surprise. Everybody knows or can know the 
generic characteristics, attributes, likes and dislikes, strengths and weaknesses, 
elements of nature, or parts of the body, for example, that each oricha is associated 
with. Equally ‘given’ are events that relate the orichas with other orichas, animals, 
plants, the creation of the cosmos and its creator, Olofi. All these are ‘given’ in the 
oral accounts that are collected in the signos (oddu) and particularly their ‘stories’ 
(patakín). ‘Cosmology’, in other words, in its generic form pre-exists and gives 
shape to the Ocha/Ifá divination (see also Holbraad 2007a). Unless a muerto is felt 
through the senses nobody knows it; it is as if it did not exist. Thus, by making itself 
able to be sensed and articulating itself, the muerto seems to be coming into 
existence: ‘Developing is not about achieving immanence at all then, but about 
achieving a cosmology, a world of spirits’ (Espirito Santo 2009a:229). It is a 
‘cosmogonic’ act, while the orichas are already born and from them are born their 
‘children’, the humans. She concludes with a final contrast between the orichas and 
muertos: 
Holbraad argues that aché should not be seen as “diversified essence but as the premise of 
diversification itself”, thus, orichas have aché precisely in as much as they are able to 
become the various elements of nature through their motions, rather than their relations. In 
espiritismo the opposite is true: spirits have fluido in as much as they are able to enter into 
relations, and in a sense, be these relations, with people (2009a:229). 
Compared and contrasted to the orichas, muertos in general could be initially 
described in negative terms as those entities which do not possess in their 
biographical baggage any signos, that is, mythological events that would account for 
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the most essential aspects of their biographies. Linked to that, I believe, is the 
predominance of the body as the vehicle par excellence for communication between 
them and the living, rather than objects serving as oracles, which predominates in the 
orichas’ oracular utterances. Muertos are (much closer to their condition as) ex-
humans, persons who used to be individuals with a specific biography and body. 
Muertos are linked with the acquisition of knowledge in a seemingly more 
spontaneous way and of a more spontaneous nature. Although they may be invoked 
by the living, the space of invocation, being the body and its senses, is confined to 
particular points of one’s camino and to specific persons, those who can sense them. 
An oracular outcome of the Ocha/Ifá divination is a concrete material configuration. 
The same outcome of a particular consultation, if noted down by the client, could be 
theoretically taken to another diviner and be rendered once again open to 
‘interpretation’. If deities ‘speak’ through material oracles, what they say, their 
utterances, become sorts of ‘objects’ as well. Their words ‘come out’ as a bundle of 
generic (shared and pre-existing; cosmological, in that sense) configurationsthe 
oddu. Furthermore, once they ‘speak’, their words ‘never fall onto the ground [nunca 
caen en el suelo]’, meaning that their ‘truth’ always remains pertinent. People, then, 
start (trans)forming their lives, their camino in the direction of their oddu. 
Muertos ‘speak’ more literally or, at least, in a more human way, through the 
body and its senses; their perspectives come out as affects, images, sounds, touch, 
moods and rarely all together and in full. Often, especially in the early stages of 
‘development’, their messages can be so fragmented, fleeting, confusing and 
unintelligible, that one has to patiently wait till the spiritthrough successive 
mediumships, ‘attention’ and offeringsacquires a fuller ‘image’. Thus, a spirit’s 
initial and apparent transcendence is quite different from that of the orichas. Orichas 
and their oddu ‘come out’ as a totality, whereby humans must fathom out, discern 
and particularize in order to make concrete sense of their lives. Spirits and their 
affective and visceral utterances come initially as fragments which slowly come 
together to form a whole: a spirit with its bio/necrography, which is under constant 
construction, in Espirito Santo’s words. 
In this sense, the muertos’ words can and do ‘fall onto the ground’, not in the 
least because their truth might be misinterpreted by the living (as is the case with 
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those of the orichas), but because they may not be ‘true’ in the first place. What I 
refer to here as ‘true’ is not confined to whether they are deemed as such by 
experiential verification. This might be the case when a spirit-human relationship 
remains under-developed, where both the spirit and the person might ‘get it wrong’ 
or when a muerto is proven to be not an ‘affine’ but a ‘stranger’ to the person. 
Spirits’ words may ‘fall onto the ground’ in a broader sense; they might be 
applicable for very specific occasions. Orichas when they ‘speak’ through the oddu, 
resist this kind of ‘specificity’. If what they do is to reveal a camino, past, present 
and future, orichas do not ‘care’ so much about exposing otherwise significant and 
desirable, for the humans that is, information about the particular point (of this past, 
present or future) the camino’s potentials and tendencies actually occur. Exactly 
because they are potentials and tendencies they (might) have happened, are 
happening and will happen. Muertos, like humans (and the humans they themselves 
used to be), have caminos, they still ‘walk’ on them, often precariously, and get 
attached to the livings’ caminos in order to fulfil their own. Deities like the orichas 
are the caminos. If the orichas and their signos ‘travel’ from transcendence to 
immanence, muertos move in the opposite direction. Their starting point is 
immanence, yet they lack the material that is constitutive of the immanence of the 
living: the body. This lack makes them pertain to the ‘beyond’ by definition, but 
affects and memories survive the demise of the physical body, and this makes them 
pertain to this world as well. Their camino involves a movement from immanence to 
transcendence and this is exactly where the living affect such a movement and, thus, 
relate to them. Thus, the initial ‘absence’ of muertos is due to their excessive and too 
embodied presence, which calls for its gradual motion towards transcendence. Let us 
take the muertos’ camino (or ‘necrography’, as I have alternatively called it) and 
allocate to it the different kinds of muertos I have identified, that is, the ‘alien’, the 
nfumbi and the ‘affines’. 
‘Alien’ muertos can be said to be the instantiation or relative crystalization of 
a kind of muertos akin to a condition that all muertos can initially and potentially 
find themselves in. Before ‘acknowledging’ and ‘developing’ a muerto, the relation 
remains latent, that is, unacknowledged and un(der)developed, putting the muerto in 
an initial position of a stranger. Yet, and as people often describe it, this state of un-
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fulfilment which places them nearer to ‘alien’ muertos, is perceived as a weight that 
pulls them down to this world, rather than the beyond. Similarly, the way they relate 
to the living is also depicted and perceived as a sort of load that affects the living as 
well. ‘Alien’ muertos affect the latter in various negative ways, such as causing 
confusion, lack of clear thought, indecision, physical ailments, which, seen in  terms 
of a camino, could be understood as obstacles, a loss of direction or deviation from 
the ‘correct’ path. 
These muertos are said to be ‘stuck in matter’ (apegados en la materia), 
unable to forget and detach from this world, they wander aimlessly, sometimes 
causing misfortune by temporarily getting attached to particular individuals. The 
latter’s efforts are to distance them; conducting a sort of exorcism, sending them 
back to this worldly, aimless and hopeless wandering. People do not get to know 
much about their past nor their wishes, as they do not create any kind of reciprocal 
relations with them. 
As for those who can sense them the affects produced by these muertos on 
their bodies are of a quite peculiar nature. Very often, they are sensed by default, so 
to speak, that is, as a presence which is characterized by absences (for an interesting 
discussion on ethnographic cases of ‘present absences’, see Bille 2010); absence of 
biographical information, absence of wishes, advice that could be deemed useful for 
the living, absence, in general, of a potential to enter into a dialogue, to exchange 
perspectives in a way that grants continuity. Equally often, this sense of absence is 
accompanied by a sense of ‘negativity’ or ‘negative energy’, yet, one that does not 
‘belong’ to the person and, thus, its disappearance does not involve propitiatory ritual 
steps but expiatory ones. What was very common, when trying to fathom out how 
exactly these muertos are sensed and what the difference is to ‘affine’ ones, was that 
the replies were somewhat vague and they revolved around affective experiences 
which were not accompanied by any kind of substantial knowledge. I got the sense 
that ‘alien’ muertos were affects, often negative (such as a pain in a particular part of 
the body), with little or no biographical knowledge following them. Such knowledge 
was significantly, I believe, limited to the part of the muerto’s biography that made it 
‘alien’ (such as its peculiar conditions of death or its liminality while in life) and 
hardly about the person they were attached to. In other words, they were just affects, 
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which are not accompanied by a sense of a potential of developing any kind of 
relation with them. Their ambiguity is what, I think, produced those vague answers. 
The answers were vague because the experiences with them were vague. ‘Alien’ 
muertos could be said to be just that: alien affects. ‘Alien’ muertos carry an alienated 
and alienating biography, which is inherited, sustained and even accentuated into 
their necrographies. If this kind of muertos is conceived as the most attached to this 
world and as the most ‘material’ ones, one could initially argue that they are the most 
immanent ones. Nevertheless, their immanence is of a peculiar kind and this is, I 
think, because although from a certain point they are seen as extremely present, 
entrapped in their immanence, from another, they are extremely absent as well. 
Theirs is a world, within this world, of extreme, immanent solitude. 
So, what kind of immanence are we dealing with here? Quite a different one 
from that of ‘affine’ muertos and deities. These last, by establishing a channel of 
communication with the living, each one intensifies their presence in their own 
distinctive ways. The ‘affine’ muertos initiate an exchange of perspectives whereby 
gradually they give out information about themselves and their ‘affines’. The deities 
offer signos-myths which are brought nearer, by way of a relative individuation, to 
the person. ‘Alien’ muertos offer exactly what makes them such: alienation. And this 
is what they also get back in return; and more of it. They remain in this world, yet 
their unrelatedness makes them complete strangers to it. The fact that they are 
perceived as aimlessly wandering spirits is telling. Though immanent, they have and 
can receive no specific direction. ‘Affine’ muertos and deities do so through 
divination, through bodies and objects respectively. In their turn, they give a 
direction (in the form of revelations, advice, warnings) to people; they constitute 
caminos. ‘Alien’ muertos do not receive and do not offer any direction and this lack 
of potential is what is sensed by those who can detect their very fleeting presence; 
their extremely intangible immanence. They obstruct caminos. This is where it 
appears a strange kind of immanence as excessively proximate but, at the same time, 
not intimate at all. 
The initial ‘alien-ness’ of any muerto has three broad potential courses or 
caminos. One, is to remain ‘alien’ and keep on its path of excessive ‘attachment’ and 
immanence to this world, occasionally getting attached to living strangers who, in 
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their turn, will once again expiate it from their bodies and person only to make them 
return to their state of aimless (or camino-less, if you like) earthly wandering. The 
other, is for the muerto to get it right, as it were, and get attached to the right kind of 
person and body that will grant it ‘attention’, ‘acknowledgement’ and ‘develop’ a 
reciprocal relation; the latter will become its ‘affine’ and their caminos, in death for 
the former and in life for the latter, will become inextricably intertwined. Within this 
process, the muerto will undergo a complex transformation in which initially its 
presence becomes more intense than this of the ‘aliens’, but which is also and 
ultimately constitutive of and leading to its transcendence, or most commonly 
described, ‘spiritual evolution’, ‘ascendance’ and ‘dematerialization’. The third 
possible camino of a muerto is to neither remain ‘alien’ nor transform into an 
‘affine’, but to become an nfumbi, which I explore later on. 
One thing that I always found perplexing while in fieldwork and I will hereby 
try to resolve post facto, is an apparent contradiction that constantly sprung up in my 
mind when comparing ‘alien’ and ‘affine’ muertos. On the one hand, ‘alien’ muertos 
were said to be in the lowest levels of spiritual evolution and ascendance, if indeed 
there was any, while ‘affine’ muertos were definitively said to be in the process of 
ascendance. In this sense, the former seemed more immanent, whereas the latter 
more transcendent or, at least, more able to transcend their immanence. On the other 
hand, ‘alien’ muertos, despite the insistence that they were more of this world and 
material, seemed much more absent in a certain sense and when compared to the 
‘affines’. What this could possible mean has since become one of the questions to 
have haunted me; the persistence of which could be paralleled to how ‘alien’ muertos 
have haunted my Cuban friends. ‘Affine’ muertos passed through a multiple series of 
what, in one way or another, was said to be their ‘materializations’ (see also Espirito 
Santo 2010). These ranged from very literal sensessuch as dolls that ‘represented’ 
them, offerings, glasses of water, flowers, pictures of them (in cases where they were 
known), objects that the muerto used to be or still was attached toto less tangible 
onessuch as chants, habits and behaviour (evinced and expressed through their 
‘affine’) and, very importantly, the very messages transmitted to the living in the 
contexts of divination. ‘Alien’ muertos, in stark contrast, were much more ‘absent’ in 
this sense. No objects ‘represented’ them, they transmitted few messages (often the 
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‘wrong’ ones and misleading) and when they faintly made their appearance to the 
eyes of the mediums, offerings, chants and other utterances and acts had the sole 
purpose of expiating them; they were disappearing acts and words, not by 
annihilating their ‘existence’ and presence, but by distancing them. 
I have no intentions of resolving this haunting question by arguing that the 
contradiction lay in the Cubans’ minds, therefore it is a native category mistake, nor 
by arguing a la Lévy-Bruhl (see Lévy-Bruhl 1926, 1966, 1975; see also Holbraad 
2007b:200-201), that, although a contradiction, the Cubans might be indifferent to it, 
defying in this way the laws of contradiction in general. If we choose this path, of it 
not being a logical error, then how may we proceed? I will try to argue that the 
contradiction is not logical, when referring to the living Cubans, but it might be 
ontological, when referring to the dead ones. It is not just a case that says something 
about the living but something that the muertos are at pains to articulate, both to 
themselves and to the living. Moving from ‘alien’ muertos to ‘affines’, I try to 
expose the peculiarities of the muertos in general and the different kinds of them, 
especially in light of immanence and transcendence. 
As we previously saw, ‘alien’ muertos’ excessive immanence and proximity 
to this world is accompanied by a distance and absence of intimacy in terms of their 
relation to the living. ‘Affine’ muertos are, in their various degrees, transcending and 
this path is harnessed by an intensification of their ‘materializations’ and relations 
with the living. This is not a contradiction posed by and limited to the latter, but 
ultimately stems from the very condition of the former. Thus, the ‘anxiety’ is not 
whether perspectives about and from the dead ‘affines’ (probably their 
‘materialization’ par excellence) should be suppressed so as to let the dead 
gotranscendbut, quite the opposite, namely, that knowledge should flow and get 
materialized in order for the muertos to transcend. In essence, the spirits’ ‘evolution’ 
from immanence to transcendence is a harnessing of a camino de muerto, namely, a 
motion of the dead, becoming ‘other’ to their previous embodied self so as to relate 
properlyas a proper muertoto the living. 
The movement from immanence to transcendence of muertos, although 
involving knowledge and a realization of the fact of death, is not of an abrupt and 
absolute nature. Knowing that you are a muerto and acting like one is a process, 
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which also involves a kind of interplay between remembering and forgetting. 
Forgetting passes through a necessary process of remembering, because only by 
remembering the muerto starts to compare and ultimately contrast its present 
condition as dead to its previous one as alive and, thus, realizes its transformation. As 
Espirito Santo argues, this transformation is gradual and not automatic. It is in this 
sense that muertos, just like the living, are perceived as still having a camino to walk 
through; a camino of gradual disembodiment though and the acquisition of a new 
kind of body, which is formed by the loss of the previous human body and its 
individuality. If a doll is the materialization of a muerto this is so in apparently two 
contradictory yet, in the Afro-Cuban cosmos, necessary and mutually implicated 
ways: first, the muerto perceives itself in the doll or certain characteristics of it (as it 
is dressed and adorned with things that resemble it) and, because of this, remembers 
its biography. Second, the doll also stands as a contrast to the full past ‘image’ of the 
person while in life because, although certain aspects persist as a way of 
reminiscence, others have perished and been substituted by ones quite unfamiliar to 
its previous personhood. Instead of bones, human organs and skin it is made of cloth, 
threads and other fabrics and materials. Thus, through its ‘materialization’ in a doll, 
the muerto activates and intensifies some memories of its biography, while at the 
same time it realizes that these memories do not inhabit anymore the human body 
they once used to. 
Probably the most intense kind of ‘materializing’ of the muertos is through 
the body. ‘Affine’ muertos are those who have been attached to a specific living 
human being. It is here that the dialogue between remembering and forgetting 
becomes more intense. Through the body of its ‘affine’, the muerto vividly 
remembers its bodily-ness and even activates its affects (as Celia’s muerto Tomás 
did through his sweat which appeared in Celia’s body while his presence was 
intensified; see chapter 3). Nevertheless, and this is an important task of the living, 
although the bodily functions activate the past capacities of the muerto, the ‘affine’s’ 
body is not the muerto’s and this should be made clear. The living start acquiring 
perspectives about themselves from their ‘affine’ muertos and in this process the 
muerto realizes it is dead. Thus, for the muertos there is always this apparently 
conflicting, yet constitutive of their fluid ‘being’ as muertos, a condition that makes 
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the body still matter (taken both as a verb and adjective) when, ideally at least, it 
should not. 
It is in this complex and dynamic, ‘cosmogonic’ in Espirito Santo’s words, 
sense that the muertos’ initially intangible and not yet materialized presence does not 
constitute (their) transcendence, something which Espirito Santo rightfully points 
out. Nevertheless, their transformation into socialized, related, and materialized 
muertos, that is, ‘affines’, is not to be confused with a parallel transformation from 
absence to presence; at least not in the very strict sense of the words. Put differently, 
personhood survives and is not annihilated after death, not because the living 
humans’ imaginative agency fancifully reconstructs them out of the nothingness of 
their ashes and dust. Immanence, in the case of muertos is their point of departure 
and, for the ‘affines’ at least, transcendence their ‘directed motion’, their camino; a 
transformative process from the affective memories of their biography to their 
necrography. This process, mediated by their ‘affinity’ with the living, intensifies 
their oracular and perspectival propensity towards the latter and proves the very 
‘material’ with which the former start to ‘dematerialize’ and transcend. Although 
compared to the living, the muertos’ perspectives are more transcendentalthey 
view things living humans cannot; hence their significancecompared to the 
orichas, their perspectives are more immanent. 
As I said before, between or besides a classificatory continuum of muertos, 
which in terms of ‘spiritual evolution’ the ‘alien’ would be at one end and the 
‘affines’ occupying a range with a direction towards the other, there is a category that 
exhibits some very peculiar characteristics: the nfumbi. In certain aspects, they 
resemble both ‘alien’ and ‘affine’ muertos, and in others, they stand on their own and 
can, thus, provoke chaos and ‘wreak havoc’, in Palmié’s words (2002:169), to any 
classificatory efforts for neat categories. Nevertheless, the otherwise chaotic 
character of nfumbi may shed some lightdespite the fact that they are said to be 
‘dark’ (oscuros) and obscure thingsto my engagement with immanence and 
transcendence. From a certain point of view, the nfumbi seem to stand between the 
broad continuum of ‘alien’ and ‘affine’ muertos. Before becoming one, the nfumbi is 
drawn out of the indistinct and anonymous mass of ‘alien’ muertos. The ambiguous 
state of the ‘alien’ muertos is transferred to the nfumbi, as both are perceived to be in 
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the lowest and most material state a muerto can be. In addition, the effects of both 
can be very similar. 
As we have already seen in chapter 2, Palo can be seen as a field of 
knowledge and practice that creates a kind of intimacy with these ‘alien’ muertos, 
that other traditions actively, or not, try to avoid and exclude. The immediate 
question that could be posed is whether the peculiar immanence of ‘alien’ muertos is 
in any way transformed when they convert into nfumbi. An initial answer to this 
could be that by becoming an nfumbi, the muerto gets into some kind of relationship, 
that is, it gets socialized at least within the limited environment of the palero and, by 
extension, his clients and ritual family. As James Figarola (2006a) has argued, in 
Palo, initiations create a ritual kinship bond among people and simultaneously their 
ngangas with their nfumbi. As with communicating vessels, there are created ritual 
families among persons, among ngangas and among nfumbi, each one interconnected 
with the rest. Thus, what is normally excluded, in Palo is embraced and included. 
From the aimlessly wandering spirits of the dead, which are normally depicted as an 
anonymous sea or mass of the dead, the ‘alien’ muerto is singled out, its human 
remains exhumed, brought to the nganga and put to ‘work’ for the palero, his clients 
and ‘godchildren’. The nfumbi are not seen as transcending this world, but as very 
immanent to it. Palo, in that case, seems to defy a purist ‘spiritist’ understanding of 
muertos as necessarily evolving towards dematerialization. 
In all the cases of the various other-than-human entities, we can observe that 
immanence and transcendence hardly ‘reveal’ anything if each is seen in isolation 
and as a bounded point or entity. Rather, immanence and transcendence is a ‘space’, 
a potential ‘path’ that has to be traversed in order to be harnessed, to be put into 
motion and with a specific direction (sensu Holbraad). If, on the other hand, entities 
do not have a directed motion they are perceived as either stagnant or with no 
specific direction, both of which are hardly fruitful conditions for a positive relation 
with humans, as they, as well, seek directed motion. Indeed, people most often 
consult the oracles and, consequently and more generally, engage with the Afro-
Cuban ‘spirit-world’ when they seek a kind of direction. Different kinds of other-
than-human entities reveal different aspects of such direction by also, crucially, 
reveal their own one. 
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Broadly put, muertos tend to move from immanence to transcendence and, 
provided they do so, it is then that their oracular propensities and intimacy with the 
living are intensifiedin their becoming ‘affines’. Such a motion is not be taken for 
granted and it is one and the same with the processdescribed as ‘education’, 
‘development’ and ‘evolution’of their ontological transformation into ‘proper’ 
muertos. The living, harness their camino along with and in direct relation to the 
muertos harnessing their own. Normally, too much immanence is an obstacle for 
relations (at least seen as positive) as this can be evinced with the ‘alien’ muertos, 
who are anonymous and aimlessly wandering, with no direction, and, thus, entrapped 
in this world without being able to ‘other’ themselves, so that they can ‘properly’ 
(‘affinally’, if you like) relate to the living. But, too much transcendence is also 
negating relations, although perhaps without the perils of excessive immanence. This 
can be observed in the highly evolved muertos who transcend to such an extent that 
they lose their ‘necrographic’ significance and oracular specificity towards the living. 
 On the contrary, deities like the orichas, although ontologically secure in 
their transcendence, are not entrapped in it. By ‘ontologically secure’, I mean that, as 
entities, their camino has already been traversed in the mythical space and time. 
Their movement from transcendence to immanence although this implies certain 
transformations, even ontological as Holbraad argues, it does not mean that they 
become completely and permanently immanent. Their perspective is still 
transcendentthey can ‘see’ beyond specific points in one’s camino and beyond the 
specificities of time or, else, ‘past, present and future’and that is what they are so 
praised for. The nfumbi seem to occupy a ‘strange’ position in this scheme. Being too 
immanent, as they derive from ‘alien’ muertos, their perspectives are aligned too 
intimately with those of their ‘owners’ (the paleros and their clients), yet, for those to 
whom they are ‘sent’ their ‘alien-ness’ is perceived as causing ‘alienating’ effects 
and affects. 
As I have progressively adopted the word ‘perspective’ and suggested how 
this is instantiated through divination, in the following chapter I will deal with it 
much more explicitly and explore whether divination, as revealing and relating the 
caminos of the humans with those of ‘the beyond’ could be seen as a kind of 
‘perspectivism’. Before doing so, I find it crucial to describe how ‘perspectivism’ has 
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been dealt with in anthropological theory so far, especially through the work of 











In this chapter, I will try to further develop the interpretation I initiated in the 
previous one, that is, attempt to account for the various kinds of other-than-human 
entities, not only each one in their own isolated domain, but as part of what my 
Cuban friends referred to as ‘the beyond’, that potentially accommodates all, yet 
without obliterating their distinctive natures. As I hope I have made clear by now, 
what brings the various kinds of entities together is partly the ethnographic fact that 
they can allpotentially at leastparticipate to varying degrees and at various 
points in one’s camino. If and when they do so, the case in which this is mostly 
instantiated, such as divination, not only harnesses peoples’ camino but also, in its 
multiple ways, harnesses the caminos of the entities themselves. The human camino, 
thus, achieves its directed motion in light of, because of, and in relation to the 
directed motion of the (different) other-than-human entities. If the latter’s motion is 
not motivated and directed, they get stuck in an aimless and stagnant ‘plane’of 
excessive immanence for muertos and of excessive transcendence for orichasand 
this affects accordingly the camino of the former. Viewed as such, ‘human’ and 
‘other-than-human’ caminos are constitutive of and feed by each other. 
By looking at the notion of ‘perspectivism’, as this has been treated 
anthropologically (and not philosophically), here, I will explore its potential affinities 
with (Afro-Cuban) divination.22 If my understanding is correct, perspectivism takes 
differences in points of views to be constitutive of each other, and not as arbitrarily 
and ‘relativistically’ co-existing. This sounds quite similar to the point I just made 
about the mutual constitution of ‘human’ and ‘other-than-human’ caminos and may, 
thus, suggest the affinity of the twoperspectivism and divination. It is in its 
perspectival dimension of ‘the beyond’ that we may trace the ‘ontological glue’ (to 
echo but also paraphrase Palmié; 2002:192) that holds muertos and orichas together, 
but does not make them alike! Before delving into the implications of this, I will try 
                                                 
22 For more philosophical discussions on ‘perspectivism’, see Dawson 1985; Hales and Welshon 
2000; Reed 1994; Reginster 2001; Schenck 1985. 
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to disentangle perspectivism from its very peculiar ‘Amerindian’ and ‘animistic’ 
content and also engage with what one could, heuristically at least, identify as its 
‘theoretical’ and ‘ethnographic’ dimensions. 
From ‘animism’ to ‘perspectivism’ 
In the last two decades there seems to have been a returning and growing interest in 
engaging with the traditional category in anthropology of ‘animism’as this was 
originally formulated by Tylor (1958)and, along with that, in others, such as 
‘totemism’as this was (re)formulated by Lévi-Strauss (1964)and ‘naturalism’.23 
The ‘debate’ most often commences with the classificatory attempt made by Descola 
(1996) and proceeds with the various reactions towards it. Very briefly put, Descola 
distinguishes societies along the basis of three broad ‘modes of identification’ 
(1996:87-89). First, we have ‘totemic systems’ wherein exist ‘discontinuities 
between natural species [which] organize, conceptually, a segmentary order 
delimiting social units’ (1996:87). In these systems, ‘non-humans are treated as 
signs’ (1996:88). Second, we have the ‘animic systems’, a mode of identification 
which ‘endows natural beings with human dispositions and social attributes’ 
(1996:87). In them, ‘non-humans are treated as the term of a relation’ (1996:88). 
Third and last: 
Typical of western cosmologies since Plato and Aristotle, naturalism creates a specific 
ontological domain, a place of order and necessity where nothing happens without a reason 
or cause, whether originating in God (such as Spinoza’s famous ‘Deus sive natura’) or 
immanent to the fabric of the world (‘the laws of nature’) (1996:88.). 
It is in this third mode that a ‘polar opposition between nature and society’ (1996:88-
89) is created. Descola goes on to identify and classify accordingly different ‘modes 
of relation’ (1996:89-91) and ‘modes of categorization’ (1996:91-94). Permeating his 
argument is the desire to recast critically the categories of ‘nature’ and ‘society’ or 
‘culture’, something which I do not wish to directly engage with in this thesis and, 
therefore, I shall omit a great part of both Descola’s effort and the reactions towards 
it. What I do wish to isolate from the ‘debate’ are two things: firstly, a critical stance 
                                                 
23 For such a reheated interest, see Bird-David 1999; Descola 1992, 1996; Ingold 1998, 2000; 
Pedersen 2001; Roy and Fuku 1996; Springer 1999; Tsintjilonis 2004a:425-431; Viveiros de Castro 
1998:472-474; Willerslev 2007:1-28, 181-191. 
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towards the neat classifications made by Descola and, secondly, his main, although 
critical, preoccupation with ‘nature’. 
As for the first, and again extremely briefly put, Descola may be criticized in 
that his ‘modes’ are ultimately models that serve to classify, understand and 
represent social and natural phenomena, and that these models look a lot like mental 
‘representations’ or ‘beliefs’: ‘In other words, despite its promise, Descola’s work 
preserves the ontological a priori of nature by rendering animism and totemism as 
imaginative and imaginary reconstructions of it’ (Tsintjilonis 2004a:429; for a 
similar critique, see also Ingold 2000:107; Latour 2009; Viveiros de Castro 
1998:474). As for the second point, there seems to be an overarching correlation 
between, what Descola calls, ‘non-humans’ and ‘nature’. In other words, whether we 
are confronted with ‘totemist’, ‘animic’ or even ‘naturalist’ systems (although in 
more negative terms), ‘nature’ acquires a kind of ‘non-human’ intentionality which 
plays its part in either organizing society after it (‘totemism’), being organized after 
society (‘animism’) or in radical separation from society (‘naturalism’). A further 
implication of this, as far as ‘totemism’ and ‘animism’ are concerned, is that the 
prototypical ‘non-human’ entities are very often depicted to be coming from the 
‘natural’ domain, especially animals, as well as ‘elements of nature’ and plants, that 
play a key social role in their interaction with humans. 
By moving from ‘animism’ to ‘perspectivism’, and with a specific focus on 
the work of Viveiros de Castro, I will try to argue that the latter seems to adequately 
tackle the first point, that is, criticize the former and offer a better ‘theoretical’ tool to 
work with, but has not managed with equal force to get away, ethnographically at 
least, from the second, that is, the strong affinity (even to the point of identification) 
of the ‘non-human’ with the ‘natural’ and the consequent one of the ‘non-human’ 
with the ‘animal’, especially, as I will show further on, with the distinction between 
predator and prey. I hope that my ethnography will contribute towards such direction 
as well as feed from the many merits of perspectivism. 
Although Viveiros de Castro initiated (at least some of) us to the ethnography 
of the Araweté, an Amazonian society, as early as the beginnings of the 1990s, with 
the publication of his book From the Enemy’s Point of View (1992), he explicitly and 
more consciously developed (following Århem; see Århem 1993, 1996) the notion of 
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‘Amerindian perspectivism’ some six years later. Since then, it has occupied a 
central role in his theoretical pursuits (see Viveiros de Castro 1998, 2004a, 2004b). 
Thus, and for the sake of textual economy, I commence with those latter arguments. 
Whereas From the Enemy’s Point of View deals mainly with the Araweté 
ethnography, his subsequent publications are an attempt to offer a more 
encompassing understanding of ‘Amazonian’ or even ‘Amerindian’ peoples. Delving 
into their cosmologies, he argues that they could be seen, heuristically at least, as an 
inversion of the Western ‘multiculturalist’ ones: theirs, in turn, are ‘multinaturalist’ 
(1998:469-470). This is where, in a nutshell, the idea of perspectivism takes life and 
is developed. 
Viveiros de Castro goes on to present what Amerindians perceive to be 
‘nonhuman’ (including deities, spirits of the dead and animals) and what they 
perceive as human. Under normal conditions, he says: 
[H]umans see humans as humans, animals as animals and spirits (if they see them) as spirits; 
however animals (predators) and spirits see humans as animals (as prey) to the same extent 
that animals (as prey) see humans as spirits or as animals (predators). By the same token, 
animals and spirits see themselves as humans: they perceive themselves as (or become) 
anthropomorphic beings when they are in their own houses or villages and they experience 
their own habits and characteristics in the form of culture – they see their food as human food 
(jaguars see blood as manioc beer, vultures see the maggots in rotting meat as grilled fish, 
etc.), they see their bodily attributes (fur, feathers, claws, beaks etc.) as body decorations or 
cultural instruments, they see their social system as organized in the same way as human 
institutions are (with chiefs, shamans, ceremonies, exogamous moieties, etc.). This ‘to see as’ 
refers literally to percepts and not analogically to concepts, although in some case the 
emphasis is placed more on the categorical rather than on the sensory aspect of the 
phenomenon (1998:470). 
Thus, one of the first premises of perspectivism is that nonhumans have a point of 
viewa perspectivejust as humans do. Nevertheless, in perspectivism, nonhuman, 
as well as human, perspectives are treated as ‘percepts’ and not as ‘concepts’ or 
representations. Perspectivism, thus, on a methodological level, is an ontological and 
not epistemological take. Instead of hurriedly reducing nonhuman perspectives to a 
socio or anthropocentric analysis (this is what Descola is criticized for), it suspends 
interpretation for the sake of a clearer ethnographic description. Thus perspectivism, 
if anything else and beyond its ethnographic particularities, is a stance  that aims to 
take seriously recurrent ethnographic practices and beliefs that seem to, in their turn, 
take seriously the agency and intentionality of ‘nonhumans’. It is interested in 
questions of ‘what’ rather than just ‘how’; what does each perspective ‘see’, rather 
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than just how it comes to see it as such. Viveiros de Castro is led to such an argument 
through the Amazonian ethnography itself. As he puts it: 
In sum, animals are people, or see themselves as persons. Such a notion is virtually always 
associated with the idea that the manifest form of each species is a mere envelope (or 
‘clothing’) which conceals an internal human form, usually only visible to the eyes of the 
particular species or to certain trans-specific beings such as shamans. This internal form is 
the ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ of the animal: an intentionality or subjectivity formally identical to 
human consciousness, materializable, let us say, in a human bodily schema concealed behind 
an animal mask. At first sight then, we would have a distinction between an anthropomorphic 
essence of a spiritual type, common to animate beings, and a variable bodily appearance, 
characteristic of each individual species but which rather than being a fixed attribute is 
instead a changeable and removable clothing (1998:470-471). 
What Viveiros de Castro implies here is that both humans and nonhumans alike have 
the capacity to have a point of view, although one which differs radically among 
different species. To have a point of view is due to a capacity common to all species, 
an ‘intentionality or subjectivity’, which is ultimately a ‘human bodily schema’ 
integral to them. The ‘envelope’ body, the ‘animal mask’, is what makes them 
perceive different things, to have different points of view; this is why, for example, 
what is blood for humans is manioc beer for jaguars. Perspectivism goes beyond this 
radical difference in perspectives; exactly because the external bodily form is an 
‘envelope’, there is the possibility, under specific conditions, for a person from any 
species to adopt another one’s point of view, instantiating a ‘perspectival inversion’ 
(1998:471). It is this inherent potentiality of perspectives-as-bodies to become other 
perspectives-bodies that makes perspectivism possible, where the locus is the 
bodynatureand not the mindculture. This is also evinced in Amerindian 
mythology, where the present bodily and perspectival differences had not yet 
occurred: 
The differentiation between ‘culture’ and ‘nature’, which Lévi-Strauss showed to be the 
central theme of Amerindian mythology, is not a process of differentiating the human from 
the animal, as in our evolutionist mythology. The original common condition of both humans 
and animals is not animality but rather humanity. The great mythical separation reveals not 
so much culture distinguishing itself from nature but rather nature distancing itself from 
culture: the myths tell how animals lost the qualities inherited or retained by humans […] 
Humans are those who continue as they have always been: animals are ex-humans, not 
humans ex-animals (1998:471-472). 
Consequently, the ‘given’ and universal factor in Amerindian perspectivism is 
humanity as a ‘condition’, while the ‘made’ and particular one is the body. Whatever 
has a potential point of view is a subject and, in this sense, is human (1998:476-477). 
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‘Animals see in the same way as we do different things because their bodies are 
different from ours’ (1998:478). Viveiros de Castro warns us that the ‘body’ here is 
not to be understood as ‘a synonym for distinctive substance or fixed shape’: 
[I]t is an assemblage of affects or ways of being that constitute a habitus. Between the formal 
subjectivity of souls and the substantial materiality of organisms there is an intermediate 
plane which is occupied by the body as a bundle of affects and capacities and which is the 
origin of perspectives (1998:478). 
It is this kind of body where different perspectives emerge but can also be 
apprehended (1998:479-480). Shamans are people who are able to ‘put on’ other 
entities’ bodies-as-clothing, and adopt their perspectives; something which suggests 
that, ultimately, bodies are not mere ‘envelopes’, but constitutive of what one, 
through the body, perceives. This is why efficacy is inscribed into the skin or masks: 
To put on mask-clothing is not so much to conceal a human essence beneath an animal 
appearance, but rather to activate the powers of a different body. The animal clothes that 
shamans use to travel the cosmos are not fantasies but instruments: they are akin to diving 
equipment, or space suits, and not to carnival masks. The intention when donning a wet suit 
is to be able to function like a fish, to breathe underwater, not to conceal oneself under a 
strange covering […] the interest lies more in what these clothes do rather than what they 
hide (1998:482). 
From (Amerindian) ‘perspectivism’ to (Afro-Cuban) ‘divination’ (via Inner Asia) 
Most ethnographic accounts, apart from those of Viveiros de Castro, which deal with 
perspectivism derive from the indigenous peoples of Central and South America and 
especially the Amazon (see Århem 1993, 1996; Course 2007, 2009, 2010; Fausto 
2007; Gow 2001; Lima 1999; Sulkin 2005; Vilaça 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005). Despite 
their ethnographic particularities, again, most of these accounts are interested in 
revealing the perspectival variation among different kinds of ‘persons’; what is 
broadly defined as ‘humans’ and ‘nonhumans’. 
Perspectivism, apart from an ‘ethnographic fact’, is also a theoretical, and 
even ethical, stance. As I said before, going against ‘reductionism’ and 
‘constructivism’, which are led to matters of ‘representation’ (for interesting 
discussions, see Latour 2010; Pickering 2000; Strathern 1990, 1999; Wagner 1978, 
1986), perspectivism can be seen as a (more) critical decisionhence its ethical 
dimensionto take seriously the intentionality, subjectivity and personhood (see 
Mauss 1996) of ‘nonhumans’ or, in other words, their ‘ontological’ constitution, 
rather than their symbolic features, metaphorical meaning, or (anti-)social function. 
191 
 
This ‘theoretical’ stance bares its ‘loop’ implications to and is congruent with 
perspectivism’s ‘ethnographic’ dimensions. Description is not only confined to 
‘nonhumans’ as ways or tools‘epistemology’ in Viveiros de Castro’s termsof 
reflecting or constructing human relations, social structures or even dealing with 
human needs and anxieties, but heavily gravitates towards what‘ontology’ in 
Viveiros de Castro’s termsthey are; in other words, indigenous definitions of them. 
This creates a relatively new and not so much cultivated field of ethnographic 
description of the instances wherein humans perceive nonhumans and vice versa, 
especially in their perspectival exchanges: ‘[P]erspectivism may have a deep 
connection with exchangenot only how it may be a type of exchange, but how any 
exchange is by definition an exchange of perspectives’ (Viveiros de Castro 
2004a:473). 
This, I believe, points to the strong affinities between Amerindian 
perspectivism and Afro-Cuban divination. In both, an ‘exchange of perspectives’ is 
vital and their driving force; its mana, so to speak. To extract perspectivism from its 
Amerindian context is not a straightforward thing to do, and it is here that the tight 
bond between its ‘theoretical’ and ‘ethnographic’ dimensions is mostly exemplified. 
Nevertheless, by trying to do so, we might gain a broader perspective of its fruitful 
merits for anthropology. Another important element of perspectivism, where its 
theory and ethnography appear to converge, is how the personhood of nonhumans is 
understood. Rather than adopting a ‘relativistic’ stance, which would probably argue 
that because nonhumans are ascribed agency and intentionality they are thus given a 
voice, a perspective, perspectivism inverts such a claim by arguing that it is the 
perspective that creates the person, be that human or nonhuman: ‘the point of view 
creates the subject’ (Viveiros de Castro 1998:476). 
In the Afro-Cuban cosmos, as we have seen, other-than-human entities are 
subjects because they have perspectives which are instantiated either as affects 
through the body and its senses (muertos) or as myths through consecrated objects 
(orichas). One of the main obstacles that perspectivism poses in the effort to export it 
out of the dense Amazonian ‘forest of mirrors’ (Viveiros de Castro 2004b), seems to 
be the strong correlation of nonhumans with animals, forcing the Amazonianists to 
engage on a more theoretical level with the debate on ‘culture and nature’ and stand 
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critically towards ‘our Western naturalist cosmologies’, to echo Descola (1996:88). 
To repeat in a succinct fashion some of perspectivism’s Amerindian characteristics, 
the potential capacity to have a point of view is attributed to a condition common to 
all species of humanity (‘culture’), while the content of the point of view, what is 
seen and perceived, varies because they occupy different bodies (‘nature’). Hence, 
the conclusion that perspectivism poses, namely, that there is one culture and many 
natures, against ‘our’ one nature, many cultures: ‘If [...] the common condition of 
humans and animals is humanity not animality, this is because ‘humanity’ is the 
name for the general form taken by the Subject’ (Viveiros de Castro 1998:477). 
Even if perspectivism is taken as a phenomenon that relates humans with 
nonhumans other than animals, such as spirits of the dead and deities (see Viveiros 
de Castro 1992:58-91, 215-251; 1998:482-483), nonhumans-as-animals seem to 
encompass the latter and thus define them. Here we are faced with small-scale 
socialities very much predicated on hunting, occasional warfare, potential affinity 
and potential enmity and constituted on an interchangeable and dialectical ‘game’ of 
predator and prey.24 As Viveiros de Castro puts it: 
The fundamental distinction between the living and the dead is made by the body and 
precisely not by the spirit; death is a bodily catastrophe which prevails as differentiator over 
the common ‘animation’ of the living and the dead [...] [B]eing definitely separated from 
their bodies, the dead are not human. As spirits defined by their disjunction from a human 
body, the dead are logically attracted to the bodies of animals; this is why to die is to 
transform into an animal [references omitted], as it is to transform into other figures of bodily 
alterity, such as affines and enemies. In this manner, if animism affirms a subjective and 
social continuity between humans and animals, its somatic complement, perspectivism, 
establishes an objective discontinuity, equally social, between live humans and dead humans 
(1998:482-483). 
Animals, and nature in general, have more tangible ‘bodies’ than, say, the dead or 
deities, and it seems that many Amerindians concentrate their perspectival efforts on 
the former, or in terms of the former when confronted with the latter. But, what about 
those contexts where this is not the case, and deities and the dead enter the 
‘perspectivist game’ and occupy its focal position? In order to proceed, I propose that 
it is essential not to stick to all the premises of perspectivism as this has been 
developed by the ‘Americanists’. That ‘the point of view creates the subject’ may not 
reveal a common condition of humanity but stress the proposition that intentionality 
                                                 
24 See, for example, Århem 1993:11-12; Lima 1999; Sulkin 2005:5, 18-20; Vilaça 2005:450-452; 
Viveiros de Castro 1998:471; outside the Amerindian context, see Willerslev 2007. 
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(subjectivity, agency, intelligence, for example) and the ability to have a perspective 
is not necessarily distinctive of humans. 
Yet, and this is what I believe applies for perspectivism in general, the body, 
not only in its variations, such as human and animal, but also in its various degrees of 
absencesas is with muertos and orichas, and as is stated in the beginning of the 
previous quotation by Viveiros de Castroplays a central role. Following from the 
previous chapter, and after taking a small detour through Inner Asia, where 
perspectivism has been recently sought to be exported, I shall try to throw more light 
onto the Afro-Cuban ethnography and argue that other-than-human perspectives in 
Cuba are perceived and, thus defined, in relation to human bodies and perspectives as 
they variably lack a human body. Briefly put, muertos are ex-human bodies and 
orichas are non-bodies, thus being able to occupy and encompass a variety of other 
‘bodies’. For the former, the effect is to adopt ‘immanent’ perspectives, while for the 
latter more ‘transcendental’ ones. In this peculiar context, affects and objects are and 
have perspectives and are thus subjects; and because the entities that mobilize and 
direct them do so in relation to human caminos and perspectives and bodies, Afro-
Cuban divination and its cosmos do indeed show a great potential affinity with 
perspectivism. 
In order to strengthen the link between (Amerindian) perspectivism and 
(Afro-Cuban) divination, I will take a small deviation which, nonetheless, throws 
light on both the particularity of Amerindian perspectivism and its potential 
theoretical reach. I will make use of a collective effort to take Viveiros de Castro’s 
perspectivism and explore the possibility of its analytical value in an ethnographic 
region as broad as Inner Asia (see Pedersen, Empson and Humphrey 2007; see also 
Pedersen 2001; Swancutt 2007; Willerslev 2007). I will pay particular attention to 
Holbraad and Willerslev’s contribution (2007), which, I believe, offers insightful 
conclusions. Inner Asian perspectivism, according to these authors, is a meaningful 
category exactly because it both resembles and contrasts with the Amerindian one. 
Let us follow their line of argument. 
In the very beginning of their paper the authors present us with an important 
feature of perspectivism: following DaCol, also a contributor to the same volume, 
they ask: ‘What can a body do? In perspectivism, this is always the question’ 
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(Holbraad and Willerslev 2007:329). Indeed, as we saw previously, differences in 
perspectives for the Amerindians are located in the differences among bodies (as 
‘bundles of affects’). Shortly after such a minimal definition of perspectivism, 
Holbraad and Willerslev suggest a stark contrast between Amerindian and Inner 
Asian Perspectivism, one that makes us ‘stretch’ (2007:330) our understanding of it. 
The latter deals more with ‘transcendent’ perspectives, while the former with 
‘immanent’ ones. Each one is further homologized or alternatively associated with a 
set of other terms: Inner Asian, ‘transcendental’ perspectivism is also ‘vertical’, 
‘asymmetrical’, ‘hierarchical’ and even ‘syntagmatic’, while Amerindian,’ 
immanentist’ perspectivism is ‘horizontal’, ‘symmetrical’, ‘egalitarian’ and even 
‘paradigmatic’. What all this might mean is exactly what the authors set out to 
explain in the rest of the paper. 
Amerindian perspectivism is ‘immanentist’ because each kind of being has 
inherently the capacity to become any other. This means that the faculty of having a 
point of view is potentially transferred as the faculty to adopt any other kind of point 
of view, provided there is a temporary bodily transformation. The shaman, from 
seeing bloodthe human point of viewtransforms into a being (a jaguar, for 
example) and, thus, sees it as manioc beer: 
Each being has the potential to transform into every other because all beings (or at least all 
the cosmologically significant species that enter into this perspectivist game) containing each 
other’s perspectives immanently (Holbraad and Willerslev 2007:330). 
However, perspectival exchanges in Inner Asia are ‘vertical’ and this implies 
perspectives which are, paradoxical as it may initially sound, ‘transcendent’ to each 
other: 
[C]hanges of perspective cannot only be a matter of actualising a potential that already exists 
immanently within all beings, since beings are asymmetrically circumscribed in terms of 
their relative lack of precisely such a potential. Rather, beings’ perspectivist transformations 
must also involve the capacity to occupy perspectives that are transcendent to them 
(2007:331). 
While the Amerindians’ adoption of other perspectives is absolute, they fully see 
exactly what the other sees (blood becomes beer), the Inner Asians adopt them by 
proxy, as it were, and, thus, ‘in a crucial sense remain other to them’ (2007:331). 
How can perspectives be able to be exchanged if they are transcendent to each other, 
the authors ask. Given that we are dealing with perspectivism, namely, that each 
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perspective is ‘constituted by its relations to all other perspectives’ (2007:333), what 
should be explored is in what way transcendence and perspectivism might be related. 
This requires a notion of transcendence that although it is defined, negatively, as an 
‘impossibility’, at the same time, can also be defined, positively, not in terms of 
‘lack’ or ‘absence’, but in terms of an ‘excessive presence’, as the totality of 
perspectives: 
What makes perspectives transcendent is that they contain within themselves too many, 
rather than too few, viewpoints – the ‘view from everywhere’ rather than the perhaps more 
familiar ‘view from nowhere’ (2007:333). 
It is this transcendental ‘view from everywhere’ that is attained in Inner Asian 
perspectivism. Nevertheless, this does not occur in absolute terms. Starting from 
Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception, Holbraad and Willerslev argue that to 
perceive an object always involves doing so from a certain point of view. This means 
that from the point of view of a particular perspective, there will always be other 
sides of the object that are not attained, they remain hidden, but one can presume or 
imagine them. It is this sense of other unseen yet envisaged sides that suggest, 
theoretically at least, the possibility of the ‘view from everywhere’, which in 
Merleau-Ponty’s terms, is a ‘normative ideal’ (2007:334); an ideal which because 
perspectives are body-specific, can never be fully realised but only perceived in 
various degrees of relative absence (see 2007:334). It is this ‘normative ideal’ that 
Viveiros de Castro describes as existing in the mythical past of the Amerindians, 
where differences in perspectives did not exist and bodies were mixed with each 
other. What prevailed then was an in-distinction of perspectives, a ‘perfect 
transparency’, a ‘chaosmos’ (2007:335; see also Viveiros de Castro 2004b). 
Inner Asian cosmologies do not conceive such a pre-perspectival 
mythological past and world. Similarly, their shamans, when they come into contact 
with the spirit-world, do not perceive it as transparently as their Amerindian 
counterparts do. Spirits are perceived in a distorted, ‘non-realist and sometimes 
monstrous fashion’ (2007:336): 
[I]f the ‘invisible’ world of spirits is defined as the ‘view from everywhere’, then it follows 
that such a viewpoint cannot be embodied in any conventional realist form […] the shaman 
does not fully occupy the ‘view from everywhere’, since no embodied subject can fully 
occupy this view […] Perhaps this is the reason why not even shamans are clear about what 
spirits actually see (2007:336-337). 
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Inner Asians, thus, can only get glimpses of this ‘view from everywhere’ and be 
limited in their effort to approach but never fully reach it. Their world is one of 
asymmetrical and hierarchical orders (of things and spirits) and, accordingly, 
perspectival transformations occur in a vertical axis in relation to the ideal ‘view 
from everywhere’. 
Because such an ideal is ultimately unattainable, each perspective is at a 
particular and variable distance from it. Not all perspectives are equidistant from it; 
this is why there is verticality. The closer to it the more they are valued; this is why 
there is hierarchy: ‘Inner Asian perspectivism then forces us to deal with degrees of 
perceptive power’ (2007:341). The closer to the ideal the more perceptive one is or 
becomes. The more distantembodiedthe more limited to a view from 
somewhere. Horizontal, immanentist perspectives can equally substitute one another 
like paradigms. Vertical, transcendental ones ordinally distribute themselves as 
distances from the ‘view from everywhere’ like syntagms: 
So if the semiotic metaphor for the perspectives that beings can occupy in the Amerindian 
case is something like the letters of the alphabet, in the Inner Asian case it would be the 
words that letters can make up or, by extension, the sentences and narratives that words 
themselves can build in syntax. The Inner Asian shaman, for example, becomes a spirit less 
like an ‘x’ could become a ‘y’ or ‘z’, and more like Cinderella could become a princess 
(2007:342). 
This hierarchical transcendalist perception of perspectives also has a temporal 
dimension. Their distribution is temporalas ‘asymmetrical relations of ‘before’ and 
‘after’’ (2007:343)and thus their deviation is not only measured from the ideal 
‘view from everywhere’ but also from the equally ideal ‘view from everywhen’ 
(2007:344). 
Having taken this small detour, from Cuba to the Amazon and then to Inner 
Asia, we return full circle back to Cuba. What does all this have to do with Afro-
Cuban divination, one could ask. Are divination and perspectivism interchangeable 
terms? And if they are, what is it in Cuba, ‘vertical’ or ‘horizontal’, Inner Asian or 
Amerindian-like? Well, maybe it is both; and more! It would be, though, too forced 
or a contradiction in terms to make an argument that in Cuba there are different kinds 
of perspectivism (a multi-perspectivist cosmos?). I wish rather to propose that what 
Holbraad and Willerslev identify as (Amerindian) ‘horizontal’ and ‘immanentist’ and 
what as (Inner Asian) ‘vertical’ and ‘transcendentalist’ perspectivism, may bare 
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striking resemblances to the ‘immanent’ perspectives of muertos and the 
‘transcendental’ ones of orichas. In this case, and as I hinted in the previous chapter, 
because the various motions that divination directs are harnessed through the ‘space’ 
in-between immanence and transcendence, and not as referential points in isolation, 
Afro-Cuban perspectivism is instantiated in and premised on this intermediary and 
‘motile’, sensu Holbraad,  ‘space’. 
The point of departure and initial reference is, once more, Holbraad and his 
view on Ocha/Ifá divination. In the last part of his contribution to Thinking Through 
Things (2007b; especially pp. 207-217), Holbraad, as we have already seen, refers to 
the ‘problem of transcendence’ (2007b:207), both as an ethnographic and a 
theoretical one. The orichas, albeit being transcendent and mythological entities, can 
and do relate to humans by becoming immanent through the powerful powder of 
divination. This movement from transcendence to immanence is best thought as one 
from distance to proximity. This is exactly the point where Holbraad brings Viveiros 
de Castro into the discussion (2007b:209-217). 
Briefly, he argues that both the orichas and the Amerindian spirits are 
characterised by a ‘potentiality’ (‘virtuality’ in Viveiros de Castro’s terms and 
‘motility’ in his) to relate by becoming other (2007b:210). Nevertheless, there is a 
contrast between the two: Amerindian spirits ‘exist’ and ‘become’ immanently; 
whereas the orichas’ potentiality and ‘intrinsic capacity’ is to move from 
transcendence to immanence. It is here that Holbraad, following Stephen Hugh-
Jones, distinguishes between ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ types of shamanism and, by 
extension, divination (2007b:214-215). We have already seen what these two types 
are and how they can be compared through the ethnographic lenses of Amerindian 
and Inner Asian perspectivism. Exactly the same strategy is followed in order to 
compare the anarchic horizontality of Amerindian spirits and the hierarchical 
verticality of the orichas. Similarly to Inner Asian spirits, which are conceived in 
terms of distance and degrees from the ‘view from everywhere’, ‘what makes Ifá 
‘vertical’ is the cosmological premise upon which such rankings are conceived, 
namely the idea that deities can be characterised by their degree of ‘distance’ from 
the human world’ (2007b:215). 
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If such is the close affinity of the orichas to Inner Asian spirits, one could not 
be accused of thinking that what Holbraad has in mind for Ocha/Ifá divination is that 
it is indeed a kind of perspectivism: 
They [the orichas] differ from the Amazonian paradigm in that their ontic transformations 
also imply shifts in what one might call ontological status, since their multiple becoming is 
inflected hierarchically as a ‘continuum’ of relatively proximate and relatively distant 
‘manifestations’ […] The shamanic ability to ‘call spirits’, explains Viveiros de Castro, is a 
matter of ‘vision’: where non-shamans just see animals in the forest, for example, shamans 
see spirits […] The problem with the orishas, on the other hand, is not so much that they are 
invisible but rather that they are not fully ‘here’ in the first place. After all, insofar as the 
orishas are visible at all, it takes no special powers to see them […] The problem is how to 
elicit the deities’ presence in these concrete forms [such as the consecrated objects] – how to 
elicit immanence, having posited transcendence. One might say that if the shaman’s task is to 
see what is present, the diviner’s is to render present what is already seen (2007b:216). 
Holbraad goes as far as to repeat the semiotic metaphor of ‘syntagmatic’ and 
‘paradigmatic’ relations, the former providing relational shifts of ‘before’ and ‘after’. 
He concludes: 
[D]eity-human relations [in Ifá] are not given as cosmological fait accompli (as virtual 
relations that are there for those who can see them, as in horizontal shamanism), but rather 
have to be accomplished by eliciting the deities from the relative ontological distance of 
transcendence to the relative proximity of immanence (2007b:217). 
Striking as these resemblances between Inner Asian perspectivism and Ocha/Ifá 
divination may seem, there is an important difference which, I suspect, prevents 
Holbraad from openly and unproblematically advocating the latter’s potential 
conflation with perspectivism. This could be argued to be the fact that Inner Asian 
shamans seem to ‘function’ as receivers and transmitters of the spirits’ perspectives 
mainly through the body and its perceptive powers rather than what in Ocha/Ifá 
divination seems to play such an important role, namely, oracles crucially involving, 
first, objects and, second, mythological ‘signs’. If in perspectivism, what a body can 
do is always the question, then what of the latter, where bodies are somewhat 
secondary in the perceptive ability to adopt the deities’ perspectives. An immediate 
and facile way to get round this apparent incompatibility is by trying to answer the 
question in initially negative terms. What can a body not do, could also be part of the 
question perspectivism forces us to always ask (or at least a particular kind of 
perspectivism). 
However, I would like to suggest that the ‘non-bodily-ness’ of the orichas 
permits them to occupy and move through a multiplicity of ‘bodies’, not only human 
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but nonhuman as well, such as ‘objects’ like their oracles. Before dealing with the 
perspectives of the orichas, I will first engage with those of muertos as I have 
classified them into ‘alien’, nfumbi and ‘affines’. Their perspectives heavily rely on 
two different but simultaneous conditions: muertos in general, being ex-humans, 
used to have a body with a specific biography but, at the same time, they do not fully 
have it in their present state. As their past conditionembodied biographypersists 
through affective memories, their present conditiondisembodied necrographyis 
defined by the former as a movement (or not, in the case of ‘alien’ muertos) away 
from it. 
The perspectives of muertos 
(a) ‘Alien’ muertos 
A very broad distinction among deities and muertos is the ‘form’ in which each 
category comes to instantiate itself as a subject with a point of view; a perspective. 
The orichas ‘speak’ through objects since their consecration confers them the ability 
to ‘come down’ at the invocative will of the humans and render the perspectives of 
the former relevant to the lives of the latter. Thus, the objects manipulated as the 
orichas’ oracles could be seen as the adequate and necessary ‘things’ with which 
they ‘speak’, namely, as their communicative organs. When an adept or client of the 
Ocha/Ifá oracles exclaims: ‘such-and-such oricha told me so-and-so’, he or she 
suggests the above. Furthermore, the very oracles of Ocha and Ifá when cast on the 
divining mat, they may fall ‘mouth-up’ (boca-arriba) or ‘mouth-down’ (boca-abajo). 
It is often said by diviners that it is the first which signifies the ‘conversing position’ 
(posición conversatoria) of the oracle. 
On the other hand, the muertos ‘speak’ through a much more visceral and 
affective fashion, leaving aside objects, and placing them in a secondary although 
often complementary position. When people recount what muertos tell them, this 
involves an experience whereby what is said is conveyed through the senses and the 
body of the mediums. Muertos do not have a body as suchthis is what crucially 
makes them muertos after allbut they get attached to a body and communicate 
through it. Following from this broad distinction between deities-as-objects and 
muertos-as-affects, I shall try to clarify in what way we can compare the kinds of 
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perspectives each articulate and what humans perceive by adopting them in 
divination.  
Within the category of muertos, as I have already described, we can trace 
another broad distinction, that between ‘alien’ and ‘affines’. A very common 
approach towards muertos is initiated by fathoming out whether a particular muerto 
that makes its presence felt, is ‘attached’ to the individual in a more or less 
permanent way. In the case that a muerto’s presence is sensed as accidental or 
incidental this consequently indicates that the muerto does not ‘belong’ to the 
individual and therefore the two must be distanced and kept apart. Importantly, this 
sensing of not belonging and incidental attachment is confluent with a sense of an 
absence. Nevertheless, the absence I am referring to is not to be understood in terms 
of existence or as the opposite of presencethis would contradict the very point that 
there are ‘alien’ muertos and they can be feltbut, rather, in terms of a potentiality 
to initiate and cultivate a relation, what, in other words, is positively postulated for 
muertos who do have an ‘affinity’ with the personthe ‘affines’. The absence of any 
relational potentiality of ‘alien’ muertos is sensed in various ways. The words 
mediums often use to describe the experience of them indicate a sense of ‘chilliness’ 
(frialdad) and ‘darkness’ (oscuridad), for example. More often, they indicate a lack 
of knowledge both about the muerto itself and from it about the person who it has 
incidentally got attached to. A much more complex phenomenon is that ‘alien’ 
muertos do offer knowledge and information, but this is ultimately confusing and 
confused. Indeed, as these muertos are depicted as aimlessly wandering spirits in a 
state of confusion, they are very likely to transfer their confusion to the person they 
temporarily get attached to. Ultimately, ‘alien’ muertos are thought and perceived as 
entities which cause misdirection insofar as they are misdirected themselves. Here is 
an aspect that the living and the dead share to a bigger degree than deities, and which 
does not create a rigid distinction between life and death. Both are perceived as 
having a course or a ‘path’. 
Humans, while in life, have a camino which, through the Afro-Cuban 
cosmos, is constituted by their relations to other-than-human entities. Death brings a 
destruction of the body, but not a complete annihilation of the person (see Bloch and 
Parry 1996; Course 2007; Hertz 1960; Tsintjilonis 2004a, 2004b, 2007). The 
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decomposition of the body is part of its transition to the world of the dead, which in 
its turn is also transitory. An important feature of this chain of transitions, from life 
to death, to the various phases of death itself, is considered to be a realization of such 
a qualitatively distinct ontological leap, from embodied life to a disembodied one. It 
is vital that this be achieved in the early stages of death, because, otherwise, the 
disembodied person will still act as and think as if it is alive. 
For instance, my friend Yodania, when she moved to her new flat, would 
experience a series of minor mischiefs. She often heard strange sounds coming from 
rooms other than the one she happened to be in, she would occasionally find that her 
furniture had moved position, belongings went missing and only to then reappear 
where they used to be, and power cuts when this did not occur in the rest of the 
neighbourhood. An espiritista friend of hers once visited Yodania and, to the latter’s 
surprise, she immediately told her that she could sense the spirit of an old lady in the 
house. The old lady, according to Yodania’s friend, used to live in the house and had 
died alone from a stroke. Her spirit was in a state of confusion and insisted on 
inhabiting what it perceived to still be her house. After that, they conducted a 
‘cleansing’ (limpieza) of the house and ‘gave acknowledgment’ (dar conocimiento) 
to the spirit, making it aware that it was no longer alive and the owner of the house. 
Here is an example of a muerto that does not belong to the person by way of 
‘affinity’, but its presence indicates the absence of a relation to a living human being 
that would ‘acknowledge’ in full its new condition as muerto and develop an intimate 
relation with it. From Yodania’s point of view, the muerto was ‘alien’ and remained 
as such by an initial acknowledgment but also a consequent expiation; the muerto 
was sent off and literally evicted. I do not possess substantial ethnographic evidence 
that ‘alien’ muertos are solely perceived as those who do not know that they are 
dead, and I suspect that, although a recurrent theme, this may not be the only 
definition of them. It is here that I suggest ‘perspectivism’ can provide us with a 
more adequate understanding. 
Much of what a muerto is required to do is to start getting used to its new 
condition, one that is characterized by the loss of its body; but this is not an abrupt 
loss where automatically its memories and affects dissolve into nothingness. There is 
a transitional phase wherein its individuality and memory as an ex-living human 
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being start fading. Its biographycamino in lifebegins a slow process of 
transformation into a necrographycamino in death. ‘Alien’ muertos have been 
formally and physically detached from their body; that is what makes them muertos. 
Nevertheless, from an affective point of view, they keep on remembering it and this 
makes them attached to it; affectively as memories, physically in its remains. Thus, 
affects, memories, habits, experiences and, in general, biographical residues survive 
the demise of the body. In the case of ‘alien’ muertos, though, these biographical 
residues are too intense and haunt the muerto without letting it transcend its human 
and individual past and ‘evolve’, in spiritist terms. Intense as these memories may 
be, they are not communicated in their detail to the living but in their pure and 
indistinct intensity. In fact, between the latter and ‘alien’ muertos there seems to be a 
profound void of communication and relation; at least in the positive terms that 
‘affinity’ denotes. ‘Alien’ muertos are the ones who cannot adopt perspectives as 
muertos. In general, other-than-human entities are praised for having perspectives 
humans, under normal, non-oracular conditions, cannot attain. The excessive 
attachment to matter of ‘alien’ muertos makes them sense and perceive the world as 
if they were alive and, even more so, to sense it through the body and its biographical 
residues of the living individual they used to be, even in the physical absence of it. 
‘Alien’ muertos can thus be broadly defined as those who are alien to the fact 
that they are muertos. Their perspectives are too immanent to the world of their 
‘things’ and the living and, for that, they cannot ‘other’ themselves from the 
pasttheir biographyand identify with their new conditiontheir necrography. 
This lack of potential to transcend does not signify a kind of transcendence as the 
hallmark of non-relation, but quite the opposite. Not being able to move from 
immanence to transcendence is what constitutes their inability to relate. In relation to 
perspectivism, the perspectives of them just remain ‘human’ perspectives and, thus, 
do not ‘alter’ themselves qualitatively so as to become radically different 
perspectives that would grant them the possibility to enter the ‘perspectivist game’ 
and start ‘seeing’ themselves as spirits. 
(b) Nfumbi 
The nfumbi are muertos drawn from the reservoir of ‘alien’ muertos. Previously 
unrelated, they undergo a kind of transformation which simultaneously alters their 
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condition as ‘alien’ and, in another sense, preserves if not accentuates it. The 
excessive attachmentimmanenceof ‘alien’ muertos to ‘matter’ is revealed by the 
way an nfumbi is constituted. The palero unearths its human remains and places 
them into the nganga, a ritually ‘prepared’ receptacle in which the nfumbi will come 
to reside and ‘work’ with the palero. Whatever else ‘material attachment’ means, in 
the case of ‘alien’ muertos, it importantly involves an attachment to their 
biographical residues I previously mentioned. These ‘reside’ or are attached to what 
physically remains from the body, the bones and the skull. By unearthing them, an 
apparently contradictory event occurs, which seems to be constitutive of what nfumbi 
are. One the one hand, the muerto having been unconsciously drawn from its 
remains, realizes ‘in shock’ (see below) that it is a spirit of someone who has died. 
Augusto an old palero remembers: 
When I went to the cemetery, almost 25 years ago, to find my muerto, I remember the state 
of shock the nfumbi was in at the beginning. I chanted for a long time over its remains in its 
tomb, so as to bring it near them [the remains]. When I sensed its presence, I started 
explaining to it that it was dead and with nobody to take care of it. It reacted violently and 
even tried to possess me, but I resisted. It was only after it realized its condition [as dead and 
alone] that it agreed to become my nfumbi and gave me permission to bring its bones back at 
home and put them in the nganga. It knew that if it didn’t [give permission] it would remain 
permanently wandering alone and confused in this world. 
It is as if the nfumbi is drawn by its remains but without realizing that they are 
remains of its dead body. In a sense, it is drawn to them but cannot perceive them as 
suchas remainsbut as what they previously were. The muerto does not see 
remains from without; it senses them from within as if they still functioned as the 
internal structure of a living body, surrounded by organs, flesh and skin. Thus, the 
manipulation of the bones and skull by the palero ‘violently’ transform an interior 
organ to an exterior one and, in this sense, the muerto, equally violently and abruptly, 
realizes for the first time its condition as dead. Nevertheless, this does not lead to a 
more ‘peaceful’ transcending to the world of the dead, as the unearthing and 
manipulation of its remains keep on reminding the muerto of its individuality and 
human past. The most significant transformation is that from an ‘alien’, unrelated 
and aimlessly wandering spirit, it becomes related to somebodythe paleroand 




Ngangas, before receiving an nfumbi, are said to be animated and function as 
a sort of ‘protection’ (protección) to a relatively smaller degree when compared to 
when they do acquire the nfumbi. When the nfumbi is inserted into them, it is said 
that ngangas acquire their full potential of strength and efficacy, followed by a 
second ‘initiation’ (rayamiento), linking and conferring the ‘powers’ (poderes) of the 
nganga to the initiate. Among others, these include: the right to initiate others in 
Palo; the increase of efficacy of his spells, as now he ‘works’ with his nfumbi, and an 
increase in the ‘vision’ (vista) of the palero, as now he can communicate with the 
nfumbi and acquire, through it, valuable information; that is, the full accomplishment 
of the nganga as an oracular centre. Augusto comments on this point: 
When the nfumbi came into the nganga it [the nganga] acquired a life of its own. Before it 
served as a small protection, but now it became a whole entity [una entidad completa], with 
which I could communicate in full and conduct strong works [hacer trabajos fuertes]. 
Could it not be suggested, then, that the nganga becomes the new body of the nfumbi 
which, although it is formed by totally new ‘ingredients’ (the receptacle and the rest 
of the things placed in it), in it exists something of its old human body, its bones and 
skull? I do not have enough information to firmly claim the above hypothesis, yet it 
seems definitive that the nfumbi adds to and augments the vista of the palero. 
Therefore, nfumbi have perspectives and paleros are the individuals who can adopt 
them.  
This is exemplified in instances of ‘witchcraft’ (brujería), where the nfumbi 
prove to be the entities par excellence, first, to ‘send’ it and, second, to detect it, that 
is, to perceive other nfumbi and the brujería they ‘send’. Because the nfumbi are 
muertos with an obstructed caminoand because their materialization in the nganga 
obfuscates this obstruction as it embodies them in a too ‘human’ way through their 
remainsthey are able to be engaged with the everyday and very personal desires 
and fears of humans. In other words, their efficacy is traced as having an extremely 
immanent perspective very akin to humans, although with their own ‘supernatural’ 
powers, they are able to perceive details of human caminos which other, more 
disembodied entities, in their transcendental perspective, fail to detect. Additionally, 
these very context specific perspectives are able to influence, obstruct or re-align 
human caminos in their particularities, but not so much in the more general flow of 
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them. In this sense, human perspectives and nfumbi perspectives are always in 
tension, of the one merging into the other, as their ontological affinity is indeed in 
very close and immanent contact. 
(c) ‘Affine’ muertos 
To some important extent, ‘affine’ muertos can be said to be those who, unlike the 
‘alien’ ones, are in a positive process of acquiring a perspectival ability that is ‘true’ 
to their new condition as disembodied entities, which nevertheless, used to be human 
and embodied. The large qualitative difference between ‘alien’ muertos and ‘affines’ 
was indicated to me by the fact that the latter, in their tendency to get attached to and 
follow a particular living human being, had a wealth of relevant things to say and 
perspectives to transmit. As there is a multiplicity of ‘affine’ muertos who get 
attached to an individual, each one slowly builds its identity by spelling out 
information about aspects of its biographical past, its wishes of the present and 
valuable knowledge about its living ‘affine’. 
Muertos do not get attached to a person’s body in order to gain a perspectival 
capacity; they do so in order to communicate it. In the success of this their 
perspective changes; it starts transcending. Their perspective starts evolving into a 
more transcendental one. Their initial anonymity involves an inert and immanent 
state where they are attached too much to their biography, impeding them to have a 
‘proper’ necrography; one that could make them able to transform. To do so, a 
muerto needs to get attached to some-body and initiate a relation with it; start an 
exchange of perspectives. As an ‘affine’, the muerto is now able to channel its 
desires but, along with this, it also gets intimate with the desires of the person. Thus, 
may not this be a process of realization and actualization in the sense that what 
previously seemed to be a monologue is actually a dialogue? A body is inhabited by 
more than one voice which must be discerned so that they can converse with each 
other. An affect, such as a headache, is not exactly one’s own but the effort of 
another’s perspective to be given voice, to pass on a message. Affects, in this case, 
are perspectives and vice versa. 
Trying to come to terms with what people might mean by ‘affinity’ when 
they describe their relation to ‘their muertos’, we could view it as one in which a 
person becomes intimate with the ‘alter’ and not the self, ‘an intimacy which gives 
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rise to familiarity rather than the other way round’ (Tsintjilonis 2004b: 383). A body, 
in this way, becomes a shared ‘material’ and because of this, perspectives must be 
exchanged in order to be voiced. This is multiplied by the fact that one does not only 
discern between his or her self and a muerto, but also between one and another 
muerto; a body is followed by a multiplicity of muertos and if a headache is due to 
one, a certain affinity to music, for instance, might be perceived as stemming from 
another muerto. It is also worth noting that this kind of ‘affinity’ is not static. The 
headache might come less often or become less intense, or even disappear, as soon 
and as long as the person acknowledges the muerto’s presence and starts fulfilling its 
desires. On the other hand, cultivating one’s musical inclinations is perceived as a 
parallel cultivation of their relation with the other muerto. Equally, the muertos’ very 
presence is not static either. A muerto might become more evident and vociferous at 
a certain period in one’s life and diminish or even disappear at another. In pure 
spiritist terms, this kind of waning of a muerto and its affects signifies that it has 
reached a quite high level of spiritual evolution and material detachment. The muerto 
becomes once again more anonymous, more disembodied and detached from its 
particular biography. At the same time, its perspective also becomes less specific and 
less concerned with the particularities of the everyday issues of the person to whom 
it was attached. Transcending embodiment, a very ‘spiritual’ muerto’s perspective 
also becomes more transcendental. Although still emanating from a particular body, 
it tends to be less intense applying ‘universal’ messages to ‘humanity’ in general, 
giving value to charity and good deeds for example (and, thus, adopting a moral 
character very familiar to a Christian ethos). 
In general, muertos transcending their memories of their past individuality 
and embodiment, start dissolving into a more anonymous agglomeration of muertos 
that is characterized by more typical features. The spirit of a doctor, for instance, that 
even as a spirit helped people heal, transcends into a group of spirits that heal, the 
‘medical commission’ (comisión medica; see chapter 3) and, at the same time, starts 
loosing its biographical residues that kept on resurfacing even after physical death. A 
complete elimination of these individual memories from the part of the spirit 
signifies very often a gradual ‘softening’ of the visceral experiences of it, they 
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become more subtle and, sometimes, even disappear and get totally detached from 
the living body of their ‘affine’. 
The ontological transformation of muertos through their ‘affinal’ and 
perspectival mobilization involves a process of disembodiment premised on their 
past partially persisting into their present bodily-ness. In order to transcend, muertos 
must be assisted into remembrance. It is only as soon as the muerto, importantly 
through the living, perceives its biography as a memory and not as still unfolding, as 
if it were alive, that it starts to forget and thus transcend. To borrow from Willerslev 
(2007), and his interesting juxtaposition of mimesis (Taussig 1993), ‘partial’ or 
‘analogous identifications’ (Pedersen 2001) and notion of ‘not me, not not-me’ 
(Schechner 1985), muertos, through their ‘affinization’ with the living, acquire a 
perspective within life and apart from it, ‘betwixt and between’ it (Willerslev 
2007:25). The muerto acquires a perspective of its biography as an ‘imperfect copy’ 
(2007:95), thus realizing its new condition (as muerto); and this is achieved through 
and with the help of its living ‘affine’: 
[I]t takes two to make one: the subject recognizes itself as such only at the moment it “loses” 
itself in/as another [...] There is a paradox here in that the subject must experience self-
objectification or self-alienation in order to gain a sense of itself as self (2007:67). 
The perspectives of the deities 
Deities like the orichas are entities that exhibit a much larger degree of alterity when 
it comes to what they are and what kind of ‘body’ they have. This is exemplified by 
the instances in which they appear and communicate with humans. Their alterity is 
suggested in the form of them ‘coming down’ and ‘speaking’. Being considered as 
more distant, their presence must be achieved by being ‘brought down’. Objects 
acquire a much more crucial role in this effort and bodies, being too human, are 
somewhat secondary. This is why divination involves consecrated objects which 
serve as the deities’ oracles and through them they ‘speak’. The orichas’ perspectives 
are deemed as, firstly, more encompassing, referring to the broader camino of the 
person, and, secondly and because of the former, as more general, where details are 
not at hand from the point of view of the deities. Their oracles are the means with 
which humans obtain a ‘visual’ presentation of a condensed mythological collection 
of events which are meant to correspond to the specific object of divination. The 
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orichas are seen to actively intervene in two main instances of divination. Firstly, 
they are the ones who, during the casting of the oracle, interfere and ‘give out’ the 
oracular configuration. Secondly, this configuration ‘says’, by way of 
correspondence, something about the client. Each ‘throw’ (tirada) of the oracle, 
while from the human point of view, is a throw left to chance, exactly because it 
occurs in a divinatory environment (where the orichas have been invoked and 
‘brought down’), from the deities’ point of view, the humans’ voluntary resignation 
of their agency transforms (as the oracle is falling on the divining mat) into what the 
orichas decide the oracular outcome to be. So, what seems to be apparently and 
initially left to chance is actually something left to the orichas. 
The outcome is a ‘sign’ (signo or oddu) which ‘stands for’ the specific 
mythological context that corresponds to the particular client and divination. Yet, 
each signo is more than a symbolic visualization of its contents, as it is treated as the 
very essence of what is said by the deities and, by extension, what corresponds to the 
client. This is probably why signos have an efficacy of their ownsacrifices are 
made to them directlyto the extent that, in certain contexts, they are deemed as 
entities in themselves or caminos of the deities invoked. What I wish to emphasize 
here is the intimate link between signos and the deities’ perspectival instantiation. 
Through the signos their perspectives are mobilized through divination and enter the 
‘perspectivist game’. Before the oracular revelation of one’s corresponding signos, 
theythe signosexist as a totality of events that happened in a mythological time 
and space and which very often involve the orichas themselves. Therefore, the myths 
can be said to be the biographies of the orichas. In their totality, they are said to 
explain everything that has existed, exists and will exist; ‘past, present and future’. 
This absolute encompassment of everything could be defined as an extreme 
kind of transcendence and, in Holbraad and Willerslev’s terms, transcendental 
perspectivism. The orichas see in the myths themselves. This is their transcendental 
perspective. Divination is a process of discernment and relative individuation. From 
the totality of perspectives, divination filters those that are most relevant. The deities’ 
active involvement in this exchange of perspectives is to highlight the parts of their 
own biographies that correspond to the client. Thus, from just perceiving themselves, 
they now have to take into account the human that seeks their perspective. By doing 
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so, they choose the relevant part of their mythological biography without altering it. 
The signo that ‘comes out’ in divination ‘speaks’ of mythological events, not ones of 
the present. These events do not change, and if they are the deities’ perspectives, 
humans just glance at them. Their perspectives do not change in content; they change 
from the total to the particular. If humans through divination adopt the deities’ point 
of view, this is in a literal sense, where the former see what the latter see, not the 
other way round. People see bits of mythological biographies as such, bringing a 
‘past’ cosmos into the present. It is their responsibility to understand and ‘interpret’ 
their lives through the lenses of that cosmos, not the cosmos’ to explain and give 
meaning to them. It is a ‘mytho-practical’ (c.f. Sahlins 1995) adoption of a 
perspective that is alter yet suggests its potential confluence with the ‘real-life’ 
situation of the divination’s client. 
The Afro-Cuban spirit world, thus, presents us with characteristics of both 
models of perspectivism described by Holbraad and Willerslev. On the one hand 
muertos in general seem to adopt and offer ‘horizontal’ and ‘immanentist’ 
perspectives, while on the other, the orichas ‘vertical’ and ‘transcendental’. The 
inclusion of these two tendencies into one general spiritual wholethe 
‘beyond’also suggests that whereas the distinctions proposed by these authors 
form two kinds of perspectivism, in Cuba, they form two kinds of perspectival 
capacity into one unitary perspectivist whole; an Afro-Cuban perspectivism. The 
‘beyond’ becomes a whole importantly through the mobilization of the exchange in 
perspectives. As with Amerindian perspectivism, the capacity to have a point of view 
is shared among humans and other-than-humans and what makes perspectives 
qualitatively different is their relation to their form, their body. The perspectival 
qualities of Afro-Cuban divination also reside in the fact that different kinds of 
‘bodies’ have different perspectives but, unlike Amerindian perspectivism, during 
their exchange in divination they are also transformed in order to take into account 
the rest. Here, perspectives are not as radically different among them because they 
occupy radically different bodies, human and animal, as in Amazonia. The difference 
lies in that each entity, from humans to muertos to the orichas, varies in its degree of 
bodily-ness and, confluent with this, its degree of perspectival reach. The more 
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embodied the less oracular or far-reaching the perspective and, thus, in more need for 
another’s perspective. 
  In order to strengthen the proposition of Afro-Cuban divination-as-
perspectivism, I will now turn to three ethnographic instances where not only other-
than-human perspectives are related to human ones, but also different other-than-
human ones meet and relate among them.  
Instance 1: consulting the Ocha oracle; the muertos interfere 
Today I am invited by my friend Emilia, a santera, to attend a consultation with the 
Ocha oracle, the dilogún. The consultation will be done for a young woman who has 
been initiated by Emilia. The young woman had previously told Emilia that she was 
experiencing problems at home, especially with her husband with whom she was 
more frequently fighting with, often their child being the ‘pretext’, as she said. After 
the dilogún was cast and the relevant signos with their ‘tendencies’ had been 
revealed, Emilia proceeded into their interpretation. Emilia told her ahijada that she 
was a bit confused with what to make of the signo, although it clearly mentioned 
‘problems at home or with the family.’ She explained, both to me and her, that one of 
the important things one has to fathom out for the signos was, first, which patakín 
(‘story’) best apply in the particular situation and, second, ‘who is who’ in actual life; 
in other words, how do the mythical characters correspond to the client and his or her 
environment. She added that it was almost clear to her which patakín corresponded 
to the situation, but that she was not sure about the ‘who is who’ part of it.  She 
turned to her ahijada and told her: ‘For that, I will need your help.’ They started 
discussing the nature of the fights and the behaviour of her husband. At certain 
points, Emilia would ask specific questions as if there was already a hint about the 
situation (later on I realized that the hints were suggested by the patakín itself). For 
example, she asked whether their child was equally loved by both. She also wanted 
to know of each parent’s behaviour towards the child, if it was caring or otherwise. 
During these questions I was puzzled by Emilia’s persistence on wanting to know 
about the child. The fights between the two parents seemed to me to be the most 
central part of the ‘issue’. For quite a while it seemed that no big advances were 
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being made towards clarification. Yet, during this seemingly trivial dialogue there 
was a moment when Emilia exclaimed in a decisive tone: 
Hija mia [my daughter, a common expression that normally shows affect], I think there is 
something you are hiding from me. For all this time I’ve been trying to figure out what is 
going on. The signo that came out talks about family tragedy, treachery and death. Until now 
I thought that you were the victim but I suddenly realized that it’s the opposite. Your poor 
husband is the victim of the story as indeed the patakín I have in mind relates. You are 
cheating on him and you want to make him feel responsible for the fights. Be careful because 
you are osogbo and things will turn out very negatively for you. You have to make a brave 
decision. You either leave him and go with this other man without blaming your husband, or 
stop seeing this other man because your husband might even try to kill you. In this signo the 
graves were born. 
What previously seemed to be them beating around the bush with general questions 
and replies now turned into an almost authoritarian prescription of what the ahijada 
should do. She admitted cheating on her husband and, in a burst of tears, that Emilia 
was right; all the problems and fights resulted from that. She even admitted that she 
sometimes felt against her will, hatred towards her own child. Emilia concluded that 
there were no major ritual prescriptions to be given, no offerings, because the 
problem stemmed from her own actions and ‘head’ and that it was these as well that 
could give the solution. Nevertheless, she said that in order to ‘refresh the head’ 
(refrescar la cabeza) she would conduct a simple rogación (a ritual cleansing of the 
head) for her. When the young woman left the house I probed Emilia about this 
obvious (to me) change in the consultation, from the initial fuzziness to the abrupt 
clarity. Emilia told me that when she consults the dilogún, her muertos are always 
around and help her, especially with the ‘interpretation’ of the signos. She said that 
Ma’ Tomasa, her old African muerto, was feeling annoyed with the ahijada’s partial 
honesty and interfered by telling Emilia exactly what was going on. Refering to Ma’ 
Tomasa, Emilia told me: 
She painted the patakín exactly as it is in the signo [me pinto el patakín tal y como cual esta 
en el signo]. In the beginning I thought that her husband was cheating on her, that she was 
the poor victim, but you see, Ma’ Tomasa knows all the cunningness of the world. 
Later on that day, when I had returned home, I consulted one of the widely shared 
‘manuals’ of Santería to see if I could find any relevance to Emilia’s consultation. I 
looked through the particular signo (called Oddi Meyi) that had come out that 
morning and I came across the following story (patakín). The story goes likes this: 
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There was a time when corpses were not buried. In Oddi a hole had never been opened 
before; corpses were tied and then left at the feet of a ceiba tree. Mofa had a wife who said 
that she loved him a lot, that she would be lost if he were to die, that he was everything to 
her; but this was a lie. They had a son, but she didn’t like children and she abused him, while 
Mofa was very caring and tender with him. All this occurred because she had an affair with 
another man, who, nevertheless, did not give her anything, he was not caring. While she 
would meet with this other man, she would tell him how bored and tired she was of Mofa, 
but when she was with Mofa, she would tell him how much she loved him. Her complaints 
against Mofa to the other man were so persistent, that one day he told her: ‘Do you want to 
get rid of Mofa?’ She replied ‘Yes, in what way?’ and he responded: ‘You know that here 
corpses get tied and placed under the tree. Tonight pretend that you have died so that 
everybody comes to see you dead. They will tie you and leave you under the tree. I will come 
in the early hours of dawn and bring you to my house.’ This is what Mofa’s wife did, she 
faked being dead, they tied her and brought her to the tree, where the other man came early in 
the morning and took her to his house. 
 Various days passed after the event. Being a merchant, selling okra at the market, 
one day, the man thought of having Mofa’s wife sell the okra, so that he could dedicate his 
time to other things. This is exactly what happened; he took the woman to the market and left 
her in charge of the business. As Mofa was left alone and didn’t have anybody to assist him 
with the chores of the house, one day he sent his son to the market to buy some okra, and as 
the man’s place was the only one that sold okra, the son ended up there. The boy was 
shocked to discover that his taken for dead mother was there selling okra. He cried ‘Mama’ 
and she said: ‘I am not your mother.’ The boy ran to his house and told his father what had 
occurred in the market. Mofa didn’t believe him and the next day he sent his son once again 
to the market. This time the boy did the shopping without saying anything to his mother, but 
on arriving back at home he said his mother was at the market again. Mofa told his son that 
his mother had died and the boy said: ‘Next time you go to the market and see for yourself’, 
and so it happened. Mofa went to the market directly where the okra was being sold. His wife 
was busy and didn’t see him arriving. Mofa recognised her immediately, he grabbed her and 
the woman started screaming in despair. Mofa also started yelling at her and soon a big 
crowd surrounded them. When there were enough people gathered around the event, Mofa 
explained to them how his wife had betrayed him and the crowd asked him to kill her. It was 
at that instant that Mofa proposed a distinct kind of death from those the village was used to.   
 Wishing to avoid a second trick by his wife, Mofa proposed digging a big hole in 
the ground and burying her alive. The village agreed, bearing in mind the gravity of the 
situation, a wife having betrayed in such manner her husband. Since then, corpses are buried 
rather than being tied and left at the feet of the ceiba tree [my translation].      
 The similarities between the mythical story and the issue of Emilia’s ahijada are 
striking, something which is not always the case in consultations. Nevertheless, 
Emilia did not immediately match the mythological characters literally with the ‘real’ 
ones. As she implied, and as the tendency of the signo had been revealed to be 
osogbo, that is negative, the young woman could well have been in the position of 
the mythological husband and be the victim. Confusion lingered whilst Emilia’s 
muerto took some time to ‘paint’ the frame in its detail and precision. If initially, the 
Ocha oracle reveals the orichas’ perspective on the particular issue, theirs is a 
general perspective; a ‘view from afar’ that leaves humans (and muertos, as it later 
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proved) to figure out and fill in the exact details. It is here that Ma’ Tomasa, 
detesting ‘the cunningness of the world’, interferes and gives her own perspective on 
the already laid down perspective of the orichas, which has come as a signo 
including a collection of advice, aphorisms and stories that need discernment and 
further particularization. 
It is very common to meet such cases of divinatory or perspectival 
interference, if I may call it that, especially in the case of Ocha rather than Ifá. 
Indeed, the vast majority of santeros do not find it contradicting or conflictive for the 
muertos to be present in an Ocha consultation and giving their own perspectives on 
the signos. Babalawos, on the other hand, feel uneasy with such a phenomenon and 
do not (openly at least) admit any kind of interference on the part of the muertos. I 
have even heard from some that they actively try to neutralize the muertos’ effects by 
conducting certain rituals, although I have not been able to confirm this. In any case, 
it seems that babalawos try to keep a distance from (overt) affective experiences, 
both from muertos and, even more so, from the orichas’ ability to ‘possess’. Orula, 
the patron deity of Ifá, is said to never ‘possess’ his children, the babalawos, as he is 
considered too big to fit in one’s head. I think that much can be said about the 
distinctions that exist between Ocha and Ifá (for an interesting discussion, see Brown 
2003a). For example, the content of the signos also differs, as in Ifá there is a 
predominance of stories which relate Orula’s adventures or those of mythical 
babalawos or of the mythical characters consulting Orula and his oracle. Also, Ifá is 
much more male dominated as traditionally full initiation is permitted only to men. 
Although there has been a relatively recent ‘revolution’ initiated by a small group of 
Ifá priests who admit women into full initiation (the so-called iyanifá issue), the 
typical babalawo figure is that of a male, who does not get possessed and is not an 
espiritista. Thus, up to an extent and on certain occasions the body (and its affective 
capacities) is feminized, while the more ‘intellectual’ interpretation of material 
oracles is stereotypically attributed to men. What interests me here, though, is this 
potentiality of different perspectives co-existing and feeding each other in, what is 
deemed as such, productive, complementary and, even, necessary ways. It is because 
they are (experienced as) different that they may become related. 
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Instance 2: a muerto leading to Ocha 
Celia, who has already appeared in chapter 3, has been involved in la religión for a 
long time, and has managed to create quite a broad circle of ahijados (‘godchildren’) 
and, in general, people who seek her help and advice. Her very first ‘religious 
experiences’ (experiencias religiosas) were of a spontaneous and not so conscious 
nature. From a very young age, she tells me, she had ‘visions’ (visions) or 
‘appearances’ (apariencias) of muertos. She particularly remembers when she first 
‘met’ Francisca at the age of eight. At first, she would see her as a ‘mute image [una 
imagen sin sonido]’ of a tall and pretty middle-aged African woman. Although in the 
beginning little Celia would be perplexed about this ‘spectral image’ (imagen 
espectral), she never felt fear, ‘as if this woman was part of my family, although I 
had never known her before as a real person.’ As I see it, it was a kind of proximity 
which was sensed as intimacy without this stemming from a conscious and pre-
established relationship. The eight-year Celia did not speak to anyone about her 
‘visions’, yet, she started talking to the ‘visions’ themselves: 
It was like a game, really. You know, kids create their own fantasy worlds. They put dolls to 
converse with each other, they create caves with creatures behind the sofas, and they have 
invisible friends and attend to them as if they were real. Francisca was my own invisible, 
although not so much fantastic as it later proved, friend. When we were alone, I would start 
talking to her; prepare her coffee to share with me and my dolls. She would sit in silence in 
one corner and occasionally smile at me. Although I was not exactly conscious and sure of 
what was going on, I always knew that there was something more real to her than my dolls 
and my various imaginations. 
As Celia was growing, her relation with the ‘vision’ grew as well. After two years of 
constant ‘visions’, which gradually became more vivid wherein the ‘spectre’ would 
interact more, according to Celia (for instance, she would appear for longer times and 
‘move more freely’ in the house), Celia remembers very intensely the day the 
‘vision’ talked. It told her: ‘Don’t you worry Celia; your grandma is here with me. 
She is fine and she sends her love to you.’ Her grandmother had died that same year 
and Celia had been deeply affected by the event. Although she did not have ‘visions’ 
of her, through the recently talking ‘vision’, she started receiving ‘small messages’ 
(pequeños mensajes) from her, such as the one mentioned above. Celia, triggered by 
the muerto’s suggestion, even started lighting candles for her deceased grandmother. 
It was at about this time that she also got to know the muerto’s name; she was called 
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Francisca. This is an interesting case where the perspective of one muerto is adopted 
through (that of) another. Nevertheless, what concerns me here is the juxtaposition of 
perspectives, not between two different muertos, but that between two different kinds 
of entities, a muerto and an oricha; the juxtaposition, in other words, of two different 
kinds of perspectives. 
Celia, as we have seen, began developing her relation with Francisca from a 
very young age, when she barely knew anything about la religión, as she stressed. 
Gradually, Francisca began to flesh out in a more complete form. From an 
anonymous, silent and quasi-static ‘vision’, she became more ‘mobile’, she produced 
sounds and words, a name, and a biography and at the same time she became part of 
Celia’s biography. As Celia began to acknowledge Francisca’s presence (initially by 
talking to her ‘as kids do’ and gradually getting from Francisca replies, and passing 
on messages), the latter, in her turn, began to communicate to her ‘things’ that 
concerned Celia’s life. At various times she would warn her against an imminent 
misfortune or reveal a hidden state of affairs. Celia’s family would be impressed by 
the child’s prodigious and extraordinary capacity. Francisca had also revealed to 
Celia that she would play an important role in la religión and would come to have ‘a 
big crowd’ (un pueblo grande; meaning lots of people becoming her ‘godchildren’ 
and seeking her help). Celia recollects how she felt a strong attraction to the sea and 
everything that had to do with it. Interestingly, she directly links this with her 
relation to Francisca. 
Francisca always appeared dressed in blue. At times she appeared holding 
beautiful big sea-shells Celia had never seen in her life. Since then Celia, whenever 
she had the chance, would collect shells that attracted her attention. As years went by 
and well into her twenties, Celia became involved in Espiritismo, through which she 
could develop ‘properly’ and more consciously her relation with Francisca (as well 
as other muertos of hers). It was during this period that Francisca revealed to her that 
she would soon be initiated in Santería and would eventually take a leading and 
successful role in it. Even more specifically, Francisca, during a misa espiritual 
(similar to the one I described in chapter 3), in a phantasmagorical event of 




Francisca descended [bajó] and took possession of me [tomó posesión de mi], as she 
sometimes does in misas espirituales. She said that while in life she was a mischievous 
character and a free spirit. Although she had been brought up in an environment submerged 
into la religión and was constantly warned to consult the orichas and pay heed to what they 
say, she always forgot or postponed it and eventually died without fulfilling her camino. Hers 
was a camino de santo [a path to the saint, meaning the need to get initiated in Santería], with 
Yemayá as her patron-oricha. This is the reason why she got attached to me, because I was 
also a legitimate daughter [hija legítima, meaning that she is without doubt a person 
belonging to that particular oricha] of Yemayá, and her mission as a muerto was partially to 
lead me to the feet of Yemayá. While as I was mounted [montada, an alternative term for 
possessed] with Francisca, I started spinning around with loud laughters, and I ended up 
dancing exactly as Yemayá does. I don’t know if Yemayá mounted me momentarily or not 
but it was very strong [muy fuerte, meaning very real, very intense]. When Francisca left my 
body, the people present at the misa told me what had happened and I immediately promised 
myself and Francisca that I would take the necessary steps as soon as possible. 
Indeed, Celia did not waste time. She visited an old santero friend of hers, who 
consulted the Ocha oracle. The dilogún confirmed Yemayá’s ‘affinity’ with Celia, 
but also told her that for a definite verification she would have to consult Ifá. This is 
when Celia decided to ‘take’ (coger) the ‘hand of Orula’ (mano de Orula), an 
initiation conducted by babalawos which importantly involves a divination wherein 
one acquires permanent signos that mark his or her camino and also obtains 
knowledge of what kinds of initiations (if needed at all) and to which particular 
orichas will have to undergo. The mano de Orula divination confirmed both the need 
to get initiated and that the oricha claiming Celia’s head was indeed Yemayá. 
In this account, we are presented with another occasion of perspectivist 
interference and transference. Celia is experiencing the presence of Francisca as a 
gradual process of increasing intimacy and reciprocity. The dramatic incident at the 
misa espiritual revealed Yemayá’s wishes and expectations through Francisca, who, 
even more interestingly, had also obligations towards Yemayá, albeit left unfulfilled. 
Her camino as muerto (her ‘necrography’) was moulded and affected by these 
unfinished businesses and her relation and affinity with Celia was constituted on 
precisely this premise. That this should be the case is made clearer by the fact that, as 
Celia told me, after getting initiated as a daughter of Yemayá, Francisca’s 
possessions diminished considerably and eventually disappeared. Celia, since then, 
would experience Francisca in other more subtle ways and makes sure to point out to 
me that Francisca’s spirit, through her own initiation, has acquired more light and 
evolved spiritually. It is also interesting, I believe, that Celia introduces, as gradually 
as her relation with, first, Francisca and, second, Yemayá, the term camino as 
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becoming a somewhat more complete and encompassing ‘entity’. Hers, being a 
camino de santo and strongly linked to playing an active role in la religión, and 
(getting initiated as daughter of) Yemayá becomes a sort of end achieved by means of 
(and through) Francisca. 
Instance 3: the palero who remained with his nfumbi 
The last ethnographic instance is an account of the relation between a palero, 
Guzmán, and his nfumbi. Guzmán became initiated (rayado, in Palo terms) in Palo 
at a very turbulent period of his life. Having studied photography and English 
literature, his dream was to become a professional photographer; more specifically 
an artistic photographer. He started off as the former, mainly getting small and 
occasional jobs in journalistic photography and at social events, such as weddings 
and celebrations. The more artistic part would have to wait for the time being and be 
satisfied as merely a hobby. But even the less creative jobs he would occasionally 
obtain would prove hard to find, and he found it diffuclt to earn enough money to get 
by, especially in a context, as the Cuban is, where private initiative was and still is 
extremely regulated and restricted. After some hard years, Guzmán was presented 
with a great opportunity to finally fulfil his bigger dream by participating in an 
artistic competition, the three finalists of which would be offered a relatively 
generous fund and work on a project organized by the Ministry of Culture. As he was 
preparing his portfolio for the competition, a devastating event occurred. The place 
where he developed his photos caught fire, burning all of his photographs and films 
which he intended to submit to the competition. This all happened just two days 
before the deadline. 
After this, Guzmán felt so desperate and at a dead end that he decided to exit 
the country, towards the USA via a common but illicit and life-claiming, for many 
Cubans, route: the (in)famous balsa (‘raft’).25 Once more, Guzmán’s misfortune 
prevented him from achieving his goal. The plan was to escape from the North-West 
part of Cuba, but was aborted at the last moment as it proved that the police and the 
coastguards had obtained certain intelligence of the event and was present on the 
                                                 
25 Balsas are often home-made, and serve as a passage to close by countries such as North America, 
Mexico, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic or Haiti. 
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spot. Guzmán’s series of misfortunes left him perplexed and wondering whether 
there was a common and hidden origin behind them all. He was seriously suspecting 
either a case of brujería or ‘unpaid duties towards the beyond’, as he called it, or 
both. It is very common for religiosos to believe that by fulfilling their ‘duties 
towards the beyond’ they are granted certain levels of protecciones (‘protections’), 
not only from a possible dissatisfaction on the part of the entities and the beyond 
(which is definitely a reason for misfortune), but also from brujería, which may (and 
most often does so) involve other-than-human entities, but ones that are ‘contracted’ 
by a certain individualan enemyand not ones which are in a more permanent and 
internal way related to the person. 
Guzmán was not a complete stranger to la religión, although he had never 
undergone any kind of initiation; and this was exactly the reason why his suspicions 
arose. Nevertheless, ‘I always had my little things [siempre tuve mis cositas]’, as he 
tells me. This expression which you can occasionally hear from Cubans both reveals 
and hides. It reveals that there is a kind of intimate relation established with the 
beyond, which also implies relations with specific (kinds of) entities, often 
materialized literally in the acquisition of certain (consecrated) ‘things’. The 
‘beyond’ very rarely stands for an abstract conception of and relation with a divine 
force; it is almost always referring to particular entities and relations with them. The 
beyond ‘hides’ a multiplicity of entities and forces. Yet, in its initial and apparent 
generality, the expression employed by Guzmán does not reveal on its own which 
specific entities and, by extension, religious traditions one is attached to, neither the 
degree. Be that as it may, he was keen on revealing more details. His ‘little things’ 
were an unexplored yet quite frequent ability to sense spirits of the dead. This raw 
talent of his gave him every now and then advice, warnings and predictions about his 
life along with getting intimate with the identities and biographies of his muertos. 
Yet, he was following things intuitively, in his ‘own way’ (a mi manera, another 
common Cuban expression describing the relation with the beyond) without pursuing 
more ritualized and formal paths, through Espiritismo for instance. This is what he 
retrospectively (after the occurrence of the misfortunes) interpreted as the partial 
reason for not having been warned by his muertos against them (the misfortunes). He 
thus decided to ‘investigate’ (investigar) the issue at depth. He started visiting 
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religiosos, friends or those recommended to him by them, and he was led to a large 
number of diviners. As he was highly confused as to what was going on, he felt the 
need to exhaust the range of possible origins as much as he could. He consequently 
visited santeros, babalawos, espiritistas and paleros. After a long process of 
‘investigation’of double-checking information and establishing bonds of trust with 
certain divinershe managed to put, in what to him seemed as, an order to this chaos 
the beyond had formerly been presenting him with. 
He was informed that he did not have any ‘unpaid duties’ towards the 
orichas. His was a path that did not involve a camino de santo or Ifá, meaning that he 
did not have to undergo any major initiation in Ocha/Ifá. This was interpreted as 
positive, as far as the orichas were concerned, and that, essentially, he had not 
‘deviated’ (desviar) from his broader camino or destiny. If this was the case, then 
why the misfortunes, the answer begged the question. It was then that Guzmán 
painstakingly discovered what his particular relation with the beyond was and, thus, 
what his camino held for him. First, he initiated a more intimate relationship with his 
muertos through Espiritismo. As he started ‘developing’, he acquired more detailed 
information about them and also from them. One of his muertos, who had been a 
powerful palero while in life, revealed to him that his misfortunes resulted from 
brujería, which had been ‘sent’ by his former wife. The muerto also strongly insisted 
on seeking the help of a (living) palero. Guzmán sought it and the above revelation 
was indeed confirmed. Additionally, the palero told him that his situation was so 
grave and the brujería so ‘strong’ (fuerte) that he would have to get rayado (initiated 
in Palo) and obtain his own nganga. He did so under the palero’s supervision and 
guidance. With the second rayamiento and the subsequent acquisition of his own 
nganga, Guzmán initiated a close relationship with a kind of muerto people normally 
try to avoid or ignore, the nfumbi. The ‘pact’ was made in the deep night-hours at the 
Cementerio de Colón, the main and largest cemetery of Havana, after bribing the 
night-guard. Guzmán, as many paleros, did not wish to reveal details of how he 
acquired the nfumbi nor of his identity. What he did tell me thoughwhich I think is 
enlightening of the transference of perspectives I am dealing with in this chapteris 
that it was his nfumbi who led him divine through the oracle of the orichas, although 
in a quite idiosyncratic way. 
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Although Guzmán does not call the oracle dilogún neither does he claim that 
it invokes the orichas directly to ‘speak’ through it, he has clearly adoptedalmost 
appropriatedthe form of the Santería oracle. For example, he employs 16 cowrie 
shells which work exactly as those in Ocha, forming oracular signs which depend on 
the combination of those that fall ‘mouth-up’ and ‘mouth-down’. Furthermore, the 
same techniques of deciding the either positive (iré) or negative (osogbo) tendency 
of the signo is followed; and the signos are those of Ocha, containing the same or 
similar warnings, advice and myths. Although he has spent time in ‘studying’ the 
signos and their content in Santería manuals, the initial and most efficacious, 
according to him, knowledge of them were taught to Guzmán by the nfumbi: ‘It is 
him [the nfumbi] who puts them into my mind, in front of my eyes’, he says, ‘And 
most importantly it works; I have seen results, I have seen truths, and people are 
impressed.’ He adds that through the chamalongothe name of the oracle in Palo 
termsthe mpungos (Palo’s deities) ‘speak’ (correlating them with the equivalent 
orichas), but also his nfumbi. Unlike the first ethnographic instance, where a muerto 
added more detailed and particularized information during the interpretation of 
Ocha’s signos, in this case the nfumbi provides the signos themselves and their 
myths in the first place, something which from a pure Ocha-centric point of view 
would be deemed as unacceptable, unless the adequate initiations had taken place. 
This could be a story of appropriation of perspectives and not just a peaceful 
adoption and exchange of them. The nfumbi, in a sense, has appropriated the orichas’ 
perspectives, their mythological biographies and transfers them to Guzmán without 
him having undergone any Ocha initiation and neither having it in his camino. 
Nevertheless, for him, ‘it works’, implying that the ‘beyond’ of the Afro-Cuban 
cosmos is experienced as an efficacious retrieval of perspectives through divination 
and actions that follow it. In fact, whatever is rendered efficacious and gives ‘results’ 
(resultados) and ‘proofs’ (pruebas) is deemed as being the ‘beyond’ and not so much 
the other way round.  
 In this last part of the chapter, I hope I have given a clearer and broader idea 
of the Afro-Cuban ‘beyond’ and its various entities, which do not only engage in 
exchanging perspectives with humans, but, as the ethnographic examples illustrated, 
between themselves as well. Indeed, it is this efficacy of this very ‘beyond’ that lies 
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at the heart of this thesisan efficacy which both manifests and instantiates the 








Thus, to summarize my argument and emphasize its theoretical implications in a 
more explicit fashion, my understanding of Afro-Cuban divination as a form of 
perspectivism is predicated on the way in which the movement from immanence to 
transcendencefor the deadand from transcendence to immanencefor the 
deitiescan also be seen as a movement from embodiment to disembodiment and 
vice versa. Although, in both cases, it is the body that allows the exchange of 
different ‘points of view’, this body is constituted and introduced in the ‘perspectivist 
game’ in rather different waysthat is, while for the dead it is the point of departure, 
for the deities it is the point of arrival. In the case of muertos, it is the affective nature 
of their presencein and of itself a material trace of their (ex)bodily-nessthat 
allows their being there to be felt and their knowledge to be shared. More than this, 
their very presence instantiates and manifests but one stage in their quest for eventual 
transcendence and disembodiment; a quest, the success of which necessitates the 
cooperation of humans and, as we saw at the end of the previous chapter, deitiesin 
other words, the incorporation of other points of view in the appropriate forms of 
(de)materialization, exemplified, perhaps, by the ‘affine’ muertos and, consequently, 
Espiritismo.  
 By contrast, rather than stemming from bodily traces and a quest for 
disembodiment, the deities’ ‘point of view’ needs to be traced in and through the 
material entanglement of the appropriate signosthat is, it needs to be embodied. 
Moving from transcendence to immanence, this process of partial embodiment (so as 
to preserve their transcendental perspectival reach) is realized in exactly the same 
way that the infinite possibilities embedded in the various patakín and their myths 
are particularized in the materialization of particular oddu and their eventual 
interpretationif the right ‘tendency’ is to be determined, the right ‘mouth’ must 
speak and, above all, be listened to in the right way. 
 Of course, within the various divinatory practices, these different perspectives 
are nothing more than different ‘motile’ points (from transcendence to immanence 
and vice versa) of seeing the same worlda world of (crossing and) crossed 
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destinies, or caminos. Indeed, echoing Holbraad and Willerslev’s take on the 
difference between Amerindian and Inner Asian ‘perspectivism’, the articulation of 
these ‘points of view’ within Afro-Cuban divination could be described as reflecting 
the mutual implication of the ‘view from everywhere’ and the ‘view from 
somewhere’that is, to use the terms of my own ethnographic analysis, the point of 
view of the deities and the point of view of the dead respectively. Perhapsto return 
to the first chapter where I mentioned Turner and his work on Ndembu divination as 
this was reconstructed in terms of content through Hortonthe difference between 
what the deities and the dead ‘see’ and reveal can also be rendered as involving more 
specific and intimate points in the flow of life or, else, camino (in the case of the 
dead), and the flow itself, as a whole (in the case of the deities).    
In any case, by focusing on the possible connection between divination and 
the efficacy of different ‘points of view’, I hope I have contributed both to a better 
understanding of Cuban ethnography and to showing a possible avenue for a broader 
reach of perspectivism. I have tried to describe both the flow of life and its intimate 
specificities in order to remain faithful to indigenous perceptions of the other-than-
human entities through divination. In this way, I hope that I have managed to 
articulate in a satisfactory way what I have set out to do; that is, engage with Afro-
Cuban ethnography outside the conventional box and rather than placing the 
emphasis on traditions or clearly demarcated sets of beliefs and practices, often 
studied in relative isolation, illuminated the complexities of a plural ‘beyond’. A 
‘beyond’ that, due to its plurality, is rich and complex, but not arbitrary and neither 
uncritically open to transformation nor strictly closed to its past. A general aim was 
to approach the inhabitants of this beyondthe other-than-human entitiesas they 
make their appearance through instances of divination, where they offer their 
perspectives on humans’ caminos but also, and inseparably from the last, their 
perspectives of themselves and their own camino. Furthermore, these perspectives 
are not mere utterances and oracular pronouncements that float into the ‘thin air’ of 
the divinatory contexts, but motivate people into actions that are meant to fulfil and 
realign their camino and harness the latter as the other-than-human entities harness 
their own. This tight‘ontological’bond between human and other-than-human 
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caminos is what compelled me to ultimately compare divination with perspectivism 
and explore their potential affinities. 
Before doing so, I dealt with the category of ‘immanence and transcendence’ 
to show the ‘space’ in which the various caminos acquire a motion with a direction 
and also argue that too much proximityimmanenceand too much 
distancetranscendencehave similar effects (but dissimilar affects!), which 
amount to the (con)fusion or disappearance of perspectives and, thus, endanger their 
potential to be exchanged and related. It is only the motion within this ‘space’ that 
mobilizes the perspectival and oracular potentials. Different kinds of other-than-
human entities move in different directions and this produces their unique point of 
view on human caminos.  
Like ‘Amerindian’ perspectivism, the ‘body’ creates the difference in 
perspectives while the ‘spirit’ is the general capacity to have a perspective; a point of 
view. But unlike its Amerindian manifestation, the bodies of other-than-humans are 
not as clearly demarcated as those of animals and, thus, their perspectives although 
different, in their exchange they transform so as to enter into dialogue with each 
other. Their ‘bodies’ are also defined by their relation to the ‘absence’ of them; 
muertos as ex-human bodies and orichas as non-bodies, and therefore able to diffuse 
themselves to a multiplicity of ‘bodies’ and ‘objects’, such as their oracles. The 
perspectival qualities of Afro-Cuban divination are thus concentrating on the beyond 
of the body, and it is there that ‘the beyond’ resides. The various kinds of entities can 
be said to initially occupy a radically different point of view from that of humans as 
is the case with Amerindian perspectivism. Deities ‘see’ their own biographies in the 
myths; muertos in their ‘alien’ or undeveloped condition ‘see’ themselves, in a 
confused condition, as still alive. Divination, by creating a link between human and 
other-than-human caminos transforms the latter’s radically different points of views 
in different yet relevant and related ways to the deities. Thus, both sides transform in 
the process. Furthermore, the Afro-Cuban ethnography seems to be offering a case 
where the distinction made by Holbraad and Willerslev, between Amerindian and 
Inner Asian perspectivism, comes to form a (perspectival) wholenamely, the Afro-
Cuban ‘beyond’.    
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Of course, by focusing on the connection between divination and 
perspectivism, I have ignored a plethora of other possible connections. For instance, I 
have not engaged with issues of politics, collective memory, the everyday 
preoccupations of Cubans, discourses on morality, and national identity. This has 
been a conscious choice and not in the least because they are not relevant. The Afro-
Cuban cosmos is part of Cuba’s broader past, present and future and cannot be easily 
extricated from it. Although there have been valuable attempts to bring them 
together, by doing so, they seem to distance themselves from these very indigenous 
definitions I have painstakingly and, somewhat, stubbornly tried to pursue.26 
Although their merit is beyond doubt as they attempt to go ‘beyond the search for 
origins’ (Palmié 2008) that characterized older generations of scholars, such as 
Bascom, Herskovits and the (early at least) Ortiz, and highlight a more active role of 
them as shaping and being shaped by the present (as well as re-shaping the past), 
they also focus on this ‘present’ in a very specific way. In other words, the various 
traditions, with their different other-than-human entities, ceremonies and 
cosmological backgrounds become different ways and tools‘epistemology’to 
deal with politics, collective memory, the everyday, and so on. This, in its turn, 
serves as a method in order to render familiar these apparently ‘exotic’ practices and 
beliefs through the assumption that the rest of the categories (‘politics, memory, the 
everyday, and so on’) are familiar to start with. 
Alternatively, and parallel to my attempts to go beyond the barren paths of 
‘syncretic’ (where differences are dissolved into similarities) or ‘pure’ (where 
differences are perceived as oppositions and are, thus, mutually excluded) traditions, 
I ventured on highlighting the various instances the Afro-Cuban cosmos and its 
entities are enmeshed in, what Lambek identifies as, the ‘poiesis’ (2002:135) of the 
world; a world constituted of ‘things, ‘words’ and ‘entities’ and vice versa, and not, 
as I mentioned in chapter 1, again in reference to Lambek, the latter being mere 
‘responses to it’ (2002:8). In this sense, the other-than-human entities and their 
perspectives are neither mere responses to the social world of ‘politics, the everyday, 
                                                 
26 For such accounts, see, for example, Ayorinde 2004; Hearn 2008; Miller 2000; Moore C. 1986, 
1988; Moore R. 2004; Palmié 1995a, 1995b, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2008; Román 2007a, 2007b; 
Routon 2006, 2009; Sigler 2005; Wirtz 2004, 2007. 
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and so on’, and thus the (Afro-Cuban) cosmos is not separate from (Cuban) society 
(see Lambek 2002:9). 
By hastily saying that divination has, for instance, its politics (which of 
course it has, as well as politics has its divinations) and exhaust the discussion there, 
it may therefore prove to be a cheap intellectual investment in both divination and 
politics, because, through its illusionary promise of making them more tangible and 
concrete, it alienates us from both. Taking seriously both, may require from us 
patience and a rather prolonged suspension of our intuitive interpretative 
assumptions. It may also require from us, in order to do them justice, to treat them 
separately for a while, even if this ‘while’ proves to be as long as a whole Ph.D. 
thesis. But I would like to hope that this can create a more productive chance for 
future projects that wouldas I did with the various kinds of other-than-human 
entitiescompare them, in their differences and interconnections, on more equal and 
dialogical terms, and not reduce the one to the other. With this in mind, my approach 
was by no way meant to overcast a shadow over the rest by arguing that all should 
resemble it. This is not a call for a total(itarian) turn to ‘metaphysics’ where history, 
politics, national identity, for example, vanish out of the picture; but it is, 
nevertheless, a call for giving voice to this indigenous ‘metaphysics’, especially 
when the former (history, politics, and so on), willingly or not, tend to make the latter 
vanish or becomein a highly structural-functional waymeans of achieving their 
own ends. 
Specifically, as far as politics are concerned, Cuba is by definition an 
interesting place as it presents us with a not so commonly encountered example of 
living ‘socialism’. As for this, the reader could excuse me for not providing too much 
information of life under and inside socialism. Many scholars, especially 
anthropologists whose discourse depends on having access to Cuba’s physical 
spaceto be thereare met with the many ambiguities of the situation. From the 
very beginning I came to realize that ‘Afro-Cuban religions’ are not, on their own, a 
‘sensitive’ topic, whereas ‘politics’ are. This has its effects on the academic 
discourse produced and often leads to an almost self-inflicted censorship in being 
explicitly political about Cuba (but, see Chávez 2005; Gropas 2007; Holbraad 2011; 
Kapcia 1992; Lewis et.al. 1977a, 1977b, 1978; Moore 1986, 1988; Rosendahl 1997; 
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Tanuma 2007). The most famous example is that of Oscar Lewis, when he and his 
collaborators were initially granted official access to Cuba to conduct research on 
everyday life under the Revolution, but finally, and after their first publications came 
to light (1977a, 1977b, 1978), they were, officially again, deprived of it. There is 
always the latent fear, real or imagined, that being explicitly political could 
compromise the very access of the researcher to the field (if the tendency is to be 
highly critical) or to be caught in the middle of the bigger (post-) Cold War 
debates‘capitalism versus communism’that have so much affected political and 
historical accounts on the Cuban Revolution. But, as I said before and in relation to 
the Afro-Cuban religious traditions, there is also the danger of reading the 
phenomena I dealt with only through the socio-political context and nothing else, 
which could be compromising a broader reach of the ‘anthropological imagination’. 
Another ‘theme’ left out of the thesis was a comparative look at similar 
phenomena elsewhere. The most obvious ones would be regions of Latin America 
and the Caribbean with a strong ‘African’ presence, such as Brazil, Trinidad, Haiti, 
and Jamaica. Similar phenomena have taken place in these countries and my decision 
to leave them untouched could be seen as an omission.27 Here again, my reasoning is 
akin to the one repeatedly made throughout the thesis. By putting the emphasis on 
the ontological dimensions of these phenomena, I consciously and heuristically 
suspended a geographical and socio-historical rendition of them into, first, traditions 
and, second, culturally specific wholes. A cross examination on the relevant 
bibliography reveals similar pitfalls as the ones I have detected in the Cuban 
scholarship, thus my contribution is meant to implicitly refer to but also go beyond 
them too. Furthermore, and more importantly, the general contribution of this thesis I 
hope is to have been a challenging approach to ‘religious’, ‘syncretic’ and 
‘divinatory’ phenomena in general, through the invaluable analytical help of 
‘perspectivism’ and, at the same time, an effort to go beyond the latter’s 
ethnographic ‘Amerindian’ particularities so as to contribute to it as well and stretch 
its theoretical reach. 
                                                 
27 For similar phenomena elsewhere, see, for example, Baca et.al. 2009; Barnes 1989; Brown 1986; 




I, thus, engaged with this (Afro-Cuban) ‘propensity’ to invoke, discover and 
seek oracular ‘signs’ that could have their own distinctive perspectives. Ambitious, 
convincing, interesting, and challenging or not, these were the limits and strengths of 
this thesis: divination and its various ‘signs’. 
Normally, the term ‘saturation’ in Anthropology comes to denote a sense of 
fullness that is produced after a prolonged period of fieldwork and the collection of 
ethnographical data that promise a satisfactory pool from which the researcher can 
draw from and produce anthropological texts. In the context of writing up a Ph.D. 
thesis, the sense is much more intense (with all its negative and positive affects) long 
after fieldwork and towards the completion of the text itself. For this thesis this 
moment has (finally!) arrived. As the saturation affect has reached its peak, I call to 
my assistance the author that has inspired the title of this thesis and whose words also 
served to open it: 
Situated in the external zone of the Milky Way, the Sun takes about two hundred million 
years to make a complete revolution of the galaxy. 
[O]nce, as I went past, I drew a sign at a point in space, just so I could find it again two 
hundred  million years later, when we went by the next time around. What sort of sign? It’s 
hard to explain because if I say sign to you, you immediately think of a something that can be 
distinguished from a something else, but nothing could be distinguished from anything there 
[...]. As to the form a sign should have, you say it’s no problem because, whatever form it 
may be given, a sign only has to serve as a sign, that is, be different or else the same as other 
signs: here again it’s easy for you young ones to talk, but in that period I didn’t have any 
examples to follow, I couldn’t say I’ll make it the same or I’ll make it different, there were 
no things to copy [...]. In other words, considering it was the first sign ever made in the 
universe, or at least in the circuit of the Milky Way, I must admit it came out very well. 
Visible? What a question! Who had eyes to see with in those days? Nothing had ever been 
seen by anything, the question never even arose. Recognizable, yes, beyond any possibility 
of error: because all the other points in space were the same, indistinguishable, and instead, 
this one had the sign on it (Calvino 2010:32-33).  
And after two hundred million years had passed and the Sun had made its 
‘revolution’: 
In the universe now there was no longer a container and a thing contained, but only a general 
thickness of signs superimposed and coagulated, occupying the whole volume of space; it 
was constantly being dotted, minutely, a network of lines and scratches and reliefs and 
engravings; the universe was scrawled over on all sides, along all its dimensions. There was 
no longer any way to establish a point of reference: the galaxy went on turning but I could no 
longer count the revolutions, any point could be the point of departure, any sign heaped up 
with the other could be mine, but discovering it would have served no purpose, because it 










Ahijado (fem. ahijada)Godchild 
BabalawoPriest initiated in the Ifá tradition 
BrujeríaWitchcraft, sorcery 
Brujo (fem. bruja)Witch, sorcerer 
CaminoPath 
DestinoDestiny 
DilogúnOracle of the Ocha or, else, Santería tradition 
EspiritistaPerson communicating with the spirits of the dead, normally through the 
Espiritismo tradition 
IréPositive ‘tendency’ of an oracular sign 
MadrinaGodmother 
Muerto(Spirit of the) dead 
NfumbiSpirit of the dead pertaining to the Palo (Monte) tradition 
NgangaReceptacle, often an iron cauldron, containing the nfumbi, among others 
OdduOracular sign 
OrichaDeitiy of the Ocha/Ifá or, else, Santería tradition 
OsogboNegative ‘tendency’ of an oracular sign 
PadrinoGodfather 
Palero (fem. palera)Person initiated in Palo (Monte) 
Prenda (Sp.)Nganga in the Palo idiom 
Santero (fem. santera)Person initiated in Ocha or, else, Santería 
Santo (fem. santa)Saint 
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